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THE " History  of  Banking in America"  was  not 
written for Americans, nor for persons well acquainted 
with American Banking, but  for  t'fiose who know but 
little about it, and who  have not time to read  lcngthy 
publications  on  the subject.  To give  an outline  of  - 
the  progress  of  Banking  in  America-to  point  out 
the principal features in which it differs from English 
Banking-to  prcserit  a  suinmary of  the condition of 
the  Banks in the respective States-and  to notice the 
opinions  with  reference  to  Banking  of  some of  the 
leading men in America, is all that has been attempted 
i11  tliis portion of the work. 
The inquiry how  far the Banking Institutions  of 
America are adapted to  this country,  will  point  out 
more  forcibly to  the  general  rcader  the  difference 
between  the  two  systems of  Banking ; while  it will 
suggest some  matters  for  consideration  to  those who 
feel an interest  in  the  improvement of  our  Banking 
Institutions. iv  PREFACE. 
Here  this  work  was  intended  to  close,  but  the 
publication  of  Mr. Horsley Palmer's  Pampl~let  upon 
the " Causes and Consequences of  the  Pressure  on 
the Money Market,"  and the discussions it occasioned, 
induced me to write  two  additional  Sections.  My 
chief object in doing this has been to repel the charges 
brought against the Joint  Stock  Banks.  In noticing 
the other causes to which the recent pressure has been 
assigned,  I  have  contented  myself  with transcribing 
the sentiments of  other writers. 
As the publication of Mr. Horsley Palmer has been 
"  looked upon as a sort of  official document, embody- 
ing the views and opinions of  the directors generally," 
it may be  proper to inform the reader, that the work 
now  before him  conveys only the individual opinions 
of  the author. 
38,  ~'IIIIoG~~oI~~oN  STU~LT, 
May  1, 1837. 
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"  A  work  lik.ely  to  be  extensively  useful  at this  period  has just 
appeared,  entitled, "  The  History  and  Principles  of  Banking."  By 
James Williarn  Gilbart.  The  author's  object  has  not  been  to  ad- 
vance any new theories of  1Js own, but to make the reader acquainted 
with  the  fncts and  principles  of  the question,  as  deduced  from  the 
existing prnctice.  In this, his long  experience must make him a very 
competent  guide.  The  numerous  claims  on  our  crowded  columns 
prevent our giving a  full  notice of  the work : the recommendation of 
which may be summed up in  his  own phrase-that  it is a "  Grammar 
of  banking."--Times,  Feb. 20, 1834. 
This  work  may  be  advantageously  consulted  for  a  practical 
knowledge  of banking in all  shapes  from the Balk of  England down 
to  loan  banks,  and  the ncy  law to  fwilitate  the purchase  of  small 
annuities.  It should  also  be  added,  that  a  variety  of  tnbles  nrc 
contained in the volume, not mere  transcripts  from  official documents, 
but  intelligible  recasts  by  a  man  of  business.  So  far  as  we  are 
able  to  judge  by  inspection,  they  seen1  to  have  the  rare  merit  of 
containing  what  is Irrnntcd, and  nothing  more."-,Spectator.  ffleb.  1.5. 
1834. Combining  a  clear  appreciation  of  tl~e  scicncc of  bankirlg, wit11 
the best practical  knowledge  of  his  business, we havc  seen  no work 
on this subject wl~icl~  bcttcr  deserves to be consulted and studied than 
Mr. Gilbart's volume."-Literary  Gazette, Feb. 22,  1834. 
"  Mr.  Gilbart  claims for  his  book  that  it  contains  both  featorcs 
(theory and practice), and  is  o  scientific work written  by  a  practical 
man.  His claims  appear  to  be  fully bo13ne  out by the perspicuity of 
his vicws, and  tlie  annlytical  spirit with whicl~  he treats the subject. 
He is fully master  of  tlie  details, and  ascends with  equal  ease to the 
examination of  the elementary principles.  His account of  the nature 
of  joint  stock  banks,  of  braincll  banlts,  of  deposit,  remittance,  cir- 
culation,  and  disconnt,  of  cm11  credit,  loan  and  savings  banks,  will 
be fonnd by mcn of  business to bc of coiisidern1)le \,due for rcference." 
-Atlas,  Feb. 24,  1831. 
"  We  h3ve  been  higl~ly  plcased with  its agreeable  and instructive 
character, ancl  we t11i:lk that  no  man  connected with  tradc should be 
without this book."--Monthly  Revrew, May,  1831. 
As  the  author  most  truly says in  11is preface,  tlie  aim  of  this 
book is to impart uscful knowlcdge.  Tl~ose  who  arc ignorant of  the 
art, or rsther science of  banking, (for banking may be  considered as a 
science in  politic$  economy) will  here  obtaiu  a  knowledge  of  facts 
and  principles  which  will  sufficiently  enlighten  their  minds  on  the 
subject, and they will  have  the  good  fxtune of  not having principles 
instilled which may lead  tllem  into  error.  The question of  currency, 
cosh  payments,  &c.  which  llave  been  such  a  source  of  labyriutl~ic 
litigation are  not  mooted.  It is  a  clear  and well written work, and 
must have been written  by  a  person  endowed with  a  lucid head and 
an in1l)artial ~l~ind."-fife&ropolitnn  Mayn:ilze,  A rryt~st,  183  6. 
"  A more con~pletc  and accurnte work, sit11 less irrclerant matter, 
nre  never read."-Gentleman's  Magazine,  October,  1834. 
"  We  11al.c before us a most  interesting work  from  the pen of  Mr. 
Gilbart,  entitled  The  History  nnd  Pril~ciplcs  of  Banking."  This 
subject,  which  is  generally  considcrcd  abstruse  and  recondite,  has 
been,  by tlic  pen  of  Mr.  Gilbart, rendcred  so  plain,  that  the most 
ordinary capacity may easily comprehend  it.  It requires  such a man 
as the manager  of  the  1;ondon  and Westminster  Bank  to  produce 
this work.  A speculative tl~eorist,  no  matter  how acute his intellect, 
must  have  failed  in  presenting  us with  those  forcible details  which 
belong only to the practical man, whilst  to the mere man  of  business, 
that  power of  combination  and  mastery of  Ianpnge must  have been 
wanting, whicll tlie literary abilities  of  Mr.  Gilbart  have enabled him 
to  bring  to  bear  upon  the  subject.  The  peculiar  interest which  it 
possesses, is  owing, as  the  author  truly states  in  his  preface, to  the 
circumstance of  its being a  scientific work, written by a practical man. 
The  subject  of  banking,  at all  times  of  such  importance  to a  mer- 
cantile country, possesses paramount claims  to attention at the present 
moment,  when  two  fresh  bodies  of  Argentarii  have  come  into the 
field  to  bear  away whatever  spoil  may  have  escaped  the  hnnds  of 
the veternn  can~paipiers. "  The History and  Principles  of  Banking" 
should be in  the  hands  of  every man, who wishes  to  be acquninM 
with the manner in which the money transactions of  this great country 
are carried on."-  Waterford  Chronicle, June D, 1836. 
It affords a succinct view of the acts of  pnrliament, through which 
the  banking  operations  of  Ireland  were  affected  from  the  time  of 
Henry VI. to  the  present  day, shewing briefly the  main  features of 
the nlonetary system in that country."-Atlas,  June 19, 1836. '. It is  a valuable  statistical work, and  a  desirable appe~~dix  to his 
I'  History and Principles of  Banking."-Gentlonds  Alagazinc, Juh 
183G. 
'' it gives  a  very  clever  and succinct  aecount  of  the  History  of 
Banking in Ireland."-Monthly  Review, July, 1835. 
It is B  useful book for  those who are bpxious  for  prncticd infor- 
mation, touching  the  money nlatters  of  the  sister kingdom;  or who 
wish, by investigating her  banking system, to  track her slow and late 
progress in commerce and civilization."-Spctator,  July, 1836. 
Fourth Edition. 
A  valuable and  useful  little work."-Mr;  M*Cullock'r  Srnizh1'd 
Wealth of  Nations." 
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SECTION I.' 
THE RISE  AND  PROGRESS  OP  AMERICAN  BANKING. 
THE  first  settlers  in America  had  not  a  sufficient 
quantity of  gold  and silver  to  serve as a circulating 
medium.  Hence  other  materials, such  as tobacco or 
corn,  were  in  some  of  the  States  occasionally  em- 
ployed  as  money.  In  the  year  1618,  Governor 
Argall, of  Virginia,"  ordered "  that all  goods should 
be  sold  at an advance  of  twenty-five  per cent., and 
tobacco taken in payment at three  shillings per pound, 
and not  more  or less,  on  the penalty of  three  years 
servitude  to  the  Colony."  In  1641,  the  General 
Court of  Massachusetts "  made orders about payment 
of  debts, setting CORN  at the usual price, and making 
it payable for all debts which should arise after a time 
prefixed."  In 1643, the same General Court ordered 
that  Mr~~~~~~~~~  (an  article  of  traffic  with  the 
Indians) should pass current in the payment  of  debts 
to the amount of  forty shillings, the white  at eight a 
penny, the black  at four  a  penny, except  for county 
rates.  In  Virginia,  the  value  of  a  wife  even  was 
estimated in tobacco.  The following extract is taken 
from Holmes' American Annals : 
* See "  A  Short  History  of  Paper  Money  and  Banking  in  the 
United States,"  published by William M. Gougc, at Philadelphia, 1833. 
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"  The enterprizing  colonists  being  generally  des- 
titute of  families, Sir Edward  Sandys, the  treasurer, 
proposed  to  the Virginia  Company  to  send  over  a 
freight  of  young  women  to  become  wives  for  the 
planters.  The proposal was  applauded,  and  ninety 
girls, '  young and  uncorrupt,'  were  sent  over  in  the 
ships  that  arrived  this  year  (1G20,)  and  the  year 
following,  sixty  more,  handsome  and  well  recom- 
mended  to  the company for  their  virtuous education 
and demeanor.  The price  of  a wife  at the first  was 
one hundred pounds  of  tobacco ;  but  as the  number 
became  scarce,  the price was increased to one hundred 
andjfty pounds ;  the value  of  which  in money was 
three shillings per pound.  This debt for wives it was 
ordered should have the precedency of  all other debts, 
and be first recoverable." 
The Rev. Mr. Weems, a Virginian writer, intimates 
that it would have  done a man's heart good to see the 
gallant young Virginians  hastening to the water  side, 
when a vessel  arrived  from  London,  each  carrying a 
bundle of  the best tobacco  under his arm, and taking 
back with him a beautiful and virtuous youilg wife. 
So late as in the year  1732, an act was  passed  at 
Maryland, making tobacco a legal tender at one penny 
a pound, and Indian corn at twenty-pence a bushel. 
Afterwards gold and  silver became  more  plentiful. 
In 1652, a mint was established in  New  England, for 
coining  shillings,  sixpences, and  three-penny pieces. 
In  1645, Virginia  prohibited  dealings by  barter, and 
established the Spanish piece of  eight, as six shillings, 
as the standard  currency of  that colony.  In all the 
colonies the money of  account was the sarrie nominally 
as in England, but the  coin was chiefly Spanish and 
Portugueze.  But  different  colonies  affixed various 
values  to the dollar.  In South Carolina, the dollar 
was estimated at 4s. 8d.-inVirginia  and New England, 
at 6s.-in  Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland, 
at 7s. 6d.-and  in New York and North Carolina, at 8s. 
Paper money was  first issued by the State of  Mas- 
sachusetts  in  1690.  A  public  bank  was  established 
in  South  Carolina  in  1702,  and  issued  £48,000  in 
bank  bills, to be lent at interest, and sunk  at the rate 
of  £4,000  a  year.  Pennsylvania first  issued  paper 
money in 1723.  The province of  Virginia does not ap- 
pear  to have  issued  any paper money previous to the 
revolutionary war. 
At  the  commencement  of  that  war, paper money 
was  issued  upon  the  authority  of  Congress.  This 
money was called continental  money.  The first issue 
was  dated  May  10,  1775,  but  the  notes  were  not 
actually in circuIation until the foIIowing Augud. 
"  Tlie paper money issued by Congress during the war of the Ame- 
rican  independence, experienced  no  sensible  depreciation  before the 
year 1776, and  so long  as the amount did not exceed nine millions of 
dollars.  A paper currency, equal in  value  to  that  sum  in  gold  and 
silver, could therefore be sustained so long as confidence was preserved. 
The issues were gradually increased during the  ensuing years,  and  in 
April,  1778, amounted  to  thirty  nlillions.  A  depreciation  was  the 
natural consequence;  but had  the value  of  tlie paper depended solely 
on its amount, the whole quantity in circulation  would  hare still been 
equal  in  value  to nine n~illions,  and the depreciation should not have 
been more than 39 to  1 ;  instead  of  which, it was then at the rate  of 
six dollars in paper for one silver dollar, and the whole amount  of  the 
paper in circulation was worth only five millions in silver. 
"  It is obvious that the difference was due to lessened confidence.  The 
capture of  Burgoyne's  army was followed by the alliance with France, 
and her becoming a party to the war against England.  The result of the 
war was no longer cons~dered  as  doubtful,  and sanguine expectations 
were formed of  its speedy termination.  The paper accordingly rose in 
value ; and in June, 1778, although the  issues  had  been increased  to 
more than forty-five millions, the  depreciation was  at the  rate  of  only 
four to one.  From  the  end  of  April  of that year,  to  the  month  of 
February,  1779,  althougll  the issues had been increased  from  thirty- 
five  to  one  hundred  and  fifteen  millions,  the  average  value  in 
silver of the whole amount of  paper in circulation exceeded ten millions, 
and it was at one time nearly thirteen millions,  or  considerably more 
than  that  which  could be  sustained  at the  outset  of  the hostilities. 
But when it  was  discovered that  the  war  would  be  of  longer  con- 
tinuance, confidence in the redemption of a  paper money daily increas- 
ing in amount was again suddenly lessened. 
"  The depreciation wss  increased  froin  the  rate  of  six  to  that  of 
thirty to one in nine months. 
"  The average  value in silver of  the lvhole amount of paper  in  circu- 
lation, from April to September, 1779, was about  six  millions,  and  it 
sunk  below five during the end of  the year.  The total amount of  the 
paper was at that time 200,000,000 ;  and altllough no  farther  issues 
took  place,  and  a  portion  was  absorbed  by  tlle  loan  ofices  and  by 4  THE  HISTORY  OF  BANKING  IN  AMERICA.  5 
taxes, the depreciation still increased, and was at tlie  end  of  the  year 
1780, at the rate of eighty dollars in paper for one in silver.  The value 
in  silver  of  the  paper  currency  was  then  less  than  two and  a  half 
millions  of  dollars ;  and when Congress, in March following, acknow- 
ledged the depreciation, and offered to exchange the old for new paper, 
at the  rate of  forty for one,  the  old  sniik  in one day to nothing,  and 
the new shared the same fate."-Considerations  on  the  C'urrency  and 
Banking System of  the United States, by Albert Gallatin, Philadebhia, 
1831. 
According  to  an  estimate  by the  register  of  the 
treasury  in  1790,  the  issues  of  continental  money 
were as follows :- 
OLD EMISSION.  NEW  EMISSION. 
Dullars.  OOlh.  Dollars.  WLb. 
In 1776 .........  20,064,464  66 .........  - 
1777  .........  26,426,333  1 .........  - 
1778.. .......  66,965,269  34 .........  - 
1779  .........  149,703,856  77 .........  - 
1780  .........  82,908,320  47  .........  891,236  80 
1781  .........  11,408,095  -  ......... 1,179,249  - 
On  the  31st  May,  1781,  the  continental  notes 
ceased to circulate as money, but they were afterwards 
bought  on  speculation at various prices, from 400 for 
one, up to 1,000 for one. 
In the year 1781, the Congress granted a charter to 
be called the "  Bank of  North America."  It  was accord- 
ingly established in Philadelphia, and commenced busi- 
ness on Jan. 7, 1782.  It obtained a charter of  incor- 
poration upon the ground that it would offer assistance 
to the States in carrying on  the war.  So profitable 
was the business that  the early dividends were at the 
rate of  12  to 16 per cent. per annum. Upon an allegation 
that the bank had produced evil effects, its charter was 
repealed  in Sept.  1785, by  the  state  government  of 
Pennsylvania ; but it continued its business, claiming 
the right to do so under the act of  Congress.  In 1787, 
the bank was re-incorporated, and has been continued 
to the present day.  Its  operations  are confined  how- 
ever to the state of  Pennsylvania. 
After the conclusion of  the war it was provided  by 
the constitution  of  the  United  States,  that no  state 
should  coin  money,  emit  bills  of  credit,  make  any 
thing but  gold  and  silver coin  a  tender  in payment 
of  debts,  or  pass  any  law  impairing  the obligation 
of  contracts;  and  the power  to  coin  money,  and  to 
regulate  the value  thereof, \as  vested  exclusively in 
Congress. 
This article  of  the  constitution  has  given  rise  to 
considerable  discussion,  as  it involves  the question 
whether Congress has the power to constitute a national 
bank.  The following summary of  the  argr~ments  on 
both  sides  is taken from Mr. Justice  Story's  " Com- 
mentaries on  the Constitution of  the United States." 
"One of  the earliest and most important measures, which gave  rise 
to a question of  constitutional power,  was the act  chartering tlie Bank 
of the United States in  1791.  That question has often since been dis- 
cussed ;  and though  the  measure  has  been  repeatedly sanctioned  by 
Congress, by  the executive, and by the judiciary, and has obtained the 
like favour in the great majority of  the States, yet it is, up to this very 
how, still debated upon constitutioilal grounds, as  if  it were still new 
and untried.  It is impossible, at this time, to treat it its an open ques- 
tion, unless  the  constitution is  for  ever  to  remain  an  unsettled  text, 
possessing n?  permanent attributes, and incapable of  having any ascer- 
tained  sense;  varying with  every  change  of  doctrine and  of  party, 
and delivered over to interminable doubts. 
"The reasoning, upon which the constitutionality of  a national bank 
is  denied, turns  upon  tlie  strict  interpretation  of  the  clause,  giving 
auxiliary powers necessnry and proper to execute tlie other encmerated 
powers.  It is to tlie following effect.  The power to incorporate a bank 
is not among those enumerated in the constitution.  In the next place, 
all the enumerated powers can be carried into execution without a bank. 
A bank therefore is not necessary, and consequently not authorized  by 
this clause of  the constitution.  It is urged that a bank will give great 
facility or convenience to  the  collection  of  taxes.  If  this were  true, 
yet the constitution allows only the means wliich are necessar,y, and not 
merely those which are conoenient for effecting the enumerated powers. 
If such a latitude of  construction were allowed, as to consider conveni- 
ence as justifying the use of  such means, it would  swallow up all  the 
enumerated powers.  Therefore, the constitution restrains Congress  to 
those means, without which the power would be nugatory. 
''  The reasoning by which the constitutionality of  the natioiial  bank 
is  sustnined is,  in  part,  contained  in  the  following summary.  The 
powers confided to the naiional government are unquestionably, so  far 
as they exist, sovereign and supreme.  It  is not, and cannot be disputed, 
that the power of  creating a corporation is one belonging to sovereignty. 
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the law on any subject whatever is  a  sovereign  power.  If the erect- 
ingof a corporation be an incident to sovereignty, and it is not prohibit- 
ed, it must belong to the national government in relation to the objects 
entrusted to it.  The true difference is this : where the authority of  a 
government is general, it can create corporations in  all  cases ;  when  it 
is confined to certain branches of  legislation, it can  create  corporations 
only as to those cases.  It cannot be denied, that implied powers  may 
be delegated as well as express.  It  follows that a power to erect corpo- 
rations may as well be implied, as  any other  thing, if  it be  an instru- 
ment, or means of  carrying into execution any specified power. 
"It is true, that among the  enumerated  powers we do not find that 
of establishing a bank or creating a corporation.  But we do find there 
the gent powcrs to lay and collect taxes,  to borrow money, to regulate 
commerce, to declare and conduct war, and to raise and support navies. 
Now if a bank be a fit means to execute any or a11  of  these pourers, it is 
just as  much implied as any othcr means.  If it be 'necessary and proper' 
for any of them, how is it possible to deny the authority to create it for 
such pnrposes ?  There is no more propriety in giving this power in ex- 
press terms, than in giving any other incidental power or means in  ex- 
press ternls. 
"  That a national bank is an  appropriate  means  to carry into  effect 
some of  the enumerated powers of  the government, and  that  this  mn 
be  best  done  by  erecting  it  into  a  corporation,  may  be  established 
by  the most satisfactory reasoning.  It  has a relation, more or  less  di- 
rect, to the power of  collecting taxes, to that  of  borrowing  money, to 
that of  reedsting  trade  between  states,  and  to  those  of  raising and 
maintaining fleets and armies.  And it may be added, that it has a most 
important bearing upon the regulation of  currency between  the States. 
It  is an instrument, which has been applied by governments, in the ad- 
ministration of  their fiscal and financial operations ;  and in the present 
times it can hardly require argument to prove, that it is U convenient, a 
useful, and an essential instrument in the fiscal operations of  the United 
States." 
The constitution  of  the United States was  ado~ted 
in  1789, and  shortly after the government was drga- 
nized.  On the  14th of  December,  1790,  the then 
secretary of  the treasury, ,(General  Hamilton) reported 
to Congress the plan  of  a  bank.  In February, 1791, 
the bill passed, and was presented  to  General Wash- 
ington for his approval.  In the progress of  the bill it 
was o posed by Mr. Madison, (subsequently president) 
Mr. Ales. and others, on  the ground that the States 
had not dklecrated the' Dower tccreate such an institu- 
tion, and  theorefore  thkt  it was  unconstitutional.  It 
was  supported by Mr. Ames, Mr. Boudinot, &C., who 
were members of  what was termed, in those  days, the 
high-toned federal party. 
The president,  (General Washington)  previous  to 
signing  the  bill,  consulted  his  cabinet  ministers. 
Thomas  Jefferson,  secretary  of  state,  and  Edmund 
Randolph, attorney-general of  the United States, were 
opposed to his signing it.  Alexander Hamilton, secre- 
tary of  the treasury,  and  General  Knox, secretary of 
war, were in favour of  it.  At that time there was  no 
secretary of  the Navy.  On  the 25th  of  February, 
1791,  the  president  approved of  the  bill, and it be- 
came a law. 
The following account  of  this bank:  is taken  from 
the American almanack of  1835. 
"  The  idea of  this  institution  was  conceived  im- 
mediately after  the adoption  of  the  constitution,  by 
Alexander  Hamilton,  the  founder  of  the  American 
system of  finance, when secretary of  the treasury ; the 
plan of  it was  submitted to  Congress Dec.  13, 1790; 
and it was incorporated  by act  of  Congress, and  ap- 
proved Feb. 1791, in the  first  tern1  of  Washington's 
administration.  Its coiltinuance  was  limited  by the 
cl~arter  to  the 4th of  March, 18  1  1, at which  time  it 
expired, as Congress refused to renew the charter. 
"  The capital was  limited  to  % 10,000,000, divided 
into 25,000 shares, of  $400  each, payable  one-fourth 
in gold and silver, and  three-fonrths  in  public  secu- 
rities bcaring an  interest  of  six  and  three  per  cent. 
The corporation were restricted from contracting debts 
beyond the amount of  their capital, and froin holding 
property, exceeding the value of  $15,000,000,  or real 
estate  more  than  necessary  for  the convenient  tran- 
sacting  of  their  business.  The affairs  of  the  bank 
were to  be  managed  by twenty-four  directors,, to  be 
elected  by the stockholders, without  any interference 
on  the part  of  the government in  the election; but 
the  government reserved  the right of  inspecting of 
the affairs of  the bank ; and for this purpose the secre- 
tary of the treasury was authorized to demand of  the 
president and directors a statement of  its concerns as 
often as he might see fit. 
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The government,  conformably  to  the right  reserved 
in the charter, subscribed  for  5,000 shares, equal to 
$2,000,000 ;  and the bank went into immediate opera- 
tion.  Its stock,  a great  portion  of  which  was  held 
in  Europe,  soon  rose  considerably  above  par ; and 
the institution proved always convenient, on some  oc- 
casions  eminently useful  to the government, and  not 
less beneficial to the public at large.  The dividends 
were  made  semi-annually ;  and, during  the twenty 
years'  continuance of  the charter, the average annual 
dividend amounted to 8%  per cent. 
"  The bank was  not  merely or  principally a  com- 
mercial establishment, but was essentially and mainly 
of  a finanical and  political  character; and it was  on 
this ground that its constitutionality  was  defended ; 
the right of  Congress to  grant such a  charter being 
maintained chiefly upon the strength of  that clause of 
the constitution, which gives to it the power necessary 
for  carrying  into execution  the powers  enumerated, 
and expressly invested in that body.  At the time  of 
its establishment, it was opposed on the ground  of  its 
presumed  unconstitutionality, by the  political  party, 
then in the minority, of  which  Mr. Jefferson was  re- 
garded as the leader; and before  the termination  of 
the charter,  this party having  come into power,  the 
renewal of  the charter was refused, and the institution 
was dissolved." 
In June, 1812, war was declared against England ; 
and  by August  and  Sept. 1814, all the  banks south 
and west of  New England, had suspended their specie 
payments. This  suspension of cash paymentsin America 
is ascribed by Mr. Gallatin to the following causes :- 
"  It  has always been found difficult to  ascertain  with  precision the 
causcs which,  in each  special case, produce m extraordinary  drain  of 
specie, and compel a bank to suspend its payments. 
"  Although it clearly appears, that very large and unforeseen advances 
to government were the immediate cause of the suspension of  the pay- 
ments of  the Bank of  England in the  year  1797, it  would  seem,  at 
this  distance  of  time,  to  have  been easy to prevent  that occurrence. 
The bills of exchange from abrond on government, or any other floating 
debt, from the payment of which the bank was required to make those 
advances, might with facility have  been  converted  into  funded  debt. 
And  when  we  find  tllat  in  less  than  seven  months  after  the  sus- 
pension, thelbank declared, by a solemn resolution, that it W%  enabled 
to issue specie, and  could with  safety resume its accustomed functions, 
if  tl~e  political circumstances of the country  did  not  render  it  inexpe- 
dient, it is hardly possible to doubt that the suspension, in its origin, as 
in its continuance, was a voluntary act 011 the part of  the government. 
Opinions are however dividecl to  this  day on  that  subject;  and some 
distinguished English writers ascribe that event to some unaccountable 
panic.  There  can  be  no doubt  that there was a great and continued 
run on the bank for specie prior to the suspension ;  and  what  renders 
the transaction still more inexplicable is, that almost immediately, and 
during some years after  the suspension  had  actually taken place,  the 
bank notes, though no longer convertible into specie, were at par. 
"  The question is not free of  difficulty as respects  the similar event 
in the United States. 
The following reasons were assigned by the directors of  the  char- 
tered  banks  of  Phildclpl~ia,  in  an  address  to  their fellow-citizens, 
dated the 30th of August,  1813. 
'L  'From the moment wllen the rigorous blockade of  the ports of the 
United States prevented the exportation  of  our  produce, foreign sup- 
plies  could  be  paid  for  in  specie only;  and  as  tl~e  importation  of 
foreign goods  in the eastern states has been  very large, it lias for many 
months  past occasioned a continual drain from the banks.  This drain 
11as been  much  increased by  a  trade  in  British  governnlent  bills  of 
exchange, which has been extensively carried on, and has  caused  very 
large sums to be exported from the United States. 
"  '  To meet this great demand for specie, the course of  trade did, for 
a considerable time, enable us to draw large supplies from the Southern 
States, but the unhappy situation of affairs there, having deprived us of 
that resource, and circumsbnces having occurred, which have in a con- 
siderable degree occasioned  alarm  and  distrust;  it  became  a  serious 
consideration, whether the  banks  should  continue  their  exertions  to 
draw within their vaults  the  specie capital  of  the  country, and  thus 
facilitate the means of  exporting it from the United States ;  or whether 
they should suspend  the  payment  of  specie, before their  means were 
exhausted.' 
"  The great  drain  from  the  east,  alluded  to  by tl~e  Pl~ildelphia 
banks, is  proved by  the  comparative view of  the  specie in  the vaults 
of  the  banks of  Massachusctts, in June 1814, immediately before the 
suspension of  payments, and  on the same  days of  the  preceding  and 
succeeding years. 
This amounted on June l, 181  1 to $1,709,000 
,,  1812  3,915,000 
,,  1813  6,171,000 
,,  1814  7,326,000 
,,  1815  3,915,000 
,,  1816  1,270,000 
And the fact that a large aniount of  British government bills was  sent 
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twellty and twenty-two per cent. discount, is corroborated by authentic 
information from  several  quarters.  Otlier  causes, l~owever,  concurred 
in producing the sus1)ension of  specie payments. 
"  1.  The circulating capital of  the United States, which must supply 
the loans required in time  of  war, is  concentrated  in  the large  cities, 
and  principnlly  north  of  the  Potomac.  The  war  was  unpopular 
in the Eastern  States ;  they contributed  less  than  from  tlieir wealth 
might  have  been  anticipated ;  and  tlie  burthen  fell  on  the  Middle 
States.  The  proceeds  of  loans,  (exclusively of  treasury  notes,  and 
temporary loans) paid into the trensnry from the commencenient of the 
war to the end of  the year 18  14, amounted to  forty-one  millions  ten 
thousand dollam.  Of  that sum the 
Eastern States lent  ...  ...... .........  $2,900,000 
New York, Pennsylvnliia, Maryland 
and Columbia  ...  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  . .. ... 
The Soutllern and Western States.. .  -  2,320,000 
"TIE  floating debt, consisting  of  outstandiug  trcasury notes,  and 
tempo~ary  loans unpaid,  alilouiited on January  lst,  1815,  to  eleven 
niillions two  llundred  and  fifty thousand  dollars, about  four-fifths  of 
which merc also due to the AIiddle States.  Alnlost  the  whole  of  tlie 
large amount arlvalrccd to governmcllt in  those  States, was  loaned  by 
the cities  of  New  York,  Plriladelpliia,  and  Baltiinore,  and  by  the 
district.  The banks made advancc. beyoiid  their  resources, either  by 
tlieir own subscriptio:ls,  or by e~ilargin their discounts in favour of the  P  s~lbscribers.  They, as well  as  severs  wealtlry and  patriotic  citizens, 
displayed great zeal in  sustaining  government  at  n critic$  rnoment; 
and tlie ba~rks  were for that purpose compelled to enlarge their issues. 
2.  The dissolution of  the  bank of  the  United Stntcs deprived the 
country of  a foreign  capital  of  more tI~an  sevcu  inillions of  dollars, 
vested  in  tlie  stock  of  that  institution,  and which  was  accordingly 
remitted abroad dunng the year  that preceded the war.  At the  sanle 
tiine, the  state banks, had  taken  up  a  considerable part of  the paper 
formerly discounted by  that of  the United States.  As  the  milount  of 
this exceeded fifteen millions, their aid  in  tliat  respect wns absolutely 
necessary, in order to  prevent the great  distress which must otherwise 
have attended such diminution of  the usual accon~nlodations. 
3.  Tl~e  creation of  new state  banks, in  order  to  fill  the cliixm, 
wns  a  natural  consequence of  the  dissolution  of  the  bank  of  the 
United States.  And, as  is  usual  under  such  circumstances, the  ex- 
pectntion of  great  profits  gave  birth  to a much  greatcr  number tllan 
was wanted.  They were  extended  throu~h  the  interior parts of  the 
country,  created  no  new  capid,  and  w~thdrcw  that  a~hicli  iniglit 
have  been  otllerwise lent  to  government, or  as profitably employed. 
From the 1st January,  1811, to  the  1st January, 1815, not  less than 
one  I~undred  aiid  twcnty new  banks  were  cl~artered  and  went  into 
operntion, wit11 a capitd of  about forty, and making an addition to the 
banking apid  of  the country of near thirty millions of  dollars.  That 
increase took place on thc  eve of,  and during a war which  did  nearly 
alinilidatc the cxports, nnd  both  the forcign  tr~ld  coasting trade.  And 
RS the salutary regulating power of  the bank of  the  United  States no 
longer  existed,  the  issues were  accordingly increased  much  beyond 
what the other circumsta~~ces  already mentioned rendered necessary." 
In  February,  1815,  peace  was  proclaimed  with 
England, and it was  expected  that  the  bank  would 
immediately return  to  cash  payments.  Bank  notes 
accordingly rose in value, but  as this expectation was 
not realized they again sunk in value. 
The suspension  of  cash  payments  i11  the  United 
States differed from  that of  England  in  two  parti- 
culars;  first,  it did not  take  place  throughout  the 
country.  Secondly, as each  bank was  independent, 
there was a  different  scale  of  depreciation  for  each 
county and each town.  The following  is the scale of 
depreciation per cent. at Baltimore, Philadelphia, and 
New York. 
SECTION 11. 
Ualh-  Ph1l.1-  New  Ballu-  Phl~a-  New  ( mew.  1  delph~a. I  Yurk  11  I  my!c  I  nlelph~?.  I  York 
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which  circulated  at  par  were  received,  but  those 
which  were  at  a  discount  were  rejected.  The 
banks  which  did  not  suspend  cash  payments  very 
much  restricted  their  issues;  and  hence  there  was 
such  a  scarcity  of  money  in those  States that  the 
taxes  could  not  be  collected.  To  meet  this  emer- 
gency,  the government  issued  treasury  notes,  some- 
what  resembling  our  exchequer  bills,  which  bore 
interest at six per cent. 
Another  diiliculty  which  the  government  expe- 
rienced  from  the condition  of  the banks was  in the 
transmission  of  money  from  one  State  to  another. 
The  money  which  was  collected  at one  place  was 
required to be  expended  at another.  But the banks 
of  one  State  had  no connexion  with  those  of  the 
others.  Hence  the government  had great  difficulty 
in  paying  any sum  of  money either  for  supplies or 
services  at any particular  place, where  the  party  to 
whom the money was due might happen to reside. 
Another  inconvenience was,  that  the  governmcnt 
was  obliged  to  employ  as  agents  for  receiving  the 
taxes, a vast number of  banks.  Had  there been one 
national bank, with  a  branch  in each  state, the col- 
lectors  would  have  lodged  the taxcs  at the various 
branches,  and the head  office would  have  accounted 
for  the whole to  the  government.  But the country 
was  studded with  a  great number  of  banks totally 
independent of  each  other, and refusing to  take each 
others' notes.  The greater  part of  these  banks liad 
also  stopped  payment,  though  their  notes  still cir- 
culated at a  discount.  At the same  time there was 
a  risk in having  large sums of  money in the hands 
of  the collectors.  The collectors  were  therefore  in- 
structed to  lodge  the  taxes  in  the  banks  of  their 
respective  districts;  and  thus  the  treasury  had 
accounts  open  at no  fewer  than  ninety-four  banks. 
The sums  lodged  in  these  banks were  usually com- 
posed of-l.  Notes of  the bank in which the taxes were 
deposited-2.  Notes  of  other  banks-3.  Treasury 
notcs  bearing  interest-4.  Small  treasury  notes not 
bearing  interest.  As  to  coin,  that was  out  of  the 
question. 
The  confusion  thus  introduced  into  the  public 
acconnts, as  well  as into private  transactions, led  to 
the  formation  of  the  second  Bank  of  the  United 
States.  The act  of  incorporation was  passed  in the 
session of  1  8  16. 
By this act a Bank of  the United States of  America 
was  to  be  established,  with  a  capital  of  35,000,000 
dollars,  to  be  divided  into  350,000  shares  of  100 
dollars each-70,000  shares or 7,000,000 dollars to be 
subscribed  and  paid  for  by  the government  of  the 
United States. 
The payments of  the subscriptions  to be made by 
instalments,  one-fourth  in  gold  or  silver  coin,  the 
remainder in like coin  or funded debt of  tl~e  United 
States. 
It was  declared  lawful  for  the  United  States to 
redeem the funded debt subscribed, and for the bank 
to sell the same  for  gold  and  silver, provided that it 
shall not sell  more than 2,000,000  dollars thereof  in 
any one  year, nor  any part without  giving  notice to 
the  secretary  of  the treasury, and offering it to  the 
United States at the current price. 
The management  of  the aff'airs of  the bank  was 
committed  to  twenty-five  directors,  five  of  whom 
being  stockholders  to  be  appointed  annually by  the 
l'resident  of  the United  States and the Senate; not 
more  than  three of  whom to be  residents of  any one 
State, and twenty of  whom to be annually elected  by 
the qualified stockholders. 
The  corporation  was  restricted  from  contracting 
debts exceeding the sum of  35,000,000 dollars, unless 
authorized by law.  Not to make any loan to the United 
States, exceeding 500,000 dollars, nor  to any particu- 
lar State exceeding 50,000 dollars, nor to any foreign 
State, unless authorized by  law.  The dividends to be 
paid  half-yearly ; a  statement  of  the affairs  of  the 
bank to  be  laid  before the  stockholders  every three 
years.  The secretary was authorized to  call upon the 14  TIIE  IIISTORY  OF 
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bank for a statement, not  exceeding  a weekly one  of 
its concerns.  No  stockholder  unlcss lie  be  a citizen 
of  the United States to vote in the choice of  directors. 
In case they suspended payments  in  specie,  the cor- 
poration  nras made  chargeable  with  interest  at the 
rate of  twelve  per  cent.  per  annum.  The notes  of 
the bank were  to  be  received in all payments to the 
government;  and on the other hand,  the  bank  was 
bound to receive and transmit the public revenue free 
of  charge.  Congress  to establish no other bank ex- 
cept in tlie district of  Colombia. 
The bank  comnlenced  business  at  Philadelphia, 
January 1, 1817. 
In the latter end of  the same  month  a  meeting  of 
delegates from the banks  of  New York, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and Virginia,  took  place  at Philadelphia, 
with a view to a general and simultaneous resumption 
of  cash  payments.  In  consequence  of  a  compact 
between  them  and  the Bank  of  the United  States, 
sanctioned  by  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  cash 
payments  were  resumed.  To  facilitate  this  object, 
the Bank of  the United  States imported from abroad 
seven  millions  of  dollars  in  specie,  and  agreed  to 
afford reasonable assistance to such of  the State banks 
as might  require it.  The resumption  of  cash  pay- 
ments was now general tliroughout the union. 
The year  1819 was  one  of  grcat  con~mercial  dif- 
ficulty in  America.  This  distress was  attributcd  to 
those measures which it had  been found necessary to 
adopt in  order  to  effect  a  return  to  cash payments. 
To accomplisll this  object, the  State  banks had been 
compelled  to  restrict  their  issues  by  limiting their 
discounts.  Many of  those banks which were  formed 
at  the dissolution  of  the  first  bank  of  the  United 
States now failcd.  And the new bank  of  the United 
States,  which  had  in  the  first  instance  made  very 
liberal advances  to  the Western  States, were obliged 
to resort to  measures  for  compelling  the repayment 
of  their loans.  Those  too who  had  contracted  debts 
either to the  banks  or  to  private  parties  in the  de- 
preciated currency, sustained great loss when required 
to discharge  their  obligations in  a  currency conver- 
tible into gold. 
The Bank of  the United States established a branch 
or office in each state.  At each branch deposits were 
received,  bills  and  notes  of  hand  discounted,  and 
letters  of  credit  granted  payable  on  demand upon 
all  the  other  branches.  Their  notes  were  legally 
payable  at  the  respective  branches where  they were 
issued, but were  often  paid  as matter  of  courtesy at 
the other branches.  The  Jive dollar  notes, the lowest 
issued  by any branch  were  made  legally  payable  at 
every branch. 
Average  Amount for  tAe  years 181  9-1  829, of  the princzkal  items  of 
the Situation of the  Bank of  tlre  United States. 
Do~neslic  I  P~zrldad  Total un  Heal  1011s  nnl.  I  I  l  Blllr.  Debt.  !  leterest.  1  Eatnte.  1  by'c1e'  I  DLpo'itr.  1 & hotas.. l 
Actual  Circulation  of the  Bank of  the  United Stutes  in September, 
1830, and Placer where the Notes were payabZe. 
............... 
Doliam. 
lank United States  Amount brought form  d.../  7,190,0g5 
Portland ..............................  ..............................  940.RIS 
.........  [Amount carried forward  1L.e~ 11  (15.341.8571 
........................  Portsmouth 
Boston  ..............................  ...........................  Providence 
Hartford .............................. 
New York ........................... 
Baltimore  ........................... 
Washington ........................  ...........................  Richmond 
Norfolk  ..............................  ........  ..............  Fayetteville  ..  ...........................  Charleston 













.  . 
New Orleans ........................ 
St. Louis ..............................  ...........................  Nashville 
Louisville ........................... 
Lexington ........................... 
C!ncinnati  ........................... 
Pittsburg ............................. 
Buffalo  .............................. 
Burlington ........................... 
A  encies Cincimti  and  Chil-  ..........................  %cothe 
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In tlie year 183  1, Mr.  Albert  Gallatin thus speaks 
of  the  advantages  derived  from  the  Bank  of  the 
United States : 
"  Experience,  however,  has since  confi~med  the grcat  utility  and 
importance of  a Bank of  the  United States, in  its conriexioil with the 
treasury.  The first  great  advantage  derivcd  from it, consists in the 
safe keeping of  the ~ublic  monies ;  securing, in  the first instance, the 
immediate payment  of  those  received  by  the  principal collectors, and 
affording a  constant check  on  all  their  transactions;  and  afterwards 
rendering  a  defalcation in the monies once paid, and whilst nominally 
in the treasury, absolutely impossible.  The next, and  not less impor- 
tant benefit  is  to  be jfound  in the perfect facility with which  all  the 
public payments  are  made by the cheques  or  treasury drafts, payable. 
at any place  where  the  bank  has an  office;  all  those who have  de- 
mands  agaiinst government are  paid  in  the place most convenient  to 
them ;  and  the public monies are  transferred, through  our  extensive 
territory, at a moment's warning, without  any risk  or expense, to the 
places  most  remote  from  those  of  collection,  and  ~vlierever public 
exigencies may require.  From the year 1791 to this day, the operations 
of  the  treasury have, without  interruption,  been  carried  on  through 
the medium  of  banks ;  during  the years  1  81  1  to  181  6  through the 
State  banks;  before  and  since,  througll  the  bank  of  the  United 
States.  Every  individual  who  has  been  at  the  hcad  of  that dc- 
partment, and, as we believe, every officer connected with it, has  been 
made  sensible  of  the  great  difficulties  that  must  be  e~lcountered 
without the  assistance  of those  institutions;  and  of  the comparative 
ease,  and  great  additional  security  to  tlle  public,  with  which  their 
public duties are  performed  through  the  means  of  the  banks.  To 
insist  that  the  operations  of  the  treasury  may  be  carried  on  with 
equal facility and safety, through the  aid  of  the  State banks, without 
the interposition  of  a  bank  of  the  United States, would  be contrary 
to fact and experience. 
"  The uniformity of  duties and  taxes of  every description, whether 
internal or external,  direct or  indirect, is an essential and fundamental 
principle of  the constitution.  It is  self-evident,  that that  uniformity 
cnnnot bc  carried  into  effect without  a  corresponding uniformity of 
currency.  Without  laws to this effect, it is absolutely impossible that 
the taxes and  duties should be uniform,  as the constitution prescribes : 
such laws are therefore necessary and  proper, in the most strict sense 
of  the words.  There  are  but  two  means  of  effecting  the  object, a 
metallic, or a  uniform  paper  currency.  Congress hns  the  option  of 
either;  and either  of  the  two, which  may appear  most  eligible,  will 
be  strictly  constitutional, because  strictly  necessary and  proper  for 
carrying into  effect  the  object.  If  a  currency exclusively metallic is 
preferred,  the  object  will  be  attained  by  laying  prohibitory  stanilp 
duties on bank notes  of every description, and without exception.  if 
it is deemed more eligible, under existing circumstances instead of  sub- 
verting the whole  banking system in the United States, and depriving 
the  community of  the  accommodation  which  bank  loans  afford  to 
resort  tc,  less  harsh  means;  recourse  must  be  lid to  such, ar will 
ensure  a  currency sound  and  uniform  itself,  and  at the  same  time 
check and regulate  that which will  continue to  constitute  the greater 
part of  the currency of  the country. 
Both  those  advantages were  anticipated  in  the  establishment  of 
the Lank  of  the  United  States; and it appears  to  us,  that  the  banlc 
fulfiis both  those  conditions.  As respects  the past, it  is  a  matter of 
fact, that specie  payments were  restored, and  have  been  maintained, 
througll  the  instrumentality of  tliat  institution.  It gives  a conlplete 
guarantee, that  under  any circcmnlstances, its  notes will  preserve  the 
same u~lifo~mity  wllich they now possess. 
"  Placed under  the  control  of  the general  government, relying for 
its existence on the correctness, prudence, and skill with which it shall 
be  administered,  perpetually  watched,  and  occasionally  checked  by 
both  the  treasury department  and  rival  institutions ; and  without  a 
monopoly, yet with a  capital arid  resources  adequate to tl~e  object for 
which it was established.  The bank  also affords the strongest security 
which can  be  given with  respect  to  paper, not  only for  its ultimate 
solvency,  but  also  for  the  uninterrupted  soundness  of  its  currency. 
The statements we have given of  its progressive and present  situation, 
show how far those expectatiolls have heretofore been realized.  Those 
statements also  show that the bank  of  the United States wherever its 
operations  have  been  extended,  has  effectually  checlced  excessive 
issues  on  the  part of  the  state banks;  if  not in  every instance, cer- 
ta~nly  in the aggregate.  They had been reduced before the year  1820 
from fiixty-sir to less than forty millions.  At  tliat  time  those of  the 
bank  of  the  United  States  fell  short  of  four  millions.  The  in- 
creased  amount  required,  by  the  increase  of  population  and wealth 
during  the  ten  ensuing  years, has  been  supplied  in  a  much greater 
proportion  by that banlr, than  by  those of  the  States.  With a treble 
capital, they have  added  little more than eight millions to their  issues. 
Those of  the bank of  the United States were nominally twelve, in reality 
about  eleven  millions  greater in November, 1829, than in November, 
1819.  The whole  amount  of  the  paper  currency has, during  those 
ten years, increased about forty-five, and  that  portion which  is  issued 
by the  state  banks  only twenty-two  and a half  per  cent.  We  have 
indeed a proof, not very acceptable perhaps to the bank, but conclusive 
of  the fact, that  it  has  performed  the  office  required  of  it  in  that 
respect.  The  general  complaints  on  the  part  of  marry of  the  state 
banks, that they are checked and controlled in their  operations  by the 
bank of  the  United  States,  that, to use a common expression, it ope- 
rates as a screw, is the best evidence that  its general operation is sucl~ 
as had been intended.  It  was for that very purpose that the bank was 
established.  We are not  however, aware, that a single  solvent  bank 
has been injured bp that of  the United States, though many have been 
undoubtedly restrained  in  their operations  much  more  than was  de- 
sirable to them.  This is certainly inconvenient to  some of  the banks, 
but in its general  effects is a public  benefit  to  the  community.  The 
best  way to  judge  whether, in  performing  that  unpopular  duty, the 
bank of  the  United  States  has  checked  tlie  operations  of  the  state 
banks more than was necessary, and has abused, in order to enrich itself 
C at  their expense, the  power which was  givcll  for  allother  ptlrpose, is 
to compxre their  rcspcctive  situations  in  the  aggregate.  In order to 
any crroneolls inference, we will put out of  question those banks 
of which we could only make  an estimate,  mrd  compare, with that of 
the United Statcs, those only of  wltich we have  actual  returns.  The 
pofits of  banks, beyoi~d the  interest on their own capital, consists, in 
that which  thcy receive  on  the  difference  betwecn  the  aggregate of 
their  deposits ant1  notes  in  circulation  and  the  amount of  specie  in 
their vaults.  We have given  the aggregate sitnation  for  the  end  of 
the year 1829 of  two hundred  and eighty-one banks, with a capital of 
95,003,557 dollars, the deposits and circulating notes of  which 
Amonntcd together to  .  . . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . $7  1,706,033 
Dcduct spccic in thcir vaults.. .  ..  .  ..  11,089,643  -- 
Leaves for difference  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  59,716,300 
Or sixty-two  and oile-cigl~tll  per cci~t.  011  their capital. 
"  The notes in circulation  of  the bank of  the United States (adding 
one million for its drafts in  circulation) amounted  in November,  1829, 
to ,$14,04.2,084#;  and togetl~er 
With the deposits to ..................  $?8,S27,793 
Deducting specie  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  7,175,274 
p- 
Leaves for the difference  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  21,652,519 
Or sixty-one and one-eight11 per cent. on its capital. 
"  It  is clear that those  state banks, taken in the aggregate, have no 
just reuson to complain, since  that  of  the  United  States  imposes  no 
greater  rcstnints  on  them than  on  itself.  It will also be  perceived, 
that it had  in  spccie  more  than  one-fifth part of  the aggregate of  its 
notes in circulation  and  deposits ; whilst  the  stnte  banks,  had  little 
nore than one-sixth, and the bank of  the Unitcd Statcs  had  in  addi- 
tion a fund of  about one million of  dollars in Europe.  The  difference 
would have been more  striking, had we  taken a view of  the situation 
of  all the state hanks, including those  on  estimate ;  for the difference 
between the aggregate of  their notes and  deposits  and  their  specie is 
sixty-seven and a quarter on their capital. 
'' The manner in which the bank checks the issues of  the state banks, 
is equally simple and  obvious.  It consists  in  receiving the  notes, of 
ail those ~vhich  are solvent, and requiring pigment from time  to time, 
without suffering tl~e  balance  due by  asy to become too large.  Tliose 
notes on hand, taking the average of  the  last  three  years  and a half, 
amount  always  to  about  one  million  and a half  of  dollars;  and  the 
balances due hv  the banks in account current (deducting balances  due 
to some) to ab.bout $900,000. 
We think that we may say, that on this operation, which  requires 
particular  attention  and vigilance, and  must  be carried on with  great 
firmness and  due forbearance, depends almost exclusively the  stability 
of the currency of  thc country. 
L'  The  principal  advantages  derived  from  the  bank of  the United 
States, which no stnte Lank, ant1 as it appears to us, no  Lank estallislietl 
on different principles could afford, are, therefore ;  first and principally, 
securing witli certainty an uniform, and  as far  as  paper  can, a sonnd 
currency:  secondly, the  complete  security, and  peat facility it affords 
to government in its  fiscal  operatiorls : thirdly, the  great  convcnieilce 
and benefit accruing to  the community, from its extensive  transactions 
in domestic bills of  eschange and inland drafts.  We liarc not adverted 
to the  aid which may be  espected fro111  tliat institutio~i  in time of war, 
and which should, we think, be confined to two objects. 
"  First.  The experience of  the last war has s~~fticiently  proved, that 
an efficient revenue must be provided, before, or inlmediately after that 
event takes  place.  Resort  must  be  had for that purpose to a system 
of  internal  taxation,  not  engrafted on  taxes  previously existing,  but 
which must be at once created. 
"  The utmost diligence and  skill cannot  render such new taxes pro- 
ductive before twelve or eightccn months.  The estimated amount must 
be anticipated ;  and advailces to that extent, including at least the esti- 
mated proceeds of  one year, of  all  the additional taxes laid during the 
war, may justly  be expected from the bank of  the United  States. 
"Secondly.  It will also be espected, that it will  powerfully assist in 
raising the  necessary loans,  not by  taking up,  on its own account, any 
som beyond what may  be  entirely convenient  and consistent, with the 
safety and primary object of the institution, but by affording facilities to 
the money lenders.  Those who,  in  the first  instance,  subscribe to  a 
public loan,  do not intend to keep  the whole, but expect to  distribute 
it gradually,  witli  a reasonable  profit.  The greatest inducements, in 
order to obtain loans on modcrate terms, consists in the probability that, 
if  that distribution proceeds slou,er than had been anticipated, the sub- 
scribers will not be compelled, in order to pay their  instalments, to sell 
the  stock,  and  by glutting tl~e  market,  to  sell  it  at a  loss;  and  the 
assistance expected  from  the bank  is to advance, on  a deposit  of  the 
scrip,  after  tlle  two first installnents have been paid, such  portions  of 
each  succeeding  payment,  as  may  enable the s~tbscribers  to hold the 
stock a rcasoilable length of  time.  As this  operation may be  renexved 
annually on  each  successive loan,  whilst  the  war  continues,  the aid 
afforded in that manner is far more useful than large direct advances to 
government, which always cripple the resources, ancl nlay endanger the 
safety of  n bank." 
In 1832 a law passed both houses of  Congress for a 
renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  bank  of  the  United 
States ;  but the president, General Jackson, refused  to 
ratify it.  This power is conferred upon the President 
b  the foIlowing  article  of  the constitution  of  the 
rihited States : 
"  Every bill that shall have passed the House of  Representatives and 
the Senate, shall before it become a law be presented  to the  President 
of  the  United States.  If  he approves, he shd  sign it; but if  not, he return it, with his objcctions, to that House ill nlricl~  it  shall lrave 
origillated, wI~o  sl~.ll enter the objections at  large on  tl~eir  journal,  ind 
proreeil  to  it.  If after  alch  rec~~~~sidcmtio~~  t..o-tllirds of 
that  House sllall qrce  to pass the hill,  it  shall  be  sent, togetller with 
the ob,iections,  to  otllcr House, by wliich it s11all likc~ise  be  recon- 
sidered ;  alld if apl,roved  by two-tl~irds  of  that House, it shall becon~e 
a, law.  But in  such CT.SCS.  the votes of  both Houses sl~al:  be deter- 
mined by  yes  and nays;  and the names of  the pcrsorls voting for  and 
against the bill, shall be  entered on  the journd of  each  House respec- 
tively." 
The President returned the bill to the Senat,e, with 
o very long message  stating his  olrjectiorts.  The fol- 
lo;vi@  are  extracts : 
cc The bill  "  to  modify  and  continue" the act entitled "  an  act to 
incorporate  the  subscribers  to  the  Lan11~  of  the  United  States," was 
presented to me on tl~e  4th July inst.  Having  considered it with that 
solemn  regard  to  the  principles  of  the  co~lstitution,  which  the  day 
was cdc~ilated  to  inspire,  and  come  to  tl~e  conclusio~~  that it ongl~t 
not  to  bccorne a law,  I  hcl-enith return  it to  the  Senate, in  ull~icl~  it 
originated, with my objections. 
A bank of  thc United  Stntes is, in  many respects, convenient for 
the govenlmcnt, and useful to the  people.  Entertaining  this  opinion, 
and  deeply impressed with  the  belief  that  some  of  the  powers  and 
privilcgcs posse?setl  by  the  existing  bank,  are  unauthorised  by  the 
constitution, subversive of the  rights of  the States,  and  dangerous  to 
the liberties of  the people, I felt it my duty, at an  early period of  my 
ad mini strati or^, to call the attention  of  Congress to the  practicability of 
organizing an  institution,  conlbining  all  its  advantages, and  obviating 
these  objections.  1 sincerely  regret  that,  in  the  act  before me,  I 
can  perceive  none of  those  modifications of  the  bank  charter n.11ich 
are necessary, in my opinion, to  make it compatible with  justice, with 
sound policy, or with the constitution of  our conntry. 
The  present corporate body, denominated the president, directors, 
and company of the bank  of  the United  States, will  have  existed, at 
the time this act is intended to take effect, twenty years.  Jt enjoys an 
cxclnsire  privilege  of  banking  under  the  autho~ity  of  the  general 
government, a monopoly of  its favor  and  support, and, as a necessary 
consequence, almost a nlonopoly of  the foreign and domestic exchange. 
The powers, privileges, and  favors  bestowed  upon  it  in  the  original 
charter, by increasing the  value of  the stock far  above  its  par value, 
operntcd  a gratuity of  many millions to the stockl~olders. 
The  modifications of  the  existing  charter, proposed  by this  act, 
are not such, in my view, as make it consistent with  the  rights of  the 
States, or the libertics of  the people.  The qualification of  the right of 
the bank to llold  real  cestnte, the  limitation of  its  power  to  establish 
\,mnclles, tile power  reserved to Congress to forbid  the  circulation  of 
small notcs, are restrictions co~npa~ati\ely  of  liltle rall~c  er importance. 
All the objectio~~able  principles of  the  existing  ,corporation, and most 
of its odious features, are retained without alleviation. 
"  By  documents  submitted  to  Congress,  at the present  session,  it 
appears, that on  1st of  January, 1832, of the twenty millions ofprivate 
stock in the  corporation, $8,405,500  were held  by foreigners, mostly 
of  Great  Britain.  The  an~ount  of  stock  held  in  the nlne Western 
States is $140,200,  and  in  the  four  Southern  States is $5,623,100, 
and in the  E2stern and middle States about $13,522,000.  The profita 
of  the  bank  in  1831,  as  shown  in  a  statement  to  Congress,  were 
about $3,455,598  : of  this there accrued  in  the nine Western States, 
about  $1,640,048  ; in  the  four  Southern  States  about  $352,507  ; 
an 1  in  the  middle  and  Eastern States, abont $1,463,04~1.  A5 little 
skock  is held in the West, it is obvious that the debt of  the  people  in 
that section to the bank is principally a debt to the Eastern and foreign 
stockholders ;  that  the  interest  they pay upon  it, is  carried  into the 
Eastern States and into Europe;  and  that  ~t is a burden  upon  their 
industry, and  a  drain  of  their  currency, which  co country can  bear 
without inconvenience, and occasional distress.  To meet  this  burden, 
snd  equalize  the  exchange  operations of  the  bank,  the  amount  of 
specie  drawn  from  those  States, through  its branches, within tlle last 
two  years, as  shown  by  its  official  reports, was  about  $6,000,000. 
More than half  a million of  this amount does not stop  in  tlle Eastern 
States, but  passes on to Europe, to  pay the  dividends  to  the  foreign 
stockholders.  In the  principle of  taxation recognized by this act, the 
Western States find no adequate compensation for  this  perpetual  bur- 
den  on  their  industry, and  drain  upon  their  currency.  The branch 
bank at Mobile made  last  year $95,140;  yet, under the provisions of 
this act, the State of  Alabama  can  raise  no  revenue from  these pro- 
fitable operations, because  not a share of  the  stock  is  held  by  any of 
her citizens.  Mississippi  and  Missoun  are in the  same  condition in 
relation  to  the  branches  ~t  Natches  and  St. Louis,  and  such, in  a 
greater or less degree, is the  condition of  every Western  State.  The 
tendency of  the plan of  taxation which  this  act  proposes, will  be  to 
place the whole United States in the same rclatio~~  to foreign countries 
which  the Western States bear to  the  Eastern.  When, by a tax  on 
resident  stockholders, the  stock  of  this  bank  is  made  worth  ten  or 
fifteen per  cent.  more  to  foreigners than to residents, most of  it will 
inevitably leave the country. 
"  Thus will  this provision, in its practical effect, deprive the Eastern 
well as the Southern and  States, of  thc means of  raisiis a 
revenue from  the  extension of  business and  the  great profits of  this 
institution.  It uill  make  the American  people  debtors  to  aliens  in 
nearly the \vliole amount due to this bank, and send across the Atlantic 
from  two  to  five millions of  specie every year, to pay the bank divi- 
dends. 
"  In another of  its bearings this provision is fraught with danger.  Of 
the twenty-five directors of  this bank, fire  are  cllosen  by  the govern- 
ment, and twenty by  the citizen stockholders.  From all voices in these 
elections  the  foreign  stockholders  are  excluded  by the  clkarter.  In 
proportion, therefore, as the stock is transferred to foreign holders, the 
extent of  sufrage in  the  choice of  directors  is  curtailed.  Already io 2.2  Tt1E  IIISTORY  OF  BANKIIVG  IN  AMERICA.  23 
xllllost a third of  the  stock in  foreign  hands, and  not  rcpre~ented  in 
It is  constantly passing  out of  the country, and  this  act 
acccler~tc  its  departure.  The entire  control  of  the  institution 
would necessarily fall into tl~e  hands of a few citizen stockholders, and 
the  ease wit11 wliicll  tlic  object would  be  accomplished, would  be  a 
temptation to designing men to secure that control in  their own hands 
by  n~ono~olising  the  rernaini~lg stocks.  There is danger  tliat a pre- 
sident  and  directors would then be able to elect tliemselves from year 
to year, and  without  responsibility or  control manage  the whole con- 
cerns of  the  bank  during  the  existence of  its  charter.  It is easy to 
conceive that great evils to our country and  its  institutions migl~t  flow 
from  snch  a concentration of  power  in  the hands of  a few men irre- 
sponsible to the  people. 
"  If  we  must  have  a bank  with  private  stockl~olders,  every  con- 
sideration  of  sound policy,  and  evely  impulse  of  American  feeling, 
admonishes  that  it  should  be  purely  American.  Its  stockl~olders 
sliould be composed exclusively of  our own citizens, who at least ought 
to be friendly to our government, and willing  to  support it in times of 
difficulty and danger.  So  abundant  is  doniestic capital, that  compe- 
tition in subscribing for the stock of  local banks has recently led almost 
to riots.  To a bank  csclusircly of  American  stocltholders, possessing 
the ~owers  and  privilcgcs  granted  11y this  act, subscriptions for two 
hundred  u~illions of  dollars could  be  readily  obtained.  Instead  of 
sending abroad tlrc stock of  tl~e  bank, in wlrich  tlic  government must 
deposit its funds, and 01:  w11icl1 it must rely to sustain its credit in times 
of  emergency, it would ratller scan to be expcdicnt to prohibit its sale 
to aliens, nnder penalty of  absolute forfeiture. 
CL The governnient of tllc United States 11ave no constitutional power 
to pnrchase lands within the States, except "  for  tlie  erection of  forts, 
magazines,  arsenals,  dock  yards,  and  other  ~lccdful  buildings,"  and 
even  for  these  objects 0111~  "  by the consent of  tlle legislature of  the 
State,  in  which  tlie  saine  shall  be.''  By ~naliin~  themselves  stock- 
holders  in  the  bank, and  granting  to  tlie  corporatioi~  the  power  to 
pnrclinse lands for otlier purposes, they assume a power not granted in 
the  constitution, and  grant  to  otl~ers  what  they  do  not  thenlselves 
possess.  It is  not  necessary to  the  receiving, safe-keeping, or trans- 
mission of  the fiinds of  tlle government, that the bank  should  possess 
this power, and it is not proper that Congress should  thus enlarge the 
poxvcrs delegated to them in the constitution. 
Tlle old bank of the United States possessed a capital of o111y eleven 
nlillions of  dollars, which was  fo~incl  fully sufficient to  enable it, with 
despatch and safety, to perform a11  tlic functions required of  it  by  the 
govern~~ient.  Tlle capital of  the present bank is thirty-five nlillions of 
dollars, at least twenty-four  more  than  cxpcrience  has  proved  to  be 
necessary to enable n bank to pcrfoni:  its public functions.  The public 
debt which existed during the period of  the  old  bank  and  on the es- 
tablisl~ment  of  tlie new has  been  nearly paid  off,  and oar revenue will 
soon be reduced.  This increase of  capital is,  tllereforc, not for public, 
but for private purposes. 
'L  That  B bank  of  the  United  States,  con~pctc~~t  to  :l11  duties 
which ninv  hc recl~~ired  111  t11e  ,~overumcnt,  ~:li,allt  bc  so  organized  ns 
not to infringe on our own delegated powers,  or the  reserved  rights of 
the States, 1  do not entertain a doubt.  Had the executive been  called 
upon to furnish the project of  such an institution, the duty would have 
been cheerf~illy  perfornled.  In the absence of  such a  call,  it  is  obvi- 
ously proper that 11e should  confine  Iiimself  to  pointing out those pro- 
minent  features  in  tlie  act  presented,  wl~icli,  in his opinion, make it 
incompatible wit11 the constitution and sound policy.  A general discus- 
sion  mill  now  take  place  eliciting  new  light,  and  settling important 
principles ;  and a ncrv Congress,  elected  in  the  midst  of  such discus- 
sion, and furnishing an equal representation of  the people according to 
tlie last rensus, will bear to the  capitol  tlie  verdict  of  public  opinion, 
and,  I doubt  not, bring  this  important  question  to  a  satisfactory re- 
6ult.'' 
1833.  General  Jackson  removed  the  government 
deposits from the bank of  the United  States.  By an 
article of  the  act which  established the bank in 1816 
it was ordered, '(  that the deposits of  public  money be 
made  into that bank  and its branches,  in  places  in 
which  the  said  bank  and  its  branches  may  be 
established, unless  the secretary of  the treasury shall 
otherwise order and direct, in which  event the secre- 
tary of  the treasury is recli~ired  to give  his  reasons to 
Congress."  The  President  considered himself justi- 
fied  by this clause  in  directing  the  secretary of the 
treasury to remove the deposits, usually amounting to 
eleven or twelve million  dollars from the bank of the 
United States.  The Secretary, Mr. Duane, refused to 
do  so, alleged  it would not  be legal, unless the  bank 
were in danger of  becoining  insolvent ; and even  in 
that case, the secretary was not under the direction of 
the  President, but  shoulcl  report  to  Congress.  Mr. 
Duane was consequently removed from his office, and 
another secretary appointed, who immediately carried 
the President's  orders  into effect.  The deposits were 
accordingly removed  from  the  bank  of  the  United 
States, and placed in the different State Banks.  The 
bank of  the United States was  accordingly compelled 
to limit its discounts and advances, and this produced 
considerable  distress.  The  bank was  accused  by its 
opponents of  reducing its accomlnodation  more  than 
was necessary in order to raise a popular outcry against 
the  President.  At  the  same  time,  the  President 24  TIIE  IIISTORY  OF 
seemed anxious to introduce a metallic  currency, and 
the mint was worked with unusual activity. 
OPERATIONS OF THE MINT IN 1833. 
The coinage effected within the year 1833,amounted 
to $3,765,710;  comprising  $978,550  in  gold  coins, 
$2,759,000  in  silver, $28,160  in copper, and consist- 
ing of  10,307,790 pieces of  coin, viz. 
Dollars. 
HalfEagles .........  193,63Opieces,making ......  968,510 
Quarter Eagles  .  .  .  4,160  do.  do.  ......  10,400 
Half Dollars  .  .  . .  ..  5,206,000  do.  do.  ... .  ..  2,603,000 
Quarter Dollars  ...  156,000  do.  do.  ......  39,000 
Dimes ..............  485,000  do.  do.  ......  48,500 
Half Dimes.. . ... ...  1,370,000  do.  do.  ...  .  ..  68,500 
Cents ...............  2,739,000  do.  do.  ......  27,390 
Half Cents .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  154,000  do.  do.  .  .  .  .  .  .  770 
Total no. of piece2  10,307,790  Totalvalue  .  3,765,710 
Of the amount of gold coined within the year, about 
$85,500  were  derived  from  Mexico, South America, 
and the West Indies ; $12,000  from Africa; $868,000 
fi-om the gold region of  the  United States, and about 
13,000 dollars from sources not ascertained. 
A great part of  the session of  1834 was occupied in 
debates  connected  with  the  removal  of  the  public 
deposits from the bank of  the United States, and upon 
the embarrassments produced by the consequent pres- 
sure upon the money market.  The  senate  took  the 
side of  the bank, ancl March 26 passed two resolutions. 
1. That the reasons assigned  by the secretary  of  the 
treasury for the removal of  the money of  the  United 
States,  deposited  in  the  bank  of  the  United  States 
and its branches,  communicated  to  Congress  on the 
4th of  December,  1833, are unsatisfactory and insuf- 
ficient."  2. "  That  the  President in the  late exe- 
cutive  proceedings  in  relation  to the public revenue 
lias assumed upon  himself  authority and  powers  not 
conferred  by  the  constitution  and  laws,  but  in 
derogation  of  both."  Tlie  House of  Representatives 
took the side of  the President, and on April 4, passed 
the following  resolutions.  1.  'L  That the bank of  the 
United  States  ought  not  to  be  re-chartered."  2. 
"  That tlie public deposits ought not to be  restored to 
the bank of  the United States." 
The following bills relating to gold arid silver coins 
were passed in June,  1834. 
1. A Bill concer?iing  the  GoM Coins oyihe  United States, andfor other 
purposes. 
"  Be it enacted bp the Senate and Honse of  Reprcscntatives  of  the 
Unitcd States of  America, in Congress assemblerl, that tlle  gold  coins 
of  the United States shall  contain  the following  quantities  of  metal ; 
that is to  say,  each  eagle  shall  contain  two  hundred  and  thirty-two 
grains fine gold and t:vo  hundred and fifty-eight grains  standard  gold; 
each half eagle onc hundred and sixteen pins  fine gold, and one hun- 
dred and twenty-nine grains  standard  gold;  each  quarter  eagle  sllall 
contain fifty-eight grains fine gold and G44  grains standard gold ;  every 
such eagle shall be of  the value of  ten dollars ;  every such  half  engle 
bliall be  of  the  value  of  five  dollars;  and  every buch  quarter  eagle 
shall be of  the value of  two dollars and fifty cents;  and the mid  gold 
coins shall be rcceirable in all payments, when of  such weight, accord- 
ing to their said respective values ;  and when of  less than such weight, 
at less values, proportioned to their respective actual weights. 
"  Xec.  2.  And be it further enacted,  that all standard gold and silver 
deposits for coinage, after the 31st day of Jnly next, shall be paid for in 
coin, under the direction of  the secretary of  the  treasury, within  five 
days from the making such deposit, deducting from the amount of  mid 
deposit of  goltl and silver one half  of  one per centum ;  provided, that 
no dednction shall be made unless  mid  advance  be  required  by such 
depositor within forty days. 
"Sec. 3.  And be it further enacted, that all gold coins of the United 
States, minted anterior to tlie 31st day of July next, shall be receivable 
in all payments at the rate of  ninety-four and eight-tenths of a cent. per 
pennyweight. 
"  Sec. 4.  And be it further  enacted, that  this  act  shall be  in force 
from and after the 31~t  day of  July, in  the  year  one  thouwnd  eight 
hundred and thirty-four." 
2.  An Act, vegulating the  value of certain Foreign Gold Coins, within 
the  United States. 
"  Be  it  enacted,  &c.  that  from  and  after  the  31st  day of  July 
next,  the following gold  coins shall pass current as money, witl~in  tile 
Unitecl  States, and  be  receivable in  all  payments, by weight, for  the 
payment of  all debts and demands, at the rates following; that is to say, 
the gold coins  of  Great  Britain, Portugal, and Brazil, of  not  less than 
twenty-two carats fine, at the rate of  94 cents. and 8-10th~  of  a cent. 
per pennyweight; the gold coins of France,  D-10th~  fine, at the rate of 26  TIIE  IIISTOI~Y  OF 
93 cents. and l-loth of a cent. per pennyw,eight; and the gold coins of 
Spain, Mexico, and  Colombia, of  the  fineness of  20  carats,  3 grains, 
and 7-16ths of  a grain, at the rate of  89 cents. and 9-l0tlrs of  a  cent. 
per pennyweight. - 
"Sec. 2.  And be it furtllcr enacted, that it shall be the  dr~ty  of  the 
sccretary of  the  treasury  to  causc  assays  of  the  aforesaid gold  coins 
made current by this act, to be had at the mint  of  the  United  States, 
at least once in every year, and to nlalte report of  the rcsult thereof  to 
Congrcss." 
3.  An  Act, regulating the value of  certain Foreign Silver Coins within 
the  United Slates. 
"  Be it enacted by  the Senate and House  of  Represcntatives  of  the 
United States of  America, in Congrcss :tssembled,  that  fro111 and after 
the passage of  this act, the following silver coins shall be  of  the  Iegd 
value, and  shall pass  current  as money within  the  Unitecl  States, by 
tale, for the payment of  all debts and demands, at the rate of  one hun- 
dred cents. the dollar;  that is to say, the dollars of  hfcxico, Peru, Chili, 
and Central America, of  not lcss weight than four l~undrecl  and fifteen 
gains each, and those restamped  in  Brazil  of  the like weigl~t,  of  not 
less fineness than ten ounces fifteen pennyweights of  pure silver in the 
troy  pound  of  twelve  ounces of  standard  silver;  and  the  five-franc 
pieces of  France, when of  not lcss fineness than ten orlnccs and sixteen 
pennyweights, in  turelve  ounces troy  ~vci~llt  of  stmldaril silver,  and 
wcighing not less than three  l~undred  and  cigl~ty-four  grains  each, at 
the rate of  nincty-three cents. cac'n. 
"  Sec. 2.  And be it further cnactcd, that it shall be tl~c  duty of  the 
sccretary of  the treasnry to cnusc assays of tl~e  afolcsaid  silver coi~~s, 
made currcnt by  tl~is  act, to bc  l~ad  at tlic mint  of  the  United  States, 
at least once in every ycar, ad  to 111:~lie  rel~ort  of  the rcsult thereof to 
Congress." 
Mr.  Gallatin had some y cars  before  rccoinmended 
a  new  coinage, and pointed  out  its  effects  in  pre- 
venting the export.ation of  the gold coins. 
''  We have already advcrted to the erroneous value assigned to gold 
coins  by  the laws which regulate the mint of the United States.  The 
relative value  of  that metal  to  silver was, by  the  law  of  1'790, fixcd 
at the rate of  15 to  1.  In England it wns at that time  at the  rate  of 
15,2  to  1 ;  and it had in France,  after  an investigation respecting the 
market  price of  both metals,  been  established at tl~c  ratc of  154 to 1, 
as early aa the year 1785.  From  that  to  this  time,  gold  coins  have 
never  been below par in that country,  and have gcncrally comnlanded 
a premium, varying from one-fifth to one per cent. ;  but which,  on  an 
average, has been rather less than one-half per cent.  This mtio in all 
those instances is that of gold to silver cui~~s,  but the diffcrc~~ce  isgreatcr 
t~etwccn  gold and silver hnllion. 
"  It is evident that our  gold  coins are  under-rated  at least four per 
cent.  The necessary consequence is  the  disappearance of  gold coins, 
and their exporta.tion to Europe whenever the exchange will admit of  it. 
According  to  that  regulation a ten dollar gold coin, or eagle, contains 
270 grains of  standard gold;  and as the twenty shillings sterling gold 
coin, or sovereign, contains 123 g  grains of  gold  of  the same  stan- 
dard, about $4,56  in gold coin of  the United States, contains a quantity 
of pure gold equal to that contained in a sovereign.  Allowing one per 
cent. for charges and transportation, our gold coins may comnlence to be 
exported to England as soon as the exchange rises to $S,Gl  per pound 
sterling,  which  rate  corresponds with nearly 3Q  per  cent.  above  the 
nomind, and three per cent. below the true par, calculati-]g this at the 
ratio  of  near 15,6 to  1, or $4,75  per  pound  sterling.  We find  by 
the tables of  exchange annexed to the report  of  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury, that, with the exception  of  the year of  the  embargo,  unless 
incidentally for  a  few  days, the exchange  on  London  from  1795 to 
1811, nerer rose to $4,62  per pound sterling, or  about four per  cent. 
above the nominal  par;  or  in  other  words, that during  the whole  of 
that  period,  the  exchange  was  constantly  favourable  to  the  United 
States, having never  been  lligl~er,  with  the  exception aforesaid, than 
two  per  cent.  below  the  true  par.  This is the reason why our gold 
coins, though underrated, were not exported till the year  1821 ;  when 
the exchange rose  from $4,60  to ,$4,08  per pound sterling;  and  our 
gold coins began to be exported, a premiunl of  one-half per cent.  upon 
them being given, when the preinium on the nominal par  of  exchange 
was  five per  cent.,  corresponding to an  exchange  of  near $4,67  per 
pound  sterling.  From  that  time  to  the  end  of  the year  1829, the 
exchanges have, with  few short exceptions,  been  unfavourable to  the 
United States ;  and the exportation has continued, not only during that 
period, but also during the last nine months, though the  exchange  has 
this  year been but  little,  if  any,  above the true par.  It is  perfectly 
clear, that,  xvl~ilst  our  gold  coins  are  thus  underrated,  they  will be 
exported, wl~encver  the  exchange  rises  above $4,61  to  $4,64  per 
pound sterling ;  and that if rated according to the true or approximate 
relative  value  of  gold  to  silver,  they mould  not  be  exported to  En- 
gland till  the exchange had risen to at least $4,80  to $4,83,  or more 
than one per cent. above the true par. 
"  The importance  of  preserving  a  permanent standard  of  value  is 
the leading principle which we have tried to enforce in this paper ;  and 
it is for that express purpose that me cons~der  an alteration in the mint 
regulations, u~hich  alone can bring gold  into  circulation, as  absolutely 
necessary.  The  rate  heretofore  adopted had its origin  in  a  mistake, 
and was not at all intended for the purpose of  excluding gold.  It did 
not produce that effect for thirty years,  on  account  of  tlle  favourable 
rate of exchanges.  To persist in it, now that experience has shewn the 
evils  it  produces,  and  amollgst others the undeniable  exportation  of 
gold, and of gold coins,  at  a  time when the  excha~lges  may  be  three 
per cent. under the true par, instead of being adherence  to  the original 




...........................  Notes in circulatio~~  15,968,731  90 
......  Deposit to tl~e  credit of  the Treasury  429,465  07 
.....................  Do.  Public Offices  1,837,168  66 
..............................  PrivateDeposits  6,741,752  24 
....................................  Capital Stock  35,000,000  00 
...........  Total liabilities.  59,977,117  87 
RESOURCES. 
To  meet  the  foregoing, the  bank  11as  the  followitlg  resources, 
VIZ :- 
JJnllnrs. 
.......................................  Discounts  34,667,828  24 
Mortgages  .......................................  87,593  29 
.................................  Domestic Bills  11,08(i,373  07 
....................................  Foreign Bills  2,727,782  11 
.......................................  Ileal Estnte  3,024,788  45 
........................  Due from State Banks  427,102  89 
...........................................  Specie..  15,9  10,034  3  1 
Total  resources .................. 67,931,511  36 
Sllowing a  surplus of  resources over liabi- 
.......................................  litics of  $,g5 1,393 49 
In his address to Congress, delivered  Dec.  1, 1534, 
General Jackson  referred to  the  bank  of  the United 
0- terins :  States in the followin, 
6'  Circumstances mnkc it 111y dnty to call  the  attcntion  of  Congress 
to tile  bank  of  tl~c  United  Shtcs.  Created  for  the  convenience of 
the government, tlvnt institution ha.s becomc the scourge of the people. 
Its intcrfcrcncc to  postpone tllc  payment  of  a portion of  the nationd 
debt,  that  it  might  retain  the  public  money  appropriated  for  tltat 
purpose  to  strengthen  it  in  a  political  contest-the  extraordinary 
extcllsion and contraction  of  its  accon~modations  to the community- 
its corrupt  and  partisan  lonns-its  exclusion  of  the  public  directors 
frolll a knowledge  of  its  most  important  proceedings-the  unlimited 
conferred on  the President  to  expend  its  funds  in  hiring 
%,ritcrs a11d  l)rocuring the  execution  of  printing, and the use made of 
that authority-the  retention  of  the  pension  money and  books,  after 
the sclcctio~~  of  nclrr ngcr~ts-tllc  groundless  claim  to  heavy damages, 
in conseqrlencc of  tllc protest of  tltc bill drawn on the French govern- 
ment, l~avc,  tl~rou~h  various cl~annels,  been laid before Congress.  Im- 
mediately after the close of tlrc last scssio~~,  the bank, tllrougll  its presi- 
dent,  announced  its  ability  and  readiness  to  aba~~don  the  system of 
unl~aralleled  excitement,  and  tl~e  interruption  of  domestic excharrges, 
rvllirh it l~ad  practised upon from tile  1st of  August,  1833, to the 30th 
of  JUII~, 1834,  and  to  extend  its  nccon~n~odations  to the community. 
The grounds assumed  in  this  annunciation  amounted  to  an  acknow- 
ledgnle~~t  tllat tl~e  curtailment, in  the extent to which it had been car- 
ried, was ]lot necessary to tl~c  safety of  the  bank,  and  had  been  per- 
ststed in merely to induce Congress to grant the prayer of  the  bank in 
its memorial relative to the removal of  the  deposits, and  to  give  it  n 
new charter.  They were  substantidly a  confession  that  all  the real 
distresses which individuals and the country lrad endure11 for the  pre- 
ceding  six  or  cigbt  months  had  been needlessly produced by it, with 
the view of  effecting, thro~~gh  the sufferings of  the  people, thc legisls- 
tive action of  Congrcss.  It is a subject of  congratulation that Congress 
and the cou~ltry  had the virtue nnd  firmness to bear tlle infliction; that 
the energies of  our  people  soon found relief  from tl~is  wanton tyranny 
in vast importations of the precious  metals  from  aln~oft  every part  of 
the  world;  and that at tl~e  close  of  this tremendous effort to  control, 
our goren~rnent  the bank found itself powerless, and no  longer able to 
loa~~  out its s~~rplns  means.  The community 11ad learncd to manage its 
affai~r,  witl~out  its assistance, and  trade  Ilad  already found  new auxili- 
aries;  so  that  on  the  1st of  October  last the extraordinary spectacle 
was presented of  a natio~lal  bank, more than one-half of  whose capital 
was either lying unproductive in its vaults, or in the hands  of  foreign 
bankers.  To the needless distresses brought on the country during the 
last session of  Congress has been added the  open  seizure  of  the divi- 
dends on  the public stock,  to  the  amount  of  170,041 dollars,  under 
pretence of  paying  damages,  costs,  and  i~~tercsts  upon  the  protested 
French bill.  This sum constituted a portion of  the estimnted revenues 
for the year 1834,  upon  which  the  appropriations  made  by Congress 
were based.  It would as soon have been  expected  that  our collectors 
would seize  on  the customs, or the receivers of  our land offices on the 
monies arising from the sale of  public lands, under pretences of  claims . 
against  the  United  States,  as  the  bank  would  have  retained  the 
dividends. 
" That  tl~e  money lrd not  technically been  paid  into the treasury 
does  not  affect the principle intended to be established  by  the consti- 
tution.  The executive  and judiciary have as little right to appropriate 
and expend  the public  money without  authority of  law,  before  it  is 
placed to the credit  of  the  treasurer,  as to take it  from  the treasury. 
In the  annual  report of the secretary of  the treasury, and  in his  eor- 
re5pondence with  the president  of  the  bank,  and the  opinion  of tile 
attorney-general accompanying it, you  will find a  further examination 
of  the claims of  the  bank, and the course it has pursued. 
"  It seems  due  to  the safety of  the public funds remaining in that 
bmk, and  to  the  honour  of  the American  people, that  measures  bs OPERATIONS  OF THE  MINT  IN 1834. 
According  to  the  Report  of  Samuel  Moore, the  late  Director,  dated 
January 1, 1835. 
"  The  coinage  effected  within  tliat  period  [l8341 
amounts to  7,388,423 dollars; comprising 3,954,270 
dollars  in  gold  coins ; 3,4 15,002  dollars  in  silver ; 
19,151 dollars in copper ;  and coilsisting of 11,637,643 
pieces of  coin, viz. 
Half  Eagles  ............  732,169 pieces, making 
Quarter Eagles  .........  117,370  do.  do. 
Half  Dollars ............  6,412,004  do.  do. 
Quarter Dollars .........  286,000  do.  do. 
Dimes  ..................  635,000  do.  do. 
............  Half  Dimes  1,480,000  do.  do. 
.....................  Cents  1,855,100  do.  do. 
............  Half  Cents  120,000  do.  do. 
11,637,643 
'L  The deposits of gold within the past year have amounted, in round 
numbers, to 4,389,000  dollars;  of  which about 1,0(i7,000 dollars con- 
s~sted  of  coins of the United States, issued previously to the act of 28th 
of June,  establishing  a  new  ratio  of  gold  and silver : about 898,000 
dollars  were  derived  from  the  gold  regions  of  the  United  States; 
225,000 dollars  from IVIexico, South  America, and  the West,  Indies ; 
2,180,000 dollars from Europe ;  12,000 dollars from Africa;  and 9,008 
from sources not  ascertained.  Of  the amount rcceived  from  Europe, 
about four-fifths were in foreign coins. 
"  The coinage of gold under  the new  ntio conimcnced on  the 1st 
day  of  August, the earliest period pe~mittcd  by the act.  In anticipa- 
tion, however, of a  change in the lepl valuation  of  gold, it hnd  been 
considered proper to suspend the colliage of  all  deposits re(-eived after 
the I st of June.  Previously to this period, the sum of  $383,545  had 
been coined, so that of  the above amount of  the gold  coinage for the 
past  year, $3,570,725  consist  of  coins  of  the new  standard.  Tliis 
amount, however, is the result of  the operations  of  the mint,  during 
only  five montlls of  the year, corresponding  to  an  amount, for a full 
year, of  about 84 n~illions  in gold.  Within the same period, the coin- 
age of silrer was regularly maintained at the average rate of the whole 
year,  making a general result of  both gold and silver corres1)onding to 
a yearly coillage of  nearly $12,000,000. 
"  The amount in gold in the vaults of  the mint on the 1st of August, 
was $468,500  : the amount now  remaining  in  the  mint  uncoincd is 
$435,000;  no  part  of  xvlcich  wns  dcpofiited earlier  than the 9th of 
Decenlber.  The amount of  silrer remnining in our vaults for  coinage, 
is,  in  rountl  nu~ill,ers, $475,000 ;  no  pnrt  of  w11icl1 nns  deposited 
earlier than the 20th of  Xorember. 
"  The amount of  silver coined nithin the pa-t year, it is satisfactory 
to state, llas exceeded by about a quarter of  a million the silver coinage 
of any previous  year ;  while the gold coinage  has csceeded the aggre- 
gate coinnge of  gold  during  the nil~e  p~eceding  xears,  from  1825 to 
1833, inclu\ive. 
"  The influx of  silrer during the past year llaving very  considerably 
exceeded the amount contemplated in the estilnates for the year, occa- 
sioned, doring a large portion of  that period, an  unusnal retardation  in 
the rlelivery  of  coins ; and  the  alnount of  deposits has no doubt been 
restrained,  to some extent, by  this consideration. 
OPERATIONS  OF THE MINT IIf  1635. 
" Tile coinage  executed duriiis  tile year 1835, lias 
amounted  to  $5,G69,(?67,  c~lll~~risi~~g  &,l 86,175  in 
gold  coins,  $3,443,003  in  silver,  and  $39,489  in 
copper;  and composcd  of  15,016,342 pieces  of  coin, 
viz. 
l>ollniq 
............  Hnlf  Eagles  37 1,534 pieces, mnlting  !  ,857,GTO 
QunrterEagles .........  131,402  do.  do.  328,505 
Half  Ilollars ............  5,352,006  do.  do.  2,676,003 
Quarter Dollars .........  1,052,000  do.  do.  488,000 
Dimes  ..................  1.41 0,000  do.  do.  141,000 
Half  Dimes  ............  2,760,000  do.  do.  138,000 
Cents  .....................  3,878,100  do.  do.  38,784 
Half  Cents  ............  141,000  do.  do.  705 
15,006,342  5,668,667 
" Tl~e  deposits  of   old witllin  the  year  have  anlonnted,  in  round 
r~umbers, to  $1,845,000,  of  which  $69  8,000  was  from  bullion 
derived from tlle gold mines in the United States. 
" The ail~o~ult  of  gold  bullion in  the vaults of  the mint  at the end 
of  the year,  was $97,830,  all of  which was  deposited  in  December. 
The amount of  silver bullio~l  in the raults was $760,CiOO,  all of  nhich 
was deposited in  November and December. 
"  The amount  of  gold  coinage  is  less  than  that  of  1834  by 
$1,768,005.  This  difference has  arisen, in  part, from  the recoinage 
of  American  gold  of  the  former  ratio, which  amounted, in  1834, to 
$1,067,000,  and in  1835, to only $160,000. 
"  The silver and the copper  coinages are greater tl~an  in any former 
year,  and  the  whole  number  of  pieces  struck  exceeds  that  in  any 
former year by more than four m~llions. 
"  In consequence of  an unusual  demand  for  small silver  coins, the 
amount of  this coinage, for  the  last  year, has  been so great as  nearly 
to equal the nrl~olc  of  that for t11e four years preceding. 
D a  Measures have  been  taken recently, and arc now in progress, for 
introducing  improvements  in  the  processes  and  rnacliincry  of  tlie 
mint, by which it  is bclieved  that  the  efficiency of  tl~c  cstablislimer~t 
may  be  nlucli  increased.  I-Ierctoforc  thc  milling  and  coining  liavc 
been  done  exclusively by human  labour.  New inacl~incs  are  nearly 
completed  by  wliicl~  these  01)erations will  be  cxccutctl  wit11  stca111 
power.  The humid assay for silver  has  bee11 succcssf~~ll~  introduced, 
and  new arrangements  for  the  assay by  fire  are  about  to  be  com- 
menced. 
"Amount of  Goldreceived unnuallyJj~om  the Gold Region of  the  United 
8tutes,f,om  1824 to  1835, inclusize. 
1828  - 
466,000 
520,000  -  678,000  -  868,000  -  898,000 
12,200  698,500 
--p 
"  American Almanack, 1837." 
1836.  The  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  expired  in  this  year.  A  new  charter  was 
however  obtained  from  the  State  of  Pennsylvania, 
authorizing the bank  to  carry  on  business  in  that 
state.  The bank also obtained permission to continue 
their  agencies  in some of  the other states.  Though 
it retains  thc  title  of  " Bank  of  the  United States," 
yet it is  not  chartered  by Congress, it is no longer 
the bank  of  the government;  it has  no  longer  the 
power  to  establish  branches  in  the  various  states 
without their  consent, and it must be subject to such 
laws or taxes as the respective states may impose. 
The following  are stated  in an American paper, to 
he the terms on which  the bank obtained  its charter 
from the State of  Pennsylvania. 
"  It  is proposed to s3y a few words  about  tlle Bank  of  the United 
States,  and  the  efforts which  certain  persons  are  making  to  distnrb 
the country about it.  The whole matter is simply this :- 
"  There M-as  a bank called the Bank of  the United States, chartered 
by Congress, but  fixed  in  Pennsylvania, and managed  principally by 
Pennsylvanians.  The  charter  was  about  to  expire  on  the  4th  of 
March, 1836, and  the  directors  liad  nearly completed  their  arrangc- 
ments for closing its concerns. 
"  They made no application  to  the  legislature  of  Pennsylvania  or 
to any other legislature for the re-charter of  tlie bank. 
"  But while they were going  on  quietly minding  up the institution, 
an official application was made by the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania to 
the  bank,  to  know  whether  the  stockholclers  of  the  bank  would 
accept a,  charter from Pennsylvania.  A joint letter from the committee 
on  banks,  and  the  corninittee of  ways  and  means  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  Pennsylvania,  was  addressed  to  tlle  President  of 
the bank, inquiring whether the stockholders of  the bank wo~dd  agree 
to a re-charter by Pennsylvania. 
"  The answer was, that  upon  certain  terms  it would  be  accepted. 
The  legislature  arid  the  governor  accordingly passed  a  bill  for  re- 
chartering the bank, on payment of  certain sums. 
:  "  This was sent  to  the  stocltholders to  know whether  they would 
take it.  They agreed  to  take  it, and  there-both  contracting parties 
having bound themselves-the  matter was closed. 
"  The state acted \-cry wisely in all this.  It  made  a good bargain. 
It made what in conlinon life is called a hard bargain. 
It  gained a bonus of  ..............................  $4,500,000 
......  Subscriptions to internal in~proven~e:lt  675,000 
To ~vhicl~  the bank has voluntarily added  ...  560,000 
And a privilege of  obliging  the bank to make 
loans  always of  6,000,000  at 4  per  cent., 
and 1,000,000  at 5 per cent., making a gain 
..........................................  equalto  620,000 
..................  Making a total of  $6,355,000 
Besides retaining within the state, loans from the bank which at present 
amount to  nearly $20,000,000,  employed  in  advancing every branch 
of  its home industry. 
"  The stockholders would not have accepted the charter but for two 
reasons.  First,  they  liad  reserved  funds  out  of  their  old  earnings 
which went  far  to  pay these  heavy charges;  and  second,  they were 
themselves  Pcnnsylvanians,  and  they were  anxious  to  give  to  their 
state the advantage and the credit of  converting to its own benefit the 
mass of  capital about to be dispersed. 
"  The advantage  of  the  contract was to  the state, not to the bank. 
The favour, if  there was any, was done to  tlie state by  the bank-not 
to the bank by the state. 
"  For all these benefits  the state in  return gave  absolutely nothing. C.  11,ey lllere]y  fllr~,~~~lc,~  ~v:~at  is  c:~ili!d  :k  c!!:~rl(~r ; LTI:LL  is,  1lltby <ti'(l 
tllnt  t]lcsc  stocltl,oldcrs  sl~oultl  be  c:tllctl  t11c  bank  of  t11c  Unitcd 
States,  alltl be  able  to  sue  f(;r  tllcir  deltk.-a  corlicl~iciice  t!~is ir~ 
~:lnnogilig their capital, but aildi!lg  ~~ot  a  doilnr  of  acl~r:i~~;:~gc  to t!mt 
cnpital, a:]?  mcre tl:a:i  the mere plece of  tape IVII~CII  is  IISCC~  to tic up 
a bnnrlle of  noit~s  ,:ire$  vduc to tile nolcs. 
Tlie  rcmarkR'ule  part  of  it  is,  that  tile  cl~\rlcr  iv  i?ot  at lliis 
monlent north the liioney  aid for  it.  if tlie state \voalcl refi~nil  tl~st 
money, a charter  jnst  as good conltl be lrad for one-fomtll of  the sl1111 
in othcr states-and  the fnnrls nrithdrasrl from Pe1111s~lr:~nia  nliglit be 
much more profitably employed elsemherc. 
"  But the bank  has  madc the  bargain,  and will  stand 1)y it.  The 
state  too,  the  honest,  sober  part  of  tlle  community,  ore perfectly 
satisEcd." 
In  his Ctil.ewell  address to Congress, diivercd Dec. 
6, 1836, the  l'resident  thus  adverts  to  the l)an!i  of 
the Unitcd States : 
"  It  was in view cf  tllcse evils, togctltcr 1vitl1 the  dangerous power 
wiclcled by tl~e  bni~lr  of  t11c Unitcd  Statcs, and  its  repugnance  to our 
constitution,  that I n  as i~~duced  to exert ti~c  poner co~~fcrrcil  1111011 nie 
by the America11 pe~ple,  to preveut tl~e  co~ltil~uaucc  of that inslilutiol~. 
But, altl~ougl~  various dangers to our rel:ublica~~  institutions  11nxc bcc11 
obviated  by the fzilorc of  that  bailli to extort from the governnlc~l~t  il 
renewal of  its charter, it is obvious tl~at  little  lras  been  accomplislled, 
except a  salutary change  of  public  opi~lion,  to~varcls restoring  to  the 
country the sol:iid  cv,rrency provided for  in  tlle  constit~~tion.  In tl~e 
acts of  several of  the states prohibiting  tlle  circulation of  s~nall  notcs, 
and the aux~liary  enactnlents of  Congress at tlie last session forbidding 
their reccption  or  payment  on  public  account, the true policy of  tl~e 
country has been a(lvancci1, and a larger portion of  the precious metals 
infltsed  into  our  circulating  medium.  Thcse measures n~ill  probably 
be followed np in due time by the  enactnlent of  state laws, banisl~ing 
from  circulation  Lank  notcs of  still  11igher denominations ; antl  the 
object  nay be materially promoted by further acts of  Co~~gess,  forbid- 
ding  tlle  cn~~lo~mcnt,  ns  fiscd  a.gents,  of  suc11 banks  as continue to 
issne notes of  low ilc~lomi~ra~ions,  ancl tl~row  i~npcdimcnts  in  the may 
of  the circulation of  gold and sil\cr. 
"  Expe~.iencc  conti~lucs  to realize the cspcctatiolls  cntcrtnined ns to 
tlie capacity of  the states' banlrs to pcrfornl  tl~e  duties of  fiscal ' agents 
of the govemn;ent ;  at the  time  cf  the ren~oval  of t11c dcposits it n  as 
alleged  by tlle  advocates of  the bank  of  tll,:  United  States, that  the 
state b~nks,  whatever might be  tl~c  rcgulationa of  tllp lreas~lry  depnrt- 
ment, could  not  make  the  transfers  required  by tl~e  government, or 
negotiate  the  clomestic  exchanges  of  tl~e  counlry.  It is  now  well 
ascertained  thzt  the  reel  don~estic exchanges  perro~mecl through 
discounts,  by  the  Unitetl  Stated Rar:lc  and  its  t~cnty-five  l~ranclles, 
were  at  least  one-third  less  tl~an  those of  the  deposit  banks for an 
equal  period of  time;  and if a conipariso~l  be  instituted  between the 
amounts of  service rdndercd  by tl1e:e  institntio~~s,  on the broader  Gcsi-: 
whicl~  has l~ecn  used  bp the advocntes of  the  United  States' Rank, in 
estimnting n-llnt the::  consider the do~~lestic  exclianges t~.~.i~sacted  by  it, 
the result will be  still more faron~able  to the deposit banks. 
"  Tl~e  whole amouilt of  public  moncp transferred  by tl~e  back  of 
the  Uuited  States  in  1832, n-as  lG,000,000  clollars.  Tl~e  amount 
trausferred  ~nd  actually paid  by the  deposit bmllts in tlie year e!lding 
the first of  October  last, was 39,310,S9!)  dollars ; tlie  anlount  tmns- 
f'erred  and  paid  betxveen  that  period  and  the  Gth  of  November 
.5,399,000 dollars, sir  cl  the amount of  tracsrer  u-zrmnts out~tancli:~g  on 
that day, was 14,450,OCO dollars ;  making an aggregate of 59,1GS,895 
dollars.  Tliese  enormous sums of  money first  i~ieiitioned  I!avc  becn 
transferred  with the greatest pro:~~ptiludc  and  regularity, antl tlrc rates 
at which the cxc;..,nge  have been negotiated prerionsly to  the  passage 
of  the deposit act, v-;re  generally below those charged by the Bank (of 
tlie  United  States.  Independent  of  these  services,  \vhich  are  far 
greater than those rendered bp the United States Bank, nacl its twenty 
five branches, a  nnniber  of  the  deposit  banks I~ave,  wit11 a  commen- 
dable zeal to  aid  in  tlle  improvement of  the  currency, imported fi.0111 
abroad, at their  o~vn  expenje, lwge  sums of  the  precious  nlctnls for 
coinage and circulation. 
"  It will be seen hy the  rcport of  the  secrebary of  the treasury and 
the  accompanying  ilocuments, that  the bank of  the United States has 
made no papmcnt on  account of  the stock  held  bp the go~ernment  in 
that institution, altl~ough  urged  to  pay any portion ~v!~ich  might  suit 
its convenience,  and  that  it has  given  no  inforniation when pa!nle~it 
may be expected.  Nor, a1thou;Ii  repcatcdly requcsted, has it f~irnislied 
the information in relation  to  its r-o::dition,  nliicli Congress  authorised 
the  secretary to  collect  at tlieir  Ia't  sessiou;  such  mcasures  as are 
within the power  of  the executive have  been  taken  to  ascertain tlle 
rluz  of  tl~c  stock, and  procure the papmenl as early as possible. 
" The conduct  an2 present  conhition of  t!iat  banlr, and  the  great 
zdnlonnt of  capital  rested  in  ic  1)y tlie  Unitetl  States,  renuire  your 
careful at ten tic^^.  Its charter ex~ired  on the t!iird  day of  March last, 
arid it has now no potver tlut that siren in the txentp-first section, 'l  to 
use the corporate  name, st~!e, and  capacity, for  the  purpose of  suits 
for the final scttlcillent  and  1iq1:idatim of  the  affairs  and  accounts of 
the corporation, and for tlie  sale  and  disposition of  their  estate, real, 
personal,  and  mixed, but  not  for  any other  pnrpose,  or  in  any otl~er 
manner  whatsoever, nor  for a period  exceeding  t~vo  years  after  tll: 
expiration of  the sad term of  incorporation."  Before  the  expiration 
of  the charter the stockholders of  the bank  obtained  an  act of  incor- 
poration from the legislature of Pennsylvania, excluding only the United 
States.  Instead of proceeding  to u  incl up their concerns, and pay ovpr 
to the United States the nmount due on accomit of  the  stock  I~eld  by 
them, the  president and directors of  the  old  bank  appeared  to  have 
transferred the books,  papers,  notec,  obligations, and most of  all of  its 
property to  this  new corporation,  wl2ich  entered  upon  business  as a 
continuation  of  the  old  concern.  Amon:  other  acts of  questionable 
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used as its own, and again put in circulation.  That  the  old  bnnk had 
no right to issue or re-issue its notes after the expiration of  its charter, 
cannot be denied, and that it could  not  confer  any such  right  on  its 
snbstitute, any more  than  exercise  it  itself, is equally plain.  In law 
and honesty, tlle notes  of  the  bank in circulation, at the  expiation of 
its charter, should have been called in by public advertisement, paid up 
as  presented,  and,  together  mith  these  on  hand, cancelled and  de- 
stroyed.  Their  re-issue is sanctioned by no law, and warranted by no 
necessity.  If  the United  States  be  responsible in their stock for the 
payment of those notes, their re-issue by  the new corporation, for their 
own profit, is a fraud on the government.  If the United States is not 
responsible, then  there is no  legal responsibily in any quarter, and it is 
a fraud on the country.  They are  the  rcdeemeil  notes of  a dissolved 
partnership,  but,  contrary to  the wishes  of  the  retiring  partner,  and 
without his consent, are again re-issued and circulated." 
The  establishment  of  a  National  Bank  being  a 
strong party question in America, it naturally became 
connected with the contest for the office of  President; 
and  a  letter  was  written  by  the  Hon.  Martin  Van 
Buren,  the  successf~~l  candidate,  upon  the  subject. 
The following are extracts: 
"  You  nest ask,  nhether I  will  sign  and  approve  (if  it becomes 
necessary to  secure  and  save  from  depreciation,  the  revenue  and 
finances  of  the  nation,  and  to  afford  a  sound  uniform  currency  to 
the people of  the United States) a bill (with proper  modifications and 
restrictions) chartering a bank of  the United States. 
"  In the published letter of  Mr. Butler  to  Mr.  Garland, wliich  has 
already been refei~ed  to, he thus states my opinions upon  the subject 
of  the bank :-"  Mr. Van Buren's opinions in  regard  to  the  Bank  of 
the United States, were expressed in the Senate of  the  United  States 
in  1828 ;  repeated  in  his  letter  to  the  Shocco-Springs committee, 
whilbt a candidate for  the Vice-Presidency,  and  have  been  so  freely 
uttered  by him, that there  cannot, I  think,  be  occasion  to  say much 
upon the subject.  But to close the door  to  cavil, 1 state,-1st.  That 
he  holds  that  Congress  does  not  possess  the  power  to  establish  n 
national  bank  in  any of  the  states of  the  union, nor  to  establish, in 
such states, the branch of  any bank located in the district of  Colombia; 
and, 2nd.  That he is therefore decidedly opposed to the establishment 
of  a  national  bank  in  any of  the  states;  and  is  also  opposed  to  the 
establishment  of  any sucli bank  in  the  district  of  Colombia, as  un- 
necessary and inexpedient, and as liable to a great  proportion  of  the 
abuses which have, in his opinion, been practised by the existing bank." 
"  But  whilst  I  so  confidently entertain, and  so  readily promulgate 
these sentiments, in regard to the want of  power to establish in any of 
the  states a  national bank,  I am  at the same time  equally desirous 
that it should be fully understood that I an1  decidedly opposed to  the 
creation of  any such institutio~~  in tlie dlstrict of  Colombia.  I  do  not 
belleve  that  ally  national  bank,  there  or  elsewhere,  is  necessary  to 
secure either of  the advantages to which your  question  has reference. 
The lxincipal  grounds  relied  upon  by the  advocates  for  a  bank, to 
establish its utility and necessity, as I understand  them, are,- 
"  1st.  That such an institution is necessary for the transmission  and 
safe keeyi~lg  of  the p~~blic  monies. 
"  2nd.  To secure a safe, cheap, an(1 convenient  system of  domestic 
exchange ;  and 
"  3rd.  To make and preserve a sound currency. 
"  Thc limits of this letter will not adnlit of  a full discussion of  these 
points, but I cannot refrain from referring to a few of  the  facts  which 
belong to them. 
"  The official reports of the secretary of  the treasury shew first, that 
the average amount of  money annually transferred by the Bank of  the 
United States from 1820 to 1823, was from  ten  to  fifteen millions of 
dollars ; and the amount transferred  by the  deposit banks, from  June 
1835 to April  1836, or about  tell  months, over  seventeen  millions  of 
dollars.  I11  both cases tl~e  operation has  been without  loss, failure, or 
expense.  And  it  farther  appears,  from the  same  source, that  at  no 
previous period has the safety of  the public monies been more carefully 
or  securely provided  for.  An  exanination of  tLe  official docnnlents 
will, I an1 well satisfied, fully sustain  these  positions.  What founda- 
tion,  then,  was  there  for  the  assumptions,  upon  this  part  of  the 
subject, which  were  put  forth  mith  so  mucll  solemnity, and insisted 
upon  with  so  much  earnestness,  in  the  carly  discussion  upon  the 
subject  of  the  bank?  If  so  much  has  been  done  in  this  respect, 
whilst the substituted agency has had to conteild with the most powcr- 
ful  opposition  that Ivas  ever  made  upon  any  branch  of  the  public 
service, what may we not expect  from  it  now, when  it  has  received 
legislative sanction-and  if  there be not gross  dereliction  of  faith  and 
dnty-when  it must also receire the support of  all parties. 
"  In regard to domestic exchanges, the folloaing facts are established 
by the  same  authentic  source, namely,  that  tlie  ainonnt  of  domestic 
exclianges, perfo~n~ed  at the last returns by tlie  deposit  banks, exceed 
thirty-five millions of  dollars, and  at no  return, for many months, has 
it been less than twenty-five millions;  which, at an  average  of  thirty 
millions at each  retuin, would  be  in  a  year  one  hundred  and  eighty 
millions, if  each bill of  exchange  run  on  an  average  sixty days.  On 
the  contrary,  the  amount  of  donlestic  exchanges  perfor~ned  by  the 
United States Bank, did  not  for  many years  equal  twenty millions  at 
any one return, and seldom exceeded it ;  being quite one-third less than 
what is now done by the deposit banks.  It furthcr appears that these 
exclianges  have  in  many cases  been  effected  at  louer  rates  by the 
deposit banks  than  by the  United  States  Bank.  Indeed, can  it  be 
doubted that even if  there was not a single bank,  state or  national, in 
the country, it wonld ne~ertlieless  be quite  easy to  place  its domestic 
exchanges upon  an ad~antageous  and safe footing, so  long  as  there is 
a sufficiency of  solid capital  to  be  employed  in  the business.  From 
the nature of  the thing itself,  and  from the experience of  Europe, we 
may be assured that the  profit  and  necessities of  tmde  would  invite 
and obtain ample  facilities for  the  business of  exchange  from  other 40  TIIE  IIISTORY  OF 
sources, so loug as tlie commercial community, 1rit11 one accord, desire 
to see it soccessfully carried on, and assist in good fait11 in efFecting it. 
Lastly, the  currency.  The  proportion  of  our  wliole  circulating 
that was  coiiiposed  of  the notes  of  tlie  bank  of  the  United 
Stntcs, during the existencc of  that institution, was much smaller than 
\r.as generally s~~~~>osed.  The calcula~ion  of  the United States  Bank, 
as 1  an1 informed, ranged, for some years  before  it  espired, at  about 
tlventy millions, often  below  that  amount, .rvliich was  not  over  one- 
fourth of  tho pnpcr circulntion of  the United  States.  Some  tl~ink  it 
has been less than one-fifth.  The great  mass  of  the  business  of  the 
country was therefore even carried on, so far  as money was  employed 
in it, by means of  the notes of  state banlis and specie.  The beneficial 
effects that mere claimed to be rendered by that  institution  in  respect 
to the currency, consisted,- 
"  1st.  In sulq~lying  bills that were  current  throughout  the Union ; 
and 
a  2nd.  The ~zlntary  effects of  its supervision  over  the  state  banks, 
in peventing over-issues, and compelling them to keep on  hand  larger 
supplies of  specie for the redemption of  their notes. 
The transactions  in ~vliich  it became  necessary, or was  nsual, to 
carry bank notes from one state to another, were wry limited  in  their 
anlounts-large  sums being  then, as  they are  now, and  ever will  be, 
transmitted tl~rougli  the medium of bills of exchange.  It  will not even 
now, I think, be sefiously clenied, that the increase of  the gold coinage, 
and  the  facilities of  getting that  species  of  coin,  together  with  the 
large  denoniination  of  notes  issued  by  the  leading  state banks, are 
abnndantly sufficient for those  purposes, and that they can be  quite as 
conveniently emplove~l  in them. 
GL  As to the bellefits alleged to have been  rendered  by the bank  of 
the United States, in checking excessive issues by the state banks, and 
compelling them to maintain an adequate supply of  specie,-whilst  by 
no means disposed to undervalue them, I yet  think  the  same  objects 
call be accomplisl~ed,  not only without the agency of  any such  institu- 
tion, but to a much greater and more useful  extent without  than with 
it :-provided  a  proper  policy be  pursued  by  the  federal  and  state 
governments ;  by the former, through  the  mint  and  treasury depart- 
ment ;  by the  latter, bp  suppressing  small  bills,  by discouraging  the 
extension of  the  paper  system, and  by sul~jccting  existing  banks  to 
wholesome restraints and to a rigid supervision. 
a Three additional  mints  have  been  established, ant1 the President 
is authorized  by the  deposit  bill  to  keep  them  amply supplied with 
bullion ; aud the secretary of  the treasury is empowered to require an 
increase of  specie in any deposit bank, and is restricted from employing, 
&S  an  agent  for  the  government,  any  state  bank which  issues  bills 
under the  denomination  of  five tlollars.  By another general larv, the 
notes of  such banks me prohibited  from  being  received for debts due 
to the United States of  any description ; and it has also bee11 provided 
by law,  that  no  note  shall  hereafter  be  offered  in  payment  by the 
United States or  post  office department  of  a  less  denomination  than 
ten dollars, and after the third day of  March nest of  aless denoniination 
than twenty doll:~rs,  nor  note  of  any tlc~~on~irtatio~~,  which  is  not 
pn!nLle  and paid  011  clemand  in  gold  and  silver  at  the place where 
issued,  and  m1:icli  should  not  be  erluivalent  to  specie  at  the place 
where offered, nnd  convertible  upon  tlie spot  into  gold ancl  silver, at 
the will of  the holder, and without  loss  or  dclay to  him.  Nor  have 
the states  lagged  beliind  in  tlieir  efforts to  in~prove  the currency by 
infu~sing  into it a greater  proportion  of  the precious  metals.  Already 
are the  issuing  of  bills  under  tlie  denomination  of  fivc  dollars pro- 
hibited  bp  the states of  Pccnsylrania,  Maryland,  Virginia,  Georgia, 
Tennessee, Louisizna, North Carolina, Indim:a,  ICentucky, Maine, New 
York,  New  Jersey, and Alabama,  and  or"  one  and  two  dollars  by 
Connecticut.  T11at this  policy  rill  Leconle  general,  and  gradually 
extended,  cannot  be  doulbtecl.  To  what  precise  estent  it  may  be 
carried  with  advantage  to  the  country,  will  Le  dccidcd  by  t~me, 
experience,  and  judicious  observation.  Evasions  of  it  may  for  a 
season  take  place,  and  some  slight  inconveniences  arise  from  tlie 
change, but  t!~ey will  Lot11  be  temporary.  Tlie  union  co~nmittee  of 
the  city  of  New  Yorlr,  confessedly  coinbining  soine  of  the  best 
business talents of  our  great  con~~nercial  emporium, reenrded  it as an 
improvement of  the currency of  great  i~nporiance  to all classes of  the 
people.  Legislative bodies  l~ave  slic~vn  great unanin~ity  in its favour. 
It is appro~ed  by  the people, nnd must prcvnil. 
"  Shcerely believing, for  tlie rcasons which  liave  just  been stated, 
that the public  funds  may Le  as  safely and  conveniently transn~itteil 
froin one portion of  tlic Union to  ailother, that domestic exchange can 
be as successfi~lly  and as cheaply effected, and the currency be rendered 
at least as so~uld  under  the  existing  system, as those objects could be 
accomplished by rneans of  a national bank,  I mould not seek a remedy 
for  tlie  evils  to  which  you  allode,  should  they unfortunately occur, 
through  such  a  medi~ini,  even if  the constitutional  objection were  not 
in the may." 
By  a  report, recently  made  by the auditor-general 
to the Pennsy1va:liail  legislature, tlie f'ol!owing  are the 
priiicipal items in  the condition of the  new  bank  of 
the United States. 
Do:Inrs. 
Capital  ............................................  35,000,000 
Notes in circulatioil  ..............................  36,G20,420 
...........................................  Deposits..  2,194,23 1 
Notes of  other banks.. ............................  19,078,796 
.............................................  Specie  5,079,460 
Debts owng by otl~er  bnnks .....................  31,553,033 
Bills discounted ....................................  56,389,253 
Unclaimed dividends ..............................  241,900 
Contingent Fund  .................................  1,695,105 
Real Estate  .......................................  3 15,214 
Due to other bai~ks ..............................  30,755,561 THE  IIISTORY  OF 
SECTION  111. 
THE  STATE  BANKS. 
The Bank  of  the  Unitcd  States  was  founded  by 
Congress, but all the other banks derived  their char- 
ter from  the government of  the states in which they 
are established.  They  are all joint-stock  companies, 
as no  private  banking  is  allowed.  Thc  chartered 
banks are subject to various restrictions, accordiiig  to 
the enactlncnts  of  the  different  states; and  their re- 
strictions are often such as are unknown in this coun- 
try.  Gc~lerally  no shareholder is  answerable for the 
debts of  the bank beyond  the proportionate  amount 
of  his  shares.  In some cases the government retains 
the option  of  subscribing an  additional  number  of 
shares, and  of  appointing a  correspoliding  number 
of  directors.  And  in  otliers.  the banks  are under 
obligation  to  advance a  ccrtain sum  to  the  govern- 
ment  whenever  required.  Somc  states  have  laid  a 
tax  of  ten  per  cent.  011  the  divideilds  paid  on  the 
stock  of  each  bank.  The  banks  are  sometimes re- 
stricted not to incur debts beyond a ccrtain proportion 
to their  capital ; and  in  all  the states tlie banks are 
now  required  to  make  periodical  returns  to  the 
government. 
I. The business of  the States Banks. 
"  The business of  all  those banks consists,  in  receiving money on 
deposit, in issuinm bank notes, and in discounting notcs of hand or bills 
of exchange.  AO  portion  of  the capital is  sometimes vcstcd in public 
stocks,  but  this  is  not  obligatory,  and in  this  they  differ essentially 
from the Bank of  England. 
"Whenever  therefore  an  American  bank  is in  full  operation,  its 
debts generally  consist, 1st. to the stockholders  of  the capital;  2nd. 
to the community, of  the notes in  circulation,  and  of  the  credits  in 
account current, con~monly  called deposits ;  and its credits,  1st. of dis- 
comlted notes or bills of  exchange, and  occasionally of  public  stocks. 
2.  Of  thc spccie in its vaults, and of  the notes of,  and balances due by, 
other banks.  3.  Of  its red estate, either used  for banking  purposes 
or taken in payment of debts.  Some other incidental items may some- 
times be introduccd ; a  part  of  the capital is occasionally  invested  in 
road, canal, and bridge  stocks,  and the  debts  secured on  judgments, 
or  bonds  ant1 mortgages,  arc  generally distinguishcd  in  the  official 
rctur~~s  of  the barilts."-Gallatin. 
11.  The follolving is a list of  all the State Banks in 
operation on thc 1st of  January,  1830.-(Froat  Mr. 
Galatin.) 
Capital  Capifnl 
MASSACHUSETTS.  I Faln~outh  -  -  -  100,000 
Massachusetts  -  -  800.000  Farmers  -  -  -  100.000 
Union  -  -  -  800;000 
Phoenix  -  -  -  200,000 
Gloucester  -  -  120,000 
Newburyport  -  -  210,000 
Beverly  -  -  -  100,000 
Boston  -  -  -  900,000 
Salem  -  -  -  250,000 
Plymouth-  -  -  100,000 
Worcestcr  -  -  200,000 
Marblehead  -  -  120,000 
Pacific  -  -  -  200,000 
State  -  -  - 1,800,000 
Mechanics -  -  -  200,000 
Merchants, (Salem)  -  400,000 
Taunton  -  -  -  175,000 
New-England  -  - 1,000,000 
Hampshire  -  -  100,000 
Dedham  -  -  -  100,000 
Manuf.&Mech's.(Boston) 750,000 
Sp~ingfield  -  -  250,000 
Lynn Mechanics  -  100,000 
Merrimack  -  -  150,000 
Pamtueket  -  -  100,000 
Suffolk  -  -  -  750,000 
Commercial, Salem  -  300,000 
Bedford Comn~ercial -  250,000 
Agricultural  -  -  100,000 
American-  -  -  750,000 
Andover  -  -  -  100,000 
Asiatic  -  -  -  350,000 
Atlantic  -  -  -  500,000 
Barnstable  -  -  100,000 
Blackstone  -  -  100,000 
Brighton  -  -  -  150,000 
Bunker Hill  -  -  150,000 
Cambridge  -  -  150,000 
Central  -  -  -  50,000 
City  -  -  - 1,000,000 
Colunlbinn  -  -  500,000 
Commonwealth -  -  500,000 
Danvers  -  -  -  120,000 
Eagle  -  -  -  500,000 
Exchange  -  -  -  300,000 
Fall River -  -  -  200,000 
Franklin, (Boston)  -  ~OO;OOO 
Frcnklin,(GreenfieId)-  100,000 
Globe  -  -  - 1,000,000 
Hampden -  -  -  100,000 
Hampshire Man.  -  100,000 
Housatonic  -  -  100,000 
Leicester-  -  -  100,000 
Low-ell  -  -  -  100,000 
Man. & Mech.'s  (Nan- 
tucket) -  -  -  100,000 
Mendon  -  -  -  100,000 
Mercantile  -  -  200,000 
Mcrcht. (New-Beclford)  250,000 
Millbury  -  -  -  100,000 
Norfolk  -  -  -  200,000 
North Bank  -  -  750,000 
Oxforrl  -  -  -  100,000 
Sunderland  -  -  100,000 
Sutton  -  -  -  7.5,000 
Washington  -  -  500,000 
66 Banlnbs  20,420,000 
MAINE. 
Portland  -  -  -  200,000 
Saco  -  -  -  100,000 
Cumberland  -  -  200,000 
Bath  -  -  -  100,000 
Lincoln  -  -  -  100,000 
Augusta  -  -  -  100,000 
Kennebunk  -  -  100,000 
Gardiner  -  -  -  100,000 
Waterville  -  -  50,000 
Bangor  -  -  -  50,000 
Casco  -  -  -  200,000 
Canal  -  -  -  300,000 
Manufacturers  -  -  100,000 
Merchants  -  -  150,000 
South Berwick  -  -  50,000 
Thomaston  -  -  50,000 
Union  -  -  -  50,000 
Vassalborough  -  -  50,000 
18 Banks  2,000,000 4 4  TIIE  IIIETOI1Y  OF 
Capilal. 
NEW-HABIPSBIRE. 
Ucion  -  -  -  150,000 
Concord,  Lowcr)  -  80,000 
Portsmout  \  1  -  -  100.000 
Esctcr  -  - 
Strafford  -  - 
Cl~csllirc -  - 
New-Hampsl~ire 
Rockingl~am  - 
Conimercial  - 
Piscataqua  - 
])over  - 
Nerrimack Co.  - 
Farniers  -  - 
Winnepisogee  - 
Pemigcwasset  - 
Grafton  -  - 
Claremont  - 
Connecticut River 
-- 
18 Banks  1,791,670 
VERMONT. 
Burlington  -  -  63,000 
Windsor  -  -  -  80,000 
Bratt.leboroug11  -  -  50,000 
Rutland  -  -  -  60,000 
nfontpelier  -  .  30,000 
St. Albans  -  -  20,0!)0 
Caledoi~ia  -  -  -  30,000 
Vergennes  -  -  30,000 
Orange County  -  -  29,625 
Bcnnington  -  -  40,000 
10 Banks  432,625 
RHODE  ISLAND. 
Providence  -  -  500,000 
Rhodc Islanrl  -  -  100,000 
Escl~an.ze  -  -  -  500,030 
Bristol  -  -  -  150,000 
JVashingto~i  -  -  7.'5,000 
Warren  -  -  -  105,350 
Sniitlificld U~lion  -  60,000 
Newport  -  -  -  130,000 
Roger Williams -  -  490,950 
Rl~odc  Island UII~UI~  -  230,000 
Nniragansett  -  50,908 
Coninicrcinl (Eristo])  -  350,009 
Nsl~ufacturcm -  -  341!,000 
Capilal. 
Union (Providence)  -  500,000 
Pantnxet  -  -  -  87,S58 
B~~rrlllvillc  (Agric.  and 
Mm~g.)  -  -  -  37,360 
Cranston  -  -  -  25,000 
Eagle (Provitlcl~ce)  -  300,000 
Eagle (Briatol)  -  -  50,000 
F~u~~lilil~  -  -  -  38,000 
Frccma~i's-  -  -  67,000 
llcllt  -  -  -  20,000 
Landlioldcrs  -  -  50,000 
Mercl~a~~ts  (Newport)-  50,000 
Merclla~~ts  (I'rovidence)  500,000 
N.  12.  Coinmercial 
(Newport)  -  -  75,000 
Phrenis (Westerly)  -  4<2,000 
11.  I. Central  -  -  66,275 
Scituate  -  -  -  15,660 
Warnrick  -  -  -  20,000 
Bank of  N. America  -  100,OGO 
Alccl~nnics  -  -  -  39.1,,600 
hlcchanics  i~nd  Mang. 
(Prov.)  -  -  -  103,990 
ITi~lr  St. Bank  -  -  70,000 
S~l~itllfield  I<xd~ang.c  -  63,000 
Villnge Bad  -  -  40,000 
Smitllficld Lime Rock -  100,100 
Cun~berla~~d  -  -  65,750 
11.  I. A4gricultur$  -  50,000 
&fount Vcrno~l  -  -  -1.0,OOO 
N. E. Pacific  -  -  83,750 
Union (Bristol) -  -  49,000 
Hope (War1.er1) -  -  10!),OCO 
iirortll Iiingsto~l  -  -  44,485 
Centreville  -  -  2.i,000 
Woonsocket Fa!ls  -  51,269 
Mount  Hope (Bristol) -  75,0C)!) 
CONNECTICUT. 
New London  -  -  146,437 
Norwicl~ -  -  -  150,000 
Hartforcl  -  -  - 1,252,900 
P11a11is  -  -  - 1,218,500 
Brirlgcport  -  -  100,000 
Union (Ncw-Lo:.don  -  100,001) 
Wi~~tll~or~~  Co.  .  -  104,300 
T~I~JIIC~  -  -  -  153.500 
(s;tpi~:~l. 
Pairfieltl Co.  -  -  1Ll3.000 
8lcchanics of  N. Haven  033,:i5!) 
Nidtlleto\r.n  -  -  4.00,000 
Hew Mavcn  -  -  339,600 
Stominzton  -  -  53.000 
Cnpilnl. 
NEW-JERSEY. 
State Bnnlc Ca~nden  -  266,050 
,,  Now Crii~~swiclc 7'1,084 
,,  ].':lizal)~tl~  Town  132,550 
,,  Ncivark  -  -  280.000  a 
1;  i3~1n!;s  !',~I.S.j,Ii7 
NEW-YGiiIC. 
State Bank at Albany -  369,000 
Gelicva  -  -  -  800,Oi)O 
Utica  -  -  -  500,000 
Meclis  and  Fanners, 
Albany-  -  -  312,000 
Catskill  -  -  -  110,000 
I)li(~nix  -  -  -  500,000 
New-York  -  -1,000 
Merchants  -  - 1,490,000 
Mecha~iics  -  -  - 2,000,000 
Farmers, (Troy)  -  278,000 
A  lhan y  -  -  -  240,000 
Mohan.1~ -  -  -  165,000 
U~~ion -  -  -1,000,000 
America  -  -  - 2,031,200 
City 13anIc -  -  - 1,000,000 
Troy  -  -  -  352,000 
Ontario  -  -  -  500,000 
Cllenango -  -  -  100,000 
Middle District  -  -  406,153 
Auburn  -  -  -  184,000 
Central (Cherry Valley)  86,000 
Jeffcrso~~  County  -  74,000 
Tradesmens  -  -  480,000 
Dry Dock Co.  -  -  200,000 
Nortli K~ver  -  -  500,000 
Commercial  -  -  22'5,000 
Duchess County -  -  7.5,000 
Rocliester -  -  -  250,000 
Long Tsland  -  -  390,000 
Frnnlilin  - '  -  -  5 10,000 
Newburgh  -  -  120,000 
Orange County  -  -  106,000 
Lansingburgl~  -  -  220,000 
Manhattan Co.  -  - 2,050,000 
Delaware and Hudson -  $00,000 
Fulton  -  -  -  750,000 
Cl~cmicd -  -  -  500,000 
37 Banks  20,083,353 
;;  hlarris  -  -  93;703 
Farmers'  Ba~ilc, New 
Jcrszy-  -  -  100,000 
New-Brru~s~r.ick-  -  00,000 
Newark  Ranking  and 
Insurance Co.  -  350,000 
S~:i~rt  -  -  -  27,.500 
Trenton Banking Co.  -  214,740 
Cuniberlnntl  -  -  52,025 
Commcrcinl  -  -  30,000 
Farmers'  and  Mcch's. 
Rail~vay-  -  -  30,000 
Ornnjic T3a11li  -  -  50,000 
Pcople's ditto  -  -  75,000 
Salcm Banking Co.  -  30,000 
Salem a1111 1'.  Rl:~;l'g  -  30,000 
Wad~ingtoi~  Bank  -  93,460 
18 Banks  2,0 17,009 
PENNSYLVANIA. 
Pennsylvania  -  - 2,500,000 
aea  -  - 1,800,000 
Nortl~  America  -  - l,C;00,000 
Farmers & Mechanics- 1,250,000 
C11an1bersl)urgh  -  -  247,228 
Chcster County -  -  00,000 
Delaware County  -  77,510 
(iettysburgll  -  -  125,318 
I'ittsburgh  -  -  346,155 
Carlisle  -  -  -  17l,4GG 
E:lston  -  -  -  187,380 
Fanners of  Bucks Co.-  60,01)0 
Farmcrs of  Lancnster -  400,000 
Farnirrs of  Reading  -  300,000 
Harrisburgll  -  -  158,525 
Lancaster -  -  -  134,235 
Monongahela  Bank  o f 
Brownsville  -  -  102,128 
Northa~npton  -  -  11  2,500 
Westmorcland  -  -  107,033 
York  -  -  -  168,720 
Germantown  -  -  129,500 
Montgomer~  County  -  133,340 
Northern  Liberties  -  ?On,000 BANKING  IN  AICIERICA.  -2 7 
Capital. 
Commercial  -  - 1,000,000 
Mechanics of  Philadel- 
phia  -  -  -  529,330 
Schuylkill -  -  -  500,000 
Southwark  -  -  249,630 
Kensington  -  -  124,990 
Penn Township -  -  149,980 
Colun~bia  Bridge  -  395,000 
Miners' Bank of  Potts- 
ville  -  -  -  40,000 
Erie -  -  -  -  20,000 
Girard's -  -  -  1,800,000 
33 Banks  14,609,963 
DELAWARE. 
Delaware  Bank,  Wil- 
mington  -  -  110,000 
Farmer's Bank of  Del.  500,000 
Wilmington & Brandy- 
wine  -  -  -  120,000 
Bank of  Snl-yms  -  100,000 
Commercial Bank of  Del. Not  knuwn 
Wilnlington  -  -  ditto 
4 Banks  830,000 
2 not known -  - 
6 Banks 
MARYLAND. 
Bank of  Baltimore  - 1,197,556 
Union  -  -  - 1,500,000 
Mechanics-  -  -  384,000 
Commercial & Farmers  31 8,400 
Farmers and Merchants  414,045 
Franklin  -  -  -  406,500 
Marine  -  -  -  235,000 
Hagerstown  -  -  250,000 
Furmers of  Maryland -  820,000 
Susquehennah Bridge -  175,000 
Westminster  -  -  175,000 
Frederick County  -  175,000 
Bank of  Maryland  -  200,000 
13 Banks  6,250,495 
DISTRICT  OF COLUMBIA. 
Wa~huigto~i  -  -  479,120 
Union, (George Town)  478,230 
Alexandiia  -  -  500,000 
Capital. 
I Potomac  -  -  -  500,000 
Mechanics of  Alexandria 372,544 
Farmers of  ditto  -  310,000 
Metropolis  -  -  500,000 
Farmers & Mechanics 
of  Geogetown  -  485,900 
Patriotic  -  -  -  250,000 
9 Banks  3,875,794 
VIRGINIA. 
Bank of  Virginia  - 2,740,000 
Farmers of  ditto -  - 2,000,000 
Bank of  the Valley  -  654,000 
North Western Bank of 
Virginia  -  -  117,100 
4 Banks  5,571,100 
NORTH CAROLINA. 
Cape Fear -  -  -  795,000 
Newbern  -  -  -  800,000 
State Bank  -  - 1,600,000 
3 Banks  3,195,000 
SOUTH CAROLINA. 
Bank of  Shtc of  South 
Carolina  -  - ],l 56,000 
Planters and Mechanics, 
Charleston  -  - 1,000,000 
State Bank  -  -  800,000 
South Carolina  -  -  679,000 
Union  -  -  - 1,000,000 
5 Banks  4,631,000 
GEORGIA. 
Bankof Stateof Georgia 1,303,426 
Planters  Bank of  ditto  566,000 
Marine and Fire Ins.  Not given. 
Allpsta  -  -  -  600,000 
Daricn  -  -  -  484,276 
Central  -  -  -  022,317 
Aupsta Insurance  -  110,000 
Macon  -  -  -  75,000 
hfercliants and Plantcrs  142,000 
9 Bmks  4,203,020 
Cnl~ilal. 
LOUISIANA. 
Louisiana  State  Bank 1,248,720 
Orleans  -  -  -  424,700 
Bank of  Louisiana  - 2,092,560 
Branch  of  Bank  of 
Louisiana  -  - 1,000,000 
4 Banks  5,665,980 
ALABAMA. 
Bank of  State  -  -  495,503 
,,  of  Mobile -  -  148,000 
2 Banks  643,503 
MISSISSIPPI. 
Bank  of  State of  Mis- 
sissippi and Branches  950,600 
1 Bank 
TENNESSEE. 
Bank of  State of  Ten- 
OHIO. 
Chilicotha  -  -  - 
Stcubenville  -  - 
Westcrn Reserve Bank 
Beln~ont Bank  of  St. 
Clairsville  -  - 
Cornnlercial of  Saioto  - 
Farmers of  Canton  - 
Farnlers and Mcclianics 
of  Steubenville  - 
Franklin of  Colunlbus - 
Lancaster Ohio Bank  - 
Mount Pleasant 
Mnrietta  -  -  - 
Capital. 
11 Banks-  -  1,454,386 
MICHIGAN. 
Bank of  Michigan  -  100,000 
1 Bank - 
FLORIDA. 
nessec  -  -  -  737,817  Bank of  Florida-  -  75,000 
1 Bank  1 Bank - 
RECAPITULATION. 
MmsacLusetts  - 
Maine  -  - 
New-Hainpshire 
Vermont -  - 
Rhode Island  - 
Connecticut  - 
New-York  - 
New-Jersey  - 
Pennsylvania  - 
Delaware -  - 
Maryland-  - 
Dist. of Columbia 
Virginia  -  - 
North Carolina - 
South Carolina  - 
Georgia  -  - 
111.  The following  tables  of  the number and con- 
ditions of  the banks in the respective  states  is taken 
from the American Almanack for  1837. 
NO.  j  Capital. 
66  20,420,000 
18 I  2,050,000 
18  1,79 1,670 






























































Ohio  - 
Michigan - 
Florida  - 
Delaware 
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1V.-Tlle  follo\~~ing  list of banl;s  that have failed or 
discontintled business is taltcrl from Mr. Gallatin. 
A List of  the Bnvks lol~ich  haoe $tileil,  or discontinued their bucilzess, 
from 1st January, 18  11, to  1st Jzily, 1830. 
Cspi:a1. 
MASSACHUSETTS. 
Essex  -  -  -  300,000 
New Bedford  -  -  150,000 
Nortllan11)to11  -  -  75,000 
Yammers',  (Bclcl~crtown)  100,000 
Brighton  -  -  -  150,000 
Sntton  -  -  -  75,000 
C~p~lnl. 
Plattsburgl~  -  -  300,000 
Wabl~ingtor~andWarrc~l  400,000 
N.  York Mar~uf.  Co.  -  700,000 
Franklin  -  -  -  510,000 
hIidtlle District  -  -  485,776 
Catskill  Aqoed. Assoc. 
l0  Banks  3,378,676 
8 Banks  1,150,000  1  PENNSYLVANIA. 
(i  Banks  850,000 
MAIh  E. - 
Maine  -  -  300,000 
NEW JERSEY. 
Jersey City Bank  -  200,000 
Patterson  -  -  -  160,000 
DELAWARE. 
RHODE  ISLAND. 
Fnrmers' & Meel~mics', 
Pautuxet  -  -  200,000 
Far. Exclmnge, Gloucester - 
l Bank  200,000  - 
NEW HAEIPSHIRE. 
Coos  -  -  -  100,000 
Cor~cord  -  -  -  29,600 
2 Banks  129,600 
CONNECTICUT. 
Eagle  -  -  -  500,000 
Derby  -  -  -  100,000 
2 Banks  690,000 
NEW YORK. 
J. Barker's  Exchange -  495,250 
Utica Insurance Co.  -  100,000 
Columbia  -  -  -  167,650 
Hudson  -  -  -  110,000 
Niagara  -  -  -  108,000 
Cnpital. 
I 
Ycnobscot-  -  -  150,000  State Bank, Trer~ton -  02,400 
\\riscasset -  -  -  100,000 1  Protectior~  ar~d  lolubard  200,030 
Wasl~ington  -  -  92,050 
Fanl~c~s'a~~d  Mechanics 
of  Grcencastle  -  74,485 
Ditto ditto of  Pittsburgll  65,337 
Juniata  -  -  -  164,478 
MaricttaandSusquel~an- 
nah Trading Co.  -  239,430 
Pennsylvania Agril. and 
Man.Bank  -  -  110,102 
Delaware Bridge  -  99,715 
Alleglleny  -  -  144,807 
Bcsver  -  -  -  78,985 
Snatara  -  -  -  75,055 
Centre  -  -  -  159,610 
Hrlntingdon  -  -  123,122 
Nort~~unlbcrland,Union 
and Colun~bia  -  116,980 
North Western Bank -  77,688 
Union of  Penr~sylva~~ia  124,792 
Silvcr Ll~ke  -  -  64,882 
Fayette, New Salem  - 
Harmony -  -  - 
Wilkcsbarre Branch  - 
I6 Banks  1,811,558 
GEORGIA. 
Hallo~,ell  -  -  -  150,000 
Icenncbec -  -  -  150,000 
Pass:~lnaquoddy  -  -  50,000 
C:~stille  -  -  -  100,000 
Lil~colr~  and  ICenucbcc  200,000 
Franklin  -  -  -  300,000 
Monmoutll  -  -  40,000 
Manufacturin,~ -  -  150,005 
Salcm and Pl~~ladelphia. 
Hobolten 
7 Banks  1,142,1,lN) 
Farmers'and Mechanics' 
of  Delaware  -  -  45,000 
MARYLAND. 
Ellcton  -  -  -  110,000 
Conococl~eague -  -  157,500 
Cunlberland  -  -  107,862 
Somerset and W.  -  90,000 
Somerset  -  -  -  195,850 
Caroline  -  -  -  103,045 
Havre  -  -  132,075 
City -  -  -  -  838,fJ40 
Plauters' P. George'sco.  86,290 
9 Banks  1,821,162 
Winchester  - 
Mol~ogalia-  -  -  -  122;930  25,000  1  KENTUCKY. 
Darien  -  -  -  480,000 
1 Bank 
LOUISIANA. 
Planters'Bank  -  -  200,000 
BankofLoilisiane  -  724,000 
-- 
2 Banks  924,000 
ALABAMA. 
Planters and Mercllants  164,175 
Tombeckbe  -  -  156,937 
Steanlboat -  -  -  16,000 
2 Banks  337,112 
P 
DISTRICT  OF COLUMBIA. 
Co111mbia -  -  -  901,200 
Union of  Alexandria  -  340,000 
Central  -  -  -  252,995 
Franklin  -  -  -  163,265 
4 Banks  1,657,460 
VIRGINIA. 
Ohio Co.  -  -  -  60,000 
Charleston M. and C. Co.  32.580 
TENNESSEE. 
Fajretteville Transfer -  110,000 
Farmers' & Rlecllanics' 
of  Nashville  -  -  180,200 
Nashville  &  Branches  994,560 
Tennessee Bank (old)  371,107 
3 Branches of  do.  -  300,000 
Nashville Branch of do.  206,775 
Rogersville Branch do.  67,140 
4 Banks and5  Branches 2,229,782 
Farmgrs and Mechanics 
Harper's Ferry  -  19,480 
South Branch  -  -  25,000 
Fnrmers,  Merch.,  and 
Mech's. Jefferson Co.  26,425 
Warrentown  -  -  60,000 
Leesburg Union -  -  20,000 
Loudon Co.  -  -  30,000 






Cheraw  -  -  -  20,000 
Hanburg 
1 Bank  20,000 
Farmers' & Mechanics 
of  Lesington,  (stock 
Lj- notes at par)  -  489,700 
Versailles -  -  -  111,180 
Kentucky & Branches 2,756,220 
Fleminsburgh  -  -  61,62(i 
Limestone  -  -  135,825 
Sliepherdsdle  -  -  55,880 
Hinkston Exporting Co.  50,120 
New Castle  -  -  40,520 
Cynthiana  -  -  47,900 
Centre Banlcof Kentucky  120,000 
Union of  Elizabethtown  39,400 
Farming & Com. Bank  37,219 
Greenville -  -  -  46,640 
Newport  -  -  -  54,700 
Southern  Bank of  Ky.  117,222 
Farmers' of Harrodsburg  81,000 
,,  Somerset  -  22,370 
Lancaster Exporting Co.  39,900 BANKING  Ih  AMERICA.  53 
Insurance  -  - 
Ba~bou~sv~lle  -  - 
Culllberland  Bank  of 
Burkv~lle  -  - 
Bu~l~ngton  -  - 
Rank  of  Colomb~a  - 
Frankfo~t  -  -  - 
Georgetown  -  - 
Grce~lshnrg  -  - 
Green River  -  - 
Cl~ristian  Bank  -  - 
Banl. of  Henclc~son - 
,,  Of  W3~11111~t0ll  - 
Colnnle~c~al  Bauh  of 
Louisv~lle  -  - 
Mount Ste~hng  -  - 
Morgantown  -  - 
Molltlcello  -  - 
Farme~s'  Baulc  of  Jcs- 
samllle -  -  - 
Owngsv~lle  -  - 
Petersbn~g  Steam R1111 
Farmers' Bank of  Gallatln 
Far  and Mech  of Logon 
10.  do  Sl~elhjv~lle 
Do  do  bpnngfield 
Winchester Commerc~al 
Con~n~onwealtl~  Banh - 2,000,00 
(nomtnal 
Cnpltnl 
18 Bnrilts  1,911,170 
INDIANA 
Fa~me~  qand hlecl~an~cs' 
Bank  -  -  -  130,000 
Bank of  V~ncennes  -  127,624 
2 Banks  257,624 
ILLINOIS. 
Illlno~s  -  -  -  105,720 
Edwardav~lle  -  -  57,190 
2 Banks  162.9 10 
Lel,nnon MIUIIII Rnnk- 
lug CO  -  -  - 
Uroana Bnnk~ng  CO  - 
Farmers'and Mechnnlcs 
Man  Ch~lhcothe  - 
Ha~n~lton  -  -  - 
Zanes\ ~lle  Canul  and 
Manufactu~~ng  CO  - 
West Un~orl  -  - 
LnheE~~e- -  - 
Stcubcnv~lle  -  - 
Musk~ngum of  Zailes 
11llc  -  -  - 
Jeffe~son  CO 
Batik of  Xenia 
CONDITION  OF  THE  DEPOSIT  BANKS, 
A ccordtng to Retw ns made to  the  T~easul  y Depnv tment, Apr  1, 1836. 
Deposlts  I  Piace.  I  Cap~td  1  ?er*  /  7 reei\uner  I 
18 Banhs  4,307,43 1 
OHIO 
M~ami Expolting  CO , 
Cincinnat~  -  -  468,966 
Columbia, New L~sbon  50,000 
Gl=nv~lle  Alx'n Soc  -  12,002 
Farmers' Bank ot  New 
Salem  -  -  -  57,000 
German of  Wooster  -  23,000 
Musklngum  -  -  97,800 
Farmers and Mechan~es 
of  C~ncinnat~  -  -  184,776 
C~n~~nnat~  -  -  -  216,430 
Dayton Manufacto~~ng-  61,622 
MISSOURI 
Bank of  Missoun  -  250,000 
,,  ,,  St  LOUIS  -  150,000 
2 Banks  400,000 
MICHIGAN. 
Munloe  -  -  -  10,000 
1 Bank 
RECAPITULATION 
129 Banks  -  24,212,339 
36  do.  -  not known. 
- 
165 
V.  Those state  balks,  which have been selected by 
Congress to i  eceive and transmit  tlie  revenue instead 
of  the  old  bml,  of  the  Unitcd  States,  are  called 
79 
"  deposit bdnhs. 





Fa1  &  Mach. 
\Iecbanlcs 
Arcade 
Mech  &  karm 





non  Id 
Elunkl~n 
#lank  I\Ietropolt< 
\  IT  Sr  isranches 
\Jot th  Carolln~ 
I'liunt  & klech 
Planters  Geo 
il UgUStd 
I~I  rnrh of Ala 
Com~ncrc~al 
Lln  Bank of La 
Merch  & Man 
Eranklrn  , 
Com~nerc~ul 
Cllnton 
\av~ngs  Inst~t 
Unlon Bank Ten 
L'ta te 




l  arm  & Mech. 
Uolla~  s 
31  0011 00 
102 000 00 
500,1100 00 
750,000  00 
127,912  00 
410 436 00 
472 170 00 
300 000 110 
442,000  00 
2,001,200  00 
2,050  000 00 
2 000 Ub0 00 
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Rale~lh 


















Recap~tulatzon  of  Deposzt Banka. 
Dollars  Dollnn 
l 
Lolla a 
27  339  YL 
11,065  46 
209 Ub4  54 
295  )46 311 
12 082 35 
10,763  80 
153 546 38 
52,231  2h 
114,032 33 
1 2(4  220 06 
1  028,'146  33 
1,271  593 00 
Ullltrd  \tale#  - 
Dullurs 
113,074 94 
128,338  33 
3  009 731 51 
931,105  79 
52 893 48 
67,560 89 
41,315  06 
115,132  40 
217,430  22 
3 358,750  20 
3,462,800  38 
3,985,08j  72 
Loans & Dtscounts  68 850,287  67 
nornestlc hxchange  32,775,529  42 
Real Fstate  ...  1,929,056  68 
Due from Banks  15  931,916  22 
Notes of other Bank  11,107,447  78 
Specle  10,885,996  92 
Forergn Exchange  532,450  96 
Fxpenes  184,901  22 
Other  Investments  10 631 759 92  --  - 
T~rul  152,849,346  79 
1,500  000 00 
l74 950 00 
1 845,562  50 
508 970 00 
500 000 00 
3,240,000  (10 
l  206 100 00 
1,0110  000 00 
53a 400  00 
897 001)  00 
2 000,000  00 
2 945,430  00 
7,051,000  00 
600,0ll0  011 
1  000,000  00 
1 000,000  00 
289 225 00 
96,512  00 
1 817,255  00 
1,279,857  78 
4,143,940  00 
448,200  00 
150 000 U0 
43 690 980  28 
I 
Capltal  43,690  980 28 
Trensu~er  of U S  33,294,024  08 
Put111c  Officers  3 477 252 42 
Due to Banks  15 366 674 49 
Contingent Eund  1,102,763  15 
Profit and Loss, &c.  4,094,358  12 
C~rculat~oli  28,796,186  68 
Pnvate Deposlts  15,453.092  11 
Other L~ab~l~tree  7,574,015  16  -- - 
To~uL . 153,849,346  79 
461,374  86  2,516,818  76 
1'3,1131~  321  502 042 21 
107 943 24  Yllb,491  54 
124  197 74  317 388 7 1 
217,219  39' 
63.3 700 07 
292,018  15 
317  162 81 
178 472 45 
31  750  03 
339 723 01 
202 533  17 
255 554 01 
I27 514  59 
167,OLO  90 
266,803  87 
121,143  47 
50,807  58 
116 585  17 
964,758  34 
513,859  06 
438,324  32 
62 139 34 
59,923  70 
10,885,996  92 
200,394  40 
358,230  56 
38,471  07 
252,522  42 
11  1,862  48 
129 770 95 
1,623,818  12 
1,119,314  50 
1,261,116  73 
51,095  72 
244,048  12 
395,175  82 
328 127 52 
494,842  26 
484,086  61 
1,379,949  98 
1,978,383  94 
2,732,319  36 
1070,820  03 
703,675  25 
33 294,024  08 THE  IIISTOllY  OF 
DISTRIBUTION  OF THE SURPLUS REVENUE. 
'L  A bill  to  regulate  the  deposits of  the  public money,"  which WU 
passed  by Congress  in  June,  1836, contains the following  enactment 
relating to the surplus revenue :-l  That the money which  sllall be  in 
the  treasury of  the  United  States on  the  1st day  of  January,  1837, 
reserving the suln of  $5,000,000,  shall be  deposited with  tlie  several 
States,  in  proportion  to  their  res1)ective rcpresenbtion  in  the Senate 
and  House  of  Rel,resentativcs  of  the  United  States,  wlvllicli  slldl by 
law authorize tlleir treasurer or other  competent  autl~orities,  to  receive 
the same on the telmls  hereinafter  specified;  and  tl~e  secretary of the 
treasury sl~all  dcliver the same to sue11 treasurer, or other conlpetent an- 
tllorities, in sue11 form as may be prescribed  by the  secretary aforesaid, 
v-liich certificates shall express tlie usual and  legal  obligations  of  conk- 
mon  depositories  of  the  public  money,  for  the  safe  keeping  and 
repaynient  thereof, and shall pledge the faith of  the State receiving tllc 
same to pay the said monies and every part thereof, from time to time, 
whenever the same shall be required by tl~e  secretary of  tlie  treasury, 
for the purpose of  defraying any wants  of  the  public  treasury beyond 
the auiount of  the five millions aforesaid. 
'l Provided, tliat if any State declines to receive its proportion  of  the 
snrplus aforesaid,  on  the  terms before-named, the  same  may,  at the 
discretion of  the secretary of  the treasury, be deposited with the  other 
States agreeing to accept the same in deposit. 
"  And  provided  further,  that  when  the  said  money,  or  any pfrt 
thereof, shall be wanted by  said secretary, to meet appropriations made 
by law, the same slid1 be called for in  ntenblc proportions, witllin one 
year, as nearly as  conve~lie~ltl~  may be, from  the  differe~~t  States with 
wliicli the mnle is deposited, and  sllall not  be  called  for  in  su~ns  ex- 
ceeding ten  thousand  dollars, from  any one  6tatc in  any one month, 
without  previous  notice  of  thirty  ilnys  for  every  additional  SLIII~  of 
tlrer~ty  tl~onand  dollars which may be required.  '. The said deposits shall be  made with  tl~e  States, in  tllc  following 
proportions, and at the followillg times, viz.--one  quarter  part  on  the 
1st day of January,  1837, or as soon after as may be;  one quarter part 
on the 1st day of  April ;  one quarter part on the I st day of  July;  and 
one quarter part 011 the  1st day of  October, all in tlie sanlc yem." 
V1.-The  circulation of  notes by the state banks. 
A  large  portion  of  the  profits  of  the  banks  is 
derived  froill  the  circulation  of  their  notes.  Thir- 
teen of  tlie States have,  in consequence  of  the rnea- 
sures  of  tlie  government  with  reference  to  deposit 
hanks,  abolished  notes  under  five  dollars.  Several 
American  writers  have  for  some  years  past  recorri- 
lnenclecl tl~is  measure. 
"  In  the  United  States,"  says  Mr.  Gallatin, "  all  the banks issue 
notes  of  five  dollars.  The  States  of  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and 
Virginia, and perhaps some others, hare  forbidden the use of  notes of 
a lower dcnon~iiiation,  to the great  convenience of  the con~mmlity,  and 
\vithoot  experiencing  any  of  the  evils mhicl~ Ilad  been  predicted. 
We have  seen  in  Pennsylvania  the  chasm occasioned  by  that  sup- 
pression instantaneously filled  by  silver, without  the  least  diniinution 
in  the  aniount  of  currency.  We cannot  but canicstly wish that  the 
other  States  may  dopt a  similar  ineasure,  and  put  nn  end  to  the 
circulation  of  the  one, two, and  three  dollar  notes, n-hich  are of  no 
utility  but  to  the  banks.  Those  small  notes  are,  as  a  currency, 
exel~~sively  local  ant1  a p~tblic  ~inisance,  and  in  case  of  the fi~ilure  of 
any bank the loss arisinl~  fkorn thcm falls more  licaviiy on  the poorest 
class of  the community.' 
Another writer observes :- 
"  The natural and  ordinary effect  of  the  circulation of  small notes 
is to cause the specie to leave  the cha~lnels  of  cireulatio~~,  and settle in 
the vaults of  the banks, and  for  the  most part iu  the balks  of  coin- 
mcrcial  towns.  Consequently,  when  from  tlie  state  of  trade  ancl 
currency it is  in  denland  for  exportation, being  alredy collected it  is 
s~lently  and  suddenly withdrawn ;  and  before  the  public at large can 
have  any sufficient notice  of  its  being  gone, the banks are obliged to 
stop tlieir issues, and tlie  paper  previously in  circulation is withdrawn 
also, being returned to the banks by their debtors. 
"  It  is owing  to  this  effect  of  the  unirersal issue of  small notes- 
notes of  one, two, three, and  five  dollars,  that  the banks  in  this city 
are  ordinarily  the  depositories  of  nearly  all  the  specie upon  which 
depends the credit of  the  paper circ~ilatioa  of  the whole State, and of 
the contiguous districts  of  sewreral adjoining States.  When, therefore, 
there is  a  demand  for  specie, the  banks  in  the  interior  depend  not 
upon their own vaults, but upon their credits in the city.  When there 
is  no  such  active  demand,  tlie  city banks  must  hold  and  lose  the 
interest on  a quantity of  specie  far exceeding  their  proportion  of  the 
whole  circulation  of  the  state  and  adjacent  rlistricts,  or  hazard  the 
occurrence  of  a  demand  beyond  their  means,  and  a  necessity  of 
instantly restraining  tlieir  issues, ruining their  debtors, and distressing 
the community. 
'' Were d  notes  under  five  or  ten dollars suppressed, an  amount 
of  specie greater  probably than  tlle  average quantity hitherto  existing 
in the State, would  constantly remain in tlie hands  of  the  people ;  in 
which  condition, besides  its  effect  in  preventing  an  excess of  circu- 
lation, it would, in the event of  a  denland  for  exportation, prevent a 
sudden and  ruinous  scarcity.  It could  not  be  silently and instantly 
withdrawn.  It would be too much in the power of  the  people ;  and a 
demand  for  it,  would  immediately  e~lhance  its  exchangeable  value, 
This, dded  to tlie progressive decline of  prices and of  confidence, and 
irr  short, $1  the  circu~nstances  which  cl~amterize  such  a  period, the 
urgent  wants  of  the  circulatior~,  and  the  disposition  to  lioard  and 56  THE  HISTORY  OF  BANKING IN  AMERICA.  57 
conccal, would render  thc  process  of  collecting and scnding it out of 
tl~e  country extremely difficult, and to a grcat extent impract~cablc. 
'G It is a  sufficient rcuson  for  the  supprcssion  of  srnall  notes, that 
they  greatly  multiply  cou~iterfeits,  owing  to  the  facility wit11 which 
spurious inlitations of  them  may be passed.  Notes of  ten dollars and 
uljwards arc  comparatively Ilnt  seldom  counterfeited.  Such notes are 
generally  in  the  hands  of  persons  capable  of  deciding  on  their 
genuineness.  No  one  receives  a  note  of  that  amount  witl~out 
attentive scrutiny;  wllereas the sma!ler  denominations, especially those 
under five dollars, being in universal  circ~ilation  anlong those who are 
without  information or  experience, unavoidably pnss with  little or no 
examination  ."-Principles  of  Currency a~zd  Ualzking.  Uy  E. Lord. 
Ne70  Ywh,  1829. 
VI1.-The  banlts of  the statc of  New York. 
The following  extracts respecting the banks of  this 
state are taken froin a work publislled a few years ago 
at New York, entitled "Report and Observations on the 
Rank and other Iricorporated  Institutions in the State 
of NCW  York." 
The  legislature  aware  that  capital was essential to dmw out the 
capabilities of  the  State, and  that  altl~ough  individual cupid was  so 
rm1210yed, without its concentration  the march of  in~provemcnt  would 
be slow over sncll an extent of  country, met the wants of  the conimn- 
nity by xts  of  incorporation for every ob.ject  calculated  to  draw forth 
the  energies of  the  people, and  l~y  charterinq companies for  carrying 
on  various  pblic works, sucl~  as  manufactone~,  working  mines, and 
o1~cni~~g  communications. 
In  order  to  crcate a circulating mediunl for such  establishments, 
.  tile State ,"ranted charters for banks, authorizing tllein to crcate n capital 
threefold what they possessed.  Tl~us,  vesting in the directors of  those 
banks  a discretionary power to produce a  circulati~lg  medium of  about 
screnty millions of  dollars, which being added to the capital authorized 
to bc invested  in  other  chartered  institutions, shews  an  incorporated 
of  olle  I~undred  nlillions of  dollars, in  all wl~icll  any and every 
citizen  or  alien  might  invest  such  portions of  their  property as tllcy 
tho11~11t  proper  without  risking  the  remainder.  It is  evident, tllnt 
without such acts of  incorpolqtion, reflecting and  cautious  n~en  would 
not embark in new undertakings, however plausible;  as the very qnes- 
tionable  law  of  partnership,  which  is  in  force  in  this  State  as  in 
England, would hazard the rcnlainiilg property of  the sharel~olders. 
It  would  betray great ignorance of  the monied  institutions of  the 
State, were I to convey the ifiea that the authorized capital had all been 
paid in, or  that  the  banks  acted np to such tllcir  privileges of  owing 
to three  tinjes  the  amount  of  their capital.  However, I am safe in 
saying that the greater  part  of  the capid of  the Lar~ks  has been paid 
in; yct of  the  other  n.orlied  institutions 1 am  equally safe in stating, 
that sale a few of  those early established not  one  half  the authorized 
capital  llas  been  actually invested, but  in  lieu  of  easll  the  personal 
security of  the stockholder is accepted for a part of  his  subsc~iption  to 
the stock standing in  his  name;  which  security is  guaranteed  by the 
hypothecation of  the stock so in part paid for, and  sometimes  secured 
by  a mortgage of  his lands ; the  balance  so  due is subject to interest 
to the institution, and  the  stock  so  hypothecated  is  transferable, and 
the  purcllaser  assunles  the  debt;  thus a  fictitious capital is  further 
increased,  thereby  enabling  persons  of  small  available  property  to 
become connected wit11 these hstitutions.  From all wl~ich  facilities of 
investnlent and accon~modation  afforded, every member of  the commu- 
nity stands in some way or other interested in these institutions. 
"  In order to restrain  the undue  investment of  property therein, as 
well as to raise a revenue from  tliem, the htate legislature on the 23rd 
April,  1823, passed an act by which  all  the  incorporated  associations 
are to be taxed  and  assessed  as  in  the  case of  individuals ;  and re- 
quiring  that  the  secretary, cashier, and  treasurer of  all such commu- 
nities should pay the anlount of  the tax imposed  upon  the  company. 
Provided, however, that if the   aid companies, or either of them, should 
elect or choose  to  pay directly to  the treasurer of  the county ten per 
cent. upon all dividends, profits, or income made by the company, they 
sl~ould  be at liberty to do so, and the affidavits of  the cashier, secretary, 
&c. as  to the anlount of  dividend, or profit, sliould be accepted. 
"  Thus  has the State not only required from many of  these institu- 
tions a  bonus for  ganting  their  charters, from  some  loans, and from 
others the privilege to subscribe for  stock, thereby deriving an  income 
from their operations, as well as securing to various public  institutions 
the right  to  become  shareholders ; but  have  subjected  them  to  tlie 
heavy  tax  of  ten  per  cent.,  wliile  the  divide~:ds payable  to  the 
public institutions are exempt from such tax.  At  the same  time,  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  has  a  branch  at  New York, which  the 
legislature  has  not  the  power  of  taxing,  yet  by  this  bank  all  the 
customs  and other  revenue  of  the  general  government are managed, 
and much of  the money transactions of  the public. 
"  While a created capital of  such extent is thus  operating upon the 
community,it maybe asserted there is not above one million and a half of 
dollars in all the banks of  the State in specie.  In this opinion I am fully 
borne out, by the opinion of  many persons conversant with the subject, 
as well as by  those whose situation enables them to  resort  to the most 
correct data.  In 1824, when Mr. Manning, one of the house of  Barclay 
and  Co.  of  London,  the  contractors  for  the  loans,  resorted  to  New 
York from Mexico, to  procure  873,000  sterling, to  remit to Mexico, 
dthough he had agents at Pliiladelphii nnd Boston, lie  could  not  pro- 
cure it witlrout so great delay, that he was  obliged  to  send to London 
and have it sent direct to  Vera Cruz.  Also in 1812 when but 240,000 
dollars for  the  British Conlmissioners at Halifax w~s  required, it was 
necessary to send to Boston for 100,000 dollars, so that I am borne out 
by facts, that an immediate demand for one million of dollars  in  specie 
could not be met without resorting to the Bank of  the United States, or 
those  of  the neighbouring states.  But at the same  time, it should be 
stated, that large demands are out of the ordinary transactions of the city, 
and I feel the most asswed conviction that the capital of' many of thebe JlANKING  IN  AMERICA.  S!) 
banks is as ~vell  secured, mld  their issues bei~lg  as  m11c11 the  rcprescn- 
tatives of real wealth, as those of  any simil:~r  institutions in tllc world ; 
and \?rere they liable for calls of lar-cr  P.  sums in specie, their transactions 
would  be  regnlatcd  by such  liab~l~ty,  bnt  great  curtailme~~ts  in  their 
issues \vould  follow as lvell  3s general  tl~ougll  temporary cnlbarrass- 
n~ent. 
"  If bullion therefore  is  to  be  regarded as tl~e  o111y safc circrlllating 
medium, and if a11  securities not  convcrtible into a mcdlic currcllcy 
argues  an  unsound  state  of  I)ublic credit-if  according  to  the  prc- 
vailing maxims of  political economists, tl~c  existellcc of  cxccssivc ficti- 
tious capital is dangerous, tllcr~  illdeed are  tllc  people of this Sbtc nl~tl 
the United States in a truly ansful co~l;lition  ;  but opposed  to  all tl~ese 
maxims stanils the actual situation of  the State of  New York." 
"  The first  act  relating  to  banks pnssed  by  the  legislature of  the 
State of  New York, bears  date the 11th clay  of  April,  1782.  It 
prollilitory ;  ~~a~ncly,  to prevent the  esta.blis111~~ertt  of  any bank within 
the State, other  than  t!le  Bank  of  North  An~erica,  wllicl~  had been 
chartered at Congress, and located at Philadclpl~ia. 
"  The first  act  to  i~~cor~)orate  a bank  by the  State legislatnre was 
pmsed  in  17192,  when  the  Bnnk  of  New  York  was  chartered,  by 
which  the stockl~olders  are allowed  to issue  notes  to the amount of 
three times tl~c  capital  paid  in, as  also  to  three  times the amount of 
depobits.  The  an~ormt  autl~orized  was  one  million  dollars,  ancl  the 
cl~artcr  was  limited  to  May,  1811, but was  afterwards  extended  to 
June, I832 ;  and  as a bonus for sncll extension, the comptroller was to 
subscribe 15,000 ilollnrs on  the part of the commonwcdtll to the capid 
stock, the  treasurer  of  Hamilton college  15,000 dollars,  and  of  CO- 
Innlbia college 20,000 dollars.  This bauk l~as  generally paid dividends 
of  four and one half  per ccnt. 11df yearly, and the stock has genedly 
borne  a  prcn~iurn of  tl~irty  pcr  cent., but  of  late the clividc~~ds  have 
been only equal to eight per ccnt. yearly. 
"  An act of  incorporation passed  ill 1799, establishing an institution 
for  supplying  the  city of  Ncw  York with  water,  capital  2,000,000 
dollars,  surplus  to  be  employed  in  money  operations.  Banking 
privileges  are  the  chief  objects  of  this  comliany,  which  is  called 
Manhattan Bank.  Its stock 11as been very prodnctive, and lias generally 
sold  from twelve  to  twenty per  cent. abore  par, (the greater part of 
the  stock  is  held  by a  gentleman  in London.)  Under the  right  to 
supply  water  this  charter  is  deemed  perpetual ; in ga~lting  it the 
Stae  rcserved tl~e  right to subscribe one thousand shares of  fifty dollars 
each, which it still holds. 
"  The  Mechanics Bank  was  incorporated  in  1810, the  State  re- 
serving  the  privilege  of  subscribing  200,000  dollars of  tl~c  capital, 
(1,500,000 dollars)  but  afteru~nrds  acccptcd 32,500 dollws in  lieu of 
the privilege of  subscribing.  This stock generally bears a prcmiunl of 
twelve per cent. atlrance. 
"  In 1812, an  act was pmsctl  to  incorporate the Bank of  America, 
in  the  city  of  New York,  with  a  cr~pital  of  G,OI;O,OOO  dollars,  for 
wl~ich  a bonus was  required of  400,000 dollnrs for  tllc Statc, and two 
loans,  1,000,000  dollars ~lt  5  pcr  ccr~t.  and  1,000,000 at  G  per cent. 
Tl~csc  terms wcru sulscqucrrtly rcducud to a  loo11 of  100,000 dollars, 
III~  a bonus  of  the  like  sun].  This stock  pays  but five  per  cent. U 
year in dividends. 
"  In tlle sa~nc  year, the city branch of  New York was incorporated, 
wit11  n  capital  of  2,000,000  dollars.  For  this  act  120,000  dollars 
were paid as a bonus to the common scl~ool  fnnd of  the State, 50,000 
dollars to the  State  itself, and  50J,000 dollars were  also  lent  to  the 
State at G  per cent. per annum. 
From the year 1816 all acts of  incorporation of  banks required that 
their notes sllould be redeemed with specie under  the penalty of  being 
liable to pay at the rate of  ten  per  cent. per annum interest, from  the 
time of  the demand in  specie ;  suits to  be  prosecuted in  any court of 
law. 
"  In the  several banlts, tl~c  Statc has invested GO(i,SOO dollars ;  and 
several colleges  in  the  State,  11old  233,4(10 dolli~rs,  wl~ich  stock was 
rcscrvcd as a privilege at the time of  granting the cl~arters." 
"  In  tllc  State  of  New York  there  is, by law,  what  is  termed  a 
"  safety fiind  security."  Thc idea of  this  fund  11aa greatly increased 
tl~e  confider~ce  of  the commur~ity  in  the  paper  of  that State.  I have 
endeavoured  to  make  myself  acquainted wit11  the  system ;  and  if  I 
understand it, there is little  or  no security in the fund.  But many of 
the  arrangements and restrictions connected with the system are bene- 
ficial.  Tl~e  fund can never consist of  more than 500,000 dollars;  and 
it is created by each  of  the  banks paying annually l~alf  of  l  per cent. 
on their capital, until it anlounts to the above sum.  The contributions 
then cease, unless  there is a  defdcation  in  some  bank.  On  such an 
event  the  contributions  are  continued,  or  re-commence, as  the  case 
may be,  until the  defalcation is  made good, and the  fund  amounts to 
the specified sum.  In this way, each bank is made liable, to a limited 
extent, for  the  paper  of  the others.  It has  been  supposed, that by 
thus linking them  together, a  degree  of  watcl~fulness  is  created  that 
otherwise would not exist. 
"  The salut~ry  part  of  the  system  consists  in  requiring  that  the 
whole amount of  the  nomi~ld  capital of  a bank shall  be  actually paid 
up before it conlnlences operation ;  that it shall report to the legislature 
mnnually,  under  the  oat11  of  its  officers,  the  true  situation  of  the 
i~~stitution  ;  that its  books  and vaults shall be  open at all times to the 
inspection  of  1):mk  cornalissioners, that arE pe~nlanently  appointed for 
the 1)urpose of  examining  the  state  of  these  institntions;  that  the 
Cltancellor of  the  State, on  the  report  of  these  comn~issioners,  pur- 
porting that they are not  satisfied, may suspend the busiucss of  a bank 
until a full  and  complete csmination can  be had ;  and that they arc 
all prohibited from mak~rrg  loans on their own stock. 
"  An objection has been urged against this plan with grcat warmth. 
It is  said, that  the con~missioners  are  mere  politicians, subservient to 
the views of  the dominant party;  and that  being  so, tl~ey  possess and 
exercise an nndue influence on  the directors of  these banks ; and that, 
in  point of  fact, the ~vl~ole  plan is a  piece of  political machinery.  This 
charge, on the other  hand, is  stoutly denied.  Tl~e  11rcv:tiling opinion 60  THE  IIISTORY  OF  BAXKIKC  IN  AMERICA.  6 1 
out of  the State  is, that the  project  is  quite as n111ch politic$  as it is 
financial."-A  Correspondent qt'the  Times, who subscri6es hinlself "  a 
Cenet'ese Travelle~." 
Mr.  Gallatin  says,  tliat  t,lie safety  fund  appears 
to be  unjust-first,  by  makilig institutions  properly 
managed  responsible  for  others  at  a  great  distance, 
and  over  which  tliey  have  no  control;  secondly, 
because on  account of  the tlisproportion between  the 
aggregate of  the circulation and  deposits  of the city 
and country barlks respectively, tllc foriner  are made 
to pay to the safety fund about twice as nlucl~  in pro- 
1101  tion as the country banks. 
SECTION  IV. 
AN  INQUIRY  I-IOW  FAR  THE  BANKING  INSTITUTIONS  OF 
A?vIERICA  ARE  ADAPTED  TO  THIS  COUNTRY. 
It will be seen from the preceding  sections that tlle 
bankinv  institutions  of  America  are  different  from  ?  those of  Englaild.  America has  no  national bank- 
no private banks, and no joint  stock  banks  upon our 
system.  Her banks are all chartered  by the govern- 
nlents  of  the  respective  States in  which  they  are 
established.  Whether  tlle  banking  institutions  of 
America are upon  the whole  superior to those of  this 
country,  is  an  interesting  sllbjcct  of  investigation. 
Those branches  of  the inquiry that have a reference 
to a national bank or to the private banks, will not be 
discussed in this section.  I shall mcrcly draw a corn- 
parison  between  our.  joint  stock  banks and the char- 
tered banks of  America, with a view to ascertain how 
far the former may  be  improved  by the adoption  of 
some  of  the regulations of  the latter.  As a guide to 
the inquiry, I shall compare the act to rrgulate  banks 
and banking, passed  by the State of hlassachusetts in 
1829, with the report of  the secret  commit,tee of  the 
Itlouse  of  Commons upon joint stock banks dclivcrcd 
iu 1536.  I must,  however, prernise that in the State 
of  Massacllusetts America11 bar~kirlg  is eshibi  ted in its 
most prudent form.  In  consequence of t1li.i~  superior 
management,  the  banks  of  New  Englai~d  did  not 
suspend  payment  in  l8  14,  as did  tile  banks  in the 
other parts of America. 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
An  Act to regulate Bunks and Banking. 
"  Sec.  1. Be it enacted by tlie Senate and House of  Representatives, 
in  general  court  assembled, and  by  the  authority of  the  same,  that 
from and after the  passing  of  this act, every bank which  shall receive 
a  charter  from or  by  autl~ority  of  this  commoi~wealth, and  every 
bank whose capital sshdl be  increased, or whose  charter  sliall  be  ex- 
tended, shall  be  governed  by tlle  following  rules : and  subject to all 
the duties, limitations, restrictions, liabilities,  and  provisions contained 
in tl~is  act." 
This section implies that no bank  shall be  allowed 
to  exist  unless  it have  a  charter,  and  that  all  the 
cliarters  shall  be  drawn  up  according  to  tlie  same 
general roles.  In  these  respects,  it stands opposed 
to the laws  of  this  country.  The  following  is  the 
language of  the parliamentary committee :- 
"  The  law  imposes  on  the  joint  stock  banks  no  prelimiilary 
obligation, beyond tl~e  payment of  a license duty, and tl~e  registration 
of  the names of  shareholders at the stamp office. 
"  The law does  not  require that  the  deed  of  settlement shall  be 
considered  or  revised  by  any competent  autliority whatever,  and  no 
precaution is  taken  to  enforce the insertion  in  such1 deeds, of  clauses 
the most obvious and necessary." 
An American bank has a charter, a joint stock bank 
has a deed  of  settlement.  The general heads of  this 
document are thus stated by the committee. 
1. "  The power  of  altering the regulations  of  the 
company." 
2. "  The mode of conducting the business of  bank- 
inn."  a  3.  "The degree of  publicity to be given to the pro- 
ceedings." 
4. "  The  terms  on  which  the company  is  to  be 
dissolved." 
Although the law may not require that the deeds of 
settlement be revised by  any competent authority, yet 
in fact,  they always are,  and precaution  is taken by 
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most obvious and necessary.  After the deed has beei~ 
prepared  by  thc solicitor,  and  a~provcd  by  the  di- 
rectors, it is submitted  to  thc inspection  of'  an  emi- 
nent  barrister.  Still  perhaps,  it  is  desirable  that 
they  be  submitted to  a  barrister  appointed  by  the 
governmcnt,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  rules  of 
savings' banks.  This oficer  should not however have 
a discretionary power;  he might  be  allowed,  1st.  to 
strike out ally clause which  may be  contrary to  law. 
2.  He might object  to any clause, which  in his judg- 
ment  would  be  injurious  to  the  public  or  to  thc 
shareholders,  although  not  contrary  to  law.  In this 
case,  the clause  should  not  be  inserted in the  deed, 
unless sanctioned at a  meeting  of  the  shareholders, 
specially summoned for that purpose.  3.-In  case he 
stated  that  any provision was  contrary  to  law, when 
the directors  did not  believe  it to  be  so, the clause 
might  be  submitted  to  the  Attorney  or  Solicitor- 
General for the time  being, whose  opinioil  upon  the 
law should be final. 
Although different deeds of  settlement may require 
some special clauses according to the circumstar~ces  of 
different  companies,  yet  in  their  general provisions 
they  must be very similar;  and hence  it would  not 
be difficult to draw up a list of  clauses  the  most  ob- 
vious  and  necessary.  But  it  does  not  follow  that 
such clauses should be enforced by act of  Parliament. 
They who execute the deed, and who are to be bound 
by  its provisions,  should  be  allowed to judge  as  to 
what are the most necessary clauses. 
Lord Althorp proposed  the granting of  charters to 
all  joint  stock  banks, on a plan somewhat similar to 
that of  America.  The following  is part of  a  speccll 
he delivered upon the renewal of the Bank of England 
Charter, in 1533, as reported in the Times. 
"  He  proposed  that  every  banking  company  of  more  than  six 
partners,  should  be  a  joint  stock  company,  such  company  to  be 
establislied  by  charter.  These  chartered  banks would  be subject to 
certain regulations, but all advantageous to themselves and the cor~ntry. 
He would  not  propose that  these  banks  should  he  banks  of  issuc: 
they were  of  two sorts ;  some issued their  own  notes, and others  the 
notcs  of  tlie  Bank  of  Englm~d;  but  banks  were  prcvented  issuing 
notes payable in London for lcss than £50. 
"  In the plan hc  proposed, joint  stock  banlrs might exist within tl~e 
sixty-five ~nilca,  if  they used thc  paper of  the 13ank of  Englanil.  The 
conditio~is  on which he proposed gorernnicnt  should grant charters to 
these joint  stock banlrs were the  follo\ving-first,  that  the partners in 
tllcse banks should  hare  half  of  their  subscribed capital paid up, and 
deposited  either  in  the  governnleiit  funtls,  or  some  equally  good 
securities.  He further proposed, that tlie  partners  should be  liable to 
an unlimited  responsibility-tlie  corporation of  the  bank  sliould  not 
hold :my  shares in it ;  and that  the  accounts  of  the  bank  sliould  be 
yearly audited  and  published.  Of  course,  it  was  plain  there was  a 
vast difference  in  those  banks which  possessed  the  power  of  issuing 
their own notes, and  those which  did  not issue  them.  In their case, 
he proposed  as  the conditions on which  charters  should  be  granted, 
that  one  quarter  of  their  subscribed  capital,  instead  of  one  llalf, as 
required  where  they were  banks  of  issue,  should  be  paid  up  and 
deposited  as before-that  their  shares  should not  be less than £100 
each ;-and  that the partners in such banks  should be only liable to  a 
responsibility to  the  amount  of  their  shares.  In  a  case  where  a 
cl~arter  was to be granted, it must  be  at the  discretion of  governn~ent 
to decide, whether  the  amount  of  capital  subscribed was a  sufficient 
aniount for  the  locality in  which  the  bank  in question was  situated. 
He hoped, however, that  every proper  facility would  be  given to the 
establishment of  such banks." 
If it were  at all desirable  to adopt Lord Althor~'s 
~lan,  it is  now  too  late.  It would  be  uniust  to 
1' 
compel  the  existing  joint  stock  banks  to  t:ke  out 
charters, and to  comply with  burdensome conditions, 
of which they had no knowledge at the time of  their 
formation.  But,  it may  be  worthy of  inquiry how 
far  charters  may  be  granted  without  any material 
alteration  of  the  laws  respecting joint  stock  banks. 
Lord  Althorp's  plan  appears  objectionable-first,  in 
requiring all joint  stock banks to be chartered banks; 
and secondly, in giving the crown a discretionary power 
in granting the charters.  Now might not Parliament 
prescribe the conditions on which charters might be ob- 
tained, and leave to the banks the power of  complying 
with  those  conditions or not  as they pleased ?  And 
might not the mixture of  banks of  different sorts be at- 
tended with advantage to the country?  It  is the opinion 
of  Mr. Clay that the three  chartered banks  of  Scot- 
land "  gave a tone to public opinion, and rendered it 
difficult for any bank commencing business to conduct BANKING  IN  A~IEBICA.  6  5 
its affairs in a  nlanncr  widely different."  Ant1  Lord 
Liverpool advocated  the cstablisllmcnt of  bmiicbes of 
the  Bank  of  England  upon  the  groulid  that  they 
would  operate  as  a  clieck  upon  the  country hanks. 
We know too that the extension  of  joint  stock banks 
in  England  has improved  the private  banks.  Why 
then,  may  not  the establishment  of  a few  chartered 
banks tend to improve the joint stock banks? 
"  Sec. 2.  And  be  it  further  enacted, that every bank  i~~colporated 
by the  authority aforesaid, shall  be  a  corporation by the  name of  the 
president, directors, and  company of  the  bank  (the blank 
to be  filled up  as  the  case may require), capable  in  lam to  sue  and 
be sued to final  judgment  and  execution, to  have  and use a common 
seal, and the same  at  pleasure  again  to  break, alter, and  renew, and 
also  to establish and  put  in  force  such  bye-laws and regulations (LS  to 
them  shnll  appear  necessary and  convenient for  the  government  of 
said corporation." 
The Americans have the sagacity to see that a bank 
has occasion  for  the power of  suing and being sued. 
In this country joint stock banks above sixty-five miles 
from London sue and  are sued  in  the names of  two 
public  officers,  whose  names  are  registercd  at  the 
stamp  office.  But joint  stock  banks situated within 
sixty-five  miles  of  London,  although  sanctioned  by 
law, have  no  prescribed  mode  of  suing  and bcing 
sued.  One  would  have  imagined  that  in  an  act 
which  sanctioned  the establishment  of  such  banks, 
this  would have been  considered  one  of  the  clauses 
tile most obvious and necessary. 
The power to establish, alter, and renew by-laws and 
regulations,  seem very  similar in both countries.  In 
England 
The active duties  are  generally delegated to  a  small body, called 
the directors, while the main body of  proprietors reserve to themselves 
the  power  of  re-electing  the  directors, and of  altering ,,from  time  to 
time the rules by which the directors are to be governed. 
'' Sec. 3.  Be  it  further enacted, that  no bank, except such  as  are 
now incorporated, shall go into operation, mnlce  discounts, loan money, 
emit bills,  or  pron~issory  notes, until  fifty per  centum, at  least, of its 
capital stock shall have been paid in gold and silver money, and exibting 
in its vaults, which shall have  been  examined by three conlmissionrrs 
appointed by the governor, whose duty it sl~all  be,  at the  expense of 
the banks, to cxamine and count the nioney actually in  the vaults, aud 
to aqcertain by the oatlts of a mojority of  Qe directors of mid bank, fl~at 
its capital hath been paid  in  by the stockholders of  said  bank, toward 
payment for  their  respective  shares, and  not  for  any other purpose ; 
nnd that it is intended to have it therein  remain as part  of  said capital, 
and to return a  certificate  thereof  to  the governor, and  110  loan  shall 
be made  to  any stockholder until  the  full amount of  llis  shnrcs shdl 
have bee11 paid  into  the  bank ;  and  it  shall  not  be  Iarnft~l for  any 
bank to  have  owing  to  it, on  loan, on  a pledge  of  its  own stock, a 
grater amount than fifty per  cerrtum  of  its capitill stock actutdly paid 
in;  anil  no  part  of  the  capibl  stock  of  any bank  sl~all  be  soltl  or 
transferred until the whds anlor~nt  tlle~of  shall l~ove  hecn paid in." 
England- 
"  The law does  not  impose  any  restrictions  npon  the amount  of 
capital.  This will  be  found  to vary from  85,000,000 to &100,000 ; 
and in one instance  an  unlinlited power  is reserved  of  issuil~g  shares 
to any extent. 
"  The  law does  not  impose  any obligation  that  the ar11de or  any 
certain  amount  of  shares  sltall  be  subecribecl  for  bcfore  banking 
operation9  commence.  In  many  instances  banks  have  commenced 
their business  before  one  half  of  tl~  sl~arcs  are  subscri!~ed  for, and 
10,000,  20,000, and 30,000  shares  are  reserved  to be issued  at the 
discretion of  the directoiu. 
"  The law does not  enforce  any rule with  respect  to  the  nominal 
amonnt of  shares.  These will be  found  to vary from  81,000 to £5. 
The effects of  this variation are strongly stated in the eviclence. 
"  The law does not enforce any rule with respect to  the  amount of 
capital paid up before  the  commeneen~ent  of  business.  This nil1 he 
found to vary from £100  to £5." 
The payment  of  a  certain  portion  of  the  capital 
before  the  commencement  of  business,  is  a  pledge 
that  the project  is not  a  mere  bubble,  and this  is 
especially  necessar  when  the  proprietors  have  no 
farther liability.  Jut even  with  unlimited  liability 
a certain amount  a  pears to be  necessary.  The em- 
ployment of  capita  f judiciously is sometimes a means 
of acquiring business ;  and in case of  loss there should 
always be a sufficient capital to fall back upon without 
recurring. to the shareholders. 
There is an evil in a bank having too small a capi- 
tal.  In this case, the bank will be  but a small bank; 
the number of proprietors will be few, and the number 
of  persons eligible to be chosen directors will be few ; 
hence there will not be  the same guarantee for  good 
management.  If  a  bank  with  a  small  capital  have 
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also a very small business,  it had  much  better cease 
as an  illdepenclant  establishment,  and  become  the 
branch of  a larger bank.  If, on the other hand, it has 
a large business,  with  a  large circulation, large de- 
posits,  and  large  loans  or  discounts,  its  losses  will 
sometimes be large, and hence the whole capital may 
be swept away.  It is true, that while  it avoids losses 
the  shareliolders  will  receive  large  dividends,  but 
these large profits had much better be left in the bank 
as  an additioil to  its  capital than shared among the 
proprietors in the form  of  dividends.  There is dan- 
ger too that the high  premium  on  those  shares  may 
induce many shareholders to sell out and  form  other, 
and perhaps rival establishments. 
On the other hand there is an evil in a bank having 
too large a capital.  In this case, as the capital cannot 
be employed in the business,  the  directors are under 
the temptation  of  investing it in dead  or  hazardous 
securities for the sake  of  obtaining  a  higher  rate  of 
interest ;  perhaps too they may speculate in the funds, 
and sustain loss.  Hence it is much better that a bank 
should commence business  with  a  small capital, and 
increase the amount as the business may require. 
It is difficult  to state in all cases what proportion a 
capital ought to bear to tlie liabilities of  a bank.  Per- 
haps the best criterion we can have, is the rate of  divi- 
dend, provided  that dividend be  aid  out of  the busi- 
ness  profits  of  the company.  &hen  we  hear  of  a 
bank paying from fifteen to twenty per cent. dividend, 
we may be  assured that the capital is too small for the 
business.  The liabilities of thc bank, eithcr  in notes 
or deposits, must far exceed the amount of  its capital. 
As a general maxim, the greater the capital  the  less 
the dividend ; let  the  whole  capital be  employed at 
any given rate of interest, say four per cent., then the 
capital raised by notes or deposit, produce after paying 
all expenses, a certain sum as profit.  Now,  it is evi- 
dent, that if  this amount of profit be distributed over 
a  large capital, it will yield a less rate per ccnt. than 
when  distributed  over  a  small  capital.  Sometimes 
however a large capital may have increased  the rate 
of  dividend, in consequence of having been the means 
of  acquiring  a  large increase  of  business.  It may 
have  done  this in consequence  of  inspiring  the pub- 
lic  with  confidence  in  the bank, aid thus inducing 
them  to  make  lodgments  or  circulate  its notes ; or 
it may  have  enabled  the bank  to  make  large  ad- 
vances, and  thus gained  the support  of  wealth:  and 
influential customers. 
Although  the  proportion  which  the  capital  of  a 
bank  should  bear  to  its  liabilities  may  vary with 
different banks, perhaps we  should  not  go  far  astray 
in saying it should  never be  less than one-third of  its 
liabilities.  I would exclude, however, from this com- 
parison all  liabilities  except  those arising from  notes 
and  deposits.  If  the  notes  and  deposits  together 
amount to more than three ,times the  amonnt  of  the 
paid-up capital,  the bank should call up more capital. 
It may be  said,  that the bank  is liable  also  for  its 
drafts  upon  its London agents, and  for  the payment 
of  those  bills  which  it  has  endorsed  and  re-issued: 
admitted ; but in  both  these  cases,  the public  have 
other securities besides that of  the bank. 
Presuming that banks are to commence with a mo- 
derate amount of  capital, and to increase that amount 
as  the business  increases, the  question  is  suggested, 
what is the best way of  increasing the capital ?  The 
English banks have followed two ways  of  doing this ; 
one,  hy a further  issue of  shares ;  and  the other,  by 
further  calls  upon  the  existing  shareholders.  The 
capital  of  all  the joint  stock  banks  in  England  is 
divided  into  certain  portions,  called  shares;  each 
proprietor  holds  a  certain  number  of  these  shares, 
and pays  a  certain  sum  upon  them.  If  he  wishes 
to transfer a  portion of  his  capital he cannot transfer 
a half  share or a  quarter  share, but  must  transfer a 
whole share, or a certain number  of  shares.  Thus, if 
the capital of  a bank  be £500,000,  it may be  divided 
into 5,000 shares  of  £100  each,  or  50,000 shares of 
£10 each, and  a  certain  proportion  of  the arnount of each  share  will  be  paid  up; and  this  proportion  is 
called the real or the paid-up  capital.  Thus, if  one- 
tcnth of  the  above capital  is paid up,  then £50,000 
will be the real or paid-up capital, and £500,000 will 
be  called  the  nominal  capital.  In  the  chartered 
banks,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  usually  no  no- 
minal  capital,  and  the  real  capital  is  not  dividecl 
into shares or  portions, but  any  fractional  sum  may 
be  transferred.  The  capital  is  then  called  stock. 
When  there  is  no  nominal  capital,  nor  any  way 
of increasing  the amount of  the  real  capital, this is 
the best way.  But, in tlie  other case, it is more con- 
venient to have the capital divided into shares. 
Some persons have objected altogether to  a nominal 
capital ;  but their objections liave  been dircted more 
to the misrepresentations that may  attend it, than to 
the thing itself.  They say, "  a bank announces that it 
has a  capital  of  t500,000, whereas few shares are is- 
sued, and but a small sum is paid on each share; hence 
people are misled, and the bank acquires a confidence 
which  it does  not  deserve."  The objection  here is 
against representing the nominal capital to be paid-up 
capital ;  it does not bear upon the principle of a nomi- 
nal capital.  In fact, we are misled by words.  What is 
called nominal capital is nothing more  than a  farther 
sum, which the directors have the power of  calling up. 
If this sum  had  not  been called capital, it would not 
be objected to,  as  it could  lead  to  no  misapprehen- 
sion.  But the inquiry simply is,  ought the directors 
to have  the power  of  calling upon  the shareholders 
for a farther  amount  of  capital  beyond  that  already 
paid  up ?  Were  they  not  to  have  the  power,  the 
bank would  at its commencement probably have too 
large a  capital, and  after  its  business  had  advanced, 
would have too  small a capital.  And if  the bank by 
any  unforeseen occurrence became involved, and should 
have occasion for further sums toextricate itself from its 
difficulties, it could not make any further call upon its 
shareholders,  although  a  very  small  aclvancc  might 
prevent its utter ruin.  111 case of  a very large capital, 
such as two or  tlirce millions, a noillinal capital may 
not be nccessary, as so large  a  sum  is likely to  be in 
all cases amp1  sufficient.  But in  banks of' a second 
class, it will a  l' ways be best  to  give  the  directors  the 
power of  making further calls upon the shareholders. 
The second way of  increasing the capital of  a bank, 
is, by the issue of  new shares.  The whole amount of 
shares to be  issued  is  fixed  in the first instance, and 
the bank commences as soon  as  a  certain proportion 
has  been  issucd.  If  the  bank  was  riot  allowed  to 
commence business until the whole of  thc shares were 
taken, a  small amount would  be  fixed upon, and  the 
bank  would  be  proportionably  weaker.  But  by 
beginning with  a  small  number  of  shares, you  liave 
capital  enough  for  your  business,  and  you  acquiro 
more as you proceed.  Many persons will join a bank 
after  it is  establislied who would  not take  sliares  at 
the  commencen~ent.  Some  shares  are  therefore 
reserved  for  persons  of  this  description ; and  as the 
shares  are  more  valuable  when  the  success  of  the 
undertaking  is  no  longer  doubtful,  they  are  often 
given out at a premium, and always a greater degree 
of caution is exercised as to tlie persons to wliorn they 
are distributed. 
Some members of  the committee appear to have an 
objection  to shares  of  a  small  amount; they appre- 
hend  that  these  shares are taken by an inferior class 
of  persons ; and hence the body of  proprietors are less 
respectable.  But it would appear from the returns, that 
the general effect of  small shares is, that each  share- 
holder takes a greater number.  Thus in the banks of 
2100 shares each proprietor has taken upon an average 
twenty-eight shares, on which  lie has paid the sum of 
$444.  In the  banks  of  220 shares, each  proprietor 
has taken  forty-three  shares, and paid £359.  In the 
banks of £10 shares, each  proprietor  has  taken fifty- 
two shares and  paid  £400.  While in the only bank 
of £5 shares, each proprietor has taken 117 shares, and 
paid £585."  It appears to me that the chief objection 
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to  small  shares  are liable is, that they do not 
admit  of  a  large  amount  of  nomiilal  capital.  The 
banks  of  £5  and £10 sharcs havc  usually  the wl~ole 
capital  paid  up, and  hence  in  case  of  necessity  tl~c 
directors have no power to call  for  a further amount. 
Could  the Nortllern  and  Central Bank  have made a 
call upon their shareholders of  £5 per share, this bank 
might have been saved from destruction. 
The latter  part  of  this  section  notices  a  practice 
which  has very justly been  condemned-the  practice 
of  advancing  'loans  to  shareholders  upon  the  secu- 
rity of  their shares.  Although in this  country "  the 
law  does  not  prohibit  purcl~ases,  sales,  and  specu- 
lative traffic on the part  of  these con~panies  in  their 
own stock, nor advances to  be  made on  the credit of 
their  own  shares,"  yet,  I  question if  aIiy joint  stock 
bank  has carried  this  practice to any thing like tlle 
extent  which  is  here  allowed  in  the  very  prudent 
State of  Massachusetts.  I think it desirable that this 
practice should be placed under restraint.  No doubt, 
sometimes it is convenient to advance a  shareholder a 
loan upon his  own shares, and  sometimes  a customer 
gets discounts  more readily from  the circun~stance  of 
being  a  shareliolder.  But the  conveniences do not 
in  general  counterbalance  its  disadvantages.  The 
adoption  of  this  principle  in America  has  been  one 
great  cause  of  the failure  of  their  chartered  banks. 
In  all  our  deeds  of  settlement  there  is a  clause by 
which every shareholder pledges his shares as security 
for  any debt he may owe  the bank.  Such a  clause 
is particularly  useful, as the consciousness of  having- 
this preference  often induces the bank to give tempo- 
rary loans  and  discounts  to  persons  whose applica- 
tions would otherwise be rcjected. 
In some cases, the circumstance of  a  bank  making 
advances  upon  its  own  shares arises  from the heavy 
stamp duties  imposed  upon  the  transfer  of  shares. 
Could  the shares in joint  stock  banks  be transferred 
like government stock  without expense, a person wllo 
wanted a temporary loan might obtain it in tlle  money 
~llarkct  upon  the transfer  of  his shares.  But now  if 
he wished to borrow £1000 for  a week upon shares 011 
which £1500 has been paid, the stamp duty on the trans- 
fer and re-transfer would be considerable. Under these 
circumstances he very naturally applies to the bank to 
make the advance, as the above-mentioned clause in 
the  deed  of  settlement  supersedes  the  necessity  for 
an actual transfer.  If  the legislature wish  to  prevent 
advances of  this kind, the most effectualiway of  doing 
so  would  be  to  abolish  the stamp  duties  upon  the 
transfer of  shares. 
The committee state- 
"  111  no instancc is  tlie  company forbidden to become tlre purchasel. 
of  its own  sllarcs;  but on  the  contrary, power  is  expressly given  to 
do  so  by  means  of  tlie  deccls,  and that  to  any amount.  Tlle only 
niodifications of tlris  power which your  committee  have  found, are in 
tlie  case  of one  bailking  company, in which  the directors are autl~o- 
rizcd  to  purchase  slrarcs in tlie case only of  a  refusnl  to  admit  ns  a 
prolwietor tlre person  proposing to buy ;  and in case of  nnotlicr  bank, 
in nrhicli  tlic  nuinbcr  of  sliares  to be  bouplit  in  by the directors is 
restricted to forty." 
In  this,  as  in  other  cases,  the  committee  have 
fallen  into the  error  of  supposing  that  the directors 
are in  the habit  of  committing  every  fault  which 
is not prohibited by  the deed  of  settlement.  I  have 
never heard of  a joint  stock  bank  trafficking  in  its 
own  shares.  It  may  sometimes  be  convenient  for 
them  to  buy  a  fcw  shares  in  order  to  get  rid  of 
an  objectionable  shareholder,  but  it  can  never  be 
worth  their  while  to do  so  to  a  great  extent.  If a 
bank  issues new sharcs, it is quite proper that a pre- 
mium  should  be  charged  proportionate  to  their in- 
creased value. 
"  Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, That tlic amount  of  bills issued  by 
any bank, shall  not  at any one  time  exceed  twenty-five per centnm 
bcyoild tlie amount of  tlie  capital  stock  actually paid  in, and no loan 
or discount sllall be made, nor  shall  any bill  or  note be lssucd by said 
corporation, or by any person on their account, in ally other  place than 
nt the said bank. 
"Sec. 5. BC it furtller ennctcd, That the total amount of debts nllicl~ 
nny banking  corporation shall  at any time pwe,  whethcr by  bond, bill, 
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stock actually paid  in, exelusivc of  sums due on, account of  deposits; 
nor sl~all  there be doe  to  said  corporation at my one time, more tlran 
dolrble  the  amount  of  its  capital  stock  actually paid  in.  In casc of 
excess of  debts  so  due from  mid  bank,  tlie  directors  nnder  wlrose 
admix~is%ation it  shall  hnppen, shnll  be  liable  for  the  sme  in  their 
private cnpac~ties,  and an action of  debt niay in such  casc  be  bro~~glrt 
apinst them, tIrcir, or any of  their  heirs, executors, or  administrators, 
in  any court  proper  to  try the sane, by any crcditor  or  creditors  of 
mid corporation, and may bc prosec~~ted  to  final ju(Ignlent and execu- 
tion, any condition, covenarlt, or  agreement  to  the  contrary 11ot\vit11- 
standing : but this shnll not bc construed  to  exempt  said  corporntion, 
or the lands, tenements, goods, or clrattels of  the same, from being also 
liable for, and c11nrgeabIe with saiil cxccss.  Such of  said directors wTio 
~nny  llavc been absent wlicn said cxccss was  contracted  or createcl, or 
wlro may lrave dissented from the resolution, or act, wllcrcby tlic same 
TV%  cont~wted  or creatcd, may rcspcctively exonerate  thcinselvcs from 
being  so  liable  by  fortlrwitll giving  notice  of  the  fact, and  of  their 
abseim or dissent, to tlio governor and council, nnd  to tlle stockl~olclcrs 
at  ally geneid  nnleeting,  wllic11  they shall  have  power to eall for tliaf 
p~urpose." 
Thesc sections  present  to  us two- restrictions which 
are not noticed l>y tlie committee.  We mily therefore 
enlarge  our  catalogue  of  legal  impcrfections  by two 
more startling articles, thlis :- 
"The law does not impose any restriction upon  the 
amount of  notes issued  by these  companies,  howcver 
small may be their yaid-up capital." 
"The  law  does  not  limit the amount of  Toans ad- 
vanced  by  these  companies,  however  small may bc 
their funds for granting them." 
Lt  is, however, wortl~y  of  inquiry, whether "  these 
eompanies"  should  incur  liabilities  beyond  a certain 
proportion  to  their  paid-up  capital?  Is  there  no 
impropriety in a bank with £50,000 capita1 incurring 
liabilities to  the extent of  $500,000?  If  a bank  by 
notes  or deposits  owes  £500,000, it is liable  to sud- 
den  calls  for  considerable  amounts;  and  hence  it 
sllould  have  a  proportionable paid-up capital,  to  be 
better  able  to  meet  these  sudden  demands.  And 
besides,  this £500,000 must be  employed, and losses 
may  thereby  be  incurred  to  a  large  amount,  and 
hence there sllould be a prq~ortionable  paid-up capital 
that  the  bank  may  be  able  to  sustain  these  losses 
without making farther  calls  upon  the shareholders. 
As  the  circumstances  of  different  banks  vary  very 
much, it would be difficult to fix  upon any proportion 
that would not be  liable to objections.  The proportion 
allowed in the State of  Massachusetts is rather liberal 
than otherwise :  thc notes may he  1% times the amount 
of  tlie  capital; and  the total liabilities, exclusive  of 
the deposits, may be twicc  the capital.  Mr.  Gallatin 
states that tile  average amount of  notes issued by the 
State Banks taken together  did not exceed forty-four 
per  cent.,  nor  the  aggregate amount  of  their  notes 
and  deposits  eighty-one  per  cent.  of  their  capital; 
and he believes that a positive  restriction on the issue 
of  notes, so that they never  should  exceed two-thirds 
of  the capital, would bc  highly beneficial.  The total 
amount of  notes  issued  by the joint  stock  banks are 
supposed to be about one half the amount of  their paid- 
up capital. 
The limitation of  debts clue to the bank appears to be 
made with the view of limiting the issue of  notes.  The 
most certain way  would  have been to limit the issues. 
If  tile  capital,  and  the  notes,  and  the deposits are 
limited, the loans made  by the banks will necessarily 
be limited  by circumstances  more  forcible  than  any 
law that could  be passed  on  the subject ; that is, by 
the ability of  the bank to make them.  But the plan 
in America has been to limit the loans.  Mr. Gallatin 
says, "  We think that no bank should be permitted to 
extend its loans, including stocks of every description, 
and  every  species  of  debt,  in  whatever  manner 
secured,  beyond  twice  the  amount  of  its  capital. 
We find  provisions  to  that  effect  in  the  laws  of 
Massacliusetts and Louisiana.  The aggregate amount 
of  the  loans  made  and  of  the stocks  held  by  the 
former bank of  the United  States never amounted to 
seventy  per  cent.,  nor that  of  the  existing  bank  to 
fifty per  cent. beyond the amount  of  their respective 
capitals." 
The act which incorporates the state bank  of  Mas- 
sachusetts is in conformity with the above  regulation, 
but tile charter  of  the North Bank  in the same State 74  THE HISTORY  OF  BANKING  fN  AMERICA.  75 
requires "  that the amount  of  bills  issucd  from  said 
bank at any one time shall not exceed fift.y per centum 
of  the amount  of  the capital stock actually paid in." 
A writer, I have already quoted, remarks, that "these 
charters are founded  upon that cautious policy whicl~ 
marks the character  of  the people of  Massachusetts; 
a prudence, however, in the opinion  of  many, which 
has neither  promoted  the  interest  of  their  monied 
institutions, nor  aided the enterprize  of  the  commu- 
nity, and which happily for the prosperity of  the State 
of  New  York  has not  been  hitherto followed here." 
"Sec.  G.  Be it further enacted, That no banking  corporation within 
and  under  the  authority of  this  conlmonwealtll, shall  vest,  use,  or 
improve any of  its monies, goods, chattels, or effects, in  trade or  com- 
merce, but  any corporation  aforesaid  may sell  all  kinds  of  personal 
pledges lodged with it by way of  security, to  an  nmonnt  sufficient  to 
rcimbursc the sun1 loaned, with interest and expenses.  Every bnnking 
corporation  as  aforesaid, may hold  real  estate, lands, and  tenements, 
requisite  for  the  convenient  transaction of  its business, not exceeding 
twelve per celltun1 on the amount of  its capital stock, unless they have 
been, or sllall be thereto specially nutllorised, exclusive of  wllat it may 
hold on mortgage, receive  on  execution, or  take  as security for,  or in 
payment of, any debt to said corporation, and no more." 
Although the law in England  does  not  place  any 
limitation  upon  the  amount  of  loans  or  advances 
made by joint stock banks, yet restrictions upon some 
descriptions of  advance  are  imposed  by most  of  our 
deeds of  settlement.  The comlnittee state-- 
Advancing money on real security is in no instance forbidden.  The 
deeds of  tllree companies are silent  on this  subject, the rest expressly 
allow it. 
The majority of  the deeds  are  silent  on  the  subject of  the pur- 
chase  of  land.  The -  Banking  Company expressly allows  it. 
The Banking  Company  and  the  Union  Banking  Company ex- 
pressly forbid it. 
6'  An advance  of  money  on  mining  concerns  is  in  no  instance 
expressly allowed, in many it is expressly forbidden, in  the majority it 
is passed over in silence. 
Advances of  money upon  any pptlblic  foreign  government stock or 
the stock of  any foreign  chartered  public "  company" is directly sanc- 
tioned in the deeds of  four banking companies.  Investment in foreign 
government  stock  or funds  is  allowed  by the  deed of  another bank. 
Such advances are expressly forbidden by many of  the  deeds, ancl  are 
over in silence by many others." 
In  no  case  does it appear  that  any restriction  is 
placed  upon loans granted upon  indivitlual  security; 
that is. uDon  overdrawn  accounts.  In  all  our manu- 
'I 
facturing towns  it  is  the  practice  for  the  banks  to 
make large permanent advances to the manufacturers. 
And as a  remuneration  they charge  a  commission of 
a  quarter  per  cent.  upon  the  account.  Here  the 
banks adopt the dangerous principle of  running grcat 
risks for the  sake  of  large profits.  This practice has 
not  been  introduced  bv  the  ioint  stock  banks.  It 
has  for  many  years bein  the Eractice  of  tlle  private 
bankers, and  has  no doubt been  exccedingly  benefi- 
cial in  stimulating  our manufactures,  and in  giving 
worthy  men  of  small  means  the  opportunity of  ad- 
vancing themselves in the world.  But now that  our 
manuf~cturers  are become wealthy, the same. practice 
is not necessary.  It is not  the business  of  banks  to 
supply their customers with capital  to  carry on  their 
trade;  it is a  dangerous  prir~ciple  ; because  in the 
first  place,  there  is  a  great  risk  upon  individual 
security ;  and then,  if  the money is wanted,  it can- 
not  suddenly  be  called  up.  I  think, therefore, that 
ioint stock banks should  limit their  advances of  this 
iort to a certain proportion  of  the amount of  paid-up 
capital.  And  with  regard  to  chartered  banks,  one 
condition  of  the  charter  should  be  that  the  bank 
admits of  no overdrawn accounts. 
"  Sec. 7.  Be  it further  enacted, That  none  but a member of  the 
corporation for whicl~  he  is  cllosen a director, being a citizen  of, and 
resident in the con~monwedth,  shall  be  eligible  to  that  office ;  and a 
majority of  directors, in any bank, shdl be residents uitllin the county 
where the bank is located, and  no  person  shall  be a director  in  two 
banks at one and the same time ;  no bank shall  have lcss than five, or 
more than twelve dircctors, to be determined  by their  bye-laws.  The 
directors sllall choose one of thcirown number to act as president;  and 
in case of  the absence of  the  president, a chairman  may be  appointed 
for  the  time  bcing.  A  majority  of  the  directors  shall  always  be 
neccssary to  constitute  a quorum  for  doing  business.  Tlle  directors 
may make the president  such  compensation as shall  appear  to  them 
rcasonablc. 
"  Sec. 8.  Be it further enacted, That  the  directors  shall  be chosen 
by ballot annually, at a meeting  held  on  the first  Monday in October, 
by tl~c  stockl~oldcrs,  at such  time  and  place, within  tlle  city or town 
lvllcrc said bauk is established, as the president  and  dircctors for the 
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days previous thereto, in some newspaper printed  in  the  county;  and 
if  there be no ncwspa  er printed in mid county, then  in  some  one in 
tlle city of  Boston.  $he nunher of  votes to whir11  each  stockliolder 
shall be entitled, shall  be  according  to  the  nl~mber  of  bhares he shall 
hold, in the following proportion :  That is to say-For  one  share, one 
vote ;  and every two sl~ares  above  one  shall  give a riglit  to  one vote 
more, provided no one member  shall  have  more  tha11 ten votes ;  and 
absent  members may vote  by proxy, such  proxy being  authorised  in 
writing ;  vacancies occurring in the  board of  directors  before  the  ex- 
piration of  the term for which  they were chosen, may be filled  at any 
meeting  of  the  stockholders  called  for  that  purpose, as  hereinbeforc 
proided.  In like  manner,  the  directors  shall  have  power  to  call 
special meeting!  of  the stockholders as often as they think the interest 
of  the corporation may require it. 
U Sec.  9. Be it further enacted, That the directors shall make  half- 
yenrly dividends of  the profits of  the bank.  The directors  shall havc 
power to appoint a cashier, clerks, and such  other  officers, for carrying 
on the business of  this bank, with such saIaiies as to them  shall  seem 
meet;  and  such  cashier, clerks, and  other  officers, shall  retain  their 
places until removed tlierefrom, or others appointed in their plnce. 
"  Sec. 10.  Be it further enacted, That the cashier, before  he enters 
on the duties of  his office, sl~sll  give bond, or bonds, with two  or more 
sureties, to the  satisfaction of  the board  of  directom, conditioned  fo~ 
the faithful performance of  the duties of  his office :  Provided, that  in 
no case  shall  bonds  be  taken  for  a less  sum  than  twenty thousand 
dollars, nor a greater than fifty thousand dollars.  It shall  be  the duty 
of the cashier of  any bank aforesaid, to  eaIl  special  meetings  of  the 
stockholders at any time hereafter,  on the application, in writing, of the 
proprietors of twenty per centum of the capital stock thereof, by giving 
fourteen  days  public  notice  of  such  meeting, in  the  manner  herein- 
before provided. 
These sections  are very similar to clauses that are 
inserted  in  our  deeds  of  settlement.  They refer  to 
several  matters  of  detail which  can  be arranged  by 
the banks much better  than by the legislature.  It  is 
worthy of  inquiry,  however,  whether  the  legislature 
might not  fix  the qualifications  of  a  director.  The 
only  tangible  qualification  is  property.  It seems 
essentially necessary that  a  bank  director  should be 
a  man  of  property.  Neither  talent,  nor  rank,  nor 
influence  should  be  taken  as  a  substitute  for  pro- 
perty.  Most  of  our  deeds  of  settlement  require 
that  a  director  should  hold  a  certain  number  of 
shares.  But  the  amount  of  property  thus invested 
is usually  inconsiderable.  And  it is  not  desirable, 
on  several  accounts,  that  a  director  should  hold  n 
large number of  shares.  It is understood  that none 
of  the  directors  of  the  Bank  of  England  hold  a 
greater amount of  bank stock than their qualification. 
It appears that in  the  banks of  Massacliusetts all the 
directors go out  every year, but may be re-elected by 
ballot.  In the Bank  of  England  eight  directors  go 
out  every  year,  but  are always  re-elected.  By  the 
charter  of  the Bank  of  Ireland  five  new  directors 
must be chosen every year.  The deeds of  settlement 
of  the joint  stock  banks  vary  very  mucl1  in  this 
respect. 
"Sec. 11.  Be  it  further  enacted, That  in  case  tile  officers of  any 
banlting corporation aforesaid, in the usual  banking  hours, shall refuse 
or delay paplent in  gold  or  silver money, of  any note or bill of  said 
corporation, tllere presented for payment, the  said  corporation shall be 
liable  to  pay, as  additional  damnges, at the  rate of  twenty-four  per 
centum per annum, for the time during which  such  paynlent  shall  be 
delayed or refused." 
This regulation  is  peculiar  to America.  I11  itself 
it  may be  very good,  but  the  stoppage of  payment 
ought also  to  be  attended  by  the forfeiture  of  the 
charter.  In  this  respect,  the  law  of  England  in 
regard to joint  stock  banks  is very defective.  If  the 
banks stop payment it does not  appear that the credi- 
tors have any power to interfere, or to obtain possession 
of  the funds of  the bank.  Each creditor may sue the 
public  officer,  and  having  obtained  judgment  may 
issue  execution  against  the  funds  of  the  bank, and 
the  private  property of  the  shareholders.  It is pro- 
posed  as a  subject  of  inquiry,  whether  in  case  of 
stoppage, the affairs of  a bank  ought not to be placed 
immediately  in  the  hands  of  government  com- 
missioners, for  the purpose of  winding it up, and an 
extent in  aid  issued  against  the  property of  all the 
directors, that in case it should  be  necessary to come 
upon  the  property of  the proprietors  to  make  good 
the  deficiency;  that of  the directors should  be  first 
taken. 
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rncy of  the wpid  stock in any bank aforemid, wl~icl~  shall  arisc from 
tlle officid rnismnnagcmcnt of  tlie directors, ~IIC  persons wlio are stock- 
holders at the time of suc11 n~isnianagenicnt,  shall  in  tl~cir  private  and 
i~itlividual  capacities, be  respectively lialjlc to pny  tllc same : Proviclcd, 
I~owever,  that  in  no  case  slid1 any one stoclcl~olclcr  be liablc to pay  a 
sum exceeding the amount of  thc stock actudly tlicii held by  him.  - 
"  Sec.  13. Be it further enacted, Tlrat  tlie  l~olders  of  stock  ill  any 
banking corporation atbresaid, in tl~is  comnlo~i~vealth,  wlicn  its  cllartcr 
dial1 expire, shall be chargeable in their private  and  individual cnpuci- 
ties, and shall be holden  for  the  payment  and  redemption of  all bills 
which may have been issued by said corporation, remaining  unpaid, in 
proportion to the stoclc they may respectively hold. 
"  Sec.  14.  Be it further enactcd,  That any stocklloldcr of  any bank 
\v110  shall l~ave  been  obligcd to pny  miy  dcbt  or  demand  against  said 
bank out of  his individual  propcrty, sl~all  have a bill  in  equity, origi- 
nally to Le  tried  in  the  supreme  judicid court, to rccovcr the propor- 
tional parts of  such  sums of  liloncy ns llc nli~y  lvilvc  SO paid, from  tl~e 
otl~er  stockholders, who may be  equally liable  for  the  same, and sue11 
damages and costs as tlie court may decree, and said bill in equity may 
be inserted in a writ of  attachment, or original suiii~nons." 
In America, the banks are chartered banks, and the 
shareholders, in  most  cases, have no liability beyond 
the amount  of  tlieir  respective shares.  In England, 
every shareholder  is liable  to  the full  extent of  his 
property for all the debts of  the bank. 
Unlimited  liability  gives  greater  security  to  the 
public.  It will hardly be denied that all the property 
of  five  hundred  partners  gives  greater  security  for 
tlie debts of  the bank than any small portion  of  tliat 
property that may be advanced in the form of  paid-up 
capital.  It is not necessary to provc tliat the paid-up 
capital and  tlie  remaining  property  of  the partners 
form a  larger  fund  than  the  paid-up  capital  alone. 
The  unlimited  liability  of  the  partners constitutes 
therefore a higher guarantee for the ultimate payment 
of  the debts  of  the  bank, whether  those  debts  arise 
from notes or deposits. 
Uxilimited liability,  is  to  a  certain  extent, a  gua- 
rantee  for  prudent  management.  As  the dircctors 
are liable  to  the full  extent  of  their  property, they 
will take  care  not  to incur such  risks  as will  plac'e 
that  property  in  jeopardy.  And  tllc  shareholders 
will take care to  choose  directors, wliose wealth  and 
character  render  them  worthy  of  confidcncc ; and 
they will  also  attend  to  the  annual  report  of  the 
directors,  and  will  be  alive  to  any  event that may 
endanger  the  prosperity  of  the  bank.  It  is  no 
objection,  to  say  that  private  bankers  run  risks, 
although  their  whole  property  is  liable,  ancl  hence 
the directors of joint  stock banks would  run  risks in 
the sar11e way.  First.  Private  bankers, for  the most 
part, liave not run risks  as  bankers, but  as manufac- 
turers and  merchants, and the  failure of  their  com- 
mercial  enterprizes has  brought  down  thcir banks. 
Secondly.  The private bankers  had  greater  induce- 
ments to run  risks, bccausc  all  the profit  of  the risk 
went to themselves ; but bank  directors have no such 
inducement, because  the  profit  that comes  to  tliem- 
sclves is very small,  being  only in  proportion  to the 
shares  that  they  hold,  while  the  failure might en- 
danger their whole  property, as  the  directors [would 
be the first  that would  liave judgment issued against 
them.  Nor is  it any objection to say, that the sliare- 
liolders will not pay any regard  to the administration 
of  the bank, so  long  as they receive  good dividends. 
It may be very true, that when the shareliolders have 
provided  for  the  good  management  of  the bank, by 
choosing efficient directors, that they will then attend 
no farther to its  administration  beyond receiving the 
half-yearly  or  annual  reports.  But  let  it  be  once 
even rumoured that the  directors are acting  unfaith- 
fully towards  the  shareholders, or  let it be suspected 
that the  dividends are not paid out of  the profits, and 
then see if  the shareholders will  not  meet, and show 
by their  conduct, that they are  alive to  the  sense of 
unlimited liability. 
The unlimited liability of  the shareholders attracts 
the  public  confidence.  It is not  enough that a bank 
is ultimately safe, the public should  believe that it is 
safe.  A want of  confidence in our banking establish- 
ments has been the cause of much misery.  The panic 
of  1825 would havc bccn far less calamitous had there 
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of  the general suspicion, many stopped payment, who 
were afterwards  proved  not oiily  to  be  solvent,  but 
wealthy.  It will not be denied,  that  the public  will 
place greater confidence in a bank, where, in addition 
to the paid-up capital they have a clailn upon the pro- 
perty of  all the partners, than where  they have to dc- 
pend upon the paid-up capital alone.  It  is remarkable 
that  this  tendency  of  unlimited  liability  to  inspire 
public confidence should  be advanced as an objection 
against it.  It  has been said, that the public confidence 
may be abused, and that banks presuming on the con- 
fidence they know they have acquired, may engage in 
speculatior~s  to which they would not other\\  71se  '  resort. 
We grant that the public  conf dence may be abused ; 
but is there no way of  guarding against these abuses, 
but  by rendering the  banks  less  deserving  of  con- 
fidence ?  If a commander presuming on the goodness 
of  his ship were  to attempt a  dangerous voyage,  in 
wliicl~  he should peril the ship and cargo, that might 
be a very good reason for displacing the  commander, 
or  for  prohibiting  him making the  same voyage  a 
second time ;  but ~lould  that be a sufficient reason for 
damaging the  ship, so as to render her less sea-worthy? 
They who assert  that unlimited  liability acquires an 
excessive degree  of  public confidence, admit that the 
public opinion is in opposition  to their  own.  They 
think  that  unlimited  liability  renders  a  bank  less 
worthy of  confidence ; the  public  think  the reverse, 
and they act accordingly. 
But it is  said,  that ~f the liability  were  limited, 
a  more  respectable  class  of  persons  would  become 
shareholders  in joint  stock  banks.  Perhaps this is 
the case with a few of the landed gentry, but certainly 
not  with  any  large portion  oC  them.  They are the 
principal declaimers against joint  stock  banks.  But 
why  is it so  desirable that they should become part- 
ners?  Is it on account  of  their habits  of  business, 
or  their  superior  knowledge  of  banking?  No ; it 
is because their  large rproperties  would  give weiglit 
and  respectability  to the  bank.  But of  what  value 
would their property be  to the bank, if  their liability 
was  limited to  the  amount  of  t!le  paid-up  capital? 
Besides,  it is  not  necessary  that every  nlan  of  pro- 
perty in the  country  sho~id  be  a  shareholder  in a 
joint stock  bank ; and if we  have n sufficient number 
of  wealthy men to make the banks safe  and respect- 
able, why need me  alter  the law to meet the scruples 
of  others whose assistance is not required ? 
But it is said that unlimited  liability has been tried 
and failed.  The private  banks in England  were  all 
founded on unlimited liability, and yet large numbers 
of  them have failed.  Is it believed  that if  these pri- 
vate banks had  been founded  on limited  liability, the 
failures would  have  been less numerous ?  Besides, is 
it fair to infer  that because  the iullimited liability of 
six partners fktils to produce  a  good  bank, that there- 
fore  the unlimited  liability of  six  hundred  partners 
would be equally ineffectual ?  And  if in some cases 
even this has been found to fail, arc: there  no failures 
on  the other  side ?  Has not  limited  liability  been 
also tried and failed ?  Are the one hundred and sixty- 
five chartered banks that have failed in America to go 
for nothing ?  And what are all the returns, the oaths 
of the directors, the examinations and countings of the 
money  by government  commissioners,  but so  many 
acknowledgments  that limited  liability  is  not  to  be 
trusted ? 
If  limited liability is to be tried at all, it should be 
under  heavy  restrictions-restrictions  more  severe 
than those imposed upon the banks of America.  It is 
perhaps possible  to frame  charters  with  such  provi- 
sions as might justify  the limitation of  the liability to 
three  or  four times the amount of thc. paid-up capital. 
I may have occasion to notice some of these provisions 
at the end of this section. 
"Sec. 15.  Be it further  enacted, that  every bank  shall  be  kept  in 
the city or town in which it is, or shall be originally established, aud In 
such part of  such city or  town as is prescribed by its charter." 
The Arnericails  have  adopted  the district  systea~. 
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The banks of  every state confine  themselves  to that 
state, and do not extend their branches into the neigh- 
bouring states.  Analogous to this  is the  district sys- 
tein  of  banking adopted  by the joint  stock banks in 
England.  Had the law of  1826 permitted joint stock 
banks to be  established  in  London,  we  sl~ould  pro- 
bably by this time have  had ten or a dozen banks hav- 
ing their head quarters in London, and extending their 
branches  throughout the  country.  But  as the  law 
these banks being established within  sixty- 
five miles of  London, it nccessarily gave rise to banks 
occupying particular  districts in the country.  The 
advantages which  are alleged  to  belong  to the dis- 
trict syste~n  are the follou7ing-that  the bank  will  be 
better adapted to the wants and habits of the pcople- 
that a local feeling will be excited in its favour, hence 
the inl~abitants  of  the district will take shares, and the 
occurrence  of  runs upon  the bank  will  bc  less pro- 
bable-that  a better system  of  management  may  be 
expected, as it can more easily be governed, and will 
be more under controul-that  a  panic  in the district 
will not affect the other parts of the comltry, and hence 
supplies may  be  more  easily obtained-  that  banks 
will be of  a moderate size, and hence mill be attended 
with  the advantages  arising  from  numerous  banks 
acting as checl~s  upon  each  other,  instead  of  a  few 
large  banks who  rnay  combine  for  objects injurious 
to  the  nation;  and  that  as  each  bank  vill  hare 
an agent in  London, the bills  they  draw will  thus 
have two  parties  as  securities,  and the  public  will 
have  a  pledge  that  there  is no excessive  issue  in 
the  forin  of  kites  or accon~modation  bills.  On the 
other hand,  it may be  contended, that in Scotla~~d 
the  large  metropolitan  banks  which  have  branches 
extended t,hronghout the country, have generally been 
morc successful than the provincial or district hanks- 
that there is a  greater security to the public for the 
notes or deposits-that  advances are not so likely to be 
made to speculative parties merely on account of their 
local  influence-that  the capital raised in one part of 
the country can  be  employed  in another-that  the 
transmission of money from one part of the country to 
another is more rapid  and direct-that  the establish- 
ment of  the bank being on a  larger scale,  you  have 
a superior class of  directors, and can demand the ser- 
vices of higher talents in those  who are employed as 
officers. 
It does not appear that these two systems are neces- 
sarily  at variance  with  each  other.  County or dis- 
tricts banks have no doubt many advantages, but they 
do not seem to supersede banks on a larger scale. 
Both the district and the extended system of bank- 
ing are attended  with  a  system  of  branches.  The 
Bank of the United States had a branch in every state, 
and several of  the state banks have also branches.  It 
will  be  seen at page 48 that the 558 banks have 146 
branches. 
When the law existed  in England that  no bank 
should  have  more  than  six  partners,  the  branch 
system  scarcely  existed.  In  some  cases,  a  bank 
had a  branch or two  a  few miles distant,  but no in- 
stance occurred of a bank extending itself  throughout 
a county or a district.  But ~vith  joint  stock banking 
arose the  branch  system-the  head office was  placed 
in the county town,  and branches  were  opened in the 
principal tourns and villages  around.  The credit  of 
the bank being firmly established, its notes circulated 
freely throughout the whole  district.  The chief ad- 
vantages of this system are the following :- 
Tliere is greater security to the public.  The secu- 
rity of the whole bank is attached to the transactions 
of  every branch ; hence there is greater  safety to the 
public than could be afforded by a number of separate 
private  banks,  or  even  so  many independent joint 
stock  banks.  These banks  could  have  but a  small 
number of  partners-the  paid-up capital and the pri- 
vate  property  of  the  partners must be comparatively 
small ; hence the holder  of  a  note  issued  by  one of 
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only 011  that bank : but if  that bank, instead of  being 
independent, were a branch of  a large establishn~ent, 
the holder  of  a note  would have the security of  that 
large establishment; hence  the branch system  unites 
together a  greater number of  persons,  and affords  a 
more ample guarantee. 
The  branch  system  provides  greater  facilities  for 
the transmission  of  money.  The sending of  money 
from one town  to another  is greatly facilitated,  if  a 
branch  of  the same bank  be  established  in each  of 
those towns, for all tlle brar~cllcs  grant  letters of  credit 
upon each other.  Otherwise you have to ask tlle banker 
in the town from which the money is sent to give you 
a bill  llpoil  London, which is  transmittecl by post, or 
you request liim to advise his London agent to pay the 
money to the London agent of  the banker, who resides 
in the  town  to which  the money  is  remitted.  This 
takes up  more  time, and is attended with  more  ex- 
pcnse.  A hcility of  transmitting money between two 
places  usually  facilitates  t.he  trade  between  those 
places. 
The brancli system extends tlie benefits of  banking 
to small places where independent banks could not be 
supported.  An independent bank must have an indc- 
pendent  board  of  directors who in most cases will  be 
better  paid-the  manager must have a higher salary 
because  he  has a heavier  responsibility, and a large 
amount of  cash must be  kept unemployed in the till, 
because tliere is no neighbouring resource in case of a 
run.  There must be a paid-up capital, upon which good 
dividends are expected ;  a large proportion of  the funds 
must  be invested in exchequer bills, or other govern- 
ment securities,  at a  low interest,  in  order that the 
bank may be prcpared to meet sudden calls ; and the 
charge for  agencies will also be more.  On the other 
hand, a brancli has seldom need  of  a  board of  direc- 
tors, one  or  two  being quite sufficient-the  manager 
is not so well  paid : there  is no necessity for  a  large 
sum in the till, because in case of necessity the branch 
has recourse to the head office, or to the neighbouring 
branches;  nor is a large portion  of  its fund invested 
in government securities that  but  little interest, 
as the head office talces charge  of  this,  and  can  ma- 
nage it  at  a  less  proyortionaI  expense.  Besides  at 
some branches tlic  manager attcllds only  on  market 
days, or once or twice a week.  l'l~e  business done on 
those days would not bear the espPllsc of  an indepen- 
dent establishment. 
The branch  system provides  the means  of  a  due 
distribution  of  capital.  Some banks raise lllore capi- 
tal  t,han  t1:ey  can  employ,  that is,  their notes  and 
deposits  amount  to  Inore  than  their loans  and  dis- 
counts.  Others employ more capital than they raise, 
that is, tlieir loans and discounts amount to Inore t1:an 
their notes and deposits.  Banks that have  a  surplus 
capital usually send it, to London  to  be  employed  by 
the  bill  brokcrs.  Tlic  banlcs that want capital must 
either  rcstrict  tlieir  business,  or  send  tlieir  bills  to 
London to be redisconnted.  Eow  if  two  banks,  one 
having too much, and the other  too  little capital,  be 
situated in the same county, they  will  have no direct 
intercourse, and will consequently be of  no assistance 
to each other : but if a  district  bank  be  established, 
and these two  banlts  become  branclies, tl~en  the sur- 
plus capital of  one branch  ill be sent to be employed 
at the other-tlins  the  whole  wealth  of  the  district 
is employed  \vitliin  the district,  and  the practice  of 
rediscounting bills  in London will be  proportionably 
diminished. 
The brancli system secures a better system  of  ma- 
nagement.  The only  way  to  secure  good  manage- 
ment  is  to  pretrent  the formation  of  small  banks. 
When  banks  arc  large  tllc  directors  are  men  of 
more wealth  and  respectability-they  can give  large 
salaries  to  their  officers,  and  hence  can  commarid 
first-ratc  talent -  there  will  bc  a  more  numerous 
l~roprictzry  ; and  in  a  large  numb?r  there  will  be 
always  some  active  spirits  who  will  be  watchfill  of 
the conduct  of  the dircctora and tlle  manager;  be- 
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number of  persons eligible to be directors, and conse- 
quently there is a wider choice.  In populous cities such 
as London or ~~nchester,  a large bank may be formed 
without  branches-but  in smaller places  thcre  is no 
way of forming a large bank but by giving it  branches 
throughout  the district.  A  branch  bank  in a small 
town  will  probably  be  better managed than an inde- 
pendent bank in the same  place.  'l'he directors and 
manager of  the branch will be appointed by the direc- 
tors  at the head  office,  assisted  by  thc general ma- 
nager, rvlro are very competent  to judge what qualifi- 
cations are necessary for  these offices, and who would 
not  be  biassed  by local  partialities.  But the direc- 
tors  of  tlle  independent  bank  woul!l  most  likely be 
self-appointed  or  chosen  by  the proprietors, because 
no others could be obtained, and these direct.ora would 
appoint some friend of  their own to be manager.  The 
manager of the branch, besides the superintendence of 
the directors, which he has  in common  with the ma- 
nager  of  the independent  bank,  will  be  subject to 
visits from the general mauager or the inspector;  and 
he must send weekly statements of  his accounts to the 
head ofice.  The consciousness of  responsibility will 
thus secure a  more  anxious attention  to his duties; 
and besides, he will probably  be  looking forward  for 
promotion  to  a  higher  branch  as  a  reward  for  his 
successful management.  These  circumstances seem to 
ensure a  higher degree  of  good  management to the 
branch. 
At the same tlmc  it must  be  admitted that banks 
with numerous branches require a proportionate paid- 
up capital, and that the capital be kept in a  dispose- 
able form ;  it also requires vigilant and constant inspec- 
tion, and a rigid system of discipline. 
A proportionate paid-up capital is necessary, because 
in case of a run there arc a  greater number of points 
of  attack ; hence  the funds must  be divided to meet 
all these possible attacks,  for  if  one  branch he over- 
powered, the whole bank  is immediately exposed  to 
suspicion. 
Another  danger arises  from  the  incompetency or 
negligence of  the managers  of  branches.  Among a 
number  of  men  it is not  likely  that  all are  clever, 
and all prudcnt ; and one case of neglect on the part 
of one manager, may in times of alarin throw discredit 
on the whole establishment.  Besides,  there is some- 
times danger even from the zeal of the branch mana- 
gers.  Each manager is naturally anxious to increase 
the business of  his own branch ;  and he will perhaps 
find that the most easy way of  doing this is to extend 
his  loans  and discounts.  Hence each manager  tries 
to employ as much capital as lie can ; and the urgent 
remonstrances he receives from head quarters, requir- 
ing hirn to restrict liis discounts, arc either evaded or 
delayed.  Thus the bank  proceeds until some heavy 
demand for money arises at head  quarters,  and it is 
then founcl that dl  the capital of  the bank has been 
absorbed  by  tlie  branches.  These  advances cannot 
be suddenly recalled, and thus the bank is ruined. 
What number  of  branches a bank  ought to  have, 
and what  distance they  ought  to  be from  the head 
office,  have  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion. 
No general rules can be given.  Thc subject may very 
safely be left to the discretion of tlie banks themselves. 
Several of  tlle  banks  in Scotland have  from  thirty 
to forty branches.  The Provincial  bank  of  Ireland, 
whose head  office is in London, have branches spread 
all over  Ireland.  I  am not aware that in these cases 
any danger or  inconvenicnce  has  hccn  experienced. 
When branches  are  found  troublesome  or unprofit- 
able, they will  very soon  be  discontinued.  In some 
instances,  even  in  Scotland,  the  branches  of  the 
larger banks have been withdrawn  in consequence of 
being unable to sustain a conlpetition ~rith  the local 
banks of t,lie district. 
"kS~c.  l I;.  RC it  filrthcr  enacted, that,  upon any requisition  of  the 
legibl:tt~~rr,  C:LCII  I~sllking  corporation slli~11  loan  to  the  commonwealth, 
s  sum not cscccdi~ig  five per ccntuni  on  its capital  stock  at  nny one 
time, rcimbursable by five anr~unl  instalnients, or at any shortcr period, 
at the  election  of  the  colnlnon\rcalth, wit11  the  annual  payment  of interest, at a rate not exceeding five per centuln per annum:  provided, 
that the commonwealtl~  shall never at any one time  stand  indebted  to 
any corporation, witl~out  its  consent,  for  s larger  sum  than  ten  per 
centum of  its capital.  It sllall  be  the  duty of  the  treasurer  of  this 
comn~onwealtl~,  whenever he shall have occasion to borrow any sum  of 
money of  any incorpo~atcd  Lank, undcr and by virtuc of  any authority 
for that purpose given by an  act  or  rcsolve of  tllis cornn~onwealth,  to 
give notice in writing to the  president  or  cashier  of  any incorporated 
bank of  the amount wl~icll  he I~as  occasion to  borrow, and demanding 
of  said  bank  a  loan  of  tl~e  same, conformably  to  the provisions of 
this  act, and  the  commonmealth will  l~old  itself  responsibIe for  any 
money borrowed of  any bank by tl~e  treasurer;  and if any incorporated 
bank aforesaid, shall neglect or refuse for the space of  thirty days after 
notice  given  as aforesaid, to  loan to  the  said  treasurer  the  sum  SO 
demanded,  said  bank  shall  forfeit  and  pty into  the  treasury of  this 
com~nonwealth,  the  sum  of  two  per  centum  per  month  upon  the 
amount of  any sum so demanded, and so after tl~at  rate  for  a  shorter 
or longer time, so long as said neglect or refusal  to  comply with  such 
demand  of  said  treasurer  shall  continue:  provided,  that  the  notice 
demanding such loon shall be accompanied by an attested copy of  sucl~ 
act or resolve, and shall be approved by  the  governor  in writing ;  and 
it shall be the duty of  the treasurer, at  the  expiration  of  one  month 
after said demand shall have been made, to institute  an  action, in  the 
nanle of  and for the nse of  this commonwealtl~,  in  any court  of  com- 
petent  jurisdiction, against the bank so  neglecting  or  refusing for  the 
recovcry of  the said pennlty, and so from month to month, to institute 
similar suits for thc recovcry of  the penalty aforesaid, so 101:g  as  such 
neglect or refusal shall continue ;  and it sl~dl  al,so be  the  duty of  said 
treasurer, upon obtaining jndgnlcnt and execution  on  any such  action 
or actions, to cause the amount tl~ereof  to be fortl~with  levied upon the 
goods, chattels,  or  lands  of  the  bank,  against u-l~icll the  same  shall 
' 
have been obtaincd.  It shall be tllc duty of  the  treasurer, in  making 
the  demand  aforesaid  of  any bank  or banks, to equalize,  as far as  is 
conveniently  practicable,  the  amount  of  such  demnnd  among  the 
several  banks  ~ritlrin  thc  common~.ealth, having  reference  to  the 
amount of  the obligation of  each bank to loan  to  the  commonwealth, 
and  to  the  anloul~t  previously  borrowed  of  each  Lank,  under  the 
authority tbcreof." 
Tllis  arrangement  is  bad-the  government  will 
require these  loans  only  in  seasons of  distress,  and 
in  these  seasons  the  banks  are  least  able  to  spare 
it.  To raise this money for the state they must res'trict 
their loans to individuals.  and hence the distress will 
be incrcascd.  [t would l;e  rnucl~  better  for  the com-  -  - 
monwealth to borrow ten per cent. of the capital at  the 
time the charter was ~ranted. 
S 
Several American writers have reco~nmended  as an 
ilnprovement  on  tl~eir  system  of  bauking,  that  the 
whole of the capitdl sllould be lent to the state. 
'L  Tl~c  business  of  all  those  banks  consists in  receiving money on 
deposit, in issuing bank  notcs and in discounting notes of  hand or  bills 
of  exchange.  A portion of  tl~c  capital is sometimes investctl in public 
stocks, but  tl~is  is  not  obligatory, and  in  tllis  they differ  csse~rt~dly 
from  the  Bank  of  England.  The  capital  of  this  iustitution  being 
loaned to government, and not deper~ding  on  the  solidity of  the paper 
discountcd, affords  a  staple  guarantee to  the holders  of  notes  and to 
the  depositors.  The  bank  can  loan  to  individuals  or  advance  to 
government (beyond its  capital as  above-mentioned) nothing  but  the 
difference between the aggregate of  its notes in circulation, and  of  the 
credits in account current  on  its  I~ooks,  and  the  amount of  specie in 
its vaults.  13ut  the An~ericar~  banks lcnd to individuals, not  only that 
difference. but also  the whole  anlount  of  their  capital, with  the  ex- 
ception oi!ly of  such  portion  as tl~ey  may find  it  convenient, but  are 
not obliged  to vest  in  public  stocks.  It follows, that  the  security of 
the holders of  notes, and of  the depositors generally, rests  exclusively 
on the solidity of  the  paper they have  discountcd.  It might scem, on 
the other hand, that as the Ba~?k  of  England  cannot apply its orignal 
capital  to  any  immediate  use,  whilst  the  American  banks  may,  by 
curtailing. tl~eir  discounts, call  in  tl~eir  capital on any emergency, they 
might, w~thont  risk, pnt in circul:ition  a  greater  proportionate amount 
of  notes.  But  such  curbilmer~ts  cnrr  never  be  made  to  any  con- 
siderable extent without  causi~~g  mucl1  distrcss ;  and in  poi~~t  of  fact, 
a large portion of  their loans  consists of what  the  merchant considers 
as pcrn~anent  accommodation, nnd  in  the  country often  rests  on  real 
security.  This departure from what has been deemed the true banking 
principle, must, it is believed, be ascribed  to  the original disposition of 
the capital."-Galatin,  page 40. 
"  The  modifications  of  the  banking  system  to  he  proposed  and 
reconlmendrd  for adoption, may be  br~efly  described, as  requiring the 
capitals of  banks  to  be  invested  in  permanent  securities,  and  thcir 
credits founded  alone  on  the known  amount, and  condition of  their 
capitals to be employed in the operations  of  discount, to an extent not 
exceeding in any instance the amount of  capital invested. 
"  By the investment  of  the  capital  the security of  the  public and 
of  individual creditors may be considered as increased to that amount. 
For  under  this  system,  wl~ile  the  capital  will  be  exempt  from  tile 
risks  of  comnlercial  paper, the  issues  lnade will  be  at  least  as well 
secured by the notes and bills  discounted, as  is  possil)le in  the case of 
banks employing both  capital  and  crcdlt.  If,  therefore, such  events 
should  occur,  as  to  render  the  discounted  paper  nr~available, the 
capital  existing  in  another  form,  and  not being  liable  to  the  mmc 
casualties,  would  supply  the  defect ; wl~crcns, undcr  tlie  present 
system, there is no such fund in reserve. 
"  Should a bank on  this plan issue a  quantity of  piper equal to the 
whole of  its  capitol, it  is  obvious  that  the whole  of  the  commercid 
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holders of  tlle bank paper  co111d bc  injured ;  ant1 in the extreme case 
of  such  an  entire  loss, the  capital  reserved  from  haaard would  still 
protect the utmost possible amount of  outstanding issues. 
" But the  safety of  this  system would  result  chiefly from its effect 
in preventing over-issues of paper, and conscquently, drains of  specie, 
and  contractions  of  tlle  circulatio~~  ; and  tl~creby  preventing  those 
reductions  and  fluctuations of  prices, which  bring  about  suspensions 
and failures, and  render  the  present  system so  unsafe, botl~  to indi- 
viduals and banks. 
"  On the proposed system a far  greater  degree of  confidence would 
exist, and be maintsined even in the periods of adversity and depression 
in  the  solvency  and  stability  of  the  banks,  than  is  possible on  the 
existing  plan,  and  consequently,  unless  in  very  extraordinary cases, 
agitation and panic would be  depressed or wholly prevented."-L~rd'~ 
Principles of  Currency and Banking, page 72,  84.  New  York, 1829. 
It has often been  suggested in this country, that the 
private bankers should make deposits with government 
as a  security for their notes,  but  the plan  has never 
been carried into effcct.  To compel  either a  private 
or a joint stock bank to deposit that which could not be 
withdrawn in case  of  emergency, would be to cause a 
lock-up of  capital liable to all the objections advanced 
against lending money upon dead security ;  and even 
should  those  f~~ilds  be available, it would  be  unjust 
unless  the same  amount  of  money that was invested 
slioulcl  be returned.  It is no  doubt  advisable  that 
every bank sliould invest some portion of its capital in 
government security.  Tl~e  objection to  buying stock 
is,  that the stock is sure to be IOW when the money is 
wanted ; and  were a law to be made requiring banks 
to  invest their  funds in a  security,  that  in case  of 
emergency could not be realized without loss, it  would 
be  little  better  than an act  of  confiscation.  It may 
therefore be worthy  of  inquiry, how  far  government 
might issue to joint stock and private banks a kind of 
bank  debentures similar  to  excheq~xer  bills.  These 
debentures  to  hear  interest,  say  at  four  per  cent. 
receivable  evcry  year,  and to  be  granted  only  to 
bankers;  the  banks  not to  be  at liberty to sell their 
debentures, but might borrow money upon them from 
the Bank of  E~lgli~~~d,  or  from  other  parties  as  they 
tl~iiili  1)ropcr. 
"Sec.  17. Be  it  furtl~er  cnactecl,  tl~at  any  committee  especially 
appointed by tl~e  legislature for tl~e  purposc, sl~dl  have  a  right  to  ex- 
amine into the doings of any banking corporation chartered  under  the 
authority  of  this  comn~onwealth, and  shall  have  free  access  to  all 
tl~cir  books  and  vaults ;  and  if, upon  such  exan~ination,  it  shall  be 
found, and  after  a  full  hearing  of  said  corporation  thereon,  be  de- 
termined  by  the  legislature, that  said  corporation  have  exceeded  the 
powers granted  them, or  failed  to  comply with  any of  the  rules, re- 
strictions, and conditions provided in the  laws  relating  to  them, their 
charter  thereupon  may be  declared forfeit and void;  and  if  an  officer 
of  any bank, or other person having cllarge of  tl~e  books and  property 
of  any bank, shall refnse or neglect to exhibit said books and property, 
or shall in any way ohstruct said examination by  a conlnlittee as afore- 
said, he or they so ofending shall  be  guilty of  a misdemeanor, and on 
conviction  thcreof,  shall  be  pnnished  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  ten 
thousancl dollars, or  iil~prisonmcnt not  exceeding  three  years, at  tl~e 
discretion of  t11e court. 
"  Sec. 18. BC it further enacted, that in addition to the capital stock 
to  w11ich  any bank  may bc  entitled  by its  act  of  incorporation,  the 
comn~onwealtl~  sl~dl  11:~ve  a right  to  snbscribe  tl~creto  an  amount  not 
exceeding fifty per ccntu~n  of  its anthoriscd capital, whenever provision 
shall II~  inade tl~creto  by law : and the commonwealtl~,  from  the  time 
of  making any such  payment  towards  tl~e  capital  stock  of  any such 
bank, shall be entitled to  tlieir  proportionate sllare  of  thc  profits  and 
dividends arising from the amount thereof. 
"  Sec.  19.  Be it  further  enacted, that, in  addition  to  the  directors 
autl~orized  by law to  be  cl~ose~l  by the  stock-holders  in  the  several 
banks, the legislature shall have a right from time to time to appoint  a 
number of  directors in any bank, in such proportion as the  sums  paid 
from  the  treasury  of  the  commonwealth  towards  the  stock  of  said 
bank shall bear to  the whole amount  of  stock  actually  paid  into  the 
said bank, if  at any time  l~ereafter  they sl~all  see  fit to  exercise  that 
right. 
I presume the object of  this  provision  is to  secure 
the good  management of  the banks.  If the govern- 
ment have reason to believc  that a  bank  is not  well 
managed,  they  can  appoint  directors  of  tlieir  own, 
through whose influence  a  better system  of  manage- 
ment may be  introduced.  But if the securing of  good 
management  be the sole object, where is the necessity 
of the commonwealth making an addition to thecapital, 
and receiving a proportion of the dividends ? If a bank 
be prosperous, why should the government step in and 
share its profits?  If  a bank:be  not  prosperous, why 
should the property of  tlie state b::  invcstrd iu a losing 
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The  directors  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
were twenty-six, of  wbom  six  were  appointed  by the 
president and senate.  There does secm a propriety in 
seine  of  the  directors  of  a  national bank  bcing ap- 
pointed by the government.  First, it seems to connect 
the lrank inore closely with tlic government, and thus 
to render t!le  gover~lmcnt  to  a  certain extent respon- 
sible for the conduct of  the bank.  Secondly,  it rrlay 
prevent  the occurrence  of  disputes  between  the go- 
vernment and t!le  bank, that might be injnrious to tllc 
public.  Tl~irdly,  it might secure a more enlightened 
system of  management, by introducing directors  of  a 
diff'crent  class  in  societv  frorrl those  chosen  bv  the 
U 
proprietors ; tlie union  of  inerchants and statesmen is 
always desirable in the formation of  a  board of  direc- 
tors.  Fourthly, the bank would be less likely to incur 
the charse of  conducting their  a@nirs upon principles 
of  hostility  towards other banks;  directors  appointed 
bv  the  state  would  not be  dis~osed  to enter into all 
t6e petty jealousies of  commeriial bodies, and hence 
would not  be  suspcctcd of  wishing to employ tlie pri- 
vileges of  thc  company as  a means of  crashing rival 
establishments. 
"  Sec. 20.  Be it further enacted, that every bank  shall  be  liable  to 
pay to any bona jde holder  the  original  amount  of  any note  of  said 
bank altered in tlie  course of  its circulation  to a larger  amount, not- 
withstanding such alteration. 
"  ,Sec.  21.  Be it further  cnacted, that  ercry bank  shall, within  ten 
days aftcr the first Mondays in October and April, annually pay to  the 
treasurers of  this  con~monwcaltl~,  for  the  use  of  the  snnle, a  tar  of 
one-hdf  of  one  per  centum  on  the amount  of  such  part  of  their 
original stock as sl~dl  have  been  actually paid  in  by the stockholders 
in the respective  banks : provided, tl~at  if  any portion  of  the  capital 
stock shall not have been paid  in  sir lnontl~s  previous  to  ssid  days, 
then the tax on such portion shall be  paid  in  proportion to  tl~e  time 
that has elapsed since it nras actually paid in.  It shall be  the duty of 
every  bank  wl1ic11 sl~all  bc  incorporated  after  the  first  Monday  in 
October, in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
thirty-one, or mhiclr, on that day, shall  not  have  completed  the  pay- 
ment  of  their  several  instalments,  to  furnish  the  treasurer  of  tlre 
common~vealth,  on  or before the first Mondays in October  and  April, 
with an abstract of  the amount  of  stock  actually paid  by the  stock- 
I~olders  into their  respective  banks, together with  the  time ahon the 
several instalments were paid.  And if any bank shall  neglect  to pay 
the  aforesaid  tax  for  the space  of  thirty days  after  the  same  shall 
become due, it shall be the duty of  the trensurer to issue a warrant  of 
distress, directed to the  sheriff  of  the  county in which  such  bank  is 
situate, or his deputy, commanding them to  levy and  collect  the  sum 
due from tl~e  estate and effects of such bank, which warrant shall be in 
the same  form, mutatis mutandis, as  warrants of  distress against de- 
linquent sheriffs are by law directed to be issued." 
The Americans tax the capital of  their banks-the 
English tax their notes,  their  bills,  their  bonds,  and 
their transfers ; the latter plan scems preferable, as the 
banks are taxed in proportion to their business. 
The composition of the stamp duty upon notes  is a 
great improvement.  The banks  pay  only  upon the 
amount in circnlation.  When the riotes were actually 
stamped, tlie banker paid a duty upon those also in his 
possession. 
Bills drawn upon London at not more tl~an  twenty- 
one days date, are included in the composition.  This 
arrangement should  be  extended  to  all bills  drawn 
upon  London.  It is much  better than stamping the 
bills, as the duty would vary, not only with the amount 
of the bill, but with the time it has to run.  It is quite 
fair that a  bill which is drawn two months after date 
should  pay  twice  the duty  wl~ich  is paid  by  a  bill 
drawn only one month ; and it would do so under the 
composition,  but  on  the  existing  plan  it pays  pre- 
cisely tl~e  same.  The cornposition upon duties should 
not  only  be  extended  to  all  bills,  but  the  returns 
ought to be made separately.  At present  the amount 
is unknown, as the twenty-one day bills  and the notes 
payable on demand are included in one sum. 
Banks also  contribute to the  state  by  the  stamp 
duties paid  on  cash  credit  bonds, surety bonds,  and 
other legal instruments ;  they also greatly increase the 
sums  derived  from the stamp  duties on bills of  ex- 
change, and the post-office revenue. 
There is  also  a  heavy  dut  upon  the transfer  of 
shares in joint stock banks.  l%  seems hardly fair that 
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the same tax as a transfer of  a  la~lded  estate of  equal 
value : the estate will probably not be sold again for a 
life-time ; the shares in  the  bank may change hands 
several times in a year.  If the tax were lightened the 
transfers would  be more  numerous, and possibly the 
revenue more productive. 
"Sec.  27.  Be it  further  cnactcd, t11:tt  the  cashier  of every  bank, 
shall, in every ycar, lllakc  n  rctrlrn  of  tl~c  state  of  such  bank, as it 
existcd  at two  o'clock,  aftcrnoo~~,  of  the  first  Saturday in  s11c11  pre- 
ceding month as the goverrlor may clircct, and shall transrnit  tl~c  same 
as soon as may bc,  not cscccdinp fifteen days, to  the  sccrctary of  th~s 
commonwenltl~,  which return sllall  spccify tl~c  nnloui~t  duc  from  the 
bank, designating in clisti~ict  colum~~s  thc  se~cral  pnrticnlars  included 
therein, and  shdl also  spccifji  the  rcsonrccs  of  the  I~auk,  designating 
in distinct col~unns  the particulars iacludcd tl~crcin.  Wl~ich  return shall 
be  signed  by the  cashier  of  each  barik  resl)cctirely, who sl~all  make 
oath or affirmation before some magistrate qualified  to administer oaths, 
to the truth of  said return, according  to his bcst kno~vledge  and belief, 
and a  majority of  the  directors of  each bank  shall  certify  ant1  make 
oath,  or  affirmation,  before  the same  magistrate,  as their  respective 
cashiers, that  the books  of  snch  bank i~ldicnte  the  state  of  facts  so 
returned  by their  c,?shier,  ancl  that  they  have  full  confidence  in the 
truth of  the return so by liinl  made,  and  no  further or  other  return 
shall be required from said banks. 
"  ,S'cc.  28.  Be it further enacted,  that the seerctary of  this common- 
wealth be, and he hereby is authorized ancl  directed to  procure, at the 
expense  of  the  commonwealth,  printed  copies  of  the  form  of  the 
return  required  by this  act, and  to  furnish  four  such  copies  of  the 
same, to the cashier of  every bank, in thc months of  March, or April, 
annually. 
"Sec. 29.  BC it further  ennctcd,  that  it  shall  be  thc  duty of  the 
secretary of this commonaren1th, after he shall have received the returns 
from  the  several  barlks, as  aforesaid,  to  cause  to be  prepared,  and 
printed, a truc abstract from those rcturns, each  column  to  bc  footed 
up as soon as practicable after they shall have  becn  received,  and  tlie 
secretary shdl transmit, by mail,  one  copy thereof  to  the  cashier  of 
each bank incorporated by authority of  this commonwealth." 
Perha~s  these  are some  of  the  most  useful of  the 
 mer rick  regulations.  Returns are  required  from 
each bank, and from tlie whole is prepared an abstract 
exhibiting the  actual  condition  of  the currency, and 
the  state of  banking in  the  country.  Every  man 
who  has  paid  much  attention  to  the  question  of 
the currency in England must  be  conscious  that  he 
has  not  sufficient  facts  to  enable  him  to  form con- 
clusions  upon  many  important  questions.  The 
paucity of  facts  is one cause why we  have so many 
theories.  The received opinions upon this subject arc 
for  the most  part,  rather  the result  of  abstract rea- 
soning  than  deductiorls  from  facts.  Had we  more 
arnple  itiforn~ation there  would  be  less  room  for 
speculation, and  we  should  arrive  at certain  know- 
ledge  instead  of  being wafted  about  by  fluctuating 
theories.  But  the science  of  statistics  has  received 
till  latcly  but  little  attention  in this  country,  and 
perhaps, the statistics of  banking have  received  Iess 
attention than  any other portion  of  that science.  It 
is only since  1833 that we  have periodical  publica- 
tions  of  the circulation of  the Bank of  England, and 
of the country banks, and even these are imperfect. 
First, then, we ought to have more minute accounts 
of  the circulation of  the Bank of  England. 
We ought to have, not merely the quarterly averawes 
0.  of  the circulation, but the actual weekly  aniounts,  111 
order that the fluctuations caused by particular events 
may be clearly perceived. 
The circulation of the Londoil office should be given 
separately from that of the branches.  At present they 
are all included in the same amount. 
The amount  of  notes  payable  on  demand should 
be given separately  from the bank post bills drawn at 
seven days sight, and from  tlie  drafts  drawn  by ttle 
branches upon the head office. 
It is quite clear that returns made as at present can 
be of  very little use as a means of  forming any correct 
principles upon  the  subject  of  the currency.  Let it 
be supposed, for  instance, that the last return sl~ows  a 
considerable  reduction  in  the  quarterly  average  of 
notes in circulation, and  I wish to  trace the effects of 
this  reduction  upon  the money  market  of  London. 
How call  I do this?  I know not whether the reduc- 
tion took place at the beginning or at the end of  the 
quarter, whether  in  tlie  issues  of  the London  office, 
or in  those  of  the  branches,  whether  in  the  notes 
payable on demand, or in the bank post bills, or in the branch  drafts  on  London.  If  then,  I  found  my 
reasonings  upon  the supposition  that  tlie  reduction 
took  at the end of  the quarter, and  in the notes 
payable  on  demand, issued  by  the  London  office, I 
may be led to very erroneous conclusions. 
There is  another  piecc  of  information which  it is 
desirable to possess  relative  to tlie  circulatior~  of  the 
Bank of  Ensland, itnd it is one wllicll the bank cannot 
supply.  It is desiritblc  tr,  hoow tlie difference in thc 
amount of the active circulation and the dead circula- 
tion, SO as to  be able to trace tlieir respective fluctua- 
tions. That portion of  tl~c  notcs of  the Bank of  England 
which is passing from hand to lland, miay be called tlic 
active circulation.  'Phat  portion which  is lloarded, or 
kept in reserve to meet possible clernnnds, may be callcd 
the dead circulation.  Now it is quite certain that tl~c 
dead circulation, while it remains in that state, has no 
effect  upon  the prices  of  commodiiies, the  spirit  of 
speculation,  or  the  foreign  exchanges.  These  are 
effectcc1 only by the active circulation.  I11  seasor~s  of 
pressure the dead circ~~lation  is increased at the expense 
of  the active  circulation,  because  people hoard  their 
money  to  meet  contii~gcncies.  IIerlce  we  find  the 
pressure  is often  more  severe  tlian the reduction  of' 
the bank circulation would seem to warrant.  But t!ie 
fdct  is, that  the pressure  is in  proportion  to  the re- 
duction of the active circulation, and not in proportion 
to  the reduction  of  thc whole  circulation.  On the 
other hand, in seasons of abuntiance, the dead circula- 
tion is diminished,  the  active circulation proportion- 
ably increased; and hence, the stimuli~s  given to trade 
and speculation is much greater tlian the returns of the 
Bank of  England would warrant us to  expect.  Now 
what means do we possess of  getting at the amount of 
the  dead  circulation?  The Bank  of  England  can 
give us no information on  the subject.  But it seems 
probable that almost  all the dead circulation is in the 
hands  of  the  different  banks:  very  few  private  in- 
dividuals keep any hoard of  bank notes.  If  then, all 
he bankers and banks be required to produce returns 
of  thc  a~no~riit  of  I3311k of  Englilnd  notcs  in  their 
possession, this niiglit  en;tblc  11s  to form  a judgment 
as to the arrlour~t  of  tlie dead circulation. 
It is well  ki~own  that  bills  of  exchange serve the 
purpose  of  p1.omissory  notes.  It is therefore  of  im- 
portance,  in  all  discussions  upon  the  currency,  to 
ascertain the amount of  the bill  circulation.  It may 
be justly supposed, that a large proportion of  the bills 
in existellce are in the hands of  the banks.  In their 
periodical  returns,  the banks,  therefore, should  state 
the amount of  bills  of  exchange in their  possession; 
and  tlie  country  banks  should  state  the  amount of 
outstanding bills they have drawn upon their London 
agents. 
Banks of  deposit serve  the  same  plirpose as banks 
of  circulation.  Pirqn~ents  are  lnndc  by  cheques  as 
well as by notps.  Tlrc amount of  the deposits should 
therefore be known. 
-  If then it bc not desirable to requirc a balance-sheet, 
every bank in England, wflether privatc or joint stock, 
should at least once in three montl~s  render to govern- 
ment the follo\ving returns :- 
LIABILITIES. 
An account of all the notes in circul  B  t.  lon. 
Tl~e  amount of their deposits. 
The nmount of undue bllls they nlay have draw-11. 
ASSETS. - 
TIIC amount of tllc Bank of England notes in tlieir possession. 
The amou~lt  of gold and silver. 
The amount of &due  bills discountcd. 
Tlle amount of government securities tl~ey  Ireltl. 
Also, the an1011nt of bills lodged by customers to be placed to 
their credit when due. 
These returns might be consolidated, and published 
in the following form- 
Notes payable  on tic~zann'. 
Banlc of England notes issued at the London office. 
Ditto issued at tl~e  branches. 
Notes iss~~etl  by the private bankers. 
Notes issued by the joi~lt  stork bunks. 
Total anlount of note3 11po11  demand in circulation. -  I1 93  THE HISTORY  OF 
Bank Post  Bills aad Bills drauwz  upon  London by Joint Stock aad 
Priuate Bankers. 
Bank of  England post bills issued at tlie London office. 
Drafts drawn by  Bank of  England branches upon ditto. 
Drafts on London by  private bankers. 
Ditto dltto by joint  stock banks. 
Total amount of  post bills and drafts upon London. 
Deposits. 
Deposits in the joint  stock banks that issue notes. 
Ditto in ditto that do not issue notes. 
Ditto in private baliks that issue notes. 
Ditto in ditto that do not issue notes. 
Private depoaits in the Bank of  England. 
Total anlount of private deposits. 
Public deposits in the Bank of  Ellgland. 
Tot$  deposits.  - 
Bills of Exchange. 
Dircau~ttcd. Ueposiled 
Bills of exchange in joint stock banks that issue notes. 
Ditto in ditto that do notditto. 
Ditto in private banks that do. 
Ditto in ditto that do not ditto. 
Ditto in Bank of  England.  -- 
Total amount of  bills of  Exchange.  -- -  -- 
An account of Bank of  England notes, gold, govern- 
ment stock, &c. might also be stated in the same man- 
ner, distinguishing the different classes of banks. 
Had we returns such as these  for  a series of  years, 
we should  probably  be  able  to confirm or to correct 
some of  the received opinions respecting the currency. 
We might also  be able to judge  how  far  the  accu- 
sations advanced against some  of  our banking  esta- 
blishments are well or  ill-founded, and we might dis- 
cover  some  ~ractical  measures  for  preventing  those 
evils  that now  result  from tlie  alternate  expansions 
and contractions of  tlle  circl~lating  medium.  To the 
statesman  this  information  wonld  be  useful  in other 
respects, as it would  fur~iish  a criteriori of  the wealth 
and commerce of  the country.  Lord Althorp wished 
to adopt  sonle lrleasurc  of  this sort  in  1833.  In  his 
speech  upon  the  renewal  of  the bank  charter,  he 
stated- 
"It  appeared to  him  vcry  desirable,  that  a  better nlode should be 
establislled for regrilating tlie estimation of  tl~e  circulation of  the country 
banks.  It \v=  essential that the aniount of  their notes in circulation 
should be accurately  Icnown.  It was  for  that  purpose  he proposed, 
that those country banks, instead of  having  the opt~on  as IIOW enjoyed 
by thc Bank of  England  of  making  a composition for the stamp duty 
payable on the gross amount of their notes issued, should be compelled 
to  pay  7s. per  cent. stamp  duty upon  the  notes  which  they issued ; 
thus government would know at all times the exact amount of  country 
bankers' notes in circulntio~l.  No evil could happen in the case of  any 
country banker from such an arrangement.  He dld not wish  to expose 
the affairs of individual bankers ;  for though he thought  it  desirable  to 
make  the affairs of  joint  stock banks known to the public, he did not 
think it expedient to extend it to private  bankers.  He proposed  that 
every  individual bank should  send  up  a  statement  to  London,  as  a 
strictly confidential paper,  which was not to be published  in a separate 
form, but the accounts being added together,  the  total result would  be 
given  to  tlie public  period~cnlly.  These u  crc the grounds of  tlle pro- 
positions which he felt it his duty to submit to the co~nmittee  on  tliis 
important subject.  He should  observe, that  the country banker could 
state the whole of  liis available assets.-(Sir  Robert P  eel asked whether 
the  statement  would  include  landed  property.)  As  to  that  point, 
landed  estates,  although  not immediately convertible, tended certainly 
to an iucrease of  security for tl~e  ultimate  solvency of  the banker,  and 
on that ground it might be matter of  consideration, wlietller tlie descnp- 
tion of  property referred  to  sllould  not  be  ir~cluded  in  the accou~it. 
These were tlle propositio~ls  which lie would submit to the committee.'' 
From this  quotation, it appears that  Lord  Althorp 
did  not  contemplate  the publication of  the affairs  of 
any individual bank.  The committee  of  1536 state, 
"  The law does not provide for  any publication  of  the 
liabilities and assets of those banks, nor does it enforce 
the comn~unication  of  any balance-sheet  to  the pro- 
prietors at large."  It may be a suhjcct of  inqiiiry how 
far such a measure would be beneficial.  The uublica- 
tion of a balance-sheet bv iildividual banks see&  liable 
to the following objections. 
1. That it is not a fair criterion  by  which  you  can 
form any judgmellt of the real conditiorl  of  tlie bank. 
You might see that the bank had a  certain  amount of 
securities, or had advanced a certain sum upon loans ; but whether tllosc sccuritics iverc available, or whether 
thosc  loans  croulil  suddr:i~ly  be  c;~lled  up, arc points 
uporl wl~icll  tlte balance-sl~eet  could give  no  intbrma- 
tion.  'i'he  Agricu1tu:al  and Commcrciill Bank of  Ire- 
land publisher1 :L  very satisfilctory balance-shcet a  few 
weeks only before tliey stopped payment. 
2.  It  would lay the I,ar~li open  to attacks  from  its 
rivals or opponents.  Tbc hllancc-sllcct will  shew  in 
what  way thc funds of thc banli are employed,  but  it 
will not state the reasons  why  they are so employed. 
Tlle opponents  of  thc bnnk  inay attack every item of 
the balance-sheet,  and the directors  may not be  able 
to repel those attnclis ~vitllo~it  a  breach  of  confidence 
that would  bc inji~rious  to  thc  cstablisl~me~~t.  Sup- 
pose, for instance, the balance-shcct sliould  shew  that 
the  bank  had  advanced  a  few  thousand  pounds 
upon  mortgage.  This  might  bc justly  considered 
as a  departure froin  the  sound  principles  of  banli- 
ing; yet  it  ~nigllt  in  this case  be justified  by some 
peculiar circumstances, whicll ncverthelcss  thc  dircc- 
tors  could not publisli  without  serious  injury to the 
parties concerned.  The production of a balance-sheet 
is advocated upon the groi1ncl that it would cnablc the 
sharel~olders  to judge of the ability and pruclcnce ofthe 
clirectors.  But how can they do tliis ~vithont  I<IIO\V~II~ 
the reasons  by \vl>icli tlic  clircctors  arc influcnccd  iu 
thcir decisions ? 
3.  It ~~oulcl  cause a great deal of  speculatioii in the 
shares.  The sllni.cholders and the public rvould form 
their opinions  of  the bank from the statements in the 
balancz-sheet;  and  accord in^  to  these  opinions  the 
price  of  the sllares  would  fluctuate in  the market. 
Suppose  it  wcrc  sccn  tllat  the  Lanli  had invested a 
large portion  of  its fnuds in government securities, 
and it was known that  clrlring  the year  the  price  of 
those sccuritics  had  cxpcrienced  a  considerable fall, 
would  not  the  bank  shares  irnmcdiatcly  fall  too? 
Again, supposc at the end of a ycar like 1836, it should 
appear t!,at the bank  held  a  considerable  amount  of 
overdue ]>ills,  the apprehcnsion of loss would cause the 
bank shares to fall ; soon afterwards these bills  might 
be  paid  and  then  the  shares  woald  rise  again.- 
Thus,  the publication  of  balance-sheets  would  lteep 
the priccs  of shares in perpetual fluct~~ation,  and fur- 
nish  a  most fr~litii~l  source  of  speculation  allcl  gam- 
bling. 
4.  It ~voulcl bc  perfectly i~ieficicnt  as a protection 
against fraud.  The balance-sheet it seems  is to be  a 
check upon the directors, and yet the dircctors them- 
selves are  to prepare  tlie  balance-sllcct.  They must 
be  stupid  knaves  indeed,  if  they  produce  such  a 
1)alance-sheet  as  sl.lall  expose  tiicir  own  knavery. 
Besides, tlie balance-slleet rrlerelv shevs  the state of tlie 
bank'on one day in the year.  ?Voultl  it not  be easy 
to put the banlc  on  that  clay  ill  s1xc11 a  condition  as 
mould givc satisfactiorl to tlle shareholders ?  A11  Ame- 
rican writer will give us a lesson upon this subject. 
"  If we I~ad  all these accounts collected and arranged to our hand, a 
question  might  a~ise  as to the sense in which they  should  be  under- 
stood.  There  is  an  anlbiguity in many bank statements,  which ren- 
ders them useless.  The word "  cash"  under  the pens of some  bank 
officers, contracts and expands its mcaning  with  as  mu cl^  facility  as 
bank  medium contracts  and cspnnds ~ts  amo~int.  Son~et~nles  it  in- 
cl~idcs  "  mint ccrtificntes,"  becanre  cash  can  be  got  for  tl~enl  in  the 
market.  Sometimes,  in  tl~c  case of  a country bank,  it  inclodes city 
bank notes,  because they are to the country bank  "as good  as  cash ;" 
sometimes cash and "  bills of exchange"  are given togetl~cr. 
"  If  all ambiguity  mere  re~noved  from  bank  stntenlents,  another 
question might arise,  and  that  is,  how  far  they  are  to  be  depended 
up011.  We  I~avc  scen s committee  of  the  legislature  of  Connecticut 
accusing one of tl~e  banks of  that state of  rendering a false account  of 
the arllount of notes in circulation. 
"  No doubt, the accounts of many banks are fairly rendered, but it is 
in~possiblc,  in a general view of  the subject,  to say  hotv  many  bank 
returns are faitt~ful,  and how many are not.  There may  be  a  literal 
exactness in the retnrns, and yet some fact may be suppressed, wl~ich, 
if generally  known,  might  entirely  change  the  in~pression  the pnblic 
receives from a bank statement.  "  I  could,"  says n writcr in a Ports- 
mouth, New I-la~npshire  paper, "n~,~ne  more tl~an  one bnnk in tlris state, 
wllere a considerable portion  of  the  debts  rncntiol~cd in  the  rchturn, 
were n-ortl~  nothing ;  and much of the spccic \V~S  1)orroaetl fiom indi- 
vidnals  or I)anlts,  1:rid  in tl~c  ranltr; tl~osc  two days, and then retc~n~ed 
to t11c owners wit11 tlic seals ~mhroken."  Tile author  of  a  pamphlet, 
published  at New  York in  1828, entitled "  ;I  Pecp into tl~e  Bulks," 
ol)jcctccl to  :b ncn. I:lw  of that stntc, rcquiri~lg  tllc brinks to 11l:lke selnl- of  tlie coinpally ;  but if  the loss anlouilt to one lldf of  tlie capital, tl~ell 
by any single sl~areholder. 
"  By the general provisions of the great majority of deeds, the disso- 
lution of  the company, though duly proposed,  may  be averted by two- 
thirds of  the proprietors ;  but  in some tliere exists no such  restriction ; 
and  on  the  occurrence  of  a  given amount of  loss, tlie dissolution, if 
proposed,  is to take place inlmediatelg, even tlloug11 110  partner should 
propose it. 
" The Banking Con~~arl~  C. 11ns  provisions for dissolution peculiar to 
itself,  and  among others it is set forth, that  tlie  partnership shall de- 
termine on the lsiof  January, 2001. 
"  The Bank of  D., besides the usual provision for ilissolutiori in case 
of  a loss, hm a  provision for dissolution if  the con1pany sliall not repay 
a contribution to a shareholder who shall 11ave been compelled to p:~y a 
debt of  the company. 
"  A dissolution, by voluntary  agreement, may in general be directed 
by  a  majority  of  two-tl~irds  of  the sl~areholders  in tllc iluillber and 
value, but with tl~e  concurrence of a certain number of the clirectors. 
"  In  some  companies  a  voluntary  dissolution  may be effectcd by 
three-fourths of  the  shareholders ;  in others by  a majority ;  in a few 
otl~ers  there is no provision for a voluntary dissolution. 
"Sec. 31.  Be it further enicted, tliat  if, during  the  continuance  of 
any Lank charter, granted or renewed under the provision of  this  Act, 
any new or greater privileges shall be granted to  any other  bank  now 
in operation, or which may l~erenfter  be  created, each  and  every bank 
in operation may be entitled to the same. 
'LSe~.  32. Be it filrtlier enacted, that 110  bill or note, of  tlie ilenonii- 
nation  of  one  hundrctl  dollars  or  less,  shall  be  issued  by any bank 
aforesaid, tirilcss the same sllnll be  imprcsscd  from Perkins'  stereotype 
plate : provided, that no  gcatcr sum  than  one  cent shall be  clmrgcd 
for each bill impressed from the  class  of  plates  on which  is  the  fine 
writing, nor more than two cents for bills of  either of the otl~er  classes; 
but tlie  legislature  may, at any time  hereafter, authorise  and  require 
the use of  any otlicr plntcs. 
''Sec. 33.  Be it  further  enacted, that  all  Acts  and  parts  of  Acts 
heretofore passcd in relation to banks, inconsistent with  the  provisions 
of  tliis Act, be, and the same are hereby repealed, so  far as  the  same 
migllt apply to all  banks whose  cl~artcr  may be  extended  under  the 
provisions of  this Act." 
Tlle committee conclutle their analysis of  the deeds 
of settlement thus-- 
The House will see from tliis anaksis that these deeds of  partner- 
ship,  on  \vliich depend tl~e  whole transactions  of  the banks and tlieir 
responsibility  to the public,  so far from being framed according to one 
colnmon  and  uniform  principle,  differ  materially  from  each otl~er  in 
Inany most important particulars ; and,  in  some  instances,  the deeds 
contain provisions open to very serious ol~jjcctions,  as  entailing possible 
consequclices highly injuiions to the  intercsh of  the pnblic, and of  the 
banking establi~l~nlents  tl~cmsclvcs." 
It ri~ay  bc clr~cstioiicd wlictl~er  any  deed  of  settle- 
rlient can  be  framecl  which  sllall  not contain  provi- 
sions that may by possibility become irijurious.  I-Ience 
arises tlie  propriety  of  inserting  a clause,  giving the 
p1.oprietor.s the power of  altering the deed, as circum- 
stai~ces  may rcqnire.  Tllc committee statc, that with 
onc singlc exceptiou, "  the main body of the proprietors 
reservc to tl~en~selves  thc power of selecting the direc- 
tors, and of  altcring fro111 time  to  time  the  rules  by 
wllicll the directors are to bc gover~~ed." "  Tlie deeds 
of  all  tlie  otl~er  compauics expressly give a power to 
the sharcholdcrs to n~altc  new laws and regulations." 
IT'llethcr we  view tlie llistory or tl~c  prir~ciples  of tlic 
respective institutions, I thiiil< it is ab~indantly  evi~lerit, 
that  as a  whole  the  system of cliartcrcd banks acted 
upon  in  Amcrica,  is inferior  to  the system of  joint 
stock  banks as acted upon in Scotland : nor  does  it 
appear that there  are many of  thc  Anlcrican  rcgula- 
tiorls  tliat  could  be  adraiitageously  iutroduccd  into 
our joiiit stock system.  The restrictions oli the amount 
of notes, deposits, arid  loans, are merely non~inal  ;  and 
wcrc they reduced to so low a proportion as to be real 
restrictions,  they would  most  probal~ly  be pernicious. 
Under the American system of  limited liability, these 
regulations  iriay  be  proper  enough,  for  it is  quite 
ptoper to limit the debts of  a  bank, if  you  limit the 
fund  from  which  those  debts  are  to  be  discharged. 
The most important  of  the America11 regulations, are 
those that refer to the paid-up capital, and that require 
the periodical returns to be  made to the government ; 
and tliese 1  think may very usefully be engrafted upon 
our system. 
While,  however,  separately  considered,  the Ame- 
rican  system scems inferior  to the joint stock system, 
I see no objection to their existing together, provided 
that'neither  be  forced  upon  the public by tl~e  power 
of  the legislature,  but that  they  are  left  to  depend 
entirely on  public  support.  JYe  l~ave  the  means of 
trying  the system  of  charterecl banks, either in con- 
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in a state of  separatiori from that system.  According 
to the existing law, no joint stock bank of issue can be 
established within sixty-five miles of London.  If char- 
tered banks were established beyond that distance, they 
would have to contend against joint  stock banks, and 
hence their  comparative merits ~ni~ht  be  easily ob- 
served.  But if  cl~artered  banks of  issue were also al- 
lowed at  a greater distance than ten miles froin London, 
the space  between  ten  and sixty-five  miles,  a  space 
greater than  the fourth  of  all England  and  Wales, 
might have an extensive system  of  chartered  banks, 
and here we should perceive their operation in a state 
of separation from the system of joint stock bauks. 
It may therefore be worthy of  inquiry, whether the 
legislature inight not improve our banking institutions 
by  the adoption  of  regulations somewhat  similar to 
the following- 
I.  With regard to joint stock banks. 
1.  All  deeds  of  settlement  to  be  submitted  to  a 
public officer  who  should  have  power  to  strike  out 
those provisions that are contrary to law, and to object 
to those he might consider injurious to the public or to 
the sl~areliolders. 
2. That a list  of  the  shareholders and the amount 
of the paid-up capital shall be inserted once a year in 
the London Gazette, and a printed copy given  to all 
the shareholders and customers of the bank. 
3. No bank to commence business until a capital of 
£20,000  was paid up ;  to  have  £50,000  paid  up  by 
the end of the first year, and £100,000  by the end  of 
the second year, or else to cease. Banks in London and 
Manchester to commence with a capital of  £100,000. 
4.  The bank  to  make  to  government  the  perio- 
dical returns I have described ;  and to  lay a balance- 
sheet before the shareholders  when  requested  by  them 
to do so, but not otherwise. 
5.  In case of  a  stoppage of  payment, the affairs of 
the bank  to be placed  iinnlediately  in the  hands  of 
government commissioners,  for the purpose  of  being 
mound  up,  and an  extcnt in aid to be issued against 
the property of  the directors, that in case it should be 
necessary  to come  upon  the property  of  the  share- 
holders to make up a deficiency, that of  the directors 
may be first taken. 
11.  That those joint stock banks that require it may 
have cl~arters  upon the following conditions. 
1. That the paid-up capital shall be at  least £250,000, 
and the nominal capital £ 1,000,000. 
2.  The sharelioldcrs shall not be liable beyond  the 
amount of the nominal capital. 
3. The bank shall make  periodical  returns  to  go- 
vernment  in  the manner described, and shall lay be- 
fore its shareholders an annual balance-sheet, certified 
by two auditors who are not directors. 
4.  The bank  sliall  not  ~ermit  any overdrawn  ac- 
counts,  nor  advance  any  money  upon  mortgage, 
railways,  &c.  &C., nor  in any other  way  except  by 
discounting bills  or investments in government secu- 
rities. 
5.  The  bank  shall  not  issue  notes  beyond  the 
amount of  its  paid-up  capital,  nor  incur  liabilities 
beyond three times the amount of  its paid-up capital. 
6.  The bank  shall not discount  or rediscount  anv 
bills  it may have  discounted,  nor  reissue  any bilfs 
having more than three months to run. 
7.  The bank shall not draw bills  upon  London  at 
more than two months after date. 
8.  The bank shall not have any branches. 
9. The charter shall be limited to ten years; and the 
bank  shall  be  established  beyond  ten  miles  from 
London. 
10.  In  case the bank should stop payment, its affairs 
shall  immediately  be  placed  in  the hands  of  the 
government  commissioners, for  the purpose of  being 
wound  up.  In case  of  a  deficiency,  all the  share- 
holders shall be answerable to make it good, but only 
in proportion to their respective shares ;  and an extent 
in aid, or some other process equally  summary,  shall 
enforce these claims. 
It  will  be  seen that  I  have  not  suggested  any tliings the bank contract their issues ;  money becomes scarce, bills can- 
not be  discounted, and trade is dull.  Now, then, the importer having 
already a heavy stock  of  goods,  will  buy  no  more, he is  anxious  to 
sell, for  he has  not now  sufticient capital to keep so large a stock-a 
general desire of  selling will cause a fall of price.  Fewer conlmodities 
will now be imported, and these obhined  at a less price;  hence there 
is less money due to the foreigner.  The exporters on the  other liand, 
deprived also of  their usnnl accommodation, cannot  carry  on  business 
to the same extent ;  tlie  supply  will  be  reduced,  the competition  is 
less, and prices rise to thc foreigner.  Tl~e  exporters,  too,  cannot now 
give such long  credit as formerly ; tl~ey  mill  call in  the  sums  due to 
them,  and  lience more money must come in from  abroad.  As,  then, 
we have to pay other nations  a  less  amount of  money for our imports, 
and they have to pay us a greater anioul~t  for our exports,  the exchange 
will become favourable.  It is  obvious that this operation  will  cause 
great embarrassment to trade ;  in fact it is only by  producing embarrass- 
nient that a contraction of  the currency can affect the exchanges. 
"  The amou~it  of  notes in  circulation  affects  the  foreign excl~anges 
in anothcr way.  When an increased issue takes place, money becomes 
more abundant;  the lenders  are  more  numerous,  and  the  supply of 
capital is increased ;  hence the price given for the loan of  money, that 
is the rate of interest,  falls.  Persons who have money to employ will 
find they  cannot  obtain  the  same  interest  as formerly, hel~ce  they 
will be disposed  to  invest  it  in  the  foreign fi~nds,  where  it  can  be 
employed  to  greater  advantage.  In order to  remit this money,  tliey 
will purchase foreign  bills ;  this demand for foreign bills will advance 
their price, and the exchanges will consequently be unfavourable.  On 
the other liand,  when  the  circulation  is considerably redoced,  money 
becomes scarce, a  higher price  M ill be given for tl:c  use of it, tlie  rate 
of interest rises ;  persons who have propcrty abroad will be disposed to 
bring  it home, where  it  can  be  more  profitably invested ;  they will 
draw bills against it, and sell tl~ern  in tl~e  market.  This new supply of 
bills will lower the price, and make tlle exchanges favourable. 
"It shonld always be recollected that the transmission of  money  as 
subsidies,  loans,  or  for  investment in the foreign funds, will have the 
same effect upon the excl~anges  as though it were  transmitted  in  py- 
melit of  commodities iinl~orted. Whenever, therefore, the issue of notes 
shall, directly or  indirectly,  cause a trans~nission  of  money  from  one 
country  to  anotlrer,  tlie  exchanges will  be  affected;  but  when  this 
shall not be the case, the expansion or contraction of the currency will 
have no effect upon the foreign exchange." 
It is  also  an admitted  principle  in  America, that 
paper issued to excess will  have the  effect  of  raising 
prices,  stimulating  speculation,  and  rendering  the 
exchanges unfavorable.  The operation of the currency 
upon the exchange  in America was  thus described  a 
few  years  ago by  Mr. Bicldle,  the  President of  the 
Bank of  the United States. 
Tile currency of  tl~e  United States  consists  of  coin, and  of  bank 
notes promising to pay coin.  As long as the bank can always  pay the 
coin they promise, tl~ey  are useful ; because,  in  a  country  where  the 
monied capital is  di~~roportioned  to  the  means  of  employing capital, 
the substitution  of  credits  for  coins  enables  the  nation  to  make  its 
exchanges wit11 less coin, and of course saves tl~e  expense of  that coin. 
But this advantage has by  its  side  a  great  dangcr.  Banks  are  often 
directed  by needy  persons,  who  borrow  too  mucll,  or  by sang uine 
persons, anxious only to increase  the  profits,  without much  pecuniary 
interest or personal responsibility in the administration.  The  constant 
tendency of banks is, therefore, to lend too much, and to put too many 
notes  in  circulation.  Now  the  addition  of  many notes,  even  while 
they are as good as coin, by being always exchangeable for coin, may be 
injurious, because the increase of  the mixed mass  of  money generally, 
occasions a rise in the price of  all commodities.  The  consequence  is, 
that the high price  of  foreign  productions, tempts  foreigners to  send 
a large amount of  their corrimodities ;  while tlie high price of  domestic 
productions, prevents these foreigners from taking  in exchange a  large 
amount of  our commodities.  When, therefore, you buy from foreigners 
more tllan tl~ey  buy from you, as they cannot  take  the  paper  part  of 
your currency, they must take tlie coin part.  If this is done to a con- 
siderable extent, the danger is,  that the banks will  be  obliged  to  pay 
so much of  their coin for their notes, ss not to leave them  a  sufficient 
quantity to answer the demand for it, in wllich case the banks fail, and 
tl~e  community is  defra~~ded.  To  prevent  this, a  prudent bank,  the 
moment it perceives an unusual demand for its notes, and has reason to 
fear a drain on its vaults, sl~ould  immediately diminish  the  amount  of 
its notes, and call in part of  its debts.  So on a  large  scale, when  tl~e 
banks of  a country perceive  such a demand  for  coin  for  exportation, 
as diniinislles too much the  stock of  coin  necessary for  their  banking 
purposes, they should stop the exportation.  This they can always do, 
if  their affairs have been well managed : and here lies the test of  bank 
management. 
"  The  law  of  a  mixed  currency  of  coin  and paper is, that when, 
from superabundance  of  the mixed mass, too much  of  the  coin  part 
leaves the country,  the  remainder  must  be  preserved by diminishing 
the paper part, so as to make the mixed mass valuable in  proportion ; 
it  is  this  capacity  of  dinlinishing  the  paper  which  protects  it.  Its 
value consists in  its  elasticity,  its  power  of  alternate expansion and 
contraction, to suit the state of  the community;  and when it looses its 
flexibility it no  longer  contils within itself the means of  its defence, 
and is full of  hazard : in truth the merit of  a bank is nearly in propor- 
tion to  the degree  of  this flexibility of  its means. 
If a bank lends  its  money on mortgages, on  stocks, forlong terms, 
and  to  persons  careless  of  protests,  it  incurs  this  great  risk,  that, 
on the oue hand its notes  are payable on demand, while, on tbe other 
its  debts  cannot  be  called  in without great delay, a delay fatal to its 
credit and character.  This is the general error  of  banks  who  do  not 
alaays discriminate between two things essentially distinct in banking, 
a debt ultimately secure, and  a  debt  certainly payable.  But  a  well- 
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ness;  the  result  of  business  transactions  payable  on  a day namcd, 
whicll the puties are able to pay, and will pay at any sacrifice in  order 
to escape  nIercantile  dishonour.  Sue11 a bank has its funds, therefore, 
consta~itly  repaid into  it, and is  able to say whether  it will or will not 
lend them out again.  A bank so managed, if  it finds too much demand 
for its coin  to  go  abroad, begins  by  not lending more than it receives 
every day, and then goes Farther, by not lending as tsinucll as its income, 
declining to renew the notes  of its  debtors,  and obliging  them to pay 
a part or the whole;  m&ng  it a rule  to  keep  its discounts within its 
income.  The  operation  proceeds thus : by  issuing no  new notes, bnt 
requiring  something from  your  tlcbtors,  you oblige tllcm to return to 
you the bank notes  you  lent'tllem,  or their eqoivalents.  This makes 
the  bank  notes  more  scarcer -  this  makes  them  more  valuable- 
the  debtor  in  his  anxiety  to  get your notes, being  willing to sell his 
goods  at a  sacrifice-this  brings down  the prices of goods, and makes 
every thing cheaper.  Then tl~e  rcmedy begins.  The foreigner finding 
that  his  goods ~ilust  be  sold so low, se~rds  no  more.  Tl~e  Anleriean 
importer, finding that he cannot  ~lialic  money  by  inlporting them, im- 
ports  no  more.  The remainder of the coin, of  course, is not sent out 
after new  importations, but stays at l~ome  wl~ere  it fi~~tls  better employ- 
ment  in purchasing these clieap articles ;  and when the foreigner hears 
of this state of things 11e sends back  tl~c  coin he  took away.  He took 
away merely because your own domestic productions were so 11igIi  that 
he  could  not  make  any  profit  in  his country by  t~king  t11c1n.  But 
udien the news reaches 11im that his productions  are very cheap in our 
country, 11e mill also learn that  our  productions  are clieap too, and he 
sends  back  tlie  coin  to  buy  tl~ese  cheap productions  of ours.  We 
therefore get back our coin by  diminisl~ing  our paper,  and it  will  stay 
until  drawn  away  by another superabundance of  paper.  Such is the 
circle which a mixed  currency is always describing.  Like  the  power 
of  steam, it is eminer~tly  useful  in prutlent  hands, but  of  tremer~dous 
hazard  when  not  co~ltrolled  ;  ant1 the practical wisdom in managing it 
lies in siezing the proper mome~~t  to ex~)a~~d  and col~tract  it, taking care, 
in working with sue11 explosive niateriuls, wl~enever  there is doubt, to 
incline to the side of  safety. 
"  These simple elements explain tl~e  present situation of  tl~e  country. 
Its disorder is over-trading brought  on by  over-banking.  The re~iicdy 
is, to bank lcss and to trade lcss. 
''  During  the  last  year, money was very abundant,  that  is, the  dc- 
mnnd for coin being small  in  proportion, the  banks  distributed  freely 
their discounts and  notes.  Tl~is  plenty concurred with  other  causes, 
especially tlie expectatio~i  of  a new tariff, to  induce  an  increased  im- 
portation of  foreign goods, and at the same  time  fur~iisli  great  facilily 
for proellring then1  on  credit.  For  instance, in  the  difficulty of  pro- 
curing profitable investn~ents,  there were found capitalists wl~~  exported 
tile  coin  of  the  country, and  sold  their  bills  for  it  on  credit;  thus 
obtaining a small profit on the shipment, and a greater on the  discourit 
of  tlie notes taken for their bills. 
"This fraction of  a per centage on the shipment of  coin, seems to be 
a trifling gain for the great inconvenience to wl~icl~  it often subjects the 
community; but the profit thoogll small, is lawfill, and no odiunl s110uld 
be attached to the agents, for the operation is often a wholesome comcc- 
tive of excessive issues of paper.  The effect was, that by the month of 
February, the esportations of  specie to France  and  England  had  be- 
come  unusually large,  amounting  ~robably,  in  tl~e  preceding  twelve 
months, to between four and five  million  dollars ;  and  great  importa- 
tions  were  constnntly arriving, and  which  when  sold  would  require 
remittances  to  Europe.  Hitherto  at  this  season,  the  demancl  for 
exchange had been supplied by  the bills drawn on  tlie  produce  of the 
South, when shipped to Europe ;  but  this  year  the  crop, and with it 
tlie bills produccd by  it, has come tardily into the  market, so  that  the 
demands of exchange for the proceeds of  tlie arriving sl~ipments  were 
directed  immediately to the  exhausted vaults  of  the  bank.  Such an 
effect was  to be  averted witl~out  loss  of  time.  The directors of  the 
Bank  of  the United States, as was their natural duty, were tlie first to 
perceive  the  danger,  and  the  bank  was  immediately  placed  in  a 
situation  of  great strength and repose.  The State Banks followed its 
example.  They begcnn  by  restraining  their loans witl~in  their income, 
and gradually  and quietly  decreasing the amount of  them,  and  more 
especially directing their retrcncliments on those whose operations were 
particularly  connected with  the  exportations  they  desired  to prevent. 
Tl~e  course of  business has  been  this:  a mercl~ant  borrows  from the 
banks  and sends abroad  A?100,000 in coin, or lie buys bills from one 
who has shipped tlie  coin.  W~th  these  he imports a cargo of  goods, 
obtaining a  long  credit  for the duties, sends them  to  auction,  where 
they are sold,  and the auctioneer's notes given for them.  These notes 
are discounted by  the bank, and the mercl~ant  is then pnt in possession 
of  another £  100,000, which he again ships, and thus he proceeds in an 
endless circle, as long a.9  tl~e  banks, by discounting his notes, enable him 
to send the coin, and tempt  him  so  to do, by keeping up prices here by 
their  excessive issues.  The banks, therefore,  begin by diminishing or 
withdrawinn these artificial facilities, leaving  tl~e  persons directly con- 
cerned in thgls  trade to  act as they please wit11 their own funds, but not 
with the funds of  the banks.  The immediateconsequence is, that the 
auctioneers can  no longer advance the  money for entire cargoes, that 
they no longer sell for credit  but for casl~,  tllat the price of  goods fall, 
that instead of  being sold  in large mnsses they are sold slowly and in 
small  parcels, so  that the importer is not able to remit the proceeds in 
large amounts.  Tl~is  diminishes the demand for tlie bills and for specie 
to send abroad.  In the meantime, tlic importer finding the prices of his 
goods fall, imports no more, and tlie shipper  of coin finding less demmd 
for cxcl~ange,  and  that 11e can make more of  11is money by  using it at 
home  than  by exporting it,  abstains from ser~ding  it abroad.  Time is 
tllus gained till tl~e  arrival of tlie Soutllern exchange, wl~ich  will supply 
t11e  demand  without tlie aid of  coin, and then every thing resumes its 
accustomed course. 
"  This is the point to which  the present memares of  the banks are 
tending.  The purpose must be  accomplisl~ed,  in a longer or  shorter 
time,  with  a greater or  less  degree of pressure, but the effect must or 
will be produced." 
While however the admitted principles  of  the cur- 
I BANKING  IN  AMERICA.  115  114  THE HISTORY  OF 
rency are the same, there is a considerable difference 
in the mode of its administration.  In  America there is 
no national bank:  even the late Bank of  the United 
States had no monopoly;  its only privileges consisted 
in being the banker of  the government, and in being 
able to  establish  branches  in  the  respectives  states, 
without being subject to local taxation.  All the banks 
issue  notes, even for so low an amount as five  dollars, 
and in many of the States for even one dollar.  If there 
is an  evil  in unlimited  competition  in  the issue  of 
notes, that evil must  be experienced  in America.  It 
is therefore worthy of  inquiry, whether  derangements 
have  occurred  in the American  currency  more  fre- 
quently than in this country ;  and if  so, whether they 
have arisen from  a  spirit of  competitioxl between  the 
issning banks, or from tlie  circumstance of  their issu- 
ing very small notes ? 
With regard to England, the case is this :-In  Lon- 
don, and for ten miles round, we have exclusively the 
circulation  of  Bank  of  England notes.  From ten to 
sixty-fire miles round London, we have exclusively the 
notes of private bankers.  Beyond sixty-five miles from 
London, we have the notes of  private bankers, the notes 
of joint  stock banks, and the notes of  branches of  the 
Bank of  England. 
First, we shall consider the circulation of London. 
The bank  charter  committee  of  1832 proposed to 
themselves the following inquiries : 
l. "  Whether the paper circulation of the  metropolis 
should be confined  as at present to  the issue of  one 
bank,  and that a commercial company ;  or whether  a 
competition of  different banks of issue, each consisting 
of  an unlimited  number of  partners,  should be per- 
mitted? 
2. "  If  it  should  be  deemed  expedient  that the 
papcr circulation of the metropolis should be confined 
as at present to the issues  of  one bank, how far the 
whole of the  exclusive privileges possessed by the Bank 
of England are necessary to effect this object ?" 
Upon  these  points,  thc committee declared  they 
could not give a decided opinion.  Lord Althorp thus 
referred to them in the speech I have already quoted. 
A  GOVERNMENT BANK. 
L'  The  advantages  of  11aving the  bank altogether in  the  hands  of 
Government, instcad of' a private  conlpany, would  be greater responsil>i- 
bility,  and in  that respect greatcr secority to the pu~ilic,  and the whole 
of the profit ;  but these were more than counterbalanced by the political 
evils to wl~icl~  it would give rise.  Government would 11a~re  a  constant 
temptation to abuse this additional pourer: besides, in times of  distress, 
Government could not give the accusto~necl  accommodation n  liich would 
be tlesiral~lc  from a bailking  company.  But supposing they could give 
this assistance, the powcr which they would acqlure, might be destructive 
to the constitution of the country.  Now, if  the banl;  n  ere tied  down 
by fired rules, to prevent their making advances, 11e thoaglit that  from 
ot;e  evil, they would fly  to  another, and it wo~lld  be impossille to pro- 
vide for all the cases, in wl~icli  the aid of  a bank to tl~e  public might be 
required." 
A  SINGLE BANK. 
"  Tl~e  first question then was whether it would be more desirable that 
the circulating rncdil~nl  should be conducted by a single body, ss bankers 
of  issue,  or  by  a  conlpetition of  different  banks or bankers?  There 
wcre advantages in  both systems.  It must be to the intcrest of  bal~ks 
competing wit11 each otlier, to issue each as much paper  circulation  as 
they could.  They would  bc a check upon each other.  It was  there- 
fore  clear  that  no  one of  thcse  banlts  could  issue more  than its  due 
proportion of  the circulation wanted.  Snppose tl~cre  should be a great 
demand for accommodation, though it n~igl~t  be  in  the  poaer of  each 
to increase tl~e  amonnt of  the circulation, it ~vould  not be ill tl~e  power 
of any of  them, to have Inore tl~an  111s duc proportion of  the a~nount  of 
tlrat increase;  and wl~cn  again, in consequence of  a depreciation  of  the 
currency, a  failure of  credit takes place, in consequence of  the turn of 
tl~e  excha~~ge  againht us, each ba11k must contract its  issues, and thus 
produce a  sudde~~  contraction to tl~e  currency of  the country.  Hence 
you would froin s1ic11 a competition cause greater flnctuatioi~  than from 
a single bank.  Tilere was another point on wl~icl~  a single bank having 
tlie control of a larger part of tl~e  circulation  of the country might be of 
advantage;  and  that  was,  the assurance  that  in  times  of  distress it 
could  assist the commerce of  tl~e  country.  111 times of  panic the ex- 
cl~anges  turn in favour  of  this country : tl~ere  was no objection  to  the 
banks  increasing  its  accommodation ; but  if  there  sl~ould  be  many 
banks,  no one would dare to come forward, from fear of  the competition 
of  its rivals." 
The great  objection to freedom of  banking in Lon- 
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numerous banks of  issue,  the rivalry  between  them 
would  put  into  circulation  an excessive  amount of 
notes;  the prices  of  commodities would thus  be  ad- 
vanced, speculation would be  encouraged, the foreign 
exchanges  would  become  unfavourable;  and  there 
would be  a  consequent demand  upon  the banks for 
gold to be exported, and this demand the banks might 
he  unprepared  to  supply.  To this it has been  re- 
plied-granting  all  these  effects would  result  from 
numerous banks of issue, should we be worse off than 
at present?  Are not all these evils experienced when 
we have only one bank of  issue? 
But  it  may  be  contended,  that  rival  banks  of 
issue  tend  to diminish  these  evils.  If  the Bank  of 
England put into circulation  an excessive amount of 
notes,  these notes  are not returned for payment until 
the foreign exchanges become unfavourable ;  but were 
there numerous banks of  issue, the notes issued by one 
bank would  soon find  their  Gay  into the others, and 
be returned for payment in the daily exchanges.  All 
the witnesses from Scotland, who were examined before 
the parliamentary committees in 1826, concurred  in 
saying, that the exchanges between the banks was  an 
effectual  check  to an excessive issue of  notes.  Why 
should  not  a  check, which  is  found so  effectual  in 
Scotland, be equally effectual in London ? 
But  even  admitting  that  one bank  of  issue  were 
preferable to an unlimited number, another subject of 
inquiry would  present  itself, that is,  whether four  or 
five chartered banks, each having a large capital, and 
founded  on  principles  of  unquestionable  stability, 
would  not  be  preferable  to  one  bank.  Here  the 
-checks,  arising  from  frequent  exchange  of  notes, 
would  exist  without  the evils arising from unlimited 
competition ;  and as neither one of  these  banks could 
calculate  upon  being  able  by its individual  exertion 
to turn the foreign exchanges, they would be  careful 
to  be  always  in  a  position  to  meet  their  engage- 
ments. 
Besides,  it  is  worthy  of  inquiry,  whether  there 
might not be  a proper division of  labour  in  banking, 
and different  banks  be  chartered  for  different  pur- 
poses.  The Bank of  England is a bank of  circulation, a 
bank  of  deposit, and a  bank  of  disconnt.  It is  the 
bank  of  the  government-a  bank  having  eleven 
branches-a  bank whose notes are a  legal  tender  all 
over the country, and which has to watch and regulate 
the foreign  exchanges.  Is it not worthy of  inquiry, 
whether  these  various  functions  could  not  be  per- 
formed better by separate establishments  ? 
Secondly.  From about ten to  sixty-five  miles  from 
London, the circulation consists exclusively of notes of 
the private bankers. 
The distance  of  sixty-five  miles  happened  to  be 
fixed  upon,  because  in  an act  passed  a short  time 
before,  a  bank  having more  than  six  artners was  b  prohibited within fifty Irish miles  from  ublin; and 
fifty Irish miles are equal to about  sixty-five  English 
miles.  But as Dublin is situated on the sea-coast, the 
bank of  Ireland has a monopoly of  only a semicircle, 
whose radius is fifty Irish miles.  But  London  being 
situated inland, the Bank of  England has a monopoly 
of  a whole circle of  one hundred  and thirty miles  in 
diameter.  She has  not,  however,  shown  any  dis- 
position  to  avail  herself  of  this monopoly :-she  has 
not established a single branch within  this  circle, but 
leaves it to the uninterrupted possession of  the private 
bankers.  This circle, after deducting the space  equal 
to ten miles round  London for  the  bank  of  England 
circulation, will leave above  thirteen  thousand square 
miles :  and as the whole of  England  and Wales con- 
tains about forty-nine thousand square miles, it follows, 
that a space equal to one-fourth of  England and Wales, 
and  taken  from  the heart  of  the country, is  in the 
exclusive possession of  the private bankers. 
It  would  be  very desirable  to have  returns of  the 
circulation  of  the  private  bankers within  this circle, 
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ascertain whether those private bankers who were  free 
from competition with joint stoclr banks, did or did not 
increase  their  cil.culation  during  that  period.  We 
know that tlie total private  circulation  decreased, and 
the  joint  stock  circulation  advanced;  but upon  in- 
vestigation, it would probably be found that the private 
circulation  within  the  sixty-five miles  had  from  the 
increase of  trade and speculation advanced, and  that 
more  than  the  whole  diminution  had  taken  place 
in the circulation  of  those  private  banks,  that are 
situated beyond the sixty-five miles. 
Thirdly. The  circulation  beyond  sixty-five  miles 
consists  of  the notes  of  private  banks,  the  notes  of 
joint  stock  banks,  and the notes  of  branches  of  the 
bank of  England. 
From the circumstance that the circle  of  sixty-five 
miles  radius,  contaills  about  one-fourth  of  England 
and Wales, we may perhaps hazard  a  conjecture  that 
the circulation bears abont the same proportion.  This 
will give about  four millions;  and it will  lead us to 
suppose  that  the  circulation  beyond  the  sixty-five 
miles,  is  pretty  equally divided  between  the private 
bankers, the joint stock banlrs, and the branches of the 
bank  of  Englancl.  I again quote from  the report of 
the Parliamentary Committee. 
"  The most im1)ortant facts whicl~  have come under tlie  considera- 
tion of  your con>mittce are connected wit11 the operation  of  the joint 
stock 1,anlts  on crecl~t  and circulation.  It appears that  a  great exten- 
sion 11as bcen given  to Loth; and that if  the operations  of  all  banks, 
whether private, or fo~n~ed  on joint  stock principles,  are not condncted 
with  ~~rudence  a~td  wit11 caution,  nieasures  adopted by the Bank  of 
Eng1:tntl  wit11 a view to the stttte of  the foreign exchanges. and of  the 
consequent  demand  for  bullion,  niay  be  contracted  by the  advances 
ant1 i~~l~reased  issues of country banks.  The following table will exl~ihit 
the progress  of  the  circulation  for  some  time  past;  and  it is  to  be 
inft rred, from tl~e  increased issues of joint stock banks at peliods when 
the Bank of  I  nglsnrl was endeavouring to limit  the amount  of  paper 
in  circulntion.  t!~ut  a  d11e  attention  was  not  giwn by them  to  the 
returns puiblisl~ed in  the  Gazette  under the  Act  of  the 3rd and 4th 
Will. IV. c.  98. 
An Account of  the aggregate number  of  notes circulated  in  England 
ancl  Wales  by  private  banks  and  joint  stock  banlcs  and  their 
branches,  distinguishing  private  from joint  stoclr  banks.-(Prom 
returns directed by 3 and 44  Will. IV. c.  83.) 
-- 
Quarter end~ng 
28 December,  1833 
29 March,  1834 
28 June,  - 
27 September,  - 
28 December,  - 
28 hIarch,  1835 
27 June,  - 
26 September,  - 
26 December,  - 
26 BIarch,  1835 
25 June,  - 
I  Flivaec BauLs.  I  Jorut Stock narths I 
BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
Total 
I 
28 December,  1833 
29 hlarch,  1834 
28 June, 
27 September,  - 
28 Dec  ember,  - 
28 hlarch,  13. 5 
27 June,  - 
26 September,  - 
26 December,  - 
26 March,  1836 
25 June.  - 
"Your  com~nittee  cannot  too  strongly  recommend  to  all  parties 
engaged in banking the utmost caution and prodence in these respects, 
both at  the present and in their future operations." 
The former part of this quotation probably refcrs to 
the practice of rediscounting bills iu London by  joint 
stock banks in the country. 
Banks situated in agricultural districts have usually 
more inoney tliail  they can  employ.  Independently 
of  the paid-up capital of  the bank, the sums raised by 
circula ion  and deposits  are usually  more than  the 
amount of  their  loans and discounts.  Banks, on the 
other hand, 'that  are situated  in  manufacturing dis- 
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raise;  hence  the bank that has a superabundance of 
money sends it to London to be employed by the bill 
brokers, usually receiving in return bills of exchange. 
The bank that wants money sends its bills of  exchange 
to Londoli to be rediscountcd.  These banks thus sup- 
ply each other's wants through the medium of  the Lon- 
don bill brokers.  Other funds besides those remitted by 
the country banks are employed  in  the same manner. 
Many merchants and others lodge money at the bill 
brokers, either as loans or in rediscount of  bills.  Thus 
the  superfluous capital  of  London  is  directed into 
channels  where it is employed  in rewarding  labour, 
encouraging  manufactures, and increasing the wealth 
of  the community. 
But this system is not confined to the production  of 
positive good ;  it prevents an immensity of evil.  In a 
wealthy and comnlercial country there must always be 
a large amount  of  floating  capital,  and  at the same 
time a  spirit  of  enterprize.  When there is no imme- 
diate  employment  for  this  floating capital,  it bursts 
out in some  wild  speculation, such as  foreign  loans; 
and hence the rediscounting  of  bills  in London  has 
a  tendency  to  revent  speculation,  by  drawing off  P.  the surplus cash  iom London  into the country.  Had 
the joint stock banks  been  in as  active  operation in 
1835 as they were in  1836, the speculation in Spanish 
bonds would probably never have  occurred : even  in 
1836 the speculative undertakings in London were far 
less numerous than in Manchester and Liverpool. 
If  this  system  considerably  increased  in the years 
1835 and 1836, it was because money  was  then  very 
cheap in London, and the joint stock banks had there- 
fore an inducement  to  do  as  much business  as they 
could.  Had the Bank of  England contracted its Lon- 
don circulation, and raised the rate of  interest during 
that period, money would  have  become  dearer,  and 
the amount  of  bills discounted for the country banks 
would have been considerably diminished. 
As  far  as regards  the  effect upon  the foreign  ex- 
changes,  it is  evident  that  this  rediscountixlg  must 
have an effect precisely the reverse of  rendering them 
unfavourable.  By  drawing off  the surplus capital  of 
London,  its  employment  in  foreign  loans,  and its 
consequent  transmission  to  other  countries  is  pre- 
vented.  This capital too being now employed chiefly 
in  manufactures, of  which  a  larger  portion  is ex- 
ported,  the exchanges are to this extent rendered fa- 
vourable. 
In reply to the charge, that the joint stock  banks 
and the country bankers do not  regulate  their issues 
by the foreign  exchanges, and  by  counteracting  the 
efforts of  the Bank of  England, are often the means 
of causing the gold to be withdrawn from the country 
-we  may observe 
1. That it is  not  the  business  of  the joint  stock 
banks to regulate the foreign  exchanges. 
The legislature has made  Bank  of  England notes 
a  legal  tender.  It is therefore the duty of  the joint 
stock  banks to be prepared to give  Bank of  England 
notes in exchange for their own; but it is not also their 
duty to provide gold for those Bank of  England notes. 
It is the duty of  the Bank of  England to provide gold 
for their own notes ;  and if  they are not  prepared  to 
do  this,  upon  whom  but themselves is the blame to 
fall  ?  The claim that is made upon them  to  supply 
gold for exportation, arises from  their  being the sole 
bank of  issue in London, and from  their  notes  being 
made a legal tender.  If  they take to  themselves  all 
the advantages of  their monopoly, they should put up 
without murmuring to all its inconveniences.  Nobody 
can demand gold from the Bank of  England except as 
payment of  their own notes ;  and as to pay their notes 
in  gold  upon  demand,  is what  they  profess  to  do, 
it ought not  to be  regarded  as  a  grievance.  The 
following  question was proposed  by the committee  to 
the director of  a joint stock bank. 
" If  you  saw  upon  a  series of  returns  from  the 
Bank  of  England, that  the  amount  of  bullion  had 
been  gradually lessening, and that  there was a drain 
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conceive that that would be  a  matter to which would 
be your  duty to give attention as a practical bankcr 
in the country." 
Answer.  We have  not  the  charge  of  providing 
bullion  to  pay our notes;  the charge rests with  the 
Bank of  England to provide bullion." 
2.  It  may be stated, that in many cases the business 
of  a  country banker  does  not  admit of  being  regu- 
lated by the foreign exchanges. 
It is desirable  that  the  business of  a country bank 
should be carried on in a steady and uniform manner. 
But this can never be the case if  the banker regulates 
his  advances  to his  customers  by the  state  of  the 
foreign  exchanges : these  are in a state of  perpetual 
fluctuation.  The production and manufacture of  com- 
modities  intended  for  domestic  consumption,  must 
proceed.  And even the manufacture of those intended 
for foreign  consumption  cannot be  suddenly arrested 
without throwing thousands of  persons out of employ- 
ment.  How then can a country bank regulate its ad- 
vances  by  the foreign  exchanges ?  What  would  a 
tradesmail  in  a  country town  say on  presenting  a 
£100 bill for discount to his banker, if  he were told- 
"Really, I cannot do it. I perceive the  foreign exchanges 
are unfavorable.  I hare noticed the price  of  gold at 
Paris  and  at Hamburgh,  I  have made my calcula- 
tions, and find there is a profit  upon  the  exportation 
of  gold ; and as the Bank of  England  has  only four 
millions  in  its  coffers,  I  should  not  like  to  press 
hard upon them.  Call upon me again this day week, 
and  if  in  the mean  time  the  exchanges  become 
favorable, I will then  discount your  bill."  The cus- 
tomer might reply, " I  do not understand  what  you 
mean  about  the foreign  exchanges;  I  am a tanner, 
and have drawn this  bill upon a shoemaker, to whom 
I  have  sold  leather.  I  shall  pay  the money  to  a 
butcher of  whom I have bought hides : he will pay the 
notes for rent to his landlord, who will lodge them wit11 
you on his account.  If you will not discount my bills 
as you have done hitherto, I must restrict my  business. 
But I cannot  see why the quantity of  leather  in my 
pits should be regulated by the quantity of gold in the 
Bank of  England." 
A  banker will  notice the foreign exchanges with a 
view  to  tlie  profitable  employment  of  his  surplus 
capital.  If the  exchanges  are  likely to become  un- 
favorable, he will  presume  that  the  rate  of  interest 
will advance, and that the price of  the  public  securi- 
ties will fall, and he will  act accordingly.  But these 
operations are performed  in London  and  not  in the 
country.  The director of  a country joint stock  bank 
stated  to the  committee,  in  answer  to  the  inquiry 
-"  Does  not  the  state  of  the  exchanges  and  the 
amount of  gold  in  the  hands of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land, affect the country banks of  this  country?"  '' I 
do  not  think  it  does  in  general-I  think  it  only 
operates with a very few banking companies." 
3.  It  may be  replied, that  supposing  it had  been 
the duty of  the joint  stock bank to regulate  their  is- 
sues by the state of  the exchanges, tile  returns  pub- 
lished  in the Gazette are not  sufficient for  this pur- 
pose. 
The average  amount of  the bullion in the Bank of 
England  for the preceding three months is published 
monthly in the Gazette.  From  these  returns  it can 
easily be seen whether there be a less amount of gold in 
the bank than there was three months ago, but it  cannot 
be  perceived whether the amount is  increasing or di- 
minishing  at the  time of  piiblication.  Now it is not 
the  past  but  the  present  state of  the exchanges that 
ought to be known, and  that is studiously concealed. 
Besides,  it is stated in the baiik  evidence, that the 
quantity of  gold  in the  Bank may be diminished by 
other causes than an unfavorable  course of  exchange. 
The followirig question was  proposed  to  Mr. Hors- 
ley Palmer. 
"  No.  131.-Does  it not occasionally llappen, that whilst the par of 
exchange according to the general estimate of  it with  another  comltry, 
France  for  instance,  is  considernbl)  in  favor of  this  country,  and 
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anme  time  a  demand  for  gold  upon the bank, and an export actually 
taking place arising from particular circumstances abroad ?  Certainly." 
Another  bank  director,  Mr. William  Ward, gave 
the following evidence. 
"  1935.-Does  it  not often  happen,  that  merchants  having  large 
remittances to make  abroad, where  it is important for them to make 
them  rapidly, and when  it is important for  them not to shew the na- 
ture of their business to all the world by being large takers on the ex- 
change--frequently  make their remittances by bullion or by coin of this 
country,  when you could  not  trace by the rates  of  exchange  that it 
would precisely answer to do it in that manner ?-It  is so. 
"  1941.-Supposing  you  had  a  large sum to  remit  to Paris, and 
wanted it there within a short period-supposing  you wanted to remit 
half  a million, and you found by  the quotation of  the exchanges  that 
bills  would  pay  an eighth  to a quarter per cent. better than bullion, 
might it not  still be more  to your interest  to  send  the bullion in pre- 
ference to the bills, considering the rapidity with which you can execute 
your business, considering you run no risk in taking bad bills, and con- 
sidering  that you might before you had executed your operation upon 
the exchanges by taking bills, have moved the course of exchange more 
than the difference at which it then stood ?-Certainly. 
"  1942.-Has  not that mode of  remittance  by  coin and by bullion, 
very much gown  into a practice in this country, since the law permit- 
ting the free exportation of coin, and since the perfection in the manu- 
facture of the coin?-There  is no doubt, that facility of communication 
has materially increased  that description of business ;  it was a descrip- 
tion of business not frequently had recourse to in former periods." 
It appears, then, that the diminution of the amount 
of gold in the bank is no evidence of  an unfavourable 
course of  exchange, and consequently, no reason for a 
contraction of their circulation  by  the country banks. 
The committee infer that the  joint stock banks have not 
paid a due attention to these returns ; but, in fact, the 
object of  these returns was not to instruct joint  stock 
banks, but to restrain  the circulation of  the Bank  of 
England.  The following  is  the language  of  Lord 
Althorp on the subject. 
"Now it was well known that the exchanges were apinst us, from 
August,  1830, to  February,  1832 ;  during  this  period,  there was a 
corresponding contraction  of  the  circulation,  which  at one time fell 
below its usual amount by £7,000,000.  This might  have  been  pro- 
ductive of  great pressure, and some distress;  but  no  convulsion  simi- 
lar to that which had been  experienced  in  former  times.  Now,  the 
publicity to which he alluded, would  be  a  check how the bank  acted 
on this principle;  he was aware the directors  were not  res onsible to 
the public for adopting any course they thought proper in  t g  e manage- 
ment of their affairs, but they would still be under the control of publia 
opinion.  He would  therefore  propose, there should be a single bank 
as at present,  but  subject  to  such  control  as the publicity of  their 
accounts  would  produce.  He proposed that the bank should make  a 
weekly return to the treasury, of the amount of bills and notes in  cir- 
culation, and also  of  deposits, and that the average of  such issues  and 
deposits, should be published quarterly.  Such a publication would  be 
sufficient  to  shew whether  the bank  acted  on  sound principles, and 
could not be productive of evil consequences." 
4.  It  may also be stated, that the countr  banks have 
many checks against over-issue,  which  o not  apply 
to the Bank of  England.  B 
M The amount  of  notes  issued by  a  bank  must  be limited by the 
demand  of  its customers.  No banker is so anxious to  put  his notes 
into circulation, that he gives them away.  He advances them  either 
by way of  loan  or  &iscount;  and he always believes that the security 
on which  he makes his  advances  is  sufficiently  ample.  He expects 
that the  money  will  be  repaid  with  interest.  It is  true,  that like 
other commercial men,  he is  sometimes  deceived in  his  customers; 
and by  plscing too much confidence in them, he sustains losses.  But 
this is a misfortune against which he is always anxious to guard.  The 
issues of bankersare limited, therefore; on the one hand by the wants 
of  the public, and on the othcr  by the bankers' desire to  protect their 
own interests. 
A  further  check  upon  the issues of  banks is, that all their notes 
are payable on demand.  Although a banker has the power of  issuing 
his  notes  to  excess, either by  advancing  them  as dead  loans  or  on 
slender security, yct he has not the power of  keeping  them out:  their 
remaining in circulation depends not on him, but  on the public;  and 
the uncertainty, as to the time  of  their  return  for payment, compels 
him to keep at all times a sufficient stock  of money, to  meet the most 
extensive demnnd  that is likely in the ordinary  course  of  business  to 
occur. 
Another check upon an extensive issue of notes, is the system of 
exchanges that is carried  on between  the banks.  Every banker that 
issues notes, has an interest in withdrawing  from circulation the notes 
of every other banker, in order to make more room for his own.  When 
a banker receives the notes of  another banker, he never reissues them. 
If the two bankers  live  in the same place,  they  meet  once or twice 
a week, as they may find convenient, and exchange their notea.  The 
bdance between them, if any, 1s paid by a draft on London, payable on 
demand ;  or, which amounts to  the same thing,  the London agent of 
the one party, is directed to pay the amount to the London agent of the 
other party.  If the country banker lives at a distance from the banker 
whose  notes he haa  received,  he sends them to his London  agent to 
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from the place  of  issue ;  they are  sure to  be intercepted  by  some of 
the rival banks ; and in a country where banlts  are so numerous as in 
England, it is obvious that the notes of  any individual bank must n~ovc 
in  a very  limited  circle.  If a banker  attempts  to  force out a  higher 
amount of  notes than the wants of  this circle  require, he will soon find 
that  the notes will be  returned to him by  the neig11l)ouring I?anlcer, or 
else they will speedily find their way for payment to his London agent. 
"  Another check  upon  an  over  issue on the part  of  the  banks  is 
the~r  practice  of  allowing interest upon  money lotlged  in their hands. 
No man v ill keep money lying idle in his hands, if he can ol)tain interest 
for it, and have it returnrd to him upon  demand.  If a l~anlcer  attempts 
to force  out  a large  numl,er  of  notes, they  will get into the hands of 
somebody.  And  those  ~~110  do not  employ  them  at tlieir trade will 
take them back to the hank and lodge them to tlieir credit, for the pur- 
pose of  receiving the intercst.  Thus, if  the notes of  a banker are  put 
in motion by the operations of commerce, tllcy are soon intercepted by 
rival bankers ;  and if  they attain a state of  rest, they are  hrought lmck 
and lodged  upon  interest:  so  that in  either  case they are withdrawn 
from  circulation. 
"  It cannot be denied that  if  any bank have the privilege of  issuing 
notes not convertible into gold, that is, not payable in gold on demand, 
the  notes may be  issued  to  sncl~  an  aniount as  to cause considerable 
advance in prices.  It is now generally believed that  the issnes  of  the 
Bank of England during the operation of  tl~e  Restriction Act, did produce 
this  effect. 
"  It  may also be admitted, that in a country where tllerc  is one chief 
bank,  possessing an immerlse  capital and  unbounded  confidence,  the 
notes of such a bank, even if  payable in gold, may be issued to such an 
extent as  to cause an advance of  prices, unt~l  an unfavorable course of 
the exchange shall cause payment of  the notes to be deniandeil ir~  gold. 
For gold will not be demanded until the  course of  the excl~~nge  is  so 
unfavorable  as  to cause the exportation  of  gold  to  be  attended  wit11 
profit.  Hence  the  issues of  the  Bank  of  England  being  at present 
under no  other restraint than  liability to pay in gold on demand, may 
for a time cause an advance in prices."" 
5.  The issues  of  the joint  stock  banks have not so 
great  an  influcnce  in  rendering  the  exchanges un- 
favorable as those of  the Bank of  Englantl. 
If  a joint stock  bank  makes  an  advance of  money 
to an  importer, a large  quantity of  comniodities may 
be  imported,  and  this  will  tend  to  render  the  cx- 
changes  unfavorable ;  but  the  advance  cannot  be 
made  in  notes.  The  importer  cannot  pay  for  his 
imports in country  bank notes ; he will want  a  bill, 
or  a  credit  upon  a  London  banker,  in  favour  of 
" History and Principles of Banking-Section,  Banks of Circulatio~l. 
the foreigner of  whom he buys  his goods.  In either 
case, the money is paid in London, and no circulation 
is given to country notes.  If a joint stock bank makes 
an advance to an  exporter, it encourages  exportation, 
and  this  tends  to  render the  exchanges  favorable. 
Here  the  advance  may  be  made  in  notes.  The 
exporter takes these notes,  and  purchases  of  the pro- 
ducer, or  the  manufacturer  the commodities  he ex- 
ports.  Thus  it  appears  that  the issues  of  notes  by 
country  banks  have  a  tendency  to  render  the  ex- 
changes favorable, and that those  advances that  tend 
to render the exchanges  unfavorable, cannot be  made 
by notes, but  must be  made,  if  made  at all, out  of 
real  capital.  On this subject I shall quote  part  of  a 
memorial  presented in 1833, by the  country  bankers 
to Earl Grey and Lord Althorp. 
'c  Your memorialists are prepared to prove that the issues of  country 
bankers have less tendency to promote  fluctuations in the country than 
those  of  the  Bank of  England, and  that  their efforts in  throwing the 
exchanges  against  the country  is  comparatively  insignificant.  It is 
indisputable that adverse exchanges that endanger the bank always suc- 
ceed great importations of  foreign produce, and that  they never can be 
effected by  large  exportations  of  domestic  productions.  Now  it  is 
notorious that the circulation of  country bankers acts almost exclusively 
in promoting these productions;  and  that when  it is  in  an extended 
state, the direct and proper influence even of  an alleged  excess of  that 
circulation would be to provide the means of  paying for the exportations 
of  foreign produce, without  causing so great  an  export of  gold as  to 
derange and endanger the monetary system of  the country.  All expe- 
rience shews that great fluctuations have originated in the speculations 
of influential merchants, aud never originated in the channels to which 
the issues of  the country bankers are confined:  their uource is in great 
mercantile cities,  and  they are promoted by  the issues of  the bank of 
England." 
These  observations  are equally  applicable  to  the 
issues of  joint stock banks, most  of  which are situated 
either  in agricultural  districts  or  in  manufacturing 
towns.  None  of  them  issue  notes  either  in London 
or Liverpool. 
6.  In  many  cases  the joint  stock  banks  cannot 
avoid  putting  into circulation  an increased  amount 
of  their notes. 
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amount of currency, notes will be withdrawn from the 
banks in repayment of  deposits.  On this subject I quote 
from the evidence delivered by the late T. Kinnear, Esq. 
before the committee of the House of  Lords, in 1826. 
"An  increased trade which regards an increased circulation to carry 
it on,  will  cause a demand for an  nddition to  the  circulating  medium 
of  any country, and if  the country possess the means of  answering, it 
will be answered.  If a  reverse  of  circumstances discredit  the trade, 
and a  smaller  medium  be  in  consequence  sufficient,  the public  will 
then return that part  of  the medinm which  is  not  required  to  the 
sources from which it  had been derived.  The bank cannot prevent the 
public from  taking  their  share in  the  regulation  of  this  part  of  its 
issues.  To  illustrate this by what happened last year-a  restless and 
speculative spirit induced many persons who had not been  accustomed 
to trade in any shape  to  employ themselves  by  en,%ing  in  the pur- 
chase and sale of stocks and property of  various descriptions.  This led 
to increased demand, not so much for the loan  of  capital,  or  for  dis- 
counts, as for an increased circulating medium  which  the banks were 
made sensible  of  by  increased  drafts  upon  them  by their  creditors, 
and by  the  circumstance  that  the  notes  which  they  issued  did  not 
return  upon  them  as usual;  in  short,  by  the increased  demand for 
bank  notes, and the  increase  of  their  circulation.  When time and 
experience had shewn, as they soon did  to  those traders and specula- 
tors, the unprofitable  and  injudicious conduct  into  which  they  had 
plunged, they gradually withdrew from those pursuits;  part of the cir- 
culating  medium  became  in  consequence  useless,  and  immediately 
began.to be  returned  by  the public to the banks.  Their  circulation 
has probably now returned to  what is necessary for the fair and legiti- 
mate  industry  and  trade  of  the  country.  In this  fluctuation  the 
banks were passive;  they  paid,  as a matter  of  course,  the  demands 
upon  them  by  their  creditors, and their notes,  contrary  to  the usual 
routine, did  not return  for  payment  for  a great many months, during 
which time the banks continued ready to restore  them.  Against  this 
sort of over circulation the exchanges  offer  no  remedy, although  they 
palliate  the evil, nor could any human device afford a  remedy, for the 
cause of it was  a  mornl one, and operated in the  minds of the public. 
Their ignorance, perhaps folly, induced  them  to  enter  upon  transac- 
tions,  to carry on which they found  it necessary to withdraw  part  of 
their capital from the banks and add it to the circulating medium:;  and 
had that circulating medium been increased by them to a much greater 
extent than it was,  the  banks  could  do  no  more  than  refrain  from 
encouraging the evil, they could not arreat it." 
Confirmatory  of  the  above sentiments are the fol- 
lowing statements: 
The average circulation of  all the banks in Scotland 
in 1823, 1824, and 1825, was as follows:- 
l 823-23,087,624  1824-83,428,851  1825-84,058,655 
The average circulation of  the Bank of  Ireland:-- 
1823-£5,117,389  1824-$5,622,845  1825-~G,4~11,3-I8 
The average  circulation  of  all the Lanlts  in  Ire- 
land :- 
1823-£6,023,847  1824-26,543,123  1825-£7,604,234 
"  All speculation bp increasing the nnmbcr and anlount of commer- 
cial transactions, puts into motion  a greater quantity of money.  Tl~is 
money is supplied by the bankers  either  in  the may  of  repnyment  of 
deposits, or of discounting of bills or of loans.  Now ns increased issurs 
on the part of  the banks are almost simultaneo~is  wit11 a spirit of  spc- 
culntion, it has been inferred that the issues of  the notes have  excited 
the spidt of  speculation,  whereas  it has been the spirit of  spcculatioi~ 
that has called out the notes.  In tl~e  ycars 1824 and 1825, as the spc- 
culations increased the issues of notes increased ;  nnd ~rhen  the spccu- 
lations were over the notes returned.  This was the case not merely ia 
England,  but  also  in  Scotlanrl,  thougli  none  of  the  Scotch  bnnlcs 
sustained the least diminution of  public confidence."* 
7. It may also  be  stated that the joint stock banl;s 
cannot so  suddenly  reduce  their  circulation  as  the 
Bank of  England. 
Those banks  that issue notes are also like the Bank 
of England, banks of  deposit, and banks of  discount. 
As far as regards the operation on their deposit ac- 
counts, the joint stock banks have no control over the 
circulation.  The amount of  notes that are issued will 
depend upon the amount of  checks that are presented 
for payment;  and when the notes are put into circula- 
tion, the banks  have no means  of  withdrawing tliem. 
When they  will  come  back,  depends  not  upon  thc 
banks but upon the public. 
As banks of  discount  they may cease  to issue, but 
they cannot recall the notes the  have issued.  lV1-1en 
the bills they hare discounted  %ecome  due, they inny 
not be paid in the notes of  the bank  that  discounted 
them.  Hence  the decline of  the amount of  notes on 
circulation must be gradual, and depends always up011 
the will of  the public. 
As a bank of  deposit  the  Bank of  England has no 
more  control  over  the amount of  its notes in circula- 
* History and Principles of  Banking4e,Secu  on Banks of Circulntio~i. 
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tion tl~an  a joint  stock  bank.  As a bank of  discount 
it may cease to issue,  but  all the bills when due will 
be paid  in  Bank  of  Englaiid  notes,  by  wliich  tlie 
amount in circulation will be reduced. 
But  the  Bank  of  England  lias  other  means  by 
which it can rcduce its circulation  more  rapidly.  It 
can sell government stock or exchequer bills.  It will 
be paid  for  these in its  own  notes, which  will  thus 
be withdrawn from circulation.  If  a joint stock bank 
should  sell stock  or exchequer bills, it would  not  be 
paid  in its own  notes,  but  in those of  thc Bank  of 
England.  Hence no  reduction would  take  place  in 
its own circulation.  It is not  tlicrcfore  quite fair to 
blame  tlle joint  stock  banks for  not  reducing  their 
circlilation as rapidly as  the  Bank of  England, whcn 
they have ilot the power so to do. 
8.  But  even  could  it bc  proved  that  tlie  joint 
stock banks had issued an excessive amount  of  their 
notes,  it might  then  become  a  matter  of  inquiry 
~vllethcr  that  excess  could  counteract  any measures 
adopted by the Bank of  England with  a  view to tlic 
state of the foreign exchanges. 
The bank  can control  the  foreign exchanges only 
through  the means  of  its own  circulation.  Let  us 
supposc tliat the circulation of  the country is in excess, 
and that under these circumstaiices  the  Bank of  En- 
gland  contracts her issues.  The immediate effect  in 
London will be, that  the interest  of  rnoncy  will ad- 
vance,  money  will  become  scarce,  traders  will  be 
less disposed to purcliase,  and  more  disposed to sell, 
and consequently  the  price  of  con~n~odities  will fall. 
Now tliis  will produce an effect upon the country cir- 
culation  in  two  ways ; first, through  the means  of 
trade;  and  secondly,  through  the  direct  monetary 
transactions. 
With regard to trade we shall simplify the illustra- 
tion by taking an individual case.  A  ~vllolcsalc  gro- 
cer, who lias travellers in  every part of  tlie  kingdoln 
collecting  money  and  receiving  orders,  will  write 
them to  avoid  taking  bills  as  licretoforc,  at two or 
tliree months diltc, a11d to allow R  liberal  tliscount for 
cash.  Now, nioney  bcirig abundant, the colliltry shop- 
keepers  will  be  glad to  take  tl~c  discouiit  and  pay 
cash.  Instead of  bills  tlie travellers will $et  conntry 
notes, wliicli they wiil take to  the banks for payment, 
or transmit  to  London  for prescntiiig  to  the London 
agents.  Here tIie  country circulution  is reduced by 
the withdrawal of notcs in circulation. 
This is the case of  a liousc that sells to thc country. 
Now let us take the case of a house tliat buys froin the 
conntry.  A ml~olesale  ironmonger has been in the habit 
of receivin~  wcckly a quantity of goods from Slieffield, 
against which he liad  accepted  a  bill : the Slieifield 
nlanufacturer liad  talieii  tliis  bill  to the bank  to be 
discounted, ancl had put into circ~~l~~tion  the  notcs  of 
the Slieffield bank to that arno~uit  ;  but in consequencz 
of  the contraction  of  the notes of  the  Bank of  E11- 
gland,  the  wholesale  ironmonger  ~liscontinucs llis 
ord.ers,  believing that money will beco~llc  scarce,  and 
that  prices  will  fall.  The  Slieffield  manuFacturer 
having no orders, sends no goods, and draws no bills, 
and consequeritly puts no notes into circulation.  Here 
the country circulation is diminished by a diminution 
of tlie issues ;  hence we perceive that the operations of 
both tlie  export and import  trade of London with t!ie 
country  have  a  necessary effect of  reducing the cur- 
rcncy in the country to a level with that of  London. 
But this effect will be still more rapidly produced by 
direct monetary transactions. 
The country banks that rediscounted  tlicir  bills in 
London, finding that their  bills are rediscounted with 
difficulty, and only at an advanced  rate  of  interest, 
will  also  reduce their  discouilts  in the country, and 
hence their issues will be diminished.  They bill also 
call up any loans they may have advanced, and  these 
will be paid  to them  in their  own  notes,  or  in  the 
notes  of  the  neighbouring  banks,  and  lience  the 
country circulation will be reduced  by  a  withdrawal 
of those in circulation.  Parties too that  have rnoncy 
will send it  to London for employment, as tlie liigli rate 
of ii~tercst,  and probable fall  in tl~c  public securitice, will offer profitable nicanr of iilvcstmcut, and this will 
draw off a further portion  of  the courltry circl~lation. 
Thesc arc sonle  of  thc  ways  ill  wllicli  a  coutractiorl 
of  tlie  Lolldoll currency  will  1-apidly  arid iwcessarily 
contract the country circulation. 
If indeed it be admitted that a variation in the dear- 
ness or cheapness of  lnoney nil1 cause it to pass  froin 
London to  all parts of  the world, it seems hardly ne- 
cessary to prove that the  same variation will cause it 
to pass from t!ie  country parts of  England to London. 
If then,  the  Bank  of  England has tllc  powcr  of  re- 
ducing  the country circulation, I1ow  can the country 
banks render  tlie  cxcliariges  unf'avonrable, in  oppo- 
sition to the exertions of the Bank of  England ? 
But it  niay  bc  still  further  a matter  of  inquiry, 
whether the Bank of  Englaiid ought to  place  lierself 
in a situation that shall render necessary the adoption 
of any measures, with a view to the regulation of  the 
foreign  excllanges ; whether  a  national  bank  ought 
not, like othcr banks, to keep furicls sufficiently ample 
to  mcct licr cngagenleuts ; and  wl~ethcr  the foreign 
exchangcs ought not to be regulated by the legitimate 
operations of  commerce,  and not  by  operations  on 
the  currency.  A  bank  that has  the control  of  the 
forcign exchanges lias an interest opposed  to the intc- 
rest of the community.  It is the interest of  the com- 
munity that the national bank should always hold  an 
amount of  treasure adequate to meet all the demands 
that may come upon it.  It is the interest of the banlr 
to  hold  as little treasure  as possible,  to employ  its 
funds in securities, upon whicl~  she gains interest; and 
then if the demands should exceed her means, to avoid 
stofiping  payment  by  a  sudden  operation  on  thc 
currency  that  may  involve  tllc  nation  in  distress. 
The notion of  regulating the currency is  peculiar  to 
England.  'Mrho regulates the currency of  Scotland or 
America ?  A  sliort  time  ago we had institutions for 
regulating the price  of  brcad,  the  wages  of  labour, 
and the iluport and export of a variety of commoditics. 
Now it is found that thcse things cai rcgulatc  tliem- 
selves.  Sucll  probably  will  I)c  the  case  with  tlle 
currency.  Aftcr a  fcw more years hilvc clapscd, aftcr 
some tl~ousnnds  of  fortuncs  have been destroyed, ancl 
some millions of  families ruiiied, we sllall thcn possibly 
discover that the amount of the currency, the prices of 
comrnoclitics, and the course of  the foreign exchanges 
would have gone on  better without our interference. 
With regard to thc tables  given by the committee, 
we may observe, 
1.  That the  table  referring to  the country  circu- 
cillation,  states the quarterly averages,  but  the table 
rcfcrring to the Bank of England ~I~CTC'IY  states the cir- 
cillation, &c. on those  days that are there n~entioned. 
To form  a proper  comparison, the  two tables shoulci 
refcr to tlic sanic periods. Tlle following table is for~ncd 
entirely upon thc quarterly averages. 
A table of tlie London and branch circulation of tlie 
Bank of  England, and the circulatioii of  the private 
and joint stock banks:- 
Dec.  1833 ..  15,000,000 
Ap111, 1834.  15,800,000 
.Tuly  ......... 15,700,000 
Sept  ........ . 15,800,OO 
I)ec .......... 14,800,000 
nIalcI1,1835  3 5,200,000 
June .........  15,0(H1,WO 
Sept ..........  14,90J,000 
Ilec. ......... 13,809,003 
lllarc11.1836 14,400,000 
.lunc .........  1  14;20@,000  .  ept ......... 14,500,000 
?h.  .........  1  13,5Ml,000 
2.  The daily amounts of  tlie  circulation present no 
certain means of  forming a coinparison.  1  hus, if  ule 
wish  to  prove  that  the  Bank  of  England  had  di- 
minished  its  circulation,  we  rl!igllt  coinpare March 
1834, with  Jnnc, 1836, and say, that tllc  circulation 
had  considerably  dccreascd.  On the ot!lcr  Iland,  if 
we wished to shew that tlie  circulation  liad increased, 
we  inigllt  take  tlie  two  points  of  comparison  three 
months farther bacli, and shcw tliat  Lctwecn  Deccin- 
Lcr  l 833, and Marcll 1836, tllc circulation had consi- 
clern111  y advanced. 
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of  England,  we  shall  find  tliat  tlie  first  and  third 
quartcl-S  in thc year are usually higher than the other 
quarters.  The  dividends  payable  in  January  and 
July are to a larger amount  than tliose  paid in April 
aria  October.  Hence the quarters tliat  take in Ja- 
nuary  and July have a  higher circulation  of  notes. 
If  therefore we 1vis11  to mark the increase or decrcasc 
of  notes  in  circulation,  we  must  not  compare  tlie 
highcst quarter in one year with the lowest quarter in 
a  subsequent  year,  but  compare  the  correspondeiit 
quarters.  Thus  we  find  tlic  difference  between Ilc- 
ccmber l835 and December  1S3G,  there  is  a  dimi- 
nution  of £300,000. 
4.  It will be seen that the branch circulation of  tlic 
I3anli of  England does not fluctuate so much quarterly 
as tlie  circulation  of  London.  There  seems to have 
been  a  steady  increase.  The  increase  between  De- 
ccmber l S35 and December 1836, is £400,000.  From 
the evenness in the amount of  the brancl1 circulation, 
I should infer that the branches  have very little busi- 
ness ill the way of  current accounts. 
5.  It will be  perceived  tliat  the  circulation of  tlie 
joint  stock  banks  has  considerably  increasecl,  while 
that  of  the  private  banlis  has  diminished.  This 
arises,  in the first  place,  from  a  number of  private 
ha111i~ having  nierged  in joint  stock  banks ;*  and 
secondly,  from  a  transfer of  accounts  from  private 
banks  to joint  stock  banks.  Had we  returns of  the 
circulatiqii  of  tl~osc  private  banks  ~vliicli are  not 
csl)oscd to the competition of  joint stock banlis, those 
for  instance within  sixty-five  miles  of  Loiiclo11,  we 
should probably  find  tliat  these banlis  had incrcascd 
tlicir  circulation, and  that  the total  diminution  liad 
fallen upon  those  private  banks  that are beyollcl tllc 
sixty-five miles. 
In  judging of  tlic effects prodllced upon the foreign 
cxcliangcs,  M-c niust  talic  tlie  1~11olc  airiouiit  of  the 
country  circulation ; for the  circulation  of  the joint 
stock  hanks  coultl  not  L,cre  protlucetl  any  cfYi~ts,  if 
it ilicrcly filled  up tllc  ~oid  occilsioncd  Ly  tllc witll- 
drawal  of  tl~e  private  circulation.  Nor  is it fair to 
consider  the  increase  in  thc whole  amount  of  the 
circulation, as produced  solely by the increased  issue 
of  the joint stock banks.  The circulation of  the joint. 
stock banks is about one-third of the whole circulation, 
and consequeiitly they arc cllargeable only with  one- 
third of  tlie excess. 
7. Every variation in the amount of  notes  in  cir- 
culation of  tlie  Bank  of  England, must be produced 
either by the action of  the pinblic, or the action of the 
bank.  The public act upoil  the circulation  througll 
tlie deposits and  tlic  bullion.  If  I  take  £10,000  in 
bank notes, and lodge them as a deposit in the bank, 
I diminish the circulation  £10,000,  and increase  the 
deposit  by  the  same  amount.  And  if  I  withdraw 
£10,000 from the deposit, I dimiilish the deposits and 
increase  the circulation.  So if  I  demand  gold  for 
notes to the extent  of  £10,000, I  diminish the stock 
of gold in the bank. and diminish the circulation.  If 
I take gold to the bank, I increase  both  tlie  stock  of 
gold and the circulation.  The action of  the  bank  is 
~ndicated  by the change in the amount of  securities. 
But did we not know the amount of  thc securities, we 
niiglit ascertain the action of  tlic bank by calculating 
the results of  the action of  tllc public. 
The circulation of  tlie Bank of  Englaild 
28tIi Decen~lcr,  1833, was ..................... 817,469,000 
25th June, 183G  .................................  17,184,000 
..........................  Sliowing a diminutioil of.  &285,000 
Now we mav easilv ascertain whether  tlie  dimirlu- 
tion was prodt;ccd  bi  the action of  the public, or that 
of  the bank.  Tlius- 
Circulation, 28th Deccmbcr,  1833 ............ &17,469,000 
........  lliminishcd by an increase of  deposits.  570,000 
1G,890,000 
Diminished by a diminution of  bullion ...  3,332,000  .  . 
............  Anlount 1)y tlic action of  tlie puLlic  13,567,000 
..............  Iilcrc;~sc  by tllc action of  tlic bank  3,G17,000 
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3. Thc increase of  the  circulatioll by the action of 
tl~c  bank is dcriotcd by thc increase  of  the securities. 
r~  lhc  only way the bank  can  affect the  circulation, is 
by  increasing  or  diminishing  the securities.  If  the 
banlr  buy  exclleqller  bills,  or  cliscoullt  bills of  ex- 
chasgq, sllc  increases  the  circulation  and  also  the 
securities.  If she sells exchequer bills, she-  diminishes 
the  circulation,  and  also  the  securities.  It  will  bc 
scen  that  from  December  1833, to  June  1836, the 
securities  of  the  bank  were  increased  £4,271,000. 
Now  it  may  be  observed,  that  the increase  of  the 
country circulation from £10,152,104  to £1 2,202,196, 
may not  have  been  by  any voluntary  action  on  the 
],art  of  the  banks;  it may have  been  by the  with- 
drawal of  deposits.  But the increase of  the Bank  of 
England  circulation  must  have  been occasioned by a 
voluntary action.  These tables therefore, do not seem 
to present us with sufficient ground for holding up the 
13anlc  of  England as  a  model  to  the  country banks, 
fdr  making  exertions to limit the amount  of  paper in 
circulation. 
THE  BRANCNES  OF THE  BANK  OF ENGLAND. 
The Bank of  England first established branches in 
1826.  The object was to improve the country circula- 
tion by operating as a check upon  the private  banks. 
The  circulation  of  all  the  branches  in  1831  was 
£2,372,000.  It has  since increased,  as will be  per- 
ceived  by  the table  to  £3,800,000.  In  1832,  Mr. 
I-Iorsley Palmer was asked- 
"Have  the bank  taken  any  measures,  and  what 
measures, for extending the circulation of  bank  notes 
through their branch banks ? 
"  The measures  they  have  taken  havc  becn  per- 
n~itting  individuals  of  supposed  credit  to  open  dis- 
count  accounts  with  tlle  branch  banks;  they  have 
also  afforded  every  facility  to  the  transmission  of 
money from London to the country, through the branch 
banks ;  ancl to those  bankers who  havc  proposcd (for 
thc bank have maclc no proposition thcmsclves  to  the 
bankers) to witlidraw  their circulat,ion, the bank  have 
given  tlic  same  amount  of  circulation  in  coin  and 
bank notes, that they  previously  stated to  possess  in 
their  own notes,  at three  per ccnt. per annum  upon 
approved  bills  of  exchange;  those  are  the  three 
sources." 
Mr. Horsley Palmer has stated  in his recent publi- 
cation, that the late increase in the branch  circulation 
has arisen from new contracts of  this kind.  It is no 
doubt an advantage to a  country bank  to  be  able to 
re-discount its bills at three per ccnt. instead of five- 
to re-discount at home, instead of  sending to London- 
and to re-discountwithout depending on the fluctuating 
supplies of  thc London money market.  On the other 
hand, as the country bank must give up its circulation, 
the arrangement is not convenient for those banks that 
have many branches, or  which  arc  situated at a  dis- 
tance from a branch of  the Bank of  England. 
Upon  public  grounds the  arrangements made be- 
tween the branches of  the Bank  of  England  and  the 
joint  stock  banks,  appear  liable  to  the  following 
objections :- 
First, that they tend to promote a spirit  of  specula- 
tion, by increasing the amount of  the currency.  The 
amount  of  re-discounts  granted  to  several  of  these 
banks, is much larger than any anlount  of  notes  they 
could maintain in circulation.  And even supposing the 
amount of  discount were limited to the amount  of the 
circulation, yet as the country bank is relieved from the 
necessity of keeping a reserve of cash to meet the notes 
daily presented for payment, the currency will be in- 
creased to the amount of that reserve.  The issues of the 
Bank too being made in Bank of  England notes, they 
are not withdrawn from circulation by  the  exchanges 
betwcen the local banks. Secondly ;  they promote spe- 
culation by reducing the rate of interest. The bank that 
can obtain money at three  per  cent.  can discount  for 
its customers at a lcss rate than those that have to pay 
four or five pcr cent.  This will attract tlle customers of 
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customers, will  bc  compelled  to extend their  accom- 
modation.  and at a  lower rate of  interest.  Thirdlv ; 
this reduction of  tile rate of  interest  is not  confingd 
to the country districts;  but  also  affects the market 
rate of  discount  in  London,  in  consequence  of  tlic 
demand  for  money  being  proportion~bly reduced. 
Fourthly;  the evil  effects  of  this  system  appear  to 
be  shown  by the  fact,  that  in  tlie  beginning. of  the 
year  1836,  tlie chief speculations did not originate in 
London. but in Manchester and Liveruool. the .places 
where tie  Bank of  England made tlic lirgcst ad;anccs 
at the lowest rate of  interest.  The subject was noticed 
by two witnesses examined by tlie ~arlfamentar~  Com- 
mittee last ycar. 
MR.  VINCENT  STUCKEY. 
"  Have you  understood  tl~at  the Bank  of  England l~as  advanccd to 
joint  stock brt~llis  illoncy at tl~ree  per cent. to a considerablc extent ?- 
I have. 
"  Do you consider that, in reference to the monetnry transactions of 
the country, a prudent tr:~nsaction?-I  take tl~e  liberty of saying, I do 
not tl~inl<  it is ;  and as a proprietor of  the bnuk stock, I 11ave  so stated 
to somc of the directors. 
"Is not that a measnre very stimulating to imprudent spccnlation?-I 
think so, but  I nvisl~  to give my 01)inion on this point with considcrablc 
donbt,  as  the  directors  of  tlle  Bnnk  of  Ellgland  have  nlucll bcttcr 
ol~portunities  of judging  than I can 11ave. 
"  If tl~c  nloncy bc advanccd at three  pcr ccnt.  to rcndcr it a profit- 
able  tmnsaction,  some intercst must be  madc  of  this Inoncy in their 
l~ands,  which could Le  creatcd  only  by  cm11  spcculation ?-We  havc 
I~nd  nothing of  this kind in tl~c  Wcst of  England;  but it was statcd in 
a public  discussion by a gcntlcman from tl~c  North,  that if  tl~c~e  was 
any miscl~icf  likely to result  from the joint stock banks, it migllt arisc 
from tl~osc  banlts wl~icl~  hacl borrowed from tl~c  Bank of Englimd, ancl 
having tl~cir  cash at less than  t11c  market  rate  of  intcrcst,  tl~cy  had 
been induced to lend it again improperly in Lancashire. 
"  In your  opinion is as mucl1 danger to be t~pprcl~endcd  from  such 
advances at thrcc per cent. on the part of  thc Bank of  England as from 
over-issues of  joint  stock banks ?-Yes,  perl~aps  solnc banlcs  do  issue 
bank paper improvidcntially, but they are kept in clleck by being liable 
to pay thcir cash ~iotes  OII demand in gold." 
MR.  W.  G.  CASSELLES. 
"What,  in your opinion, is tl~c  cffect of  that accommodation nffordcd 
1)y tl~c  Bank  of  England? what effect 11as it  upon  tl~c  opcmtions of 
tl~c  ba111is to wl~icl~  it is gmntcd ?-It  f:~cilitatcs tllcir  opclntions, and 
enables  tl~cnl  to  iblisco~mt  morc papcr  tlia~l  tl~cy  otl~crwisc  would bc 
cnablcd to do. 
Does it give them a confidence in affording  accommodation to their 
cnstorncrs, wl~icll  in your opinion they would  not  wit11 tl~cir  owl1 cir- 
culation of  notes?-Undoubtedly  it does;  I sl~ould  tl~illl<,  if  a  larger 
quarttity of  papcr wcre ~resentcd  to  that bunk wllicll lras  a  constant 
discount acconnt ~vith  the Bank of  England, they would be cncournged 
to discount a larger amount, because they know that by  going  to  the 
Bank of  England, and giving in those bills again, under their agreement 
with  tl~cm,  they will bc pretty ccrhin of their being discounted 1)y the 
Bank  of  England;  the  other  banks,  which have not an account with 
the Bank of  England, must make their discounts in proportio~l  to thcir 
means. 
"Is it, as far as your experience goes, a facility wl~icll  has tendcd con- 
siderably to i~lcrense  the amount of nccommodation given in thc town of 
nlancl~ester  ?-I  understand  it has increascd very mu cl^ the business of 
tl~c  Mancl~ester  and Liverpool district  bank, wl~icl~  is  tbc  only  onc  I 
know of  at present.  Of  the  banlcs  established  two  or thrcc montl~s 
yo, 1  do not know any tl~ing  ;  but of  thc four banks  cstablisl~cd  prc- 
vionsly  to the con~mencement  of  this ycar, I tl~iuk  it has increased tl~c 
business of  that particular bank, that tl~ey  have  co~~tinued  tllcir  intcr- 
course with the Bank of  England. 
"  By enabling then1 to discount freely, does it force upon other banks, 
not having tl~e  snnle engn~en~e~~t  wit11 the Bank of England, tl~c  neccs- 
sity of  morc freely supply~ng  tl~eir  costoalers ?-I  thi~lk  it does in this 
way, that where customers are liberally supplied at oue bank, tllose in 
the same line of  business with them, and possessing equal  means, and 
whose  busincss could I)e done wit11  equal  safety, say, "  Why, cannot 
we have our business done  in  the  same  way ?  ~t is very strange that 
you should pi~lch  us."  And I think it is their interest to increase as Fir 
as thcy safely can ;  tl~erefore  it has an cffect upon the whole. 
"  Tllcrcforc that must tcnd  to  foster  spccn1:~tion to  thc  extent to 
whicl~  such accolnmodation is increased ?-I  sho111d bc  sorry  to  say it 
fostcrcd spcculation.  I consitlcr a circulntion, fo~unded  on the  tradc of 
that part of t11c  country, to be a circulat~o~~  pcrfcctly safc, and I c10  not 
think they l~nvc  gone further than prudence justificd. 
"In wllatcvcr dcgrec the accom~~~odation  may  tcnd  to  cxtcnd  thc 
dispositio~~  to trrulc to that cstcnt, thc accommodation nffordcd  by  tl~c 
Banli of  England has 11ad its cffcct ?-It  hns rcndcrcd it more casy. 
"  In your opinion, 11as it any effcct on tl~c  London n~arl<ct  for  intc- 
rest?-I  think it 11s  a lrttlc effect upon it. 
"  In what way has it that efiect ?-If  all  t11c  four  banks of  Man- 
cllester, for instance, hd  no  account wl~atever  with the  Dank  of  EII- 
gland, for any thing tl~at  tlrey rediscount, they must  depend  upon  thc 
floating capital  of  the  country,  wllicli  gcncrally  centres  in  London; 
any thing done in the conntry bears n snlall proportion to that done  in 
Lonilon.  I think  tllere is ge~~crally  a large an~ou~lt  of  floating capital 
rcqnired to be vested for a temporary purpose, or for a ccrtain  period. 
Banks in the country send their bills to their broker ancl agent in Lon- 
don to  redisco~~nt;  if  four of  them were bringing $1  their bills to bear 
upon tl~c  floating capitill, that woultl mal;c  a very  great  demand  upon 
it ; if  t11:~t  was co~~lincd  to tl~rcc-fo11rt11s  of  that dcm:tnd,  tl~c  floating 
capibd will 11o1  1)o ulfcclcd to so grcnt  an cstcnt as it otl~crnrisc  would 140  THE  HISTORY  OF  DAXI<INC: IN  AMERICA.  14  1 
be.  In tllat way, perhaps,  if  a  fourth part of the wliole denland  for 
rcdiscount be trnnsactcd by the Bank of England, that takes away fro111 
the demand upon thc floating capital,  and I  think  tl~osc  otller  tllrce 
banks will obtain their discounts at a clieaper rate than if  all four were 
competitors for it. 
"  Do you ltnoxv the extent to which the Manchcstcr  and  Liverpool 
district bank has tllc power of discounting with tl~c  Bank of  E~lglalld?- 
I have heard it is to  tile extent of &400,000 or 8500,000, constantly 
running;  I do  not give that as a niattcr of  fact I an1 acquaii~ted  witll, 
but I have no reason to believe it is incorrectly given. 
<c Supposing it  be,  for  illustration, &500,000, the effect is, it gives 
greeter accomn~odation  to tile business of tl~e  bank llaving that accom- 
nlodation ?-Certainly. 
"  It  has a tendency to compcl otlier banks also more frccly to accom- 
modate their customers?  Tl~cy  would not do it except they  complai~i 
of it, but it is an inducenlent. 
"  It  also, by the assista~lce  it affords to the bank having that account 
wit11 the Bank of England, has a tendency to lower the general rate of 
interest ?-I  tllink so ;  that must fo1lo.r~. 
"Do  you mean that it lowcrs the market rate of  interest in London 
or Manchester ?-In  London. 
"Do  you mean tlint many bills being sent from Manchester to Lon- 
don  for  discount,  will  lower  the  rate of  interest in London?-Bills 
being sent from Mancl~ester  to London for  cIiscoui~t,  will  increase the 
rate of  intcrcst ;  but the Bank of  England giving a greater facility, and 
preventing one-fourtll part of  the bills coming to London, prcvcnts the 
intcrcst on money being so high in London." 
If it be  desirable  to increase the efficiency of  the 
"  measures adopted by the Bank of  England,  with a 
view  to  the  state of  foreign  exchanges,  and of  the 
consequent demand for bullion,"  the bank should, first, 
discontinue tlieir branches ; and secondly, cease to act 
as  a  bank  of  private  deposit  in  London.  If the 
branches  were  replaced  by  independent  chartered 
banks, their circulation  would  be  colltrolled  by  the 
daily  exchanges with  the neighbouring banks.  The 
Bank of England would be more watchful of the coun- 
try circulation, and be better able to judge when it  was 
excessive ;  whcreas now she feels no alarm at tlie cxten t 
to which the country circulatiori is increased, provided 
that increase consists of  her own notes :  and if tlie bank 
ceased to act as a bank of private dcposit in London, she 
would have a more effective command of the exchanges. 
At present, if she maltes inoiley scarce, iiiercl~ants  and 
others who  have  accou~lts  at tlle bank draw out tl~cir 
dc  posi ts ; ~omc  1 o  cinploy  tlicm  in  their  l.usiness, 
otllers to lend tllcin at intcrcst ; thus niorc  notes  are 
put into circulation, and the bank must make a fidrtlier 
contraction to count,eract this operation.  If  the bank 
did riot act as a bank  of  private dcposit, a demand for 
gold would iiecessarily coiltract her circulation to the 
extent of  the gold withdrawn.  If these deposits were 
in tlie  hands of  tlie  London  bankers, they would be 
more effectively employed in  assisting trade and com- 
merce  in scasons  of  pressure.  It nlay be  said  that 
the bank employs these deposits-so  she may, but it is 
not in siliall advances to individual traders, but in large 
masses on the money market.  As to their influence in 
fertilizing commcrce there is as much  diffcrcnce be- 
tween these two ways of  employing money, as there is 
between a shower of rain and a water-spout. 
SECTION  VI. 
AN  INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF  THE  RECENT PRESSURE 
ON  THE  MONEY  MARKET. 
As the rccent pressure  for  money has  extended  to 
America, an inquiry into the causes to which  it may 
be ascribed, is not unsuitable to an essay on American 
Banking. 
In  the  beginning  of  last  year  tlierc  was  no  ap- 
pearance  of  distress;  but  on  the  contrary,  every 
symptom  of  prosperity, attended by its usual  conco- 
mitant-a  readiness  to engage in speculative  under- 
takings. 
The following  description  of  this period  is  taken 
from  the  speech  of  Mr.  Clay,  on introducing  his 
motion respecting Joint Stock Banks, May 12, 1536. 
"  To what cxtent the operations of  the joint  stock banks may l~nve 
contrilntcd to create tlie prcscnt state of  crcitc~llcnt  in tl~e  commercinl 
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hd  sornc  consit1cral)lc  iufl~~cncc  is probable, from the fact that thc ex- 
c.itclllc~lt  a11d  rage  for  spccillation is  grcatcst  in  tliosc  pmts  of tllo 
kingclom,  n-llcrc  tlic  operations  of  tlrosc  cstol)liaJ~nlc~~ts  11:tvc  bccu 
luost activc.  London has bccn compnrativcly unmoved, but  Liverpool 
and Mnncl~ester  l~nvc  mitncssccl  a  masl~room  growtl~  of  schemcs  not 
cxcccdcd by tltc mcntorablc year 3825.  I lloltl  in  my Iland  a  list  of 
scvcnty  contcm1)latctl conlpanics  for  cvery  spccics  of  u~idcrtaki~~g, 
~vllicl~  have appeared in the Livcrpool  and  Mnncl~cstcr  pnpcrs nitllin 
the last three nio~~tlis.  Tliis list was mndc a fortnigltt or  tl~rcc  wccks 
since, and n~igllt  probably now be cor~sitlcrably  cstendcd. It  is in~possillc 
also, I think, not to suspect tliat the  facility of  credit  and  conscqncnt 
nlcourn,ncment to  ~~~ecr~lation  to wllicl~  I  l~ave  nlludcd,  cannot  l~avc 
bccn withoitt  its  effcct  ill  tl~e  grcnt  incrcnsc  of  pricc  in 
almost all tlle cllicf  articles  of  consun~ption  and  raw materials  of  our 
mnnufactnres.  That incrcase has bccn enorn~ous-not  less  than  from 
twenty to fifty, and even one hundred per ccnt.,  in  many of  tl~c  cllicf 
articlcs  of  producc,  of  consumption,  a~ld  niatcriols  of  our  manu- 
factures.  I  am  quite  aware  that  there  is  cvcry  i~~dication  of  this 
a(l~a11cc  of  pricc  bcing  sou~ld;  that  it 11as arisen  fro111  consuniption 
outr~~nning  supply;  and that our manufacturers are working on orders 
rather than speculation.  But I  cannot  forgct  that  the excitement  of 
1825 commenced  lcgitimstcly-that  tl~e  rlse  of  prices  will  inf~~llibly 
cl~cck  consumption, wllilst it stimulates supply;  and when we loolc  at 
tlie  anlount  of  our  pnpcr  currcncy  resting  at tliis  monicnt  on  tl~c 
sonicwltat narrow mctnllic basis of  tlrc bi~llion  and spccic in  tlic vaults 
of tl~c  Unnk of  El~glnlid,  it is  ir~ipossible  not  to  fccl  app~cl~ension,  or 
at lcnst tllc propriety of  caution and forctl~onght. 
"  Tl~c  circulntio~l  of  tllc Bank of  England,  as  appcarcd  by tl~c  last 
average in The Gazette, is- 
Circulation of  tllc bank ...........................  % 18,OG3,000 
1)cposits u~itli  ditto .................................  l 4,751,000 
32,814,100 
Privatc and joint  stock banks .....................  11,447,919 
44,261,919 
Probablc amount of  Scotch and lrisll currency . 10,000,000 
54,261,919 
Spccic and bullion at the bank. ..  87,801,000 
It is rig11t tliat I should say, I cannot approvc of  tl~c  coursc tdicn 
by  the  Bank  of  Englnnd  ill  this  mattcr.  Tllc  directors  of  tllnt 
cstnblisl~n~endactir~g,  I doubt not, wit11 tllc most conscie~itious  desire 
to protect the  interests  of  the  comn~u~~ity,-liavc not  taken,  in  my 
opinion, the  wisest  course  to  effcct  that  object.  Wit11 a  desire  to 
discourage  the  circulation  of  the  notcs  of  joi~it  stoclc  ba~~lcs,  they 
afford facilities, as I have said, to sucl~  as issuc Bank of  Englancl notcs. 
1  cannot think that this  niotle  of  forcing  issucs  is  a  Icgitin~ntc  pro- 
cceding on the part of  that corporation, combining, as it cvicle~itly  does 
combine, an incrcasc of  the currcncy which may not be  rccluired, with 
a tcmptatio]~  to tile joint stock banks  thus  supplied with  its  notcs,  to 
afford illdiscrcct accommodation. 
These  appearances contii~ucd  with  little  alteration 
until  the month of  July,  when tlie Bank of  England 
raiscd  the  rate  of  discount  to  four  and  a  half  pcr 
cent.  It then  became  ltnown  that there  had  hen 
a  demand  upon  tlie  bank  for  gold  from  tlie  pre- 
ceding  April,  and this  measure was  adopted  by the 
bank as a means of  rendering  the foreign  exchanges 
more  favourable.  Tliis  being  found  ineffectual,  the 
bank in September raised the rate of  discount  to  five 
per  cent.  Besides  raising  the  rate  of  interest,  tlic 
bank adoptcd  other measures of  increasing  the value 
of  money.  A large amount of  American  bills  upon 
first-rate houses  had  been  offered for  discount  and 
rejected.  A  high degree  of alarm was  immediately 
spread  throughout  the community.  The dread  of  a 
panic  similar  to  that  of  1825  almost  universally 
prevailcd.  Those wlio had  money were  unwilling  to 
part  with  it-trade  became  suddenly stagnant-the 
prices of  all con~modities  fell considerably, and num- 
bers  of  commercial  houses,  chiefly  of  tlie  second 
class, suspended  payment.  Many railway  and other 
projects now fell into oblivion. 
The alarm that existed was kept up by the monthly 
accounts  of  the  bullion  in  tlie  Bank  of  England. 
The  public  returns shewed  a  gradual dccliae  from 
April,  1836,  to  February,  1837.  It was  therefore 
supposed, that the  Bank  of  England would be under 
the necessity, for her own safety, of  still  further con- 
tracting  her issues, and  thus increasing the existing 
pressure.  This apprehension  caused  all persons who 
had money, to retain it in their possession, and bankers 
and others withheld accommodation they would other- 
wise liave been disposed to grant. 
This  state  of  alarm  was  considerably  augmented 
by the publication of  the Report  of  the Secret Com- 
rnittce of  the House  of  Commons  upon  Joint  Stock 
Banks.  This committee had  been  appointed,  on  the 
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Hamlets,  whosc  speccli  on  the  occasion  might  bc 
termed a  bill  of indictment.  The joint  stock  banks 
hiid rapidly increased ; they had issued small sliares ; 
they had large nominal capitals; they had circulatcd an 
excessive amount of  notes ;  they had promoted specu- 
lation.  These were the charges brought against them; 
and  they had  greater  weight  from  being  advanced 
by a member who was known  to  be  friendly to joint 
stock  banking.  The report  of  the  committee  ay- 
pearcd  to  sustain all Mr.  Clay's  accusations.  Th~s 
report was  highly creditable  to  tlle  talents  and in- 
dustry  of  the  committee,  but  marked  by  a  dc- 
cided  hostility of  tone.  While it enumerated all tlie 
actual  or  possible  imperfections  of  the joint  stock 
banks,  it  ascribed  to  them  scarcely  a  single  ex- 
cellence.  At the same time, tlie  committee deferred 
to  the  succeeding  session,  the proposal of  any mca- 
sures  for  their improvement ;  thus  the public  were 
led  to  suppose,  that in  the  following  session  some 
astringent  measures would  be adopted with  reference 
to joint  stock  banks,  but  what  they would  be  iione 
could conjecture. 
Had  the  report  appeared  at any  other  period  it 
might possibly have done good;  but as its appearance 
was conteinporaneoiis with  a  pressure  on  the money 
market, and a high  state  of  alarm, it unqucstionably 
tended to weaken public  confidence, at a  time when 
it required  to be  strengthened.  Persons  who  were 
unfriendly to joint stock banks, seized tlie opportunity 
of  dispraising  them,  and  believed  or  pretended  to 
believe  that  the  banks  were  unsound,  and  would 
certainly  stop payment.  Others, who  were friendly, 
were  apprehensive  that  the  banks  being  still  in 
their infancy, would be  found too weal;  to withstand 
the  storm  now  raised  against them.  But  though 
this alarm  began \vith  respect to joint  stock banks, 
it did  not end there.  It was  soon  foreseen  that  if  a 
few joint  stock  banks werc to stop payment, the pri- 
vate  banks  in their  neighbourhood  would  bc  put to 
a severe trial ; and  if  the banks should even bc coiiz- 
pclled  to  witl~hold  their usual advances to their cus- 
tomers, the credit of  individuals  rnust  suffer.  Hence 
the private  bankers and the mercllants, as well as the 
joint  stock  banks,  made  prepal-ations  to  meet  any 
event  that might  occur,  and  IJ~  thris  increasing tlie 
pressure on tile London rnoney market, occasioned still 
farther apprehensions. 
Tlle  alarin  was augmelitecl  by the stoppage of  tile 
Agricultural and Coru~ncrcial  Baak of  Ireland, in the 
month of Novembcr,and thecle~nal~d  for goldwhich that 
stoppage occasioned in Ireland.  The  joint stock banks 
of  England now became subject to increased suspicion ; 
the acconimodation they had been accustonled to obtain 
by the rc-discount of  their bills in the London  market 
was considera1)lg restricted ; and in  the beginning  of 
December, the Northern and Central  Bank  at Man- 
clieste~.,  a bank l~avirig  a paid-up capital of  £800,000, 
with  above  1,200  partners,  and  forty  brancl~es, 
applied for assistance to the Bank of  England.  This 
was  afforded  up011  condition,  in  the first  instance, 
that they should wind  up all their  branches except 
that  at  Liverpool ;  and  afterwards  further  assist- 
ance  was  granted, upon  condition  they should  dis- 
continue business after February, 1537. Their life was 
saved,  on  conditiori  they  should  commit  suicide. 
At the commencement of the present year the old and 
.  respectable London  banking-house of  Messrs. Esdaile 
and Co. received assistallce upon similar terms. 
The  pressure  which  existed  in  England  rapidly 
extended to America.  A large amount of  American 
securities, consisting chiefly of  bonds of the respective 
States, had been remitted to the agency houses in En- 
gland.  This  circumstance,  in connection  wit11  the 
exportation of  gold to America, attracted the notice of' 
tlie  Bank  of  England.  The following letter, written 
by a respectable  London  house, was published  in the 
American newspapers :  .  * 
"  Loxuox,  Arccs~  20,  1836. 
"  DEAR  SIR, 
We  nere  i~~folnlcd  to-day,  by  nn  active  intelligeut 
director of the Bank of  Engln~~d,  that more British capital has bce~i  nb- 
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sorbcd  by  American and Contincr~td  houses than can bc sparctl, with- 
out injury  to the commcrcial and nlanuFact~uing  intcrcsts of  this coun- 
try ;  that  tllc directors  of  tl~e  bank  l~avc  decidcd, t11:~t  they will take 
rncclsures  to  check  the  sale of  sucll securities, by refusing to discount 
bills  of  excl~angc  drawn  in  those  count~ics  on houses here, however 
high may be then standing or credit. 
"Tl~is  decision places dl houses in  jeopardy that do business with 
American  dealers  in  British  mcrchandisc,  because  rcmittanccs  are 
usually made in payment  for such merchandise in bills of  exchange on 
sucll  houses;  and  if  the  clecision  referred to is rigidly enforced, SUC~I 
remittances will be unavailable till due.  Under these circumstances, we 
decm  it prudent  to  state, that we (10  not feel bound to  continue  our 
usual fccilities to dealcrs in British merchandise, and that we reserve to 
ourselves the  rigl~t  of  regulating  then1 according  to existing  circum- 
stances.  We hope  this  decision  will not be rigidly enforced ;  and, if 
not, that we shall be able to act wit11 more l~bcrality  than Inre now think 
probable.  It is  dcsirablc that our correspondents sl~ould  be made ac- 
quainted with this sbtc of  things, that they might be governed by it in 
making out orders for mcrchandisc the ensuing season, which we hope 
will be unusually sn~all." 
The  Bank  of  England  did  carry  into  effect  the 
measure  intimated  in  the  above  letter.  A  large 
amount of  bills  drawn  from  America upon first-rate 
London houses was rejected.  In America the pressure 
became  severe-money  was  wanted to remit to  En- 
gland  to meet  the drafts that had  been  drawn upon 
England,  either  upon  credit  or  against  securities 
that could not  now  be sold.  The rate  of  discount  at 
New York  rose  to two,  and  even to  three per  cent. 
per month. 
From  the  pressure  upon  the  money  market, and 
from the great fall in the price of  American produce, 
the cotton and  other commodities sent from  America 
to meet drafts upon the English agents, could not  be 
sold except at a ruinous loss.  And other remittances 
not  having  arrived,  several houses in the  American 
trade,  who  were said to have given  extensive  credits 
to  parties  in  America, applied  for  assistance  to  the 
Bank of  England. 
It is unquestionably  a most important  inquiry-to 
what cause we ought to attribute this severe pressure- 
a pressure by which thousands have been  ruined,  and 
trade  and  cornnlerce  and  manufactures  greatly  de- 
pressed.  Several publications upon the subject  have 
aljp~u'ed,  writtcn  cliicfly  by  practical  Illell  of  hig.11 
standing in the  nlonietl  aid co~lilnercial  circles, and 
wl~ose  opinions,  on  account of  tlle station and talents 
of  tlie writers, are worthy of  every consideration.  Thc 
lxincipal are t!ie  followii~g  :- 
l. A Letter to tl~c  lligl~t  Ho~louroblc  Lord Viscount Alelbonrne, on 
tl~e  Causes  of  thc rcceat 1)erangement  in  thc hIo11ey Alarkct, :~nd  OIL 
Bnnl:  Reform.  By R. Torrcns,  Esq. F.R.S. 
2.  A  Defence of  tl~e  Joint  Stock  Banks,  an  Esanlinatio~l  of  tl~e 
Causcs  of  the  present  Monetary  difficulties, and Hints for the future 
manage~l~cnt  of tl~e  Circ~dation.  By David Salomons, Esq. 
3.  The  Causes and Co~~scquences  of the  Pressure upon the  Afoney 
Markct, with a Statcnleat of  the Action of  the Bank of  England, frorn 
1st October, 1833, to t11c  27th Dec.  1836.  By J. Horslcp Palmer, Esq. 
4.  Reflections  suggcsted  by  a perusal  of  Mr.  J. Horsley Palmer's 
P:unplllct,  on  the  Causes and  Cor~scquc~~ces  of  the Prcssure  011  the 
AIoncy Marltet.  By Samuel Jones Loyd. 
5.  Observations on tl~e  recent Paml)l~let  of  J. Horslcy Palmer,  Esq. 
on  tlie  Causes and Consequenccs of  tl~e  Pressurc on tl~e  Money Mar- 
ket, kc.  By Snmson Ricardo, Esq. 
G.  Tl~e  Causc  of  the present  Money Crisis explained, in answer to 
tl~e  Pan~pl~let  of  Mr. J. Horsley Palmcr, and  a  rcmedy pointed  out. 
By W. Bcnnison. 
7.  Reply  to the Reflections, &c. &C.  of  Mr. Sanluel Jones  Loyd, on 
the  Panlpl~let, entitled, "  Causes and  Consequences  of  the Pressure 
u11o11 the Money Market."  By J. Horsley Palmer. 
The recent  pressure  upon  the  iiloney  market has 
been  assigned  by  the  above  writers  to  some  one  or 
niore of the following causes. 
First.  It has been  ascribed to the excessive issue of 
notes by the joint  stock banks.  This opiiiioil is stated 
by Mr. Horsley Palnier. 
"  Inlmcdiately subsequent to the panic of  1823, ~vlvllich  nffected almost 
every  banking  estal)lishrnent  in  London  as  ~vell  as the country, tl~e 
Government  of  that  tlay  was  ~ulfortunately  induced  to call upon t11e 
Bank  of  England to relinquish, beyond sixty-five miles from London, 
its exc!nsivc  privilege as to the number of  partners autl~orized  by law to 
be  associated for the formation of  banlrs, in order to enable ministers to 
frame  reg~llations ai~tl~orizing  the  establishment of  joiut  stock ba:~ks 
tl~rougliout  all  pnrts  of  the  country beyond tllc limit above  specified, 
tl~ercby  rirtuallp  declaring  that  t!le  csiatiug  private  banks mere un- 
worll~y  of  credit.  Tl~e  term  "  unfortunate"  is  used ;  for  perhaps 
there never was a measure morc nncalled for  by thc wants of  the conl- 
nlnnity.  Tl~e  esisting system was intimately  conuected with the pros- 
perity of tlle coantry. and was good  in all its parts, excepting the power 
of' issning  papcr-money  nd  li:~tun~.  The cl~mlgc  in qucstion laid the 
foondetion of  a ncw systc111  to bc  broug11t into tl~e  ficld by con~l)ctitio~l 
in the issue  of paper-lnoncy, tl~o  nlost prcjoilicial nlcalls tl~at  conl,l  be 148  THE  HISTORY  OF  BANKING  IN  AMERICA. 
devised.  A reluctant concession was obtained from  the bank ;  and in 
order to place the whole subject before the public, the corrcsponrlencc 
\vhicll  then  took  pluce  between  the  government and the bank is an- 
nexed  to the present statement.  Very little progress was made in the 
formation of those projected institutions prior to the year 1830, when a 
further  application  was  made by  government  to the bank for conces- 
sions intended to have formed part of the conditions at that time for the 
renewal of  the charter.  The opinion  of  the bank remained unchanged 
as  to the danger  to be apprehended  from the extension of  the systenl 
of joint  stock  banks, and. this opinion was pressed upon  the  govem- 
ment  at that  period.  Tlre ministry  under  the  Duke of  Welli116ton 
having  soon  after  been dissolved,  no further discussion of  the subject 
took  place  until  the  negotiation undcr the government of  Earl Grcy, 
which terminated in the renewal of  the  charter of  the bank  in  1833. 
Pending  the discussions w11icI1  tllen took  place the strongest rcprcsen- 
tations  were  verbally made  to  Earl  Spencer  (then Chancellor of  the 
Excl~e~uer),  of  the  necessity  of  placing  joint  stock  banks  of  issue 
under  some  regulatio~ls  to  be proposed by his majesty's  government, 
which  might  tend  to a  prevention of  excess in their issues of  paper- 
money.  It is  well  known  that that noble lord was  desirous  of  sub- 
mitting such rcgulations for the consideration of  parliament ;  but these 
he was prevented from carrying into effect.  The system of  joint  stock 
banking  was  further  facilitated  by  permitting the formation of direct 
agencies in London ;  and a declaratory clause was inserted in the Bank 
Charter Act authorizing the establishment of  those bodies in the metro- 
polis.  It is  conceived that the bank had the more reason to complain 
of the ministers' proceeding upon that occasion, it having been distinctly 
nnderstood  during  the  negotiation,  that  the law affecting  the forma- 
tion of banlcs withinsixty-five miles of  London should remain untouched, 
and  upon  the fhith  of  that  understanding  Earl Spencer undertook to 
bring  the bill into the House of  Commons for the renewal of  the char- 
ter of  the bank. 
"  Having thus briefly shtcd the proceedings which have dccurred in 
the establishment of joint  stock banks prior to the renewal of the charter 
of the Bank of  England, it may, perhaps, be proper to state the periods 
of the increase of  those of issne from the year 1826; they are as follotv, 
taken from rctur~~s  furnished by the stamp office. 
IN  ENGLAND AND WALES. 
1826,  were  established -  ---  -  3 
1827,  9,  -----p 
1828,  YY 
---m  -  nil 
1829,  ,,  -  -  -  -  7 
1830,  ----  ,,  -  1 
1831,  v  ----  -  8 
1832,  7,  ----  -  7 
1833,  7,  -  -  -  -  -10 
1834,  ,>  -  -  -  -  -  11 
1835,  7  -,--  -  9 
1836, from 1st January to 26th November  -  -  42  - 
Total  -  -  -102 
IN  IRELAND. 
Tl~ere  were formed prior to 1834  -  -  -  - 3 
111 1835  -  -  -  -  ---  -  2 
1836  -  -  -  -  -  -8 
- 
Total  -  -  -  -  13 
"  Until the year  1833 the action of the banks,  as nlready stated, ap- 
pears to l~ave  been perfectly regular.  From that period the increase in 
the number of  joint stock banks, in England and Wales, to the 26th of 
November  last,  has  been  seventy-two, and in Ireland ten, making an 
aggregate of eighty-two, exclusive of  their innumerable branches fornled 
in alniost  every town in the two kingdoms, wl~icli  are, in fact, equiva- 
lent to so many additional banks." 
"  Having thus endeavonred to explain the causes ~vllich  have operated 
to reduce the bullion of  the bank during the last three years, it becomes 
desirable to shew why it is that the contraction of  the circulation of the 
bank has affected  private credit more than in 1832, when a similar loss 
of bullion and  contraction of  tlie bauk's  engagements were exhibited. 
The  difference  between  the  two  periods  appears  to have been occa- 
sioned  by  the  altered  state  of  private banking in the interior of  the 
country.  In  the  first, there  was  no  particular excitement either ill 
England  or  Ireland, nor  any excess in the issues of provincial paper. 
In  the second, both countries teemed wit11 competition crested by the 
adtlitional establisl~ment,  as previously stated, within the short space of 
two years, of  not less than seventy-two joint  stock  banks  in England 
and Wales,  :tnd  tell  in  Ireland,  with  their  innumerable  branches  in 
alnlost  every  town  tl~roughout  the  two  kingdoms.  It is needless to 
attempt  to  describe the competition that  grew  out  of  this  excessive 
mnltiplication of  banks : its effects nere exhibited in a great and undue, 
and eve11 rash extension of paper-money and credits, accompmied by an 
unusual  reduction  in the rate of  interest in  the interior of  both coun- 
tries,  but  particularly in  Ireland : tile commoilest observer must have 
seen the gathering clouds, and dreaded the consequences. 
"  These circun~stanccs  at  length attracted the attention of Parliament. 
The  volume  of  evidence, taken  before a Conlmittee of  the House of 
Commons, and published since the close of  the last session, must satisfy 
every  unprejudiced  mind  of  the danger  attending the continuance of 
such a system.  Suffice it  here  to say, that the influence whlch should 
have  attended  the  contraction  of  the Bank  of  England paper arising 
from the export of  bullion, was counteracted by the imprudent facilities 
of  credit  and cheapness of money occasioned by the proceedings of the 
issuing banks in the interior of  England and Ireland.  Upon the publi- 
cation in the Gazette of  the issnes of  the joint stock and private banks 
of England and Wales in the early part of  last Jnly, an increase of  25 
per cent. of  their issues  urns exhibited  above the  amount existing  irl 
March  1834, while  the  circulation of  the  Bank of  England had been 
diminisl~ed  nearly to the same extent.  The increase in the issues of the 
joint  stock  banks of  Ireland, though not publisl~ed,  has since been as- 
certained  to  have greatly excceded in proportion that exl~ibited  in this 
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"  The  of tllc joint stock systcnl I~ad  bcrn, for some tinlc 
prior  to  tlic  year  1825,  forced  upon  pu1)lic  attention  by  tl~c  many 
failures n.lricl~  I~ad  taken pl:~cc  s111)scqncntly  to 181  0 in privatc 1)nnlting 
cstal~lishn~cnts,  a~~~ounting  to  more tl~an  one I~undrcd  ancl fifty : and as 
about  eigllty  private  bulks  snspc~~tlcd  tl~cir  ~)ayn~c~~ts  in  1825, the 
government t11ou~l;llt  tl~c~nselvcs  tl~cn  called upou witl~ont  hlrtl~cr  ilclay 
to endeavour to cllangc tl~c  system altogctl~cr-a  sorund system of  bank- 
jng  being an object of tl~e  11jgl1est  importance to tlic wliole con~munity. 
The view  taken  by governnlent wns strcngtl~enctl  by  observing  the 
little  comparative  derangement  sustained by Scotland under  the joint 
stock  banlts, by wl~ich  tl~e  monetary concerns of that part of  the king- 
dom  have  been almost exclnsively conducted.  Looking to that conn- 
try  as an  exanlple,  it  was  perl~aps  natural  to  conclude  that  wl~at 
afforded evidence of  advantage in  one part of  the kingdom would bc 
equally good for all t11e rcst.  Tl~ere  is no intention to criticise tl~e  Scotcll 
system of banking, but were it narrowly cxan>incd,  it might not appear 
so  perfect  in  all its parts  as its  many warm advocates arc inclined to 
believe.  Suffice  it  to  say, that  it has produced great benefit to Scot- 
land, which  is  a sufficient reason for leaving it untoucl~ed  so long ns it 
commands public confidence. 
"  In precipitating  a  cl~ange  in  England  ministers seem not to have 
given sufficient attention to the real causes wl1ic11 occasioned the failures 
in this country, or the peculiar origin ancl state of tl~e  banking interest in 
Scotland.  The evil of  tl~e  system in England 11ad grown up duriug tlic 
period of tlic restriction upon cash payments, and especially during the 
depreciation of  the  currency  from  1810 to  1819, wl~cn  the issues of 
paper-money  were  governed solely by the extent of  the demand upon 
approved securities ;  and as cvcry bank  not having more tl~an  six part- 
ners  had  tlie  privilcgo  of  issuing notes witIiont limit,  it is  not  to  be 
wondered,  while  sucli an  ~unsouncl  principle  of  issue  uras generally 
approved, that  banking  establisllments  sl~ould  l~ave  n~ultiplied  in ail 
parts  of  the coillitry n~crcly  for the profit to be obtained from their rc- 
spective paper mints, witl~out  paying mu cl^, if  any, regard  to  security 
for the eventual payment of  their notes either in paper of  the Bank of 
England, or  coin.  As the  pcriod  of  return  to  casl~  payn~ents  ap- 
proached, these  ephemeral  establishments began  to disappear, and the 
banking business of  the interior assumed a more substantial cl~aracter  : 
the principal evil suffered to remain was tlle  continuance of  the privi- 
lege to the country banlcs of issuing one and two-pound notes after they 
had been withdrawn by the Bank of England.  This rcntlered coin the 
only means of  upl~olding  that description of circulation;  and this coin, 
in  the  event of  discrcdut, could  only  be  obtained  from  tlic Bank  in 
London. 
"  Sucli was tl~e  state of the provincial banking interest tvl~cnovertakcn 
by the universal panic of 1825.  During that eventful pcriod it is true, 
as  already  statcd,  that  nearly  eighty  private  ba~~ks  suspended  their 
payments;  but  it  is  equally true, and perl~aps  no stronger proof could 
be  afforded  of tl~c  really sulmtantial state of  tl~e  country banks at tl~at 
time, that  a  very  small portion  (it  is  Lelievcd  not  tcn) proceeded to 
bankruptcy.  Jf,  therefore,  tluc attention  11ad becn  given  by  Lord 
Liverpool's  administration to the causes wl~icl~  occnsioncd tlie i~~solvm- 
cies prior  to the resumption of  cash  payments, and  a little more time 
had  been  taken  to  inquire into  the real state of  the country banks in 
1825, it  is  probable  that  the discredit  so  nnjnstly  t11rou.n upon  tl~e 
system of private banking  in the m~ncxcd  correspondence would never 
have been I~carcl  of.  So far as the opinions then  expressed were based 
upon the example of  Scotland, it is maintained that they were founded 
in  error.  The  two  systems  were  different in  origin  and  principle. 
That of  England had becn formed upon the Bank of  England and privatc 
establisl~uncnts  precluded  by  parlianlcnt from embracing more than six 
partners, wl~ilc  tl~c  system of  joint  stock banlcs liad ever becri the main 
support of the circulation of Scotland.  Both systcrns existed wit11 equal 
advantage to the several districts where est,abIished-a  cllnngc in either 
could  only  bc accomplisl~ed  by competition endangering tl~c  credit and 
currency of the country. 
"  In making these observations upon what appears  to have  been  an 
injudicious encouragement  given  to  the formation of  joint  stock banks 
in England, where adequate banking institutions already existed, there is 
no intention of questioning tl~e  propriety of  sanctioning  sue11 establish- 
ments in a country differently situated.  Banking is one of the princi- 
pal  means  of  promoting the prosperity of  a nation, ancl it must conse- 
quently always command the vigilant attention of a government  anxious 
to forward the welfare of tl~e  various branches of  the community.  As 
a general principle, it may be stated, that joint  stock societies are only 
deserving  of  encouragement IV~ICII individual capital and enterprise are 
found deficient.  They are peculiarly applicable to banking business in 
an early  stage of  accunlnlation of  property, and before private credit is 
extensively created.  Sucli was the  case in  Scotland at tl~e  time ul~en 
joint  stoclc  banks  begm  to  be  establisl~ed  in  it ;  such  was  also tl~e 
situation of America, and sue11 too,  is now the situation of the Canadas. 
In  the  interior  of  Ircland  the  first attempt was made to conduct  the 
banliing business by private capital, snpportcd by tlle Bank of  Ireland, 
in  the  sanle  may as in  England.  Tl~c  situation of  the two countries 
was  I~owever,  widely  different, and consequently tl~c  privatc banks  of 
Ircland  alniost  tohlly  failed;  wl~icli,  Icaving  tl~c  ficld  open to  otl~cr 
agency, occasioned  tl~c  formation  of  joint  stock  banks in their place. 
In all t11e instances l~erc  alluded to,  tl~osc  institutions, if their issues of 
paper be duly regulated, witliout w11icl1 tl~eir  respcctivc currencies can- 
not  fail  to  be  in  a  frequent state of inconvenient and even dangerous 
fluctuation, will  continue  to  prosper;  and  with  their  own prosperity 
will  tend  to  pro~note  tl~e  public and privatc interests dependent upon 
them. 
"  Advcrting, therefore, to tlie mischief wlricll appcars to l~ave  attended 
the uncalled-for encouragement given to joint stoclc banlcs in England, 
lv11ile the advantage of  tl~osc  bodies is adn~itted  in countries differently 
situated, it becon~es  the duty of  government to bring the subject under 
the consideration of parliament, and to propose such rgnlations as may 
clleek  the  unlimited formation  of  sucli institutions hereafter,  in places 
where banks already esist, affording cvcry security and acconlmotlatio~l 
whicli the  district  maq  require.  Anil  furtl~cr,  to rcg~~lotc  the fi~tnre 
management  of  tl~osc  now  in  existence,  in  order  to  e~aril  against  a 
recurrence of  tl~c~t  excess in tl~c  circillnting n~cdiun~,  nl1ic.11 on  tl~c  late 152  THE  HISTORY  OF 
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occasion neutralized the influellcc of  the contraction of  the circulation of 
the Bank of Englarld, and occasioned a serious, it may be said ruinous, 
pressure up~n  the money market.  Unless  measnres, having those ob- 
jects in  view, be adopted with firmness on the part of  the government, 
a repetition of  the pressure will no doubt recur with increased violence. 
Earl  Spencer, when Chancellor of  tlic Exchequer,  was fully aware of 
the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  present  systenl ; and  the 
attempt made bp his Lordship at  the time of  the renewal of  the bank 
charter  to establish regulations for  the conduct of  joint  htock banks of 
issue, sufficiently proves that at least one member of  government was 
convinced  of  the necessity  of  protection  being  nfforded to the public 
wii~st  its  abuse.  So dangerous  does  the  system appear, as it now 
stands, that  it becomes questionable whether the Bank of England and 
the bodies in question can pe~nlanently  exist together." 
In rep5 to this, we may observe, 
1. The  amount  of  the  country circulation  is not 
sufficient to  shew that the issues were carried to  ex- 
cess. 
And here it may be proper to notice two important 
principles  with  regard  to  the  currency.  The  first 
is, that the amount  of  notes  in circulation is in itself 
no decisive  proof  either  of  excess or otherwise ; for 
certain  circurnstances  may  require  an  increased 
amount  of  notes  to  carry  on  the  same  extent  of 
operations.  Such,  for  instance,  as  an  advance  of 
prices, arising either from scarcity or  speculation,  an 
increase in the production of  commercial commodities, 
or a want of  confidence that may cause the circulation 
to be hoarded to meet contingencies.  In consequence 
of  this principle  having  been  orerlooked,  the  Bank 
of  England  has  sometimes  been  uiljustly  censured. 
Writers have  imagined  tliat  because  the  amount  of 
notes in circulation  has increased, that money has be- 
come more abundant, and the exchanges must become 
less  favourable.  But  it is  always  necessary to  take 
into  account  the  circumstances  under  which  these 
increased issues have been made.  If,  throughout  the 
year, the  same amount  of  notes were  kept in  circu- 
lation, the currency would sometimes be deficient, and 
sometimes be excessive. 
The secorid  principle  is,  that  an  increase  in  the 
amount of  the country circulation would not necessarily 
have  any effect  upon  the  fofeign exchanges, even  if 
the Bank of England did not exercise any controlling 
influence ; for that  increase  may have arisen from an 
increase in the internal trade of  the country.  If there 
is a greater  production  of  commodities, or  a  greater 
number of  transfcrs, arising from increased trade, then 
more money will be  required  to  circulate the,  =e  com- 
modities.  And  if  this money  be  hot  issued  to  an 
extent  that  shall cause  an  alteration  of  prices, it is 
impossible that it should affect the foreign exchanges." 
"  The joint  stock  banks,"  says  Mr. Ricardo, "  might  extend  tlieir 
issues  to  places  which  had  bcen before occupied by the Bank of En- 
gland, and displace the notcs of the latter, and this has certainly occurred 
ill Lancashire.  An increase  of  trade in the provinces might acquire R 
larger  comparative  amount  of  circulation ;  it  is likely,  that  this  has 
been the case in the last year.  The improving commerce of Liverpool 
and  Manchester,  the  capital  employed in the establisllment of  banks, 
and the formation of railways, the greater part of which capital has been 
furnished by the country districts, and the dealings in the shares of these 
undertakings,  may  liave required  such an increase of paper, as mate- 
rially  to alter the proportion that before subsisted between the country 
and bank circulation." 
That the country circulation was not excessive seems 
evident from two circumstances : first, from  the small 
amount of  increase, when compared with the extended 
trade and the increased prices ;  secondly, from the fact 
that it has not declined.  It will hardly be contended 
that  the amount  was  excessive in the last quarter of 
1836 ;  yet then it had declined only £246,500 from the 
quarter ending  June  1836, and was  superior to any 
other quarter. 
It will  also  be  seen  that  the  country  circulation 
sustained but  little increase  until  the quarter ending 
December,  1835, after the speculative spirit had com- 
menced;  a  proof  that  the  notes  had  not been  the 
cause of  the speculations, but that the speculations had 
drawn out the notes. 
Mr. Palmer  states-"  Upon  the  publication in the 
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Gazette,  of  the  issues  of  the joint stock  and private 
banks of  England and Wales, in the early part of  last 
July, an increase of  25 per  cent.  of  their  issues was 
exhibited  above the amount existing in March, 1834; 
while  the circulation  of  tl~e  Bank  of  England  had 
been diminished nearly to the same extent." 
This  language  conveys  the  impression  that the 
country  circulation  had  increased  between  the  pe- 
riods mentioned  25 per cent.,  and  the  circulation of 
the Bank of  England had  diminished  nearly  25  per 
cent.  From the table  at page 133, we find  the facts 
are these :- 
March,  1832.  June,  1836. 
Country Circulation  10,191,827  12,202,196  2,010,.369 increase. 
Bank of England do.  19,000,000  17,900,000  l,]  00,000  decreaac. 
It will be seen tliat the increase of  the country cir- 
culation is £2,010,369 upon £10,191,827, which is less 
than 20 per cent.  With regard to the decrease of  the 
Bank of  England circulation, we presume Mr. Palmcr 
did ndt  mean  that £1,100,000  was 25 per  cent., that 
is,  one-fourth  of  f 19,000,000 : he could  mean  only, 
that £l,]  00,000 is nearly £2,010,369. 
2. The joint stock banks formed last year could not 
be the cause of  the alleged excessive issue. 
Mr. Palmer  has  stated  that  forty-two  banks were 
formed last  year, but  he has  not stated at what time 
in the year  they were  established.  As  the  dcmand 
for  gold  commenced  in  the  middle  of  April,  any 
excessive issue that produced  that demand must have 
existed  for  some  time  previously.  Now  previous to 
the 30th of  April,  only four joint  stock  banks  were 
registered in  1836.  One of  these was a private bank, 
that  became  a  joint  stock  hank  by  increasing  its 
partners to  fifteen ;  and  another does  not issue notes. 
It will hardly be contended,  that the other two banks, 
one  registered  the  11th January, and  the other  the 
27th February, issued  so  many notes as to render the 
exchanges unfavourable by the middle of  April: 
It is obvious from this  statement, that the increase 
of joint  stock  banks  last  year was  not the cause but 
the effect of  the  speculative spirit that existed in the 
cour~try.  Money  was  abundant,  and  sought  em- 
ployment;  interest  was  low,  and  hence  a  mode  of 
investment  that  promised  a  higher  rate  of  interest 
was eagerly embraced.  The private bankers too became 
convinced  that  it would  be  tl~eir  interest  to  merge 
their  establishments  in  joint  stock  banks.  The fact 
that so many of  the new banks were formed upon the 
basis of  respectable private  banks,  is of  itself  a proof 
that these new companies were not speculative under- 
takings, but were  built  upon a rational expectation of 
success. 
I have placed in the Appendix, a list of  113  country 
banking establishments that have been merged in joint 
stock banks.  The materials of  this list were supplied 
by various managers of joint stock banks in the coun- 
try, and it was  arranged by Mr. Henderson, the sub- 
manager of  the London and Westminster Bank.  Pos- 
sibly there may be  other instances, which are not in- 
cluded in this list.  The following table will sllew the 
number  of  private  establishments  that  have  been 
merged in the joint stock banks formed in each  year 
respectively, from  1826 : 
It will hence appear  that the forty-two joint  stock 
banks, which were formed in 1836, have absorbed forty- 
nine country banks. 
While it is admitted that some of these  banks were 
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it is  not  admitted  that  this  is  any  reflection  upon 
those  banks.  In seasons  of  excitement  both  good 
and  bad  projects  are brought  forward : and  when 
the excitement has subsided,  the  good  projects  are 
carried on, while the bad ones  are abandoned.  Is it 
any objection to the Provincial Bank  of  Ireland, that 
it was nurtured amid the speculations of  1525  ?  And 
can it be an objection to any of the English joint stock 
banks that  they were  brought  before  the  public  in 
1836?  A proof  of the solidity of  the banks that were 
formed  last year, is found  in  the  circnmstance, that 
they  have  not  been  abandoned.  All  of  them  have 
stood  the recent  pressure, without  seeking the assist- 
ance of  the Bank of  England. 
3.  Mr.  Palmer  has  virtually  acquitted  the joint 
stock banks of the cllarge of  excessive issue, by stating 
distinctly, that  the commercial exchanges have never 
been  unfavourable, arid  that  the exportations of  gold 
since June 1833, have been  produced  by  causes over 
which the joint stock banks had no control ; viz.  tEic 
foreign loans, and the demand from  America. 
In order  to  establish  tlie position that the commercial exchanges 
were  not  against  England, it  may be right to refer  to the increase or 
decrease  of  gold at the Bank, from which alone any correct inferences 
are to be drawn as to the state of our currency in comparison with that 
of  foreign countries. 
" The first period may be taken from October  1833, to April 1835, 
during almost the whole of w11icl1 time there was a continued purchase 
of gold by the bank, at E3  :  17 :  9 per oz. ;  the excl~ange  on Paris never 
fell below 25.35 for short paper, and the premium upon gold remained 
in Pans at about 9 per mille;  thus sl~ewing  tl~atduring  that period there 
was no demand upon the bank for bar-gold, and no profit upon the export 
of that metal or the gold coin of  the realm. 
"  The second period was from April 1835, to April  1836, during the 
whole  of  which  time  the foreign exchanges were considerably higher 
than during the preceding cigl~tcen  montl~s,  and consequedy the influx 
of  gold correspondingly increased at tlie  bank. 
c'  The third  and  last pcriod is that from April  to December  of the 
past year, during the whole of wliicll t~me  the foreign excllange on  Paris 
was  seldom under 25.35 ;  the premium upon gold, however, was for a 
short  time  as  high as 13  and l4  per mille, wliicl~  occasioned a loss of 
about  $100,000  of  the  bank's  stock  of  gold bullion, an amount too 
trifling  to  establish  the  fact  of  an  unfavonralle  con~mercial  rate  of 
exchnnge." 
4.  The  Bank  of  England  llas  tl~e  means  of  ef- 
fectually controlling  the  country circulation,  and  is 
therefore chargeable  with  any excess  that  may Iiave 
existed. 
The  arnount  of  gold  that  car1  be  demanded 
from  the  Baiik  of  England  must  depend  upon 
the  amount  of  its  own  notes  in circulation.  Tlle 
holder  of  the  note  of  a  joint  stock  bank  cannot 
demand gold for it of  the Bank of England : he may 
demand  payment  of  the joint  stock  bank,  who illay 
give him in  exchange  a  Bank  of  England note, for 
which  he may  get gold.  But the joint stock banks 
have no means of drawing out notes from the Bank of 
England,  they can  only  procure those previously  in 
circulation ; these notes may be  obtained by the sale 
of  stock  or  exchequer  bills, but as they were  previ- 
ously in circulation,  the amount of  the Bank of  En- 
gland circulation is not thereby increased, while that of 
the country banks who pay away the Bank of England 
notes in payment of  their own is to that extent dimi- 
nished.  The bank then can always limit its liability 
to be called upon  for gold, by limiting its issues.  In 
1826, when it was  a  question  how  far  a  small note 
circulation  in Scotland  and Ireland  was  compatible 
with  a  gold  circulation  in England, two directors of 
the Baiik  of  England were esamined upon  the  sub- 
ject ;  they stated that the Bank of  England could not 
be aflected, because  the Scotch  banks  could  not get 
gold from  the Bank of  England, unless they first got 
possession of  its notes. 
The  following is the evidence of J. B. Richards, Esq. 
"  Altl~ougl~  the paper circ~~lation  of Scotland was confined within its 
own liniits, if a sudden denland sl~ould  arise there for gold, what would 
be its effect in England, and particularly on the Bank of  England ?-It 
could  only  reach  the Bank of  England, I apprel~end,  by getting  pas- 
session of  Bank of England paper;  and by that means, or by discount- 
ing  bills,  or by  some other process, arriving at  the gold of  the Bank of 
England ;  their  own  notes would never bring it out, because they  are 
not convertible at the Bank." 
If  the  Bank  of  England  has  the  power  of  con- 
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that  power,  she  has  no  siglrt  to  complain  of'  the 
excessive issues of  thc joint stock banks ;  and the banli 
has no right  to  assert  that she  does not possess that 
power,  unless  she has  tried  to  exercise  it, and has 
failed.  It must  be  admitted, that the Bank  of' En- 
gland has no control over  the country circulation but 
by controlling her own issucs.  But we  contend that 
every contraction  or  expansion  of  tile  circulation  of 
the Bank  of  England will  be  always certainly, and 
generally  immediately, followed  by  a  corresponding 
contraction  or  expansion  of  the couiltry  circulation. 
As I  have  referred to this  subjcct  in  the  preceding 
section, I will now only quote the language of  Colonel 
Torrens : 
"  Were it true, that the paper of  the provincial banks flows into the 
channels  of circulation as  tl~e  paper of  the Bank of  Englm~d  is wit11- 
drawn, and  tl~us  prevents the currency from contracting under the in- 
fluence of an adverse excllange, then there would be  no  narrowing of 
mercantile  accon~n~odation,  and  no  pressure upon the money n~:~rliet, 
requiring  advances from tl~c  Bank of  England in SUPPOY~  of  conlnler- 
cial credit.  On  the  otl~er  l~and,  the fact, so freqnently and so  fatally 
experienced, thnt a  contraction of  the issucs of  the Bank  of  England 
inflicts immediate pressurc on the money market, is a practical dc~non- 
stration, that tl~e  paper of  the provincial banks  does  not flow into  tllc 
cl~annels  of  circulation  as the paper of  thc Bank of  Eng1:~nd  is with- 
drawn ;  and that the operations of  the proviucid banks do not  coon- 
teract the efforts of  the dircctors to regulate the currency upon  sound 
])ri~~ciplcs,  and  to  prcscrvc tl~e  nlcilium of  escl~ange  from any dccl)er 
fluctuations than  tllose  to  which  it  would be occasionally liable were 
t11c  circulation purely  metallic.  In 1825, the Bank of  Engkd  nar- 
rowed its issues by  upwarcls of  $3,000,000 ;  but the provinc~al  banks, 
instead  of  being able  to  counteract the operation, by  increasing tl~eir 
issucs to a corresponding amount, were cruslled and extinguisl~ed  under 
the cdan~itous  pressure which it occasioned.  And, in the present year, 
when  the directors  of  the Bank of  England resorted  to measures for 
contiwting the currency, the provincial bunks of  issuc, instead of  being 
able to throw increased supplies of  paper into the channels of  circulatiol~, 
were  crippled  and  paralysed, and com,nelled  to resort to tlie Bank of 
England for assistance. 
"  Now, if the  bank  directors were  to  regulate thcir issues by tl~c 
foreign exchanges, the  paper  circulation  of  the  n~etropolis  u  ould  be 
exactly  equal, both  with  respect  to amonnt and value, to  a metallic 
circulation ;  and consequently, every excess of  provincial paper would 
raise prices in the markets of  the provinces, witl~out  raising tl~e~n  in tl~o 
markets of  London ;  would  tun1 the balnncc of  payments  r~gainst  tl~c 
1)rovinccs ;  cause tllc excess of  provincial pnpcr to be retnnlcd upon tlrc 
banks of  issue, in cxcl~an~e  for Gills r~pon  Lo~ldon  ,  and, by crctti~~g  an 
increascd  demand  for foreign bills, to  pay the foreign debts incurred 
during  the  Iligll  range  of  provincial prices, would have a tendency to 
contract  tllc currency of tlic mctropolita~~  district, ratl~cr  tl~an  to render 
it redundant.  If  tl~e  directors of  the Bank of  England were to regu- 
late tl~eir  iss~ies  upon sound principles, the over-issues of  the provin- 
cial  banks  rno~~lcl  be  almost  imn~ediatcly returned  upon  them,  and 
therefore coulld not, except for periods too  brief  to  be important, l~ave 
any sensible effect in increasing the amount, and reducing the value, of 
the general nmdiunm  of exclla~~ge.  While tl~c  Bank of England retains 
its exclusive  privileges in  the metropolitan district, no considerable or 
protracted derangement in the money market can take place, except in 
conscquencc of tile Ltilore of  the directors to regulate their issues upon 
sound 
5.  The contraction  of  the  circulation  of  the Bank 
of  England has not been  sufficient to shcw that she 
could not control the country circulation. 
Tile  table  given  at  page  133, certainly shows  a 
reduction, but the Bank  of  England could  have  had 
no great fear of  the issues of  the joint stock banks, if 
this  was  the  whole  extent  of  her  efforts  to control 
them.  But if  this reduction  appears  trifling,  when 
compared with the object to be effected, it will appear 
with reference to the stock of  bullion to be still more 
inconsiderable.  Upon  this  subject  I  quote  Colonel 
Torrens and Mr. Loyd : 
COLONEL  TORRENS. 
"An inspection of  this table will convince your Lordsl~ip  of the cor- 
rectness of  my assertion, that tl~c  bank directors act in systen~atic  vio- 
lation  of  tl~c  principle of  leaving the currency to contract and expand 
under  the action of tlie exchanges.  In December 1833, their circula- 
tion uras £17,400,000,  and tl~eir  bullion &10,200,000 ;  in Marcl1 1634, 
their  bullion  was  reduced  to &!8,753,000;  and if  they  had acted on 
tl~e  principle of  leaving  the  currency  to  contract  under  the  action  of 
an adverse  exchange,  their  circulation would  have  been  redoced  to 
&lF,022,000.  But what was the fact ?  In utter disregtnrd of the only 
sountl principle upon wl~icl~  a paper currency can be regulated, the bank 
directors,  wl~ile  bullion was  thus flowing from  their coffers, increased 
tl~cir  circulation to  &18,544,000;  and  tl~us  tl~rew  upon  the money 
market an excess of  circulating money to the amount of  £2,522,000. 
"  In Marcli  1835, the  treasnre  in tlie  coffers of  tl~c  bank was re- 
dnced from 21  0,200,000, its amount in Deccnlber 1833, to &6,295,000; 
and  if  the directors,  during  this  continued  advcrse  exchange,  11ad 
allowed  their issues to contract as their gold was withdrawn, their cir- 
culation would  lravc been  reduccd from £17,4~~,000,  its  anlourlt  ill 
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pear  and  incr~liblc  it would be, if  not established by authentic 
officia  \ rcturlls,)  the clirectors kept out a  circulation of  £1 8,152,000, 
and thns created in the nloney market an cscess of  paper to the amoul~t 
of  64,588,000. 
"  The continuance of the adverse exchange, was the necessary result 
of  this  excess  in  the  circulation.  Tl~e  Gnzettc accon~lt  of  the qaar- 
terly averages of  liabilities and  assets  of  tl~c  Bank  of  England, from 
the 23rd of  August to the 14th of  November, 1836, gives the following 
results :- 
"Taking  these  figures as they stand, without troubling ourselves to 
inquire how  mucl1  the actual  quantity  of  bullion, held  by  the bank 
during  tl~e  last  week of  the  quarter, fell short  of  the average of  the 
wl~ole  quarter (which is all tl~c  rcturn gives), we sl~all  still l~ave  suffi- 
cient data to shew tile monstrous extent to which principle has been de- 
parted from in the reguletion, or rather in the no regulation, of the cur- 
rency.  Between December l 833, and November 1836, the treasures 
in  the  coffers  of  the  bank  wns  reduced  from  510,200,000  to 
64,933,000 ; while  the  issues  of  the  Bank  of  England  paper ncre 
increased from  &17,469,000 to 517,543,000 !  How did the directors 
contrive to get, out more paper w11ile the adverse cxcllangc was dcpriv  - 
ing them  of gold ?  Simplv by  violating  the principle by  ~vl~ich  they 
profess to be guided.  ~llile  the  adverse exchange was reducing their 
treasure  from  £10,200,000  to  64,933,000 ; ancl  while,  on  every 
sonnd  principle, they should have allowed their paper in circuliltio~l  to 
contract  from &17,460,000 to &12,202,000, they increased their scco- 
rities  from  &24,567,000,  their  amount  in  Decenlher,  1833,  to 
528,134,000,  their  avenge amou~lt  for the quarter ending the 15th of 
November,  1836 ;  and by  issuing  paper  on  the incrcased  anlount  of 
secnrities,  succeeded in  causi~~g  tl~c  currency  to  expancl,  under  the 
action of  a decided and protracted  adverse erchi~ngc." 
MR. LOYD. 
'' IS it possible for  the joiut  stock  bnnks  to maintan an expa~lsion 
of  their  issues  for any permnnency in  the  face  of  a  regular,  steady, 
and undeviating course of  co~~traction  on the part of  the bank ;  or will 
such a course on the part of the bank bring the subordinate issucrs into 
such  a  sitnation  that  a  corresponding  cl~nngc  in thcir issues becomcs 
inevitable?  A  correct  determinatior~ of  tl~is  question is a matter of 
the greatest importance, and it is n~uch  to be regretted, with this view, 
that  Mr. Palmer  has  not  furnished  us with  minnte  and  detailed ac- 
counts of  the action of  the bank, from December, 1835, to the prcscnt 
time.  Such accounts when prod~~ced  may possibly substantiate his case. 
But the information to be derived from  thc  vcry in~pcrfect  statements 
given us, does not tend to this conclusion :- 
LIABILITIES. 
Circulation -  -$17,543,000 
Deposits  -  -  12,682,000  / 
Dec.  29,  1835.. . ...  London  circulation  81 3,800,000 
Mar.  29,  1836  ......  Do.  14,400,000 
June  28,  1836  ...  ...  Do.  14,200,000 
"  Tllis statement does not look like that steady incl undcviating con- 
traction of tl~cir  issues w11icI1 can justify  the bank in complaining of any 
counteractloll  on  the part  of  the joint  stock banks as a tliil~  cntirely 
bcyond  tlrcir  control,  and so independent of them as to illellace their 
existence. 
"  This view  of  tile  matter seems to gaiu additional strength when 
WC look to tile issues of the bran cl^ banks :- 
Dec.  29,  1835  ......  Branch  banks  £3,400,000 
Mar.  29.  183G ......  Do.  3,600,000 
June 28,  1836  ......  Do.  3,700,000 
By this statement,  it appears that the country issues of  tl~c  bank were 
themselves increasing at  tlle period during wl~icl~  the bank complains so 
severely of the increased issues of its rivals. 
"  In the face of these statements we are not urarranted in coming to 
the  concl~~sion  that  the action  of  the joint  stock banks is utterly be- 
yond the control of the central issuer ;  the bank must first prove that it 
hns really tried the effect of  a steady and uninterrupted course of  con- 
traction, and that in face of this tlle issues of  the  joint stock banks have 
as  steadily  increased.  Such  may  be  the case ;  but  Mr.  Palmer's 
pamphlct  has  not  furnished us wit11 any evidence of  it, and the infor- 
mation,  i~nperfect  and  unsatisfnctory  as  it  is,  which  he does give us, 
directly tends to the opposite conclusion. 
"  But  to  return  to  the above table :'  we would ask any reflecting 
person  to look first to the column of  bull~on,  and mark its regular and 
rapid  decrease;  tl~en  to compare with this the  column  of  circulation, 
terminating  with  a larger amount than that with which it commences, 
and  l~aving  done so, to  declare wl~etl~er  he discovcrs any evidence of 
the hnk llavil~g  made  the amount of  its circulation to fluctuate a  it 
would have done had  it been  purely metallic ;  or whetl~er  11e can per- 
ceive, during the dnin of bullion wl1ic11 comrnenccd in April, or during 
the months  which immediately preceded that event, any sips of  that 
steady and undeviating contraction of circulation on tl~e  part of  the bank, 
on  which  alone any just  objection  to  the conduct of  the joint  stock 
banks can be founded? It  is not a satisfactory reply to this question to say 
"  that the diminution of bullion has been met by a diminished amount 
of  deposits."  If  the joint stock banks  see, by  the published  returns, 
that  the  circulation  of  the bank is maiataiiced at its full amount, they 
are warranted  in concluding that there is no real call for a diminution 
of their issues, notmithstandmg that some of  the depositors in the bank 
may have thou~l~t  proper to draw from it a portion of  tl~eir  funds.  In- 
deed, the Lank is not entitled to calculate at  all upon the long-;, ~~htedncss 
* This is a tal~le  of the circulation and the bullion from Janual?  1836 
to February  183'i.-The  render will find this ill the Appc~~dix. 
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or  1)rtldencc of the joint stock banks, but ought to rely solcly up011 tl~c 
influence wllicl~  a steady and continuous course of contraction on hcr part 
must exercise upon the proceedings of  11cr suborclinatc rivals.  This it 
is  clear  sl~e  11s not  done from  January 1836 to Fcbrunry 1837, and 
therefore slie appears to Le nitllout any suficicnt ground for attributing 
tllc wl~ole  or  tl~e  grcatcr portion  of  tlic existing dcrangemcnt to tllcir 
nlisconduct.  If tlicy  have done wrong, it appears to have bccn from 
tl~e  want of that controllirlg action on tlie part of  tl~e  Bank of  England 
wllicli she might have exerted and has not." 
One of  the most  effectual checks  upon  excessive 
issue, possessed by the Bank  of  England, is to main- 
tain a high rate of  interest.  Had  the rate of  interest 
been  advanced  in  1834, that  measure  alone  would 
have prevented the joint stock banks rediscounting in 
London to the extent  they did, and  have  prevented 
many  of  those  speculative  schemes  that  were  pro- 
duced solely by the cheapness of  money.  If the price 
of money, that is, the rate of  interest, be ION, it proves 
that money  is abundant,  as compared with  the  de- 
mand, how low soever the circulation may appear to be 
from the bank books.  And on the other  hand, if  the 
market rate of  interest  be  high, it shows that  money 
is scarce,  whatever  may  be  the amount  of  the out- 
standing notes of  the bank. .- I think the bank should 
never charge less upon either loans or discounts than 
five per cent.  If  money was wanted  for the purposes 
of  trade that rate would be readily paid, and if  it was 
not wanted, the  bank  ought  not to issue.  The bank 
having the power  of  making  money, or what is equi- 
valent. to money, ought not to  come  into  competition 
with other banks, especially as it is not subject to any 
check upon its issues, by daily or weekly exchanges with 
other establishments.  The issues of  the Bank of  En- 
gland are never known to be in excess, until they have 
turned the exchanges, and  occasioned  a  demand for 
gold.  But then the mischief  has been done ; a rapid 
contraction  subsequently, only increases the distress ; 
whereas, had this  excessive  issue  never  taken place, 
there would  have  been  no  speculation  from  an  ex- 
pansion of  the currency, nor any distress from its sub- 
sequent contraction. 
G.  The Bank  of  England can control  the issues  of 
the joint stock,  as effectually as she can control  the 
issues  of  any other  banks, in which  the  public have 
equal confidence. 
Mr.  Palmer intimates  that the Bank  of  England 
cannot  control  thc issues  of  the joint  stock  banks so 
effectivcly  as it  could  control  the  issues  of  the pri- 
vate  banks.  In  one  respcct this is true.  When  the 
private banks possessed tlie circulation of  the country, 
the Bank  of  England had  only to  contract  their own 
issues to  a  moderate  extent, and  some  dozen  of  the 
private  banks  immediately  stopped  payment.  A 
general  run  took  place  upon  the others;  prices im- 
mediately fell,  and the exchanges became favourable. 
But  now,  even  when  there  is  a  general  clamour 
against joint stock banks ; when the Bank of  England 
rejects  all  their  indorsements;  when  they  are  de- 
nounced  by  a  parliamentary  committee,  still  they 
most  provokingly refuse  to  stop ; and the public,  so 
far  from  running  upon  them  for  payment  of  their 
notes,  actually circulate  a  larger  amount.  It must, 
therefore,  be  admitted,  that  the  circulation  of  the 
joint  stock: banks  is,  in  this  respect,  less  under the 
control  of  the  Bank  of  England  than  that  of  the 
private banks.  But this fact shows the superior confi- 
dence placed  in joint  stock banks;  and if  tlie public 
placed  the  same  confidence  in  private  banks,  they 
would be equal in this respect to joint stock banks.  For 
the Bank  of  England holds as effective and as prompt 
a control over the circulation of  the joint stock banks, 
as it would  have  over  that  of  any other  banks,  in 
which the public have equal confidence. 
We are informed  by  Mr.  Palmer,  that in  1825, 
above  eighty private  banks  stopped  payment.  This 
occasioned of  course a run for gold upon  all the rest; 
prices  consequently fell,  and  the exchanges became 
favourable.  Had  the same system  existed  in  1836, 
the same result would probably have followed : or had 
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183(i,  occasioned  thc  stoppage  of  :l  proportioriatc 
rlllrrlber  of  joint  stock  banks,  the  exchanges  would 
llave  becorrle favourable.  Uut is it a matter of  regret 
that the country has banking  irlstitutions that deserve 
and  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  public?  Are  we 
seriously  advised  to  adopt  a  system  of  insecure 
banks, in order  that the Bank of  England may have 
the  power  of  destroying them ?  And  is  it  likely 
that  the legislature  will  be  disposed  to  follow  such 
advice ? 
It must  be  recollected  that up to June 1836, the 
country bankers had  a  circulation  nearly double that 
of  the  joint  stock  banks,  and  there  is  no  certain 
evidence to prove that the whole  of  the increased  is- 
sues were not made by them.  But could it be proved, 
that during the early part  of  last year  the joint stock 
banks did issue to excess,  that would be no argument 
against them, unless it were also proved that this exces- 
sive issue arose from the principles of joint stock bank- 
ing.  To  justify the charge against the principles of joint 
stock banks, it must  also  be proved, that  the private 
bankers would  not  have  issued  to  the same  extent. 
And  how  can  this  be  proved?  Was not  the  panic 
of  1825 attributed by Lord Liverpool and Mr. Robin- 
son " to the rash  spirit of  speculation, supported, fos- 
tered,  and  encouraged  by  the  country  banks?"  If 
then  the private  banks  produced the panic of  1825, 
what  reason  is there to suppose that if  they had been 
the exclusive  issuers  in  1836, that their issues would 
have  been  to  a  less amount  than  those  of  the joint 
stock  banks?  But  if  the  panic  of  1825, was  pro- 
duced by  causes  unconnected  with  the country  cir- 
culation, is it not possible that the same  causes which 
produced a panic in 1825 may have produced another in 
1836 ?  And what then becomes of  the charge against 
the joint stock banks ? 
7.  We may observe, that the difference between the 
years 1832 and 1836 may be  accounted  for  without 
attaching any blame to the joint  stock banks. 
Mr. Palmer inquires why the system whicll worked 
well in  1832, should not work well in  l536 ; and Mr. 
Ricardo will supply us with a11  answer. 
"  Tlle  conscquences of  the  events  of  1825  were  of  too  serious 
n nature  to  admit  of  a  speedy  recovery-a  period  of  calln  tllcre- 
fore  succeeded; and  from  1826 to  1828,  tllc  bank  is  found  to  be 
amassing  treasure,  wl~ich  is  not  a  state  of  things  likely  to  induce 
speculation.  In  1830,  at  the  period  of  the  French  revolution,  the 
bank  had  a  circulation  of  notes  of  $22,500,000,  and  a  rescrvc  of 
bullion amolunting to £12,000,000.  The  exchange  being above par, 
this was a  favourable position for a  necessary diminution  of  the  cur- 
rency,  of  \vhich  that. event  was  likely  to  be  the  forerunner.  Tl~c 
demand for specie which  then  occurred  for exportation, is ascribed by 
Mr.  Palmer to  the  derangement  between  the  currencies  of  this  and 
other  countries  produccd  by  the  revolution  in  France : it is  morc 
likely to  have  arisen  from  the  balance  of  trade  being  apinst  this 
country, in consequence of the larger investments made, between 1830 
and 1832, in the French and Dutcli funds by English capitalists.  Mr. 
Palmer  states  that  from  1830 to  1832, the system  upon which  tlle 
bank  acted "  adjustcd  itself  so  satisfactorily ;"  but, upon a reference 
to tile rctums, it will be  found  that  a very considerable diminution of 
the circulatio~l  then took place.  From August 1830 to Janoary 1832, 
there is n decrease  in  tl*  Lullion  of  about  six  millions, and  also a 
decrease in the circulation to  the  same  extcnt : that  no  derangement 
thcrcforc took place in  tlie  currency, on  this occasion, is clearly to be 
nttributed to its  gradual reduction, wl~icll  in  this  case was  allowed by 
the bank to be consequent on  the  exporbtion of  the bullion.  At this 
period  tl~e  currency had  righted  itself, a  reaction  took  place, bullion 
hcgan  to  flow into  the  bank, and  the  circulation  began  to  increase. 
Tllis  increase  continued  gradually till October, 1833, when  the paper 
amounted to d?19,823,000, and the bullion to gl0,905,000.  Evident 
slgns  of  e  redundant  currency  now  began  to  manifest  themselves; 
the exchanges were  depressed, and  gold  disappeared from the  coffers 
of  tlle  bank.  From  December,  1833,  to  &ray,  183.5,  there  is  an 
increase in  the  circulation, notwitllstanding  that  the  bullion  had pro- 
gressively diminished to  the  extent of  &3,750,000 !  If, at this time, 
the same course had  been  adopted  by the bank 3s in  1830 and 1831, 
would  not  the "  speculative  action" mentioned  by  Mr. Pnl~uer  havc 
been rnatcridly checked 1" 
We may  further  observe, that in 1832 the Bank  of 
England did not advance the rate of  intcrest, they did 
not solicit the government to raise the interest  on ex- 
chequer bills-there  was no wholesale rejection of  bills 
on  American  l~ouses-they  did  not  raise  an  outcry 
against  joint-stock  banks-nor  bad  they determined 
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there wag no public alarm, and consequently no pres- 
sure. 
8.  Could  it be  proved  that the joint  stock  banks 
were the cause of  the speculative spirit that  preceded 
the  pressure,  that would  not  prove  that  they were 
the cause of  the pressure itself. 
In discussing the causes  of  the pressure on the mo- 
ney market, Mr. Palmer has confined his attention  to 
the cause of the s  eculation that preceded the pressure. 
Now when Mr. $lay  stated, so late as  May last,  that 
there were no stocks on  hand, and Mr. Palmer states 
that the commercial  exchanges have never  been  un- 
favourable, it may be  questioned, whether  the degree 
of  speculation  has not  been  considerably overrated : 
but, admitting the existence of  speculation to the full 
extent that has been  represented,  may it  not  then 
be asked, whether  the  subsequent  pressure  was  the 
necessary  consequence  of  that  speculation.  That 
seasons of  excitement sliould be followed by seasons 
of  repose  is natural enough;  but then  the  change 
is  always gradual.  A  sudden  change from a  high 
point  of  excitement, to  a  low  point  of  depression,  is 
not the natural result of  the operations of  trade ;  it is 
the  sole  result  of  our  monetary  system ; and  the 
question  is,  who  were  the  banks,  whose  safety  re- 
quired this sudden re-action ? 
That this sudden change is not  attributable to the 
joint  stock  banks,  will  be  admitted by  their  oppo- 
nents ;  in fact, they were accused in the public papers 
of  pursuing  after  the  pressure  had  commenced  the 
same reckless course they did before.  It is quite cer- 
tain,  that  their  circulation  went  on  increasing; and 
equally certain, that a currency perpetually increasing 
cannot produce distress. 
In what way can  the excessive  issue  of  notes pro- 
duce a pressure upon the money market ?  A pressure 
means a  difficulty  of  getting money, in consequence 
of  its scarcity.  13ut how can excess of  notes  produce 
a scarcity ?  It is true, that if  notes are issued  to  ex- 
cess,  and  then  suddenly withdrawn,  distress may be 
produced.  But  in  this  case, it  is  not  tlic  exccssive 
issue,  but  the  contraction  of  the  circuIatioil  that 
produces distress.  Excess can never produce distress 
without a  subsequent  contraction.  Now  the circula- 
tion of joint stock banks has never  been  contracted : 
the circulatio~l  has  got  on  increasing  to  the  present 
time ; and  in  what way a continually increasing cur- 
rency can  produce a  scarcity of  money it is not easy 
to explain. 
"  The fall in price,"  says  Mr.  Palmer, "of  almost 
all tlle leading  articles of  raw produce (sugar, coffee, 
tea, silk, cotton, piece goods, metals, drugs, &C.) from 
the  1st July last, when  the rate  of  interest was  first 
advanced,  has  not  been  less  than  from  twenty  to 
thirty per cent." 
Mr.  Palmer has intimated  here and,elsewhere  in 
his  pamphlet, that this fall  of  prices was  occasioned 
by the advance in the rate of  interest by the Bank  of 
England.  The Bank  of  England  may  contend  that 
this advance became necessary, in order to  check  the 
spirit of  speculation,  to  depress  prices,  and  thus  to 
prevent  the  exportation  of  gold.  But this defence, 
would amount  to an admission, that the bank had the 
power  of  preventing the speculation  altogether,  and 
would  consequently  be  an  abandonment  of  all  the 
charges against the joint stock banks.  Those charges 
are founded upon  the assumption, that the joint stock 
banks created  these  speculations,  in  opposition to the 
most  strenuous exertions of  the Bank  of  England; 
but  if  the Bank  of  England  could  suppress the spe- 
culations at  their  height, could  it not have controlled 
them in their infancy ? 
9.  We observe,  that the legislative enactments pro- 
posed by Mr. Palmer do not  seem  adapted to prevent 
the evil of  which he complains. 
He  proposes  first,  that  parliament  shall  adopt 
"  such  regulations  as  may  check  the  unlimited 
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where  banks  already  exist,  affording  every  security 
and accommodation which  the  district  may require." 
Mr. Palmer makes this recommendation, after having 
twice  asscrted  that the joint stock banks have "  innu-  ' 
merable branches formed in almost every town in  the 
two  kingdoms."  Here  we  may  inquire -  In  what 
new place  can  joint  stock  banks  be  planted?  And 
secondly,  what  authority  is  to  decide  whethcr  the 
existing banks of  any district do afford every security 
and accommodation which the district may require ? 
Mr.  Palmer  proposes, secondly, "  to  regulate  the 
future management of  those now in existence, in order 
to  guard  alainst a recurrence of  that  excess  in  the 
circulating  medium,  which  on  the  late  occasion 
neutralized  the influence  of  the contraction  of  the 
circulation of  the Bank  of  England,  and  occasioned 
a serious, it may be  said  ruinous  pressure  upon  the 
money market."  The only  measure Mr. Palmer has 
suggested is that at page 39.  - - 
"  It  is perfectly immaterial whether banks of  issue retain  their just 
proportion of  reserves in Bank of  England  notes  or coin, but  one  or 
the other  it is submitted  that  they ought  to  be  compelled  to  retain 
with reference  to their liabilities, or to abandon the issue of  notes, the 
upholding of  which, under discredit, becomes a source of  difficulty and 
danger to the public at large, as well as to  the Bank of  England.  In 
the late  instance  tlie  discredit  fortunately extended  no  farther  than 
Ireland, but the apprehension of  what  might  ensue  in  England occa- 
sioned a considerable  abstraction of  bank  paper from  London  by the 
issuing banks of  the country, which to that extent so far increased  the 
pressure of  contrnction-and  was  the  principal  cause of  tlie pressure 
upon the money market,  which is tlie first head of  the present inquiry. 
In such times it is not only the contraction of money which constitutes 
the  evil, but  the  consequence which  invariably ensues of  timidity on 
the part of bankqrs generally, to grant their customary accommodation, 
and of  those  situated in the more distant parts of the country accumu- 
lating and  locking up reserves  three or four  times  greater  than they 
retain under ordinary circumstaaces." 
It is not  easy  to  see  in what way this regulation 
would  be a check to over-issue.  A bank  that  had a 
large amount of  gold, or  Bank of  England  notes  in 
its vaults, would  be  not  the less  disposed to issue its 
notes, nor would the public be tlie less disposed to take 
them.  Nor  is  it easy  to  see  in what  way it would 
guard  against  discredit.  The property of  the banks 
would  not  be  increased ; thcy would  merely hold  a 
larger amount  of  gold, or  Bank  of  England  notes; 
and a less  amount of  exchequer  bills  or  other  secu- 
rities.  As  the  profits  of  the banks  would  be  thus 
reduced, they would be less worthy of confidence, and 
Inore open to discredit.  But  it is easy to see in what 
way  this  measure  might  increase the  profits  of  the 
Bank  of  England :-they  would  have more  notes  in 
circulation,  and the  capital  thus raised might be in- 
vested in government securities that would yield inter- 
est.  Thus, there would be a transfer of  a certain por- 
tion of  the profits of  the private and joint stock banks 
to the Bank of  England. 
The following  is a  summary  of  the  charges  that 
have been brought against the joint stock banks. 
I.  It has been  asserted, that the joint  stock  banks 
have issued an excessive amount of  their notes. 
1. We do not admit the f'dct,  that the  country cir- 
culation was excessive.  We assert, that the  incrcascd 
amount of  notes in circulation, arose from the incl-cased 
trade of  the country. 
2. Admitting the country circulation was excessive, 
there is no  evidence that  the excess arose  from  the 
joint stock banks ; it migl~t  have  arisen  chiefly or en- 
tirely from increased issues by the private bai~kers. 
3.  Admitting even that the joint stock banks issued 
to excess, yet as the system of  private banking affords 
no  protection  against  excessive  issue,  this  excessive 
issue is no argument against the systcm of  joint  stock 
banking. 
4.  Admitting  that the country circulation was  ex- 
cessive, and that the whole  excess  was  issued by the 
joint  stock  banks,  then  we  contend,  that the  blame 
rests with the  Bank  of  England, who  by adopting in 
1835 the measures she  adopted  in 1836, might have 
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11.  It has been asserted, that the excessive issues  of 
the joint stock  banks, liave  rendered  the foreign  ex- 
changes unfavourable. 
1. We  state,  upon  the authority  of  Mr.  Horsley 
Palmer,  that the commercial  exchanges  liave  never 
been  unfavourable,  and  that the demand  for  gold 
arose from causes wholly unconnected with joint stock 
banking. 
2.  We deny the possibility of  the joint stock  ba~iks 
being  able  by  any  excessive  issue,  to  render  the 
foreign  exchanges  unfavourable, in opposition to the 
controlling power of  the Bank of  England. 
3.  Admitting both  tlie  facts,  that the  joint  stock 
banks  have issued  to  excess, and that this  excessive 
issue have rendered the exchanges unfavourable, then 
we  contend  that the blame  rests  not  wit11  the joint 
stock  banks,  who  arc ready to  pay  off  all  their  cn- 
gagements, but with  tl~e  Bank  of  England,  in  not 
providing  ample  means  to  meet  her  own  engage- 
ments ;  the supplying of  the foreign demand for gold 
being one  of  tlle  conditions  on which  she holds  her 
exclusive privileges. 
111.  It has been  asserted, that  the excessive  issues 
of  the joint  stock  banks, have  been  the cause  of  the 
recent pressure. 
1.  We do  not  admit the fact  of  excessive  issue; 
but admitting the fact, we say, that there is no  neces- 
sary connection  between  excessive  issue  and  subse- 
quent panic. 
2. That  the joint  stock  banks have  not  been  tlie 
immediate cause of  the pressure, is evident  from  the 
continued increase  of  their  circulation :  a  pressure 
being always produced either by a  contraction  of  the 
currency, or by tlie  destruction  of  credit; to neither 
of  which have the joint stock banks contributed. 
3. That the sole necessity for the pressure arose from 
the small amount  of  gold  in  the Bank  of  England; 
that had  the gold  been  three times the amount, the 
foreign  demand  would  liave  been  supplied, and the 
speculative spirit would have  expended  itself  without 
producing  any disastrous  results ; and that the low 
amount  of  gold  in the  Bank of  England, cannot  be 
charged as a crime upon the joint  stock banks. 
4.  That the  pressure  upon  the money market was 
rendered more  severe by the clamour  raised  against 
the joint  stock  banks ; by rendering  it necessary for 
the joint  stock  and  private  banks  in  the country, 
to  keep  larger  reserves  of  cash, and thus diminished 
their  means  of  giving  accommodation  to their  cus- 
tomers ;  that for this increased pressure, not the joint 
stock banks, but the enemies of  joint  stock banks, are 
answerable. 
5. That the joint stock banks have considerably mi- 
tigated the pressure : the confidence  placed  in  their 
stability, having  delivered the  public  from  the  re- 
currence of  a panic similar to 1825. 
Secondly.  The  recent  pressure  upon  the money 
market, has been  ascribed  to the mis-government  of 
tlie Bank of  England. 
The plan  upon  which  the  Bank  of  England  pro- 
fesses to  be  governed,  was  explaincd  by  J.  Horsley 
Palmer, Esq. before the Bank Charter  Committee, in 
the year 1832, in the following terms :- 
"  What is  the principle, by  which  in  ordinary  times  the  bank is 
guided in the regulation of  their issues ?  The principle,  with reference 
to  the  period of  a full currency, and  consequently a pnr of  exchange, 
by which the bank is guided in the regulation of  their issues (excepting 
under  special  circumstances,)  is  to  invest  and  retain  in  securities, 
bearing  interest,  a  given  proportion  of  the  deposits, and  ttle  value 
received for the notes in circulation, the remainder  being  held  in coin 
and bullion;  the proportions u;hich seem to be desirable, under existing 
circnmstances, may be stated et about two-tliirds in securities and one- 
third in bullion;  the circulation of  tlie country,  so far as the same may 
depend  upon  the  bank, being  subsequently regulated by the action of 
the foreign exchanges." 
The  following  explanation  of  this  principle  was 
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"  The  principle upon which the bank managed its affairs, had  beell 
correctly  stated,  and  he  believed  fully  approved,  namely,  to  keep 
one-third of bullion in proportion to their liabilities, to allow the public 
to  act  on the currency, and  not  force it by any artificial means;  to 
allow  their  circulatiorl  ?adually  to  diminish, as  the  excl~anges  were 
spinst us,  and  the  drain of  bullion became great;  and wllen the cx- 
changes  turned  in our favour, and  the bullion  came  back, to  let tllc 
circulation gradually extend in proportion." 
Upon this subject, I shall content myself  with tran- 
scribing the sentiments of  other writers.  But for the 
information  of  those  who  are not  familiar  with  the 
subject, I may  state,  that  the  system of  Mr. Horsley 
Palmer, as explained before the Bank  Charter  Com- 
mittee,  has been  understood  by  diffcreilt  writers  irr 
three different senses. 
First.  It has  been  understood  to  mean,  that  the 
bank sllall at all times, kecp a stock  of  gold  equal  to 
one-third of  its liabilities ; that is, equal  to  one-third 
the amount of  its notes  and deposits  added togetller ; 
and consequently, if  any portion  of  its gold  Le  witll- 
drawn, tlie reduction in  the amount of  the liabilities 
shall be  equal  to three  times  the amount of  the gold 
withdrawn. 
Secondly. It has been understood to mean,  that at 
the time oj' a fit11  currency, the stock of  gold shall be 
one-third the liabilities, and that if  any portion of  the 
gold  be withdrawn,  the reduction  in the amount of 
the  notcs  in circulation alone  shall  be  equal to the 
amount of  gold  withdrawn.  This is  the  sense  in 
which  it appears to have  been  understood  by  Lord 
Altl~orp,  and this is the principle upon which  Colonel 
Torrens contends the bank ought to be governed. 
Thirdly.  It has  been  understood  to mean,  that  at 
the  time  of a full  currency, the  stock  of  gold  shall 
be  equal  to  one-third  of  the liabilities;  and if  any 
portion of  its gold be withdrawn, the reduction in the 
amount of  its liabilities, that is, the deposits and  notes 
together, should  be equal to the amount of  gold with- 
drawn.  This is the explanation given by  Mr. Palmer 
himself, and it is the principle upon which  tlle  bank 
profcsses to be governed. 
Tlic objcct of  thc writers, who have replied  to  Mr. 
Palmer is,  to shew, first, that  the principle involved 
in the third  explanation  is  erroneous,  and  that  thc 
bank ought to be regulated by the principle  involved 
in the second  explanation ; and secondly, presuming 
the  principle  iri  the third  explanat.ion  to  be  sound, 
they contend, that the  bank  has not  acted uniformly 
upon  that principle.  I quote in the following order, 
Mr. Palmer, Mr. Loyd, Colonel Torrens, Mr. Ricardo, 
Mr. Bennison, and Mr. Palmer's  reply. 
MR. HORSLEY PALMER. 
"  The conduct of  the Bank of  England from  the  year 1819 to the 
present time is before the  public.  The events which  seemed  to  have 
led to the panic of  1825 were attempted to be explained by the author 
of  this tract, in evidence given  before  the  con~n~ittee  of  the House of 
COII~I~IOIIS  upon  the  renewal of  the  bank  cllarter  in  1832; when lie 
further endeavoured to shew that  the almost  total  drain of  coin from 
the  Bank  in  Deccmber 1825, which  endangered  the  credit  of  that 
establishn~ent,  was  occsioned solely by the  discredit of  private paper- 
money, particularly of that part below the denomination of five pounds. 
Jt was xlso slie~vn  in that evidence that tlle policy pursued by the bank 
subsequent to the uritl~drawal  of  the one pound and  two  pound notcs 
in England and Wales, had been to maintain  thcir  securities as nearly 
as  possible  at  a  fircd  amount,  and  to  allow the  contraction of  the 
currency, effected Ly  the return of  bank notes for bullion, gradl~ally  to 
proceed  until  the value of  tl~e  paper-money remaining  in  circulation 
was so far increased  as  to  occasion  the  return of  that  specie  to  the 
bank which might  have  been exported, and  thus  to  replace  the  cur- 
rency upon  a  level with  that  of  other  countries.  That  system  had 
appeared  to work satisfactorily and witl~out  any forced  action  on  the 
part of  tl~e  bank in contracting its circulation.  It was  tried upon the 
cl~ange  of government in France in July, 1830, when credit tl~roughout 
that kingdom was shaken to its foundation.  At that pcriod the Bank 
of  England was  possessed of  about  twelve  millions of  bullion.  Im- 
mediately upon  the  events  referred  to  taking  placc, the  currency of 
England exhibited  an  excess compared with that of  France and other 
parts of  Europe.  The  consequence of  that derangement between the 
currencies of  this  and  other  countries was a continued  diminution of 
the bullion held by  the bank from Jnly,  1830, to  February or  March, 
1832, when the increased value of  money in  England  and the gradual 
restoration of  credit  upon  the Continent gave a favourable turn to the 
foreign exclianges ;  ~vhich  continued  in  our  favour  till the autumn of 
1833, at wl~ich  time  the bullion in deposit  at  the  bank  amounted to 
nearly eleven  millions.  At tl~is  pcriod an exportation of  the precious 
n~ehls  again commenced, from causes that will hereafter be  explained, 
as well as the reason why that system wl~ich  happened to adjust itself 
so  satisfactorily from  1830 to  1832  failed  from  1833 to 183G;  for gold, their cstnblisl~ment  bcconlcs cxposcil  to  two opl~osite  tlangcr~  ; 
and  they cannot  avoid  the  one,  witl~out  approncl~i~~g  the  otl~cr.  II' 
they do not  contract  their  issues, tl~cir  treasure may I)c cxl~anstc~tl  by 
the  continual  action  of  the  forcign  escl~ange;  :~ntl  if  tl~e!.  tlo  11ot 
incrcasc  tlreir  issucs, tl~cir  coffcrs  Inay be  en~ptictl  1)). tl~c  inlmctliatc 
action of  a domcstic l,n~~ic.  Of  tlrc two  dangers, tl~nt  of  hnvi~~g  tl~cir 
coffers  emptied  by do~ncstic  panic, is tl~c  most  sc.rio~~:i  ant1  the n~ost 
pressing ; and  tl~ercforc,  in  an  cmclgcucy,  11ari11g  only  a  el~oicc  of 
evils, tl~c  bank directors are  jnstificd  ill  disrcgnrtling tl~c  principlc of 
reg~lating  their issucs by  the  foreign cxcl~angcs,  ancl  in  rnal~ir~g  sucl~ 
advat~ces  as illay bc lrcccssary to restore  con~n~crcinl  crcdit.  nut tlocs 
the necessity under wl~icl~  tl~c  bnnk  directors  arc  occasiondly ~~laced, 
of  resorting to  extraordinary rncasnrcs for  tl~e  purposc of  mitignting n 
pressing tniscl~ief,  afford a justification  of  the  prcvions  dcviatio~~s  fro111 
principle by ~vl~icl~  that  tniscl~icf  was crcatcd ?  Could n surgcon, \v110 
had wounded ail artery, instead  of  lia~*i~~g  opcned a veiu, vindicate his 
professio~~al  reputation,  by  sl~owing  that  11c 11ad  sccureil  tl~c  blood- 
vessel before his patient  bled  to death ?  Could  an  n~cei~diary  escape: 
condemnation, by proving that IIC 11ad laboured at the engine by  ~vhicl~ 
the co~~flagration  nl~ich  11c 11ad kindlcd was at lcngtl~  snbdued ? 
"  When, in  1826, the ba111i directors rcstorcd  commcreial credit, by 
making  extensive  issues,  rcgarilless  of  tl~e  state Y tl~c  foreign cx- 
changes,  their  conduct received,  as it  deserved,  the  higl~cst  praise ; 
but  this  conduct, however  praise~rortl~y  in  itself,  cannot  bc  refcrrecl 
to, in justification of  the previons mismanagement of  tl~e  circulation of 
the  Bank  of  England,  by  ~vhich  the  frightful  pt111ic of  1826 was 
occasioned.  In  like  manner,  though  the  contluct  of  the  present 
directors, in making liberal advances npon mcrcnntile  sccnrities, and in 
affording assistance  to  the  provincial  banks,  xvitl~out  waiting  for  an 
influx  of  the  precious  metals, is  laudable  ant1 wisc, yet this conduct, 
however calculated to  avert  a more scrious  crisis, cannot  remove tlrc 
responsibility they have incurrcd  by that  earlier  departure  from prin- 
ciple, wllich has  led to  the  mitigated panic of  the present year.  Tltc 
only  disturbances  in  the  nloncy  marlict,  whicl~  the  directors  of  tl~e 
Bauk  of  England  have  any power  to  correct,  arc  tl~osc  wl~icl~  tlreir 
own  misn~anagcnlcnt of  tl~c  currency  crcates.  If  they  conld  be 
prevailed  upon  to  attend  wit11 strictr~css  to  their  csscntial  duty,  of 
rcgnlating  their  issucs  by tl~c  cour3e  of  tl~e  foreign  excl~angcs,  they 
wo~ilrl  ncvcr  be  called  upon  to  perform  tl~c  snpcrfluons  duty,  of 
watching over and supporting comn~ercial  credit.  Wl~cn  they cease to 
inflict disease, they will no longer Le  required to dil~inistcr  rcmcilics." 
"  It is a curious fact that, from 1831 to 1886, there is 110  one period, 
except for  four  or  five  months  in  1833, in ~vl~ich  this  proportion  of 
one-tl~ird  and two-thirds II~  been preserved, and it must  tllcn  indeed 
have bccn a vcry full  currency, for it was  speedily follo~ved  by  a con- 
tinucd reduction of  the bulliou.  Tl~erc  is IIO casc, evcri during  thcsc 
fo~u  nlontl~s,  wl~erc  tllc  bullion, cscept to a vcry trifling amount, has 
ever exceeded one-third,  60 that tlte banlc hua  ncvcr  been in a positioll 
to increase its issues agreeably to its own rule. 
"  Tlte  great  error  of  the  bnnk  has  been to confound the deposits 
and the circulation, wl~crcas  they arc totally different in their character. 
A demand for gold for exportation  should  be  ullo\rrcd  to  act  on  tile 
currency only in order  to  corrcct its exccss;  a withd~awal  of  deposits 
should  be  niet  by  a realization of  sccuritics-it  is  the neglect of  tltis 
principle that has occasioned nluch of tl~c  mischief wlricl~  Ilas occurrecl. 
When tile  rate of  intcrcst is low, that  portion of  the  deposits wl~icll 
belongs  to  private  individods is generally 1:tger;  that wllicl~  consists 
of  monied  capital  waiting  for  e~nploymcnt,  is  likcly to  be  tl~e  first 
\vitl~dra~vn  upon a rise  in  the mte of  interest,  tlle  usud  consequence 
of high ptices, and the exportation of  the precious metals. 
"  If  a sun1 of  gold be taken from the coffers of  the hank  to be sent 
abroad, and this same amount be 1r7it11drawn from  the  bank  notes  ill 
circulation, prices will be affected and tl~c  equilibriom  restored ;  but if 
it be taken from the deposits, it can  in  no  manner possibly relieve the 
currency-the  gold will have disappeared, and the effect of  its abstrac- 
tion be neut~dized.  In  this  part of  the sub.ject it has been necessary 
to re-state some of  the  facts  and  reiterate  sonie of  the arg~~nlents  so 
Jly  adduced by  Colonel Torrerls in  the pamphlet  bcfore  ullntled  to, 
the correctness of which has in  IIO way been disproved in Mr. Pdmcr's 
work." 
AIR.  BENNISON. 
"  The system of  classing together  their  circulation  and  deposits rrs 
liabilities, and  likewise  clussinp  toptl~cr  securities  aod  bullion  as 
assets, rest~ng  satisfied  that all IS going right, when  tl~c  reductio~l  in 
their liabilities is equal iin  amount to  tllc reduction  in  their nssets, may 
eusily lead to lanlentnble consequences, whilst  they dllerc to tlle plan 
of keeping up tl~eir  securities to a givcn amount, wlletl~cr  their deposits 
be  increased  or  dimi~~ishcd,  and wl~ctl~cr  there be a drain for bullio~~ 
proceeding  from  ordinary or  extraordinary circumstances.  To  make 
my argument more clear, I will suppose a czsc.  Tlle bal~li  affairs illay 
stand tllus :- 
Circulation  -  619,000,000  securities  -  626,000,000 
Deposits  -  13,000,000  Bullion  -  10,000,000 
32,000,000  3.k,OOO,OOO 
"  The exchanges are exactly balanced ;  there  is  neither importdion 
nor  exportation  of  bullion, and  tl~c  circulation  is  adeqnnte  but  not 
redundant.  Now  suppose  the  government  or  individuals  dmw  out 
deposits  to  the  amount of  three millions, thc bnnk will be qr~itc  easy, 
because tliey linvc  not  increased  their  liabilities:  b~tt  tl~c  accoru~~t  ~vill 
then stand thus. 
Circulation  -  622,000,000 
Deposits  -  10,000,000 
Sccuiities  -  &24,000,000 
Bnllion  -  10,000,000 
32,000,000  84,000,000 l  c90  TIIE  1119~0lt~  OP 
"But this operation 11as disturbed the balance of the money-market; 
the  circulation  of twenty-two  lnillions is  reclnndant, as will  soon  be 
proved by the exportation of  bullion to the amount of  excess, and  thc 
return of  notes to the bank  in  payment for it : the account will  then 
stand :- 
Circulation  -  S,10,000,000  Sec~uitics -  &24,000,000 
Ileposita  -  10,000,000  Bullion  -  7,000,000 
29,000,000  31,000,000 
Thus they cancel the notes paid in for bullion, and  reduce the circula- 
tion  and  liabilities  in  the same  ~roportion  ns the  assets  have  been 
reduced, whicli  is  quite  sntiafactory to the  bank  manngers, althongl~ 
they have lost three mill~or~s  of  tl~eir  bullion, and  are  liable to lose all 
the  remainder  by a similar  process, without  perceiving  any derange- 
ment in the relative proportions of  liabilities and sssets. 
It is evident, after this  process  has  g?ne  on to some extent, they 
must take the alarm, and endeavour to retr~eve  themselves by dcspe~ste 
and violent  means, before  they come  to  actual  stoppqe; and this is 
tlre  pnd  evil  and  cause of  our  dangerous  checks and panics in tllc 
midst of  the greatest prosperity. 
&'  Let us now examine what the bank ought to do undcr tl~c  rircnm- 
stances  statcd  above.  Like  all  otllcr  banking  establishments, u:hcn 
dcposits  are  paid  in, sllc ougl~t  to  employ them  on  good  sccurities; 
(bills  of  exchange or exchequer bills in preference to all  others ;)  and 
on  the  contrary, so  fast  as  notes  arc witlldramn  by  depositors, sl~c 
ought to realize her securities to bring back the notes abstracted ;  thus 
keeping the amount of  sccurities always fluctuating  in  like proportiorl 
wit11 the anlount of  deposits. 
"  It is evident this plan would  effectually guard  against  any excess 
or diminution of  the circulation by her deposit business.  Now for the 
circulation busilless :-We  llave  sopposed in the preceding statement, 
that £19,000,000  is a fair circulation, neither  redundant nor deficient, 
consequently things will  remain  at rest ; but if  circumsta~ices  alter, 
and tl~e  nineteer~  n~illio~ls  of  circulation sllould  then  be  redundant,  an 
exportalion of bullion 1vould comn1ence, ant1 notes .rvould flow into the 
bank  in  exchange for her gold.  By cancelling all  notes  scnt  in  for 
bullion, the excessive circulation would soon be  corrected ;  ant1 as the 
evil could not be prolonged by  a,oain  drawing tlle notes  into circnlation 
through deposit accounts, all further mischief  would be stopped." 
MR PALMER'S  REPLY. 
"  The objection to such  an  action on the  part of  the bank, so long 
ss it is tlle  deposihiry of  the  surplus  or  unemployed  money  of  the 
capid, seems to be this :-The  vduc of  money in  London affects the 
value  tl~rongl~out  the  country,  a11d  any measure  which  might  tend 
untlnly to  reduce  the  rate  of  interest would  so  far bc prejudicial, by 
increuing  the  oscillations in  tlic  money market.  If  the  bank were 
contin~tdly  tl~rowing  back  upon the public the suq)lus money deposited 
by tlle  bailkers  of  London  a~~d  otl~ers  in  times  of  influx  of  bullion, 
sucl~  conduct woultl, it is submitted, unduly lowcr the rate of  interest; 
whereas,  rlrltler  tlle  course  l~itl~erto  pnrsi~cd,  such  deposits  being 
uo~~aitlcrctl  purely as pnrt of  thc cit.culation  of  notes, and held as sucll 
ir~  bullion, no disturbance  arises, and  the currency is left freely to find 
its level wit11 reference to that of  otl~er  countries.  It is admitted that 
a  cllangc  in  tl~e  nunlbcr  or  character  of  the  customers'  accounts, 
tcuding  to  a  pc~rnanc~lt  alteration  of  the  amount  of  the  deposits, 
would necessarily occasion  a  corresponding change  in  the  anlount of 
sccurities, but so long  us the former continue unchanged in chal-aeter, 
therc does not nI)pear any necessity for varying  the  latter  if  there be 
onc-third  of  their  amouilt  retained  in  boll~on  prior  to  tlle  com- 
nicnce~ncnt of  tlle  drain.  If  Mr.  Loyd's  notion  were  adopted  of 
forming t~o  bodies-one  for  issuing notes, and the otlicr for managj~~g 
the  general  banking  business,  the  Bank  of  England  would  be  not 
unlikely to become a gent joint stock bank.  The ndvantages expected 
from tl~~sepamtion  sceni to be 
"  1st.  That  the  circulatioli would  fl~~ctuatc  exactly  as  if  purcly 
nletallic. 
"  2nd.  Tllst  the  knowledge  on tlle  pnrt of  the public of  the flnc- 
tuation  of  the  amount  of  ppcr money would  induce  all  parties  to 
govern thcmsclves accortlingly. 
"  That  the  first  advantage  would  be  obtaincd  may be  conceded. 
Respccti~~g  tllc second, it is belicvcd that ninctf-nine  persons out of  a 
h~~ndrecl  will pay no attention to  the  information  thus afi)rded them. 
The  true  gr~idc  for  the  pblic at present  is  the  fluctuation  in  the 
stock  of  bullion  held  by  the  bank, and  if  attentio~  be  not  paid  to 
tl~at,  we may be  assured tl~at  all otller statements will  bc  useless.  If 
therefore  tllc  present  joint  action  can  be  maintained  under  proper 
nlan:tgorner~t, and  the  fluctuations  of  bullion  be  made  known, it is 
qucst~onablc  whetl~er  any advantage  will  be  obtained  by  tlle  cl~ange 
proposed by  Mr.  Loyd.  Upon that point, however, the writcr  begs to 
be  nt~derstood  as offering no decided opinion. 
"  The opinion thus  expressed  is  intended to apply to  the working 
of  the Imnk in its joint  cl~arwter  undcr ordinary circumstances.  The 
real difficulty of  conveying accurate information as to the issues under 
tl~e  existing form of  pabhcation  in  the Gazette  is  correctly stated by 
Mr. Loyd, and wns  represented  to  the governnvnt at the time of  its 
being determined upon, while it was at tlle same time maintained, that 
there was  no  accnrate  conclusion  to  be  drawn by  the public, except 
From  the increase or decrense of  the stock of  bullion : to a publication 
of  that  simple  nature  the  government  objected, and  finally resolved 
II~OII  adopting  the  plan  now acted  on with  all  its  admitted  dcfccts. 
For tl~cse  tllerefore the bank is not blameable." 
Tllirdly.  Tile recent pressure on the motley market 
has  hcerl  ascribed  to  the  transactions  1)ctween  the 
governineilt and tlle  Lank respecting the lllest  Inclia 182  TIIE  IIISTORY  01; 
loan in  the year  1835.  This sentiment is  advanced 
by Mr. Salomons. 
A better founded cause for the derangenlcnt of  tl~c  cnrrcncy tllail 
the issues of  the joint stock banks may bc sl~cwn  to be tl~c  tra~isaction 
bctwccn the government, the pnblic, nnd  the  Bank  of  England,  con- 
nected with the West Intlia loan.  Tl~is  mensure, wlricl~  required very 
skilfid treatment, was managed with a most  reckless  haste.  At first, 
the  bank  seerned  clctcni~i~ied  not  to  interfere, but, either  not  proof 
ngninst  the  solicitatiolis of  tl~c  government, or  l~avi~lg  unfortunately 
listened to evil advisers, they permitted tliemselves  to  lend  nioney on 
all desciiptions of  securities, nnd  tlius  thcniselves gnvc the in~pulse  to 
tl~ose  speculations of  wliicl~ tl~ey  and tl~e  pnblic  are  now tlie victims. 
Joint  stock  banks were multiplied all over the country ;  rail-road and 
other schemes covered the land ;  the means for  setting  tliese_projects 
011  foot, in  many cases, came  from  thc  proceeds  of  the West  India 
loan, and altl~ougl~  it was not yet assigned to the various clainiants, the 
funds paid in for that loan on account of  the government, werc ponrecl 
out in masses from the coffers of  the Bauk of  England, who  advanced 
money to a11  applicants, both on the deposit of  that loan  and all other 
government securities.  Whether the govcrnmcnt stimulated the bank 
to act  tlius, I do  not  inquire ;  my business  is with  the facts of  tlic 
case, and with these I must deal. 
"  Believing, as I do, that the first  impulse to speculation came from 
London, and not from tlie country, I am  inclined to assert, that if  the 
joint  stock banks had  not been  in  existence  tlirougl~out  the country, 
and by  the instrumentality  of  thc  sharcl~olders  dispersed  in  all  di- 
rections, who werc  both  individually and  collectively interested in the 
support pf  public and private credit, we  should  have  had as severe a 
bank and  commercial  crisis in  183G as we  hd  in 1835, and in both 
instanccs  by  excessive  speculations  fostered  by  the  im- 
provident conduct of  the Banlc of  England." 
It may be objected, that the amount of  Bank of  En- 
gland notes in circulation in 1835 was not greater than 
that of  1834.  Mr. Salomons anticipates this objection, 
and contends,  that  an  alteration  in the channels of 
the circulation would have as great an effect in stimu- 
lating speculation as an increase in the amount.  This 
is a very important principle, and one that had not pre- 
viously been urged upon public attention. 
The writer of  tl~csc  observations, imprcsscd with the parallel  that 
exists betwcen  the  period  of  1825 and  1836, is inclined to  attribute 
the difficulties of  both periods to the same causes, vix.  the derangcnlent 
of  the  currency ca~~scd  by  tl~c  assistance  givcii  by the  bank  to  the 
govern~lleilt  in  order  to  cnable  tl~enl  more  easily to  carry into effc-ct 
financial mcasurcs.  At tl~e  former period tlicy aided  the  government 
to pay otf the fonr per cents., nnd  at  the latter they advanced money 
on tl~c  Wcst Illdin lo:tn, ant1 on otl~cr  governn~cnt  seci~ritics. Altl~o~igl~ 
it III:L~ be mscrt(:d tint no grcbnt llcrmancnt  addition to tl~c  circulatio~l 
toolr place sillcc t11c banlc did c:ontrivc to Itcep  its  securities  cvcn, yct 
tllc orilir~nry  cl~nririels  of  thc circulation being changed, a dersngenicnt 
of  tllc currency nir~st  be produccd ;  and tlic  consequcllccs  that  have 
foIlo\vcd tl~c  intcrfcrcncc of  tl~c  bank  on  scvcral  occasions, might be 
t111otcd to pl.orc tl~c  corrcctr~ess  of  thcsc  reniarlis, were  not  tlie facts 
tl~cmsclvcs  sutticicntly obvious. 
"  It concerns the public as inocl~  that tlic cliaiiilcls tlirougli wl~ich  the 
circolation is supplied, sl~ould  not be suddenly and frcquently clia~~gcd, 
as  that  its  amount  sl~ould  not  bc  frequently arid l~astily  augn~ented. 
Let us snppcsc tl~c  Unuk of  E11g331id s~iddeiily  to cl~angc  the channels 
tl~rougli  wllicl~  its  notes  circulate, and instead of  a definite part of its 
issuc representing  an  atlvaiice  in  the  ordinary course of  pnblic busi- 
ncss,  ,as  the  fountnin  froin wliicl~ the  circulatio~l  of  tl~e  country  is 
s~~pplicd,  the  bank  sl~ould  change  the  nature  of  its  invcstnlents  by 
issuing n similar amount upon government stock : although tlic sccnri- 
tics may rcmain cvcn, yct the cha~igc  of tl~en~  ~ii~~st  have an immediate 
cffcct  on  the  circ~dat~o:~  of  tl~c  country,  by sulq>lying  in nl:lsscs  to a 
more active class of persolis, that nioncy wl~icl~  was for~ncrly  distributed 
tl~rongl~o~~t  tl~c  coni~nnnity,  arid  performing  the  dutics of  a ncccssay 
ant1 l~cnltlry  circulation. 
"  If  tl~c  Bank of  Bnglnnd, ns tlie chief  circulator of  pnpcr,  wcrc to 
:~ugnicnt  its issues to ally great  cstcnt  in  tlic  country, tl~rougl~  their 
brancl~cs,  .and wcrc to dinlinisl~,  in the same proportion, tl~cir  circulation 
in London;  altl~ougl~  the  total  niiiount  of  circulnt~on  ~voulrl bc  tlle 
sanic, and  tl~c  arno~u~t  of  sccnrities  reprcsenting  that  circiilntion, and 
Ircld by tl~c  bn;~k,  be also tl~c  same ;  would not tl~e  effect  bc, at least 
for  n  ti~ue,  to  ~~~ake  uloney 1)lcntiful in  the  country and  scarce  in 
Lontlo~i  ? 
"  If  wc  suppose  t!~e converse  proposition, nioney  would  bcconie 
scarce in the cou~~try,  and plciitif~il  in London. 
"  An operation, lwoducing etluiblly iiiiporhnt rcs~ilts,  may be carried 
on in Loiitlon itself, withoot any great variation eitller  in  tl~c  amount 
of  nom~nal  circulation,  or  in  tl~c  amount of  securities.  For  let  us 
suppose t11:~t  nn  agrecnicnt be m?.de  wit11 the government, in refcrcnce 
to somc pentling loan-transaction, that  the  bank  shall  citlrcr  lend or 
issue  on  some  particular  class of  seciiritics, a part of  its circnlation, 
~vl~icli  mould othcr~vise  be  employed  i~  the  ordinary coorsc of  their 
transactions.  Wo111d not that also, "  pro tanto," have  its  etfect  upon 
tl~c  1)rice of  moncy, by changing the clianncl  tlirongl~  whicl~  tlic  cir- 
culation of  thc bnnL flows for the supply of  public wants ? 
"  It then appears cvidcnt  that  the  public  arc  intercstcd, us n~ucl~ 
in  lwcventing  the  cl~nngcs  w11icl1 atfcct  the  clianncl  os  tl~osc  which 
affcct the quantity.  Wl~encvcr  tl~c  bank lends moncy to  the govcrn- 
mcnt out of tl~c  usual course, it affccts tl~c  cl~annel  of  tl~e  circulation. 
The assistance afforded by tllc bank in tl~c  West India loan, IIILIS~  l~ave 
atfcctcd tl~c  c11:~~incls  of  tlic circulation as ~vell  as  tlic  qt~antity. As 
rcgcbrtls  tl~c  quantity,  1)crhal)s  the balk nlay l~avc  bccu  cnnblctl, c~ftcr 
:r  til~ic,  to rci111cc t11c tliubntity  so us to  1icc11 tl~cir  sccuritics  and  tl~c 184  THE  IIISTOlIY  OF  BANICING IN  AMERICA.  185 
circulation to their ordinary level.  But  the bd  effects resulting from 
a change in the channel are not SO  easily ren~edied. 
The means for all the miscl~ief  of  the last year, were  abundantly 
supplied  by the  advances of  the  Bank of  England  to  the  public on 
account of  the West India  loan in 1835.  These  advances  increased 
the circulation as well as directed  it  into  ncw channels, and  laid  the 
foundation of  much future difficulty and distress. 
"  It is thus clearly  that although on a tl~reemonths'  averqc, 
the bank  may get  both  its  circulation  and  its  securities witl~in  their 
ordinary limits, its account with  the  public  is not so easily made up : 
for large sums of money issncd in masses, cheapen tile rate of  intcrcst, 
alter  the  price of  conlmodities, and  give  tl~e  grand  in~pulsc  to every 
kind of  speculation." 
Fourthly.  The recent " pressure"  has been ascribed 
'' to the  exportation  of  bullion  required  by  the  pay- 
ments on  foreign  loans  and the pnrchases of  foreign 
stock." 
MR.  HORSLEY  PALMER. 
''  The  sl>eculativc action  here  alluded  to,  and  pertaining  to  the 
present inquiry,  originated in  the  loans  to  Don Pcdro upon his first 
attempt  to  recover  the  throne  of  Portugal.  The moncy  advanced 
effected the  overtlirow  of  Don  Miguel,  and  upon  that  overtl~row 
followed  the  speculative  mania  in  the  foreign  stock market.  hZore 
loans were contracted in  aid of  Donna  Maria,  and  provided  the  con- 
tractors  could  only  secure  their  agency and  commission,  the  public 
were left to take care of themselves.  The  rage for speculation  being 
f~~rtller  cxcited  by  thc  popular  idea of  overthrowing  absolutism and 
establislling liberal governments throughout the Peninsula,  Spain came 
in for her  share of the  plunder  obtained  through  English  credulity. 
Tlicse loans were  going  forward  from July, 1833, until  towards  the 
end  of  1831,  when  the  profit  realized  upon  the  daily  extending 
engagements  in  the foreign  stock market  engendered a further spirit 
of  speculation in  almost  evcry  kind  of  previously  neglected  South 
American,  Spanish,  and  Portuguese  bonds,  causing  an  enormous 
advance in all, and in  some  nearly 100 per cent.  In sllort, until  the 
spring of  1835 hardly a packet arrived from  the  Continent which did 
not  come  loaded with  evcry sort of  foreign  securities  for  realization 
upon  our foreign  stock exchange.  During  that  period, and  through 
the means here referred to, tlle bullion  ant1  coin  held  by  the bank in 
October, 1833, was  reduced  by  the  sum of  ~5,100,000,  efyccted  by 
&2,400,000 s~lver  sold, and £3,200,000  sovereigns exported.  It  may 
perhaps  be  maintained  that  the  sale of  silver  by  the  hank was the 
iileans of  preventing  a  further  export  of  gold  than other~visc  would 
hare taken place, and that there  is  no  proof  of  thc export of  bullion 
having  becn  occasioned  by  the  operations  upon  tlic  foreign  stock 
market.  In reply  it  may be stated,  that not only the demand for tllc 
silver  and  cxport of  the  sovereigns originated  and  continued  during 
the mania dluclcd to, but further, that that demand ceased the moment 
tlle rcaction took place in  May,  1833, when a panic  seized the deders 
in  foreign  securitics,  causing  their  prices  to  fall  with  far  greater 
rapidity than thcy 11acl risen. 
L L  111 the progress of  the contraction, whicl~  ensncd upon  the  dimi- 
nution of  the  bullion  held  by  the  bank, the  market  rate of  interest 
gradually adranccd  for  first-rate  commercial paper from 24 to 34 per 
cent.'per  atlnunl, which  may be  quotecl  as  having  been  its value  in 
May,  1835 ; at tl~at  time thcrc was no  material increase  in  the paper 
money circulation of  the  interior, consequently, inlmcdiately up011 the 
discrcdit taking place, tl~e  export of  gold  ccased  and  the foreign  ex- 
cl~angcs  furtl~er  advanced, bringing  back  the  major  part of  the gold 
w-llicl~  11ad becn  cxportcd in the  preceding  eigllteen  montlls, thereby 
clcarly she~ving  tllot  the currency was not redu~idant." 
bIR.  RICARDO. 
"  Foreign  stock  is  a  commodity, the dealings in which  with  other 
countries opcrate  precisely in  tllc same manner ss would  the dealings 
in  any otl~cr  article  of  commerce.  Wl~ether  the  stock  imported be 
for  investl~~ent  or  speculation,  the  effect  on  the  currency  will  be 
precisely the  same.  If,  at any one  period, a larger  portion of  these 
securitics be purchased in  the  markets  abroad  than can be paid  for in 
commodities, the balance will  be  scnt  in bullion;  but  this would also 
be  the  case  if  the  exccss  were  cotton, or  silk, or  wool.  The only 
difference  is, that  foreign  stocks  are  transmitted  and  paid  for more 
promptly;  and with an exchange apparently not  unfavourable,  it nlay 
not be practicable  to  obtain  bills,  without  creating a depression whicll 
renders it equally advantageous to export the precious metals.  It may 
also  happen  that, in  the  eugngen~ents  attendant  on  a  foreign loan, 
when payments are fixed at certain  periods, sl~ipments  of  bullion may 
be made  to  particular  places  upon  wl~icl~  bills  cannot  be  obtained, 
without the exchangcs  Gcing  generally below par ;  but this  cannot be 
carried to any considerable extent, (it  certainly has  not occurred since 
1825,) and in  most  cases  thc  bullion will  come  back  through other 
channels. 
"  The "..speculative  action,"  which  is  animadverted  upon  by  Mr. 
Palmer, is  rather  the  effect tllan  the  cause  of  a  derangement in the 
currency, which dcrangemcnt is lil.cly  to llave 1)cen first occasioned by 
a  redundant  circulation of  the  Bank  of  England.  When moncy is 
ab~uldant,  tl~e  ratc  of i~lterest  low, and the prices of  English securities 
hig11, a disposition  to  speculate  uniformly arises, and  tlils will expend 
itself  on  ally objects  which  may present  tl~en~sclves.  I11  1824 and 
1825, it took  an  extensive range : numerous were  the  foreign loans 
and  foreign  undertakings  entclrd  into,  and  to  these  were  added  a 
variety of internal enterprises ;  llcnce the wide-spread  ruin occasioned 
Gy  the  bnrsting  of  all  those  schcmcs, in  conscqncllcc of  the sudden 
contraction of  the  currency towards tllc  cnd  of  1825.  The mischief was greater  than  it  cvcr  has been  since ;  and  at that  pcriotl, tllcrc 
were no joint  stock banks upon wl~ose  sl~ouldcrs  to lay tl~c  blamc. 
At the beginning of  1834, money became vcry abundant, and tllc 
price of  the  English  funds  improving, tllc " speculative  action" again 
exhibited  itsclf.  Attention  was  chiefly  attracted,  in  the  absence  of 
otllcr schcmes, to\vards  Portuguese and Spnnisll sccuritics ;  in adilitioii 
to  tl~cse,  a  large  :nnollnt  of  Dutch  stock  was  imported ; and  tl~c 
cxtcnt to which tliesc operations wcre  carried, brougllt  about tlle evils 
of  May,  1835,  the  rlliscllicf  of  wllicll  was  elltirely  confined  to  tllc 
stock market. 
"  In 183G, tlic "  speculative  action" arising  out  of  the low ratc of 
intcrcst once  more  raised its hcact ;  but in tliis instance  it vented itself 
in railways and joint stock  banks.  Tliese  nndertal<ings have already 
experieliccd  a rcry severe  check : tlie  ultinlate  result  remains to be 
seen. 
"  If  the  artificial  abundance  of  money,  wliicli  gave  rise  to  the 
various "  speculative actions" above  dluded  to, can  be  traced to have 
arisen out  of the  mismanagement  of  tlie  circulation  by  tl~e  Bank  of 
England,  tllen  will  tlie  blame  sought  to  be  attached  to  others  fall 
xnore justly  on the directors of  that estnblislln~ent. 
To subject  every tranmction  in  foreign  stocks  to  a stamp clnty, 
must  be very difticnlt, if  not  in~pmcticablc.  A  tax  of  tllis  kind  on 
bonds that pass from hand  to  hand,  would be so easily evadcd, that it 
is not lilrcly the legislature would impose it.  With rcgarcl to rcnderi~~g 
time bargains illegal, the  csan~plc  of  this law applictl  to  the  Englisl~ 
fiunds shows that suc11 a law is not effectual in cl~cclrin~  ~~~ccnli~tio~~." 
MU.  SALOMONS. 
To attempt to limit  tllc  freedom of  trade, by intcrfcring wit11 tllc 
unrcstrictcd  transfcr of  foreign funds, seenis  to  me  nlost  imprudent; 
aid, notwitllstandi~lg  the opinion of  Mr.  Horslcy Palmer, whose  scnti- 
mcnts  arc  e~~titled  to  very  great  attention,  I  have  no  llcsitntion  in 
mying, tl~at  he is quite nlistakcn in llis views regarding tlie cffcct which 
the foreign stock transactio~ls  have on tlie country.  I will  not go into 
the  question of  tlie  policy either of  the  introduction of  foreign  stock 
into England, or of the investments tliat may have bccn nldc in tllcnl, 
but I will venture to assert, and I speak advisedly, that tlie co~mtry  11% 
gained  enormously by tlie  investments, that  l~avc  up  to  the  prcscnt 
time  bccn  made,  in  the  debts  of  the various  solvent  Europcan go- 
vernments;  nay,  I go still furtllcr, and asscrt  that  their  transnlisslon 
has on the whole bccn favourable to comnicrcc, that  they have tclldcd 
to regulate the exchanges, instead of  having l~ad  an injurious  effcct on 
tlrcnl;  ancl many most importznnt payments could not liavc bccn niadc, 
without  tlie  powerful  assistance dcnvcd  from  tl~c  csport of  foreign 
stock, as tlic  most ready means of  liaynlcnt.  It will be, indccd, dlfti- 
cult to shcw how such descriptions of  forcign funds, for ~vliicl~  a rc:uly 
rnarkct  cxists on  thc Continent  as well  as  in  London, could  at all 
injuriously affect tl~e  exchanges.  Sncll Sulltls arc, ill trutll, a ~11ivcrm1 
corrcncy, ;and  pnynlcnts citllcr :it llome or :~bro:ail,  c;u~  bc made, by tlicir 
transniision, and  the  ballance of  trdc as  readily adjusted, ns  by  an 
irnpol t or export of  the precious metals. 
"  It sl~onld  be  anticipated,  that  wl~encver the  interest  of  money 
bccomcs  reduced to a low rate  in  this  country, some  individuals will 
then  look  to  foreign  funds, ns a mode of  investment paying a higher 
ratc of  interest  than  can be obtaincd at 110me; and  an  export of  bul- 
lion may in consequence take place to pay for such foreign funds.  But 
after all,  this  ought to be regarded only a symptom of  an overflowing 
currency, and should also exhibit  an  excess  of  bullion  in  the  coffers 
of  the  Bank  of  England.  Wlienever  an  opposite  state of  things 
arises, and money becomes more valuable in tliis country tl~ail  abrod, 
an export of  foreign funds  usually takes  place, and  essentially contri- 
butes to set the cxcllanges right. 
How were the large importations of corn in the years 1820 and 1830 
paid for, except by the means provided by the export of  foreign funds? 
During  those  ycars  the  sales  of  French  stock  by  English  holders 
amounted  to  a most  enormous  sum.  The  unfortunate  evcnts  tlpt 
preceded the  cl~angc  of  governnlent in France were in progress ;  they 
had, Ilowever, no bad effect upon  the  price of  tllc public funds of  the 
European  States.  Whcther  the  English  liolders  of  Frcnch  Stock 
wcre  alarmed  at  the  pertinacity  of  the  Polignac  atlministration,  or 
whether they were contentell wit11 thc great  advance  in  the  price of 
the French funds, wlvlrich  in those  ycars  had  attained tllcir maximum, 
sales of  securities were made  to  an  extensive  amount ;  and notwitli- 
standing the very large importation of  corn wllich  took  place  at that 
period,  it  seems  by the  high  rates  of  exchange  whicli  were  then 
current, that  the  proceeds of  those  sales paid  for  the  importation of 
corn, and also increased the bullion  in  the coffers of  the Bank of  En- 
gland.  I may also  say with  confidence  tliat during tlic whole  of  the 
year  1836, tlic  amount  of  export  of  foreign  European  funds, and 
remitkances  to  this  country for  the  dividends  due on  them, greatly 
excecded the import of  sucll securities, and thus assisted tlie exchanges 
at a most important and eventful period." 
Fifthly.  The pressure  has  been  ascribed  to "  the 
recent dernand for gold  for  the United States, arising 
out of  the operations adopted relativc  to the currency 
of  that country." 
Mlt.  PALMEH. 
"  The  reduction wl~icll  took place  in the bullion  of  the bank from 
April to SeptcmLer last is tl~nt  to wllicll it is now necessary to advert. 
The  diminution  amounted  to  &2,600,000,  and was  eelfcctcd  in  tllc 
following manner :- 
%200,000 amount of Silver sold. 
100,000  ,,  Gold  do., 
2,300,000  ,,  Sovcrcigns si~pposcd  to  liavc  bccn  cx- 
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"  In order to explain the cause and origin of  the American demand, 
it may be proper  to advert  to the proccedin,os in America for  tlie two 
preccdi .W  ears.  Theavowed hostility of  tlie Presidcnt, Jackson,  to tltc 
a Y  renewal  of  the Charter  of the Bank  of  the  United  States tcmnlinated, 
after  a  violent  struggle, in  con~pcllin~  that  institution  to prepare for 
closii~g  a11  its transactions in  1836, and for repaying tliat portion of  its 
capital that  belonged  to  government.  In  order, Ilowever, to increase 
the cn~barrassment  of  the  Lank,  measures  were  taken  for ren~oving 
from  its custody the deposits of  public money, nnd for placing them in 
the hantls of various States' banks, under condition that tl~ey  sllould be 
prepared to pay a given portion  of all denlands upon them in gold coin. 
To fxilitate this object, Congress passed a law reducing the quantity of 
fine gold  in the  Ea~le?  tlle equivalent of  ten  dollars, from 246 to 232 
grains.  This deprec~atlon  of  the American gold coin had the effect of 
raising  the current  value of  the  Englisll sovereign from  4.44  dollars 
to  4.874,  or  84 per  cent. shove its previous current value.  Simulta.. 
neously  with  and  in aid of these nleasurcs several of the States were 
persuaded  to  prohibit the circulatioll of  notes of  less amount tltan five 
dollars.  In taking these measures it wos an  avowed object on the part 
of the President to endeavour to establish a gold currency in conjunction 
with  silver throughout  the union.  Tlte  hostility cvineed towards  the 
Bank of  the United States, and the reftisal to renew its charter, caused 
an immediate  contraction  of  the usual accommodation granted at the 
numerous brancl~cs  of that establishment, and further, cntailcd upon the 
favoured States' ballks the necessity of procuring an additional  supply 
of  gold to enable them to fulfil the conditions under wllicll tlley received 
tlie  deposits  of  government  money.  This combiuation  of  circum- 
stances, having  no  relation  to  the  ordinary  coinmercial transactions 
existing between  this country and America, materially reduced the rate 
of  exchanges  with Europe, so mucli as to afford  a profit upon the im- 
portation both of  gold and silver from England and other pnrts of Europe. 
The  President,  too,  in order further to aid lds  favourite project of  in- 
creasing the  metallic  currency  tl~rougllout  the States, directed, in the 
early part of  last year, his ageuts in Europe to remit in gold to America 
tlle  wl~ole  of  tl~e  indemnity money  to  be  received from Francc and 
Naples.  About the time of  tliat remittance l~aving  been made, a loan 
for a million or twelve l~undred  thousand pounds was negotiated in Lon- 
don on  account of  the United States' bank, to facilitate tlie settlelnents 
upon  tlle  expiration  of  the  charter.  The effect of  that loan upon the 
currency of this country was further incrensed by a mucl1 larger amount 
than usual of American securities, or of  States' stock ;  bank  and cannl 
stock,  &c. having been  sent to  Europe for sale, and upon wllich credit 
]lad been given by  some of  the principal houses in England in anticipa- 
tion  of  the  sums they were expected to realize, thus throwing an inor- 
clinate  anlount  of  American  paper  upon  our  markets.  If  all  these 
circumstances be  adverted  to, together  with  the very large anlount of 
produce  imported  from  America, the  surprizc will  be,  not tl~at  some, 
Lut that so small a portion of bullioll should liave hcen abstracted from 
Englalld  ns that  already shted.  Since the 1st September last the dc- 
rlland has entirely ceased, and rlotwitl~standing  the desire of  the Alneri- 
CM  Presiclcnt to  rehin the bullion acquired from this country,  it is not 
improbable  that  we  may  soon  see  it return  from that quartcr of  tho 
world." 
MR.  RICARDO. 
" The demand for gold for America was  one  of  a  peculiar  nature, 
ant1  could  be  attended with  no  disadvantage  to  this  country, if  tlie 
currency had  been  in  a  sound  and wholesome  state : it was  accom- 
panied with  a  great  depression  of  prices  in  the  United  States, and 
must have been  largely paid  for  in  commodities.  An  nlterntion had 
been  made  in  the  value  of  the  gold  coin  of  America,  and  otlier 
measures adopted with  regard  to  her  currency, which compelled her 
immediately to  seek  for  a  supply  of  the  precious  metals;  this  her 
want of  circulating  medium  obliged  her  to obtain at any cost.  En- 
gland and  France were the  two  countries with which America was in 
most intinlate relntioms, and W-llich  were best able  to administer to her 
immediate wants;  in  addition  to  tlie  22,300,000  supposed  to have 
been  Lxken  from  England,  a  large  quantity was  also  obtained  from 
France, wl~icll  was  furnished by  the  Uank  of  France,  as stated in the 
report of  that association. 
"  Fortuiiatcly for America tllcre was  a considerable debt due to ller 
from France which was  then  paid ;  fortunately also  England  took off 
a large  amount  of  the  local  stocks  of  tl~e  different States, otlierlvise 
tile fall in her  produce  and  the distress consequent on  the di~l~inution 
of  prices would have been infinitely increased. 
"  Tllc  corlsideratioii  of  this  question  sl~o~vs  the  difference which 
there  is  between  an  import  or  export  of  gold,  arising  out  of  the 
ordinary  transactions  of  conimerce,  whicl~ may  eitller  occasion  a 
balance of  trade in  favour  of  or  against  a country, and that which is 
caused by a forced cout;action  or augnientation  of  the circulation.  In 
the one case gold is the  most  profitable article which can  be  receivcd 
or paid-it  is either added  to, or  abstracted from, the circulation, and 
tlle  equilibrium  of  prices  is  shortly  restored.  In  the  other  case, 
prices  are  forced  by  a  contrnctioii  of  the currency much  below  the 
level of  those  of  other  countries, or  raised  by an  increase  of  it con- 
siderably above tl~at  level ;  thus on tllc import  of  gold a large amouiit 
of  conlmodities is given in exclia~~llg~,  and on its export a laser alilount 
of  comnlodities receivcd:  such liave at times bccil tlle consequences of 
the forced action  on  the  currcllcy under  the  system  adopted  by  the 
Bank  of  England, subjecting the  pnLlic  to  severe  loss,. and  inflicting 
crerious  jnjury on individuals, in  their  conimercinl relations  with  one 
anotlier. 
Sixthly.  The following articles, published Api-il 7, 
1837, ascribe the recent pressure  to  the  inlprovident 
conduct of  some of  the  Amcrican  houscs, and to the 
fdcilitics they obtained from the bill brokers.  I insert 
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had their origin in the bank parlour, and to express tlie 
sentiments of  at least some of  the directors. 
FROM THE COURIER. 
"  The Bank of  England  has  been again compelled to come forward 
with a fresl~  loan to sustain the falling credit of  certain parties enggetl 
in tl~e  American trade.  The extraordinary circumstances under wl~icl~ 
the houses engaged in that trade  have  been  placed by the non-arrival 
of  packets from America,  would seem to jostify and warrant  an  inter- 
ference of  this  sort bn  the  part of  the  bank,  though  we  must  say, 
spealcing generally, that this continued tinkering  and  bolstering cannot 
be too mucl1  deprecated,  when  it  is  recollected  that  the 
Bank of  England has not at this moment the third part of  the tremtre 
she ought to possess ;  and when  the  fact, that  not a single  ounce  of 
bullion  has  returned  to  us from the Continent, to which we exported 
during  the  adverse  cxchangc  of  tl~c  past  year  above  two  millions 
sterling, shows  conclusively  that  the  cnrrcncy  is  still  in  excess and 
ought to be diminished.  It is  not  enough, in vindication of  the rclicf 
afforded  to  embarrassed  houses, to  say, that  tl~cir  transactio~ls  have 
been fair and honourable.  Nothing  can  justify tllc  bank  in  coming 
forward to bolster  them  up, that is, in doing wl~at  in her present situ- 
ation is obviously inconsiste~lt  wit11 all sou~ld  principle, but  tl~c  illjury 
that would arise  to  the  public interests  by  l~cr  rcsolutely adllering to 
tl~e  strict line of  duty.  If this injury be great and i~nn~inent,  the bank 
will be justified,  but not otl~crnise.  However  I~ononrable  the  trans- 
actions of the American l~ouses,  it is certain that the majority, for there 
are exceptions, have conducted tlieir  business with  the  most  reckless 
improvidence, and  in  such a way as  called  forth  at a distant  period, 
from parties acquainted with the facts, the  most  confident  predictions 
of  their ruin.  It is certain, indeed, that they could  not  have  gone so 
very far beyond their means as they have done, but for the support and 
encouragement given tl~em  by the  money-dealers.  The  latter  are, in 
fact, by far the greatest cnlprits, and have evinced the most stupendous 
infatuation  and  ignorance  in  their  transactions with  the American 
houses of  which any example  is  to  be found  in  the  history of  com- 
merce.  They first gave them unlimited credit,  and could  not get  too 
many of their bills;  and when  the  natural course of  events (for they 
never  could  have  discovered it themselves) made  them  aware of  the 
consequences of  their  conrluct,  nnd  of  the  extreme  risk  they  were 
running, they instantly got upon  the  opposite tack-from  unhesitating 
confidence  they went  to  the  extreme  of  suspicion  and  distrust, and 
totally rejected the paper of  which a little  wl~ile  before they could not 
get too much ! 
"  What may be the dcnouenze?zt of  this  affair  no  individual can at 
present foresee ;  but, however it may end, it is certain that it  will ever 
form one of  the most discredik~blc  chapters  in  the  llistory of  British 
commerce.  Notl~ing  of  any kind has occurred to ii~terrupt  the  inter- 
course between  tl~is  country and A111crica ; nor 11as any thing occurred 
in  either  country to lessen  its  resources  or  to  diminis11 its power of 
meeting its engagemncls.  There 11as not, in  fact, been any lnore room 
or real gron~~d  for dcrangcment  in  tlic  intercourse  bct~vccn  Liverpool 
:111d Ncxr York, t11m1 in  that  bctmecn  Liverpool  and  Mancllestcr, or 
brtwccn  London and  Ilampstcad.  Jnstcatl  of  being  involved  in  tile 
grcatcst tlifficulties,  and thrcatcned xvitll totid ruin, the parties  engqed 
in tl~c  trulc, had thcy displayed thc most ordinmy prrtdcncc or sagacity, 
wo111tl havc bccl~  conducting a sccnre business, and realizi~~g  l~andsonle 
profits.  But  they  would  not  be  satisfied  with  this.  Parties  wit11 
21  00,000, or &200,000 must  ncecls  carry 011  a  business  for uhicl~  a 
capital of  one or  two  millions would  hardlp have  been  adequntc ;  in 
consequence, they 11ad to depend wholly on discounts, became gamblers 
instead of  mcrcl~ants,  and arc now reaping the  natural  and  legitimate 
fruits of  thcir concloct !  We  believe Jonatllan  has  managed  his  part 
of the busil~css  wit11 infinitely more sense and discretion, than 113s been 
displaycd on this side  the water.  Unless  11e  11as done  so, tl~cre  will 
be a friglitful extent of  bankruptcy." 
FROM  TIiE  MORNING  POST. 
"  The directors  of  the  Bank  of  England, after much  nnsious  de- 
liberation, have adopted, at a very late hour  this  evening, a  resolution 
of  great  in~portal~cc  to  tl~c  commercial world  at  thc  present  crisis. 
We  announce the tlccision of  the bank with great  satisfaction, because 
we know that it will  dispel  much  of  the alarm, wl~icll  11ns for  some 
days existetl  in  a very cstcnsive  and in~portnnt department  of corn- 
mcrcc, ancl  avert  an  impending  calamity, the  consequei~ces  of  wliicll 
must  have  becn  deeply  and  widely  felt,  and  this  without  exposing 
the bank  to  any considerable  danger  of  eventual  loss.  The circunl- 
stances n,llicll callcd for the interference of  tlie  bank  in  this  iustance 
were,  as  will  prcscnlly be  seen,  so  urgent  and  extraordinary,  3s  to 
require  and  justify a  deviation  from  tl~e  rules which  have  generally 
governed tl~c  conduct of  that corporation. 
"  The cnsc we arc about to state is  that  of  a  commercial house  of 
the first milk, whose trausactions have been principally with Amclica ; 
and, important  as  this  case  is in  itself, the decision of  the bank wit11 
respect to it acquires additiollal importance, from  the fact, that  it has 
been regarded by that corporation as one of  a  considerable class ;  and 
fio~n  the probability that  the  extraordinnry  intervention  wl~ich  it has 
required and ol~taincd,  will not be withheld  in  othcr  cnscs, in  respect 
to  which  claims  equally valid,  and  explanations  equally  satisfnctory, 
can he brought forward. 
''  Tl~e  house  in  question  has slloxvn  that  it  possesscs  a  capital  of 
betwccn 2300,000 and &400,000 of  its own, ancl that its  commercial 
friends and connexioi~s  in this  country have  come  forward  to  its  aid, 
and subscribed an additional capital  of  equal  amount.  It 11as shown 
that all its tranclrctions have becn in the fair and  honourable  course  of 
con~mercial  dcding.  It 11s  shown that its debtors, chiefly in America, 
are persons who l~ave  l~itl~crto  becn considered affluent and honourable 
men, and tl~at  tl~cre  is  at this  ~nomcnt,  no  ground  to  susl~~  bet  either 
tl~cir  integrity or solvency.  It has sl~own  that all its transactions have 
been  in  the  strictest  connnercial sense, legitimate  and  prittlent,  free 
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magnitude  in proportion  to  the  11ot  inconside~able  capitnl by  wllicll 
they were to be sustained. 
"  This house was, however, one  of  those wl~icl~,  in the recent pres- 
sure,  was compelled to apply to the bank for assistance, and  obtained 
it, upon the ordinary securities, to an extent  supposed to.  be  sufficient 
to carry it over every difficulty-to  an  extent whicl~  there is no doubt 
would  have  been  sufficient for this purpose, but  for the extraordinary 
circumstances which  have  since  arisen.  It will at once be perceived 
that we allude to tile non-arrival  of  the  American  packets,  several of 
which have been overdue for a considerable period.  To houses in sucll 
a situation as we have described, the consequences of  an extraordinary 
and unexpected delay in  the  arrival of  large reinittances  need  not  be 
explained.  The cala~llity,  to avert which  so  much  has  already  been 
done, seemed tliis morning to be inevitable,  togctller with its necessary 
consequences, the discredit and ruin of other l~ouses  to an indefinite and 
appalling extent.  In thcsc circumstauccs anotl~cr  application was made 
to the Bank of  England, and tlre result, as we have already stated, was 
a resolution  of  that body  to give assistance  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
exigency, without insisting upon what  would have been  an impossible 
condition-the  actual possession of  tangible securities.  Tl~e  ba~lli  will 
enable the house to  w11icl1 we have referred to meet a11  its outstanding 
obligations,  with  the  proviso  that  it  sl~all  not  enter  into  ally  new 
engagements until tl~e  advances of  the bal~k  are fully repaid. 
"  In the  facts  we  hare  tllus  detailed we see another very striking 
example  of  the advantages wliich the  commercial world derives from 
the existence of  SUCII a body as the Bank of  England, possessing, in its 
own boundless credit, tl~e  ample nleans  of  arresting the fatal  progress 
of discredit in the mercantile community, and unfettered by  any  rules 
of conduct so stnct and absolute as to prevent tl~e  prompt and eficncious 
application of tl~ose  means in whatever manner nlay be best adapted to 
the existing emergency.  It is  plain  that no power analogous  to  this 
could be confided to any government establisllment, or  he  acquired by 
any banking institution  of  recent origin. 
"It may not bc improper on  this occasion  to  advert  to  one of  the 
causes which have mainly contributed  to involve  mercantile  houses  of 
considerable capital, of  geat credit, and of  unl~len~isl~cd  reputation,  in 
the kind  of  en~barrassment.fro~ll  wl~ich  the firm in question has been 
so seasonably and generously rcscuetl.  Tllis cause  is  the system, the 
inlprudcnt and vicious system, \rl~ich  wc nnderstand  to  be vcry  gcne- 
rally pursued by the bill-brokers of  the city of London.  These persons 
have at their  disposal a large proportiol~  of  the unemployed  capital  of 
the metropolis, which is entrusted to  thcm  for  tllc  purpose  of  being 
invested in good bills of exchange.  Thc bills wl~irl~  bcar tl~e  names of 
certain houses  are  deemed preferable to any other;  and  wit11  respect 
to this class of bills, the brokers act as if it wcrc in~possible  for tl~enl  to 
have  too  many.  Tlley grasp at then1 wit11 an eagerness wllich would 
seem to imply that they hold tl~cin  to be not n~crely  ns  good  as money, 
but much better.  Hence it not unfrequently l~appcns,  that tl~e  houscs 
enjoying this extreme facility of obtaining money, are led progressively 
into  nn  extension of  their  transactions 1;eyond  what  tl~e  nmoant  of 
their capital, independent of tlris resource of unstinted discount can sus- 
tain.  But the moment  it happens  to be remarked tl~at  the paper of  a 
particular  house, or  of  a  particular class of  houses, or of  a particular 
branch of  trade,  is  unusually abundant,  the  inference  is  drawn  that 
trading in excess, as compared with capital, is going on ;  and  the com- 
mercial  money market,  that  is,  the  general  body  of  bill-brokers, 
immediately take  the  alarm,  and, instead  of  gradually and  gently di- 
minishing the amount  of  thcir transactions in the paper supposed to be 
redundant,  they at once  cast  it  off  altogether.  Thus the commercial 
money market  first  tempts  merchants  of  high  credit to trade beyond 
the extent  of  their  independent  resources,  and  then, when  they are 
least prepared  for  such  a  reverse, suddenly throws  them  bxk upon 
their own independent resources.  Some of  the  houses whose position 
has recently occasioned so much anxiety have, we  believe, experienced 
this  vicissitude  in  its  most  aggravated  form.  The  example  should 
teach merchants, in  the most palnly state  of  their credit. the necessity 
of  apportioning  the extent of  their transactions to the amount of  their 
capital, instead  of  placing too  implicit  a reliance  upon  the precarious 
resources of  credit, which  are generally least  available when  most re- 
quired." 
Although the distress  in America  is not attributed 
to any miscond~~ct  on the part of  the banks, yet it has 
led, in the States of  New York, to some proposals  for 
a modification of  the law.  The following articles are 
taken  from  the  Times;  but it does not  appear  that 
the regulations mcntioned have yet been adopted. 
"  The attempt making in the United  States to procure the repeal of 
the  restraining  law,  by  which  all  private  banks,  and  discounts  by 
private  individuals  are  prohibited, has  been  attended with  some  cir- 
cumstances well worthy of  general notice.  The aim  has  been on tile 
part of  the corporate  banks  to  prevent  altogether the introduction of 
any act to  repeal  the  restraining  law ;  but  not  having succeeded in 
this, their next object  has been to annex such conditions to the repeal 
as would render  it of  little avail, and  leave to  them  the same  men- 
dancy  still  in  the  money  transactions  of  the union.  Hence  it  has 
assumed all the characters  of  a bill  drawn up to protect the corporate 
banking interest,  instead of giving increased facilities to the merchants; 
and much  indignant  feeling  has  in  consequence  been vented  against 
the measure.  Tl~e  second section  of  the bill, for  example, establislles 
an invidious  distinction  between  this  ancl  any other  department  of 
business, by requiring the person who  opens  an office  of  discou~~t  and 
deposit to rcport to the clerk of the city or county his name, residence, 
and the amount of  capital  he  intends to  employ.  Tl~e  tl~ird  section 
places a still stronger  impediment  to  free action, by  forbidding him to 
issue or circulate any other notes  than  those of  tl~e  safety fu~id  banks 
of  the State.  According  to this  provision, the private  banker callnot 
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accommodate tile  customer  about  to  travel  with  any of  the  notes  of 
the States through which  he  is to pass ; and  any infringement of  the 
law  is  made  punishable  with  fine  and  imprisonment.  The  private 
banker, or  the  keeper of  an  office  of  discount and deposit,  is  further 
prohibited  from  resorting  for  accon~n~oclation  to  any  banks  already 
established;  and it is  even  made  penal  in  sucll  banks  to afford him 
accommodation.  They are also  to  be  restrainetl  from  buying  land, 
deding  in  goods,  or  trading  in  stock,  and  tlieir  business  confined 
exclusively to  receiving  deposits, lending  money, and taking paper on 
personal,  instead of  landed  security, for  the loans made.  These, and 
other clauses, had so far perverted the  original  intention  of  those who 
had urged on the measure for  establishing  discount ant1 deposit banks, 
that they felt little  interest  in  carrying it  through, and  characterized 
the bill as only meant, in effect, to increase the power of  the cl~artered 
banks." 
" Tl~e  legislature of  New York (Feb. 7.)  had introduced a bill "  to 
improve  tlle  currcncy  of  that  State,  by  compelling  the  safety  fund 
banks  to  keep  their  bills  at  par.  To  accomplish  such  object,  it 
proposed  to provide that every bank  should, as  often  ns  once a week, 
cause to be entered upon its books the amount  of  specie on hand, and 
the amount of  notes  in  circulation ;  and that  the bank con~missioners 
sliould be enlpowered to examine the books.  At tlle quarterly exami- 
nation,  any bank whose average circulation of  bills should exceed twice 
the amount  of  specie  on  hand, should  be  deemed  guilty of  violating 
the law, and the bank commissioners were  to report them to the legis- 
lature.  The law was not to  apply to  such banks as should keep their 
bills at par  in  New York.  No bank was to  be  allowed  to charge a 
greater premium on the sale  of  any draught  on Albany or New York 
than one half  per cent." 
111 his  farewell  address to the people  of  America, 
the lhte President,  General Jackson, tl~us  refers to the 
Bank of the United States : 
"  In reviewing  the  conflicts which  have  taken  place  between  the 
different intcrests in  the United States, and  the  policy  pursued  since 
the adoption of  our present form of government, we find  nothing  that 
has produced sucl~  deep-seated evil as the course of  legislation in rela- 
tion to the currency.  The constitution  of  the United  States unques- 
tionably intended to secure to  the people a circulating medium of  gold 
and  silver.  But  the  establishment of  a  national  bank  by Congress, 
with the  privilege of  issuing  paper-money receivable  in  the  payment 
of  the  public  dues, and  the unfortunate  course of  legislation  in  the 
several states upon the same subject, drove from general circulation the 
constitutional currency, and substituted one of  paper in its place. 
"  It was  not  easy  for  men  engaged  in  the  ordinary  pursuits  of 
business,  whose  attention  had  not  bcen  particularly  drawn  to  the 
subject, to  foresee  all  the  consequences  of  a currency exclus~vely  of 
paper,  and  we  ought  not,  on  that account,  to  be  surprised  at  the 
facility wit11 \vllich laws were  obtained  to  carry into  effect  the  paper 
system.  Honest, and  even enlighteued men, are sometimes misled by 
the specious  and  plausible  statements of  the  designing.  But  experi- 
ence has now proved  the  mischiefs  and  dangers of  a paper currency, 
and it rests with you to determine whether the proper remedy shall be 
applied. 
"  The paper  system being founded on public confidence, and having 
of  itself  no intrinsic value, it is liable to great and  sudden fluctuations, 
thereby rendering property insecure, and the wages of  labour unsteady 
and uncertain.  The corporations which create the paper-money cannot 
be relied upon to keep the circulating medium uniform in amount.  In 
time of  prosperity,  when confidence  1s  high, they  are tempted, by the 
prospect  of  pin, or by the influence of  those who hope to profit by it, 
to extend  their  issues of  paper  beyond  the  bounds of  discretion and 
the  reasonable  denlands  of  business.  And when  these  issues  have 
been pushed on from day to  day, until  public  confidence  is  at length 
shaken, then  a  reaction  takes  place, and  they immediately withdraw 
the credits they have given, suddenly curtail  their  issues, and produce 
an  unexpected  and  ruinous  contraction  of  the  circulating  medium, 
which is felt by the whole community.  The banks by this means save 
themselves,  and  the nlischievous  consequences of  their imprudence or 
cupidity are visited  upon  the  public.  Nor  does  the  evil  stop  here. 
These ebbs and flows in the currency, and  these  indiscreet  extensions 
of  credit, naturally  engender a  spirit  of  speculation  injurious  to  the 
habits and character of  the  people.  We have  already seen its effects 
in the wild spirit of  speculation in  the public lands, and various kinds 
of  stock, \vhicl~  within the last year or two seized upon such a multit~lde 
of  our citizens, and threatened to pervade all classes of  society, and to 
withdraw their  attention from  the  sober  pursuits of  honest  industry. 
It is not by encouraging this spirit that we  shall  best  preserve  public 
virtue  and  promote  the  true  iuterests of  our  country.  But if  your 
currency continues  as  exclusively paper as it now is, it will foster this 
eager desire to anlass wealtll without labour; it will multiply the num- 
ber of  dependants  on  bank  acconlmodations  and  bank  favours;  tlle 
temptation to obtain money at any sacrifice will  become  stronger  and 
stronger, and inevitably lead to corruption, which will find its way into 
your public councils, and  destroy, at no distant day, the purity of  your 
government.  Some of  the evils which arise from this system of  paper 
press with  peculiar  I~ardst~ip  upon  the  class  of  society least  able  to 
bear  it.  A  portion  of  this  currency frequently becomes  depreciated 
or worthless,  and  all of  it  is easily counterfeited, in such a manner as 
to require peculiar skill and much  experience to distinguish  the  coun- 
terfeit from the genuine note.  These frauds are most generally perpe- 
trated in the smaller  notes, which  are used in the daily tmnwctions of  . 
ordinary business ;  and  the losses occasioned  by them  are  commonly 
thrown  upon  the  labouring  classes  of  society,  whose  situation  and 
pursuit  puts  it  out  of  their  power  to guard  themselves  from  these 
impositions, and whose daily wages are necessary for their subsistence. 
It is  the  duty of  every government  so  to  regulate its currency as to 
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of  avarice  ancl  fraud.  It  is  more  esl~ecially  the  duty of  tl~c  United 
States, where  the  government  is  cmpl~atically  the  govrrnment of  the 
people,  and  where  this  respectable  portion  of  our  citizens  ale  so 
l~roudly  distinguislicd from  tllc  lai~ouring  classcs of  all  otl~er  nations, 
hy thcir independent spirit, tlreir love of  liberty,  tl~cir  intclligcnce, and 
their lrigh  torrc of  111oral character.  Tlrcir  industry, in  peacc, is  tile 
source of  our wcaltlr;  and  tlieir  bravery in war  has  covercd  us with 
glory ;  and the govcrn~nent  of  tile United States aill but ill  discharge 
its dutics if  it leaves them a. prey to sucl~  dishonest  in~positions.  Yet 
it is evident that  tlre~r  interests  cannot  be  effectually protected unless 
silvcr and gold are restored to circulation. 
"  Tlrese  viens alone  of  the paper  currency are sufficient to call for 
immediate reform ;  but there is another consideration wl~ich  should still 
more strongly press it upon your attention. 
"  Recent events  lrave  proretl that  the paper  money system  of  this 
country may Le  used as an engine to undemnline your frce institutions ; 
ancl that those who desire to engross all power in tlie hands of the few, 
and to govern by corrnption or force, are aware of  its power,  and pre- 
pared to employ it.  Your  banks  now  fnrnish  your  only  circulating 
medium,  and money  is  plenty  or  scarce,  according to tl~c  quantity  of 
notes issued by them.  Wl~ile  they  liave  capitals  not  greatly  dispro- 
portioned to each other,  they  are  competitors in business,  and no  one 
of them can exercise dominion over the rest ;  and although, in the pre- 
sent state of the clirrcncy,  these banks may and  do opcrnte injuriously 
upon the habits of  business,  the pecuniary  concerns and the moral tone 
of society, yet, from  their number and dispersed  situation,  they cannot 
combine for the purposes of political influence ;  and  whatever may  be 
the  dispositions of some of  tl~em,  their power of  mischief  must  neces- 
sarily be confined  to a narrow space,  and felt  only in their immediate 
neiglibourhoods. 
"  But  when  tlie  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the United  States  was 
obtained from Congress, it perfected the schemes  of  the paper system, 
and gave  to  its advocates tlie  position they have struggled to  obtain, 
from the commencement of the federal government down to the present 
hour.  The inimense capital and peculiar privileges bcstowed  upon  it, 
enabled it to exercise tlespotic sway over other banks  in every part  of 
the country.  From  its superior  strengtlr  it could  seriously injure, if 
not destroy,  the  business  of  any  one of  them  which might  incur its 
resentment; and it openly claimed for itself the pourer  of regulating the 
currency  throughout  the United States.  In  other words, it asserted 
(and  it undoubtedly possessed)  the  power  to  make  money plenty or 
scarce at its plrasure, at any time, and in any quarter of  the union, by 
controlling  the issues of  other banks,  and permitting an expansion,  or 
compelling  a  general contraction,  of the circulating medium, according 
to its  own  will.  Tlre  other banking institutions were sensible of  its 
strength,  and  tliey  soon  generally  became  its obedient  instruments, 
reslly at all times to execute its mandates ;  and  with the banks neces- 
sarily  went,  also,  that  numerous  class  of  persons in our commercial 
cities who depend  altogether  on  bank  credits for  their  solvency  and 
means of business,  and wlio are therefore obliged  for their own safety 
to  the favour of  the money power by  distinguislled zeal and 
devotion in its service.  The result  of  the ill-adviscd Icgislation which 
establisl~ed  this great monopoly  was,  to  co~ice~ltrate  tile whole  money 
pourcr of  tlie union, with  its boundless  means  of  corruption  and its 
numerous dependants,  under  tlre  direction  and  co~lilnand  of  orre  W- 
knowledged head ;  thus organizing this particular interest  as  one boJy, 
and securing  to  it unity and concert of  action  througlrout  the  United 
Statcs, and enabling  it to  bring forward, upon any occasion, its entire 
and undivided strength to support or defeat any measure of  the govern- 
ment.  1x1  tlre hands of this formidable power, thus perfectly organized, 
u as also placed unlimited  dominioil  over tlre amount of  the circulating 
medium, giving it the power to regulate the value  of  property and the 
fruits of 1:rboiir  in every quarter of the union ;  and to bestow prosperity, 
or bring ruin, upon any city or section  of  the  country,  as  111ight  best 
comport with its own interest or policy. 
"  We are not  left  to  conjecture how tlie  monied  power,  thus  or- 
ganized, and with such a weapon in its hands, would be likely to use its 
The distress and alarm which pervaded and agitated tlre wliole country 
when the Bank  of  the United States waged war upon the  people,  in 
order to compel them to submit to its demands,  cannot yet be forgotten. 
The ruthless and unsparing temper  with which whole  cities and  com- 
munitics were i~npovcrished  and ruined,  and a scene of  cheerful pros- 
perity suddcnly changed into one of  gloom and dcspondcncy, ought to 
be  indelibly  impressed  on  the memory  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  If such was its power in a time  of  pcace, what would  it not 
l~ave  been in a season  of  war,  with  an  cnemy at your  doors ?  No 
nation but tlie freemen  of the United States could liave  come  out  vic- 
torious from such a contest;  yet, if you had not conqucrecl, the govern- 
ment  mould have passed from the hands of  the many to the few; and 
this  organized  money  power,  from  its  secret  conclnve,  would  have 
dictated  the choice of your highest officers, and compelied you to niake 
peace or war as best suited their wishes.  Tlrc fonns of  your  govern- 
mcnt might for a time  liave remained, but its living spirit  would  lrave 
departed from it. 
"  The distress and sufferings inflicted on the people by the bank are 
some of the fruits of  that system of  policy which is continually striving 
to enlarge tlie  autl~ority  of  the  federal government  beyond  the  limits 
fired by the constitution.  The powers enumerated in that i~lstr~mlent 
do not confer on Congress tlie right to establish  such  a  corporation  as 
the Bauk  of  the  United  States,  and  the  evil  conseque~~ces  wllicli 
followed may warn us of  the dangcr of  departing from the true rule of 
construction, and of permitting temporary circunista~~ccs,  or  the  hope 
of better promoting the pblic welfare, to influence, in any degree,  our 
decisions upon the extent of  the authority of tile general government. 
Let us abide by  the constitution as it is written,  or  anlend  it  in  tl~e 
constitutional mode, if it is found to be defective. 
"The severe lessons of experience will, I doubt not, bc suficicnt to 
prevent Congress from again chilrteri~~g  sucli a  ~no~iopoly,  cvcn  if  the 
constitution  did  not  present  an  insuperable objection to it.  But you 
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is the price of liberty ;  and that you must pay the price if  you wish  to 
secure tlie blessing.  It  behoves you,  therefore, to be watchful in your 
states, as well  as  in  the  federal government.  The power which  the 
monied interest can exercise, when concentrated under  a  single Ilcad, 
and with our present system of currency, was sufficiently demonstrated 
in tlie struggle made by  the  Bank of  tlle United States.  Defeated in 
the general government,  the  same  class  of  intriguers  and  politicians 
will  now resort to the States,  and endeavour to obtain there the same 
organization which they failed  to  perpetuate  in  the union;  and  with 
specious and deceitful  plans of  public  advantages,  and  state  interest 
and state pride, they will endeavour to establish, in the different states, 
one monied institution with overgrown capital, and exclusive privileges 
sufficient to  enable  it  to  control  the  operations  of  the other  banks. 
Such an institution  will  be  pregnant  with the same cvils produced by 
the Bank of  the Unitcd Sates, althoagll  its  sphere  of  action  is  more 
confined;  and in  the state in which it is chartered, tllc  money power 
will  be  able  to  embody its own strength,  and  to move together with 
undivided force, to accomplish any object it may wish to  attain.  You 
have already had abundant evidence of its power to inflict injury upon 
the agricultural, mechanical, and labouring classes of  society; and over 
those  whose eng?pments  in trade or speculation render them depen- 
dent  on bank fac~hties,  the  dominion  of  the  state  monopoly will be 
absolute, and their obedience unlimited.  With such a bank and paper 
currency, the money power would,  in  a  few  years, govern  the  state 
and control its measures ;  and if a sufficient  number of  states  can  be 
induced to create such establishments, the time will soon come when it 
will agsin take the field against the United States, and succeed in per- 
fecting and perpetuating its organization by a charter from Congress. 
"  It  is one of  the serious evils of our present system of banking, that 
it enables one class of  socicty, and that by no means a numerous  one, 
by its control over the  currency, to act injuriously upon  the  interests 
of $1  the others, and to exercise more than its just  proportion of  influ- 
ence  in  political  affairs.  The agricultural,  the  mechanical,  and  the 
labouring classes, llave little or  no sllare in the direction  of  the  great 
monied corporations;  and  from  their habits  and  the  nature  of  their 
pursuits,  they are incapable of  forming extensive  combinations  to  act 
together with united force.  Such concert of action may sometimes be 
produced in a single city, or in a small district of country, by means of 
personal communication with each other; but they have  no regular  or 
active correspondence with tllose who are  engaged  in  similar pursuits 
in distant places ;  they have hut little patronage to give  to the  press, 
and exercise but a small share of  influence over it; they have no crowd 
of dependants about  them,  who  grow  rich  without  labour,  by  their 
countenance and favour, and who are, therefore,  always ready to exe- 
cute their wishes.  The plantcr,  the  farmer,  the mechanic,  and  the 
labourer, all know that their success depends upon their  own  industry 
and economy, and that they must  not  expect to become suddenly ricll 
by the fruits of  their toil.  Yet these  classes of  society form the great 
body of the people of  the United States ;  they are the bone and sinew of 
the country, men who love liberty, and desire nothing but equal right and 
cqual laws, and who nloreover hold tlte great mass of our national wealth, 
although it is distributed  in  moderate amounts among  tlie  millions of 
freemen who possess it.  But, with overwlielming numbers and wealth 
on their sides, they are in constant danger of losing their fair  iufluence 
in the government, and with difficulty maintain their just rights against 
the incessant efforts  daily made to encroach upon them.  The  mischief 
springs from tl~e  power wliich the monied interest derives from a paper 
currency, which they are able to control ;  from the multitode of  corpo- 
rntions, with exclusive privileges, which they have succceded in obtain- 
ing in the different states, and which are employed altogether for their 
benefit;  and unless  you  become more  watchful  in  your  states,  and 
check this spirit of monopoly,  and thirst  for  exclusive privileges, you 
will, in the end, find that the most  important  powers  of  government 
have been given or bartered away, aud the control  over  your  dearest 
interests has passed into the hands of these corporations." 
The latest packet from America  brings intelligence 
that the Bank of  the United States have consented to 
assist the merchants  in  making  their  remittances  to 
England.  The following  correspondence  has  passed 
between  the  President, Mr. Biddle, and  some of  the 
mercantile houses in New York. 
"  TO  MR.  N.  BIDDLE,  PRESIDENT  OF  THE BANK  OF  THE  UNITED STATES. 
"  NLW  YOIIX,  XIARCH  28,  1837. 
"  Sir, 
"  In consequence  of  the  peculiar  position  in  which the 
commercial community is  placed, it was  resolved  at a meeting of  the 
merchants lield this day, that the Bank of  the United States be invited 
to interpose at this conjuncture by a  shipment  of  coin, and by  the use 
of  their credit, so as to  meet  the exigencies of  the occasion, and by 
the sale of  bills  of  exchange  on  Europe, by the  issue  of  post  notes, 
payable at Philadelphia, and  of  bonds payable at some  distant  day in 
London, Paris, and Amsterdam,  to  facilitate negociations at home, and 
furnish safe remittances abroad, and thus, not only be of  service to this 
city, but to the United States at large. 
By order of  the meeting, 
"  J.  A. STEVENS,  Chairman. 
"  C.  A. HEKSCHER,  Secretary. 
(Signed by 101 houses.) 
"  NEW  YORK,  MA~CII  29. 
"  Sir, 
"  I had this day the honor of receiving your communications 
of  the  28th  instant,  accompanied  by the  signatures  of  many highly 
respectable citizens  of  New York, requesting the interposition  of  the 
Bank of  the United States to assist  in  removing  the  existing embar- 
rassmcnts of  the commercial community.  The  board of  directors, on 200  THE HISTORY  OF  BANKING  IN  AMERICA.  20 1 
learning from a committee of your fellow-citizens the existence of  these 
difficulties, directed  me  to visit New York  for  the purpose  of  ascer- 
taining their  nature  and  the most  effectual mode by which the bank 
could be useful.  All  the  suggestions  for  that purpose  co~~taincd  in 
yocr  letter will  accordingly be  presented  to  the  board  of  directors, 
from wholn they will receive  the  most  respectful  and early attention. 
In the mean time what  my own  observation  suggests as the cause of 
these troubles is, that  recent events iu the Soutl~  and in Europe have, 
in concurrence wit11 rcasons of  an earlier  (late, produced  a pnr:lysis  of 
private credit, whicl~  deranges  the  wl~ole  system  of  our  forelgn  and 
domestic exchanges.  For this  the appropriate remedy seems  to be to 
substitute for  thc  private  credit  of  individuals  the  more  known and 
established  credit  of  the  bank,  until  public  confidence  in  private 
stability has time to revive.  To the  foreign  exchanges I would apply 
that restorative, by issuing  the  engngen~ents of  the  bank, payable  in 
London, Paris, and Amsterdam, to be remitted in lieu  of  pr~vate  bills. 
These will  be  ready  by  the  next  packet,  and  they will  enable  the 
country to make, without injury, an early provision  for the adjustment 
of  the  foreign  exclianges,  by  tl~e  natural  operation 'of  remitting'its 
produce  and  its  coin.  A similar  operation I shall recommend to the 
board in respect  to the  domestic exchnnges, by an  enlarged  and  im- 
mediate purchase of  bills  of  exchange  on  the  distant  sections of  the 
union. 
" These are the two  measures which  seem  to  be  tl~e  best adapted 
for  the  present  emergency.  They  are  proposed  with  the  sincerest 
desire that they may bbc  useful, and with  a  clear conviction that, aided 
by the spirit and  intelligence  which  belong  to  tl~is  community,  they 
will carry it triumphantly  througl~  its  present  difficulties.  The surest 
ground of  confidence for others is confidcncc in oursclves ;  and I have 
seen  this  community  bear  up  against  calamities which  would  have 
broken the spirit of  a less free and generous people. 
"  President  nf  the Dunk gthe  United Stuter." 
The following  comlnunication upon  the  subject, is 
from a correspondent of the 'I imes : 
"  For several days past  the money market  has  been  in  a most a@- 
tated and alarming  state.  When  tl~e  packet  of  the  244th  ult.  sailed 
from this place, public confidence was greatly shaken, and the commer- 
cial men  of  the  country appeared to be tottering on  the I~rink  of  ruin. 
Through the instrumentality of  the United  States Bank  light  is  agnin 
breaking in  upon  tlle  mercantile  community.  At no period  since the 
war of  1812 have the capitalists  experienced greater apprehension,  or 
tl~c  rate of  interest been so high, as dnring the past weck.  An armnge- 
nlent has been effectcd with Mr.  Biildle, in  1)ursunnce  of  which  he  has 
agreed  to  issue  the  bonds of  the United  States  Bank  for  a  specified 
amount, payable 12 months after date, in Londo~~,  Pads, or  Arnstcrdan~, 
at the option of  the purchaser.  For these bonds he receives mercantile 
notes at a rate whiell  will  bring  the  bonds  a  fraction  below  the  cm11 
price of first-rate ~rivate  bills of  exchange;  thus enabling the merchant, 
by extending tlle time of payment a few months, to continue his remit- 
tances, in bills  or  paper of  solidity equal  to any which can be made in 
Europe or America.  The American merchants,  as a class, are men of 
great enterprise and industry ;  many of  them  are opulent;  hut the in- 
judicious interference of  the government in attempting to regulate  the 
currency has produced such a scene of  speculation  and  such a transfer 
of  specie to the interior,  as to embarrass all the regular business of  the 
country.  It may not be uninteresting to retrospect. 
"  Immed~ately  on the removal of  the  public  deposits  from  the late 
Bank  of  the  United  States, speculations  in  its stock  on  a  fall  to  a 
large  amount ensued.  Here the mania commenced.  New local banks 
were thereupon  chartered  by the  several  states, and  their  stocks  be- 
came the object of  speculation.  Paper  money being  abundant  in  the 
hands of  a favoured few, these gentlemen turned their attention to  the 
national domain.  The disease had  now become  contagious, and  eon- 
sequently alnlost universal.  Every description  of  property,  foreign or 
domestic,  personal  or  landed,  was  greatly  enhanced  in  price ; but 
more espec~dly  lands.  In the height of  this mania, the  President  di- 
rected the Secretary of  the Treasury, under  the  date of  the  11th  of 
July,  1836, to instruct the receivers  of  public  money in  the Western 
and South Western States, to take nothing  in  payment  of  the  public 
lands but gold or  silver, or  the  notes  of  banks  in  their  vicinity that 
would be redeemed forthwith in specie. 
"  The effect of  this order was  twofold.  It con~pelled  the Western 
and South Western banks to contract  their  loans, and  thus  gradually 
withdraw from  circulation  a  portion  of  their  paper, lest  they should 
subject themselvcs to a run.  At the same time it compelled both  the 
speculator and the actual settler, who wished  to  purchase  the  public 
land,  to  provide  l~imself in  the  Atlantic  States  with  specie,  and 
transport it to the place where his payment was to be made. 
"  By  these  anti-commercid  regulations,  the  gold  and  silver  was 
withdrawn from the marts of  commerce, where it ought to  have  been 
left, as the means of  regulating  and  balancing  the  accounts  between 
the United States  and  foreign  countries;  and  it was  thrown  into  a 
district  of  territory,  where  ~t remains  unemployed  in  the  vaults  of 
certain banks, in the form of  deposits, to the credit of  the government. 
This  is  an  unnatural  state  of  thing,  and  11as tended  ~ncalculably 
to  embarrass  the  merchants  on  the seaboard.  It may be  asked, in 
what manner have these merchants been so much embarrassed, if  they 
lrave not entered into these  1a11d speculations? it is  due  to  them  to 
give the explanation. 
"  I have  already remarked,  that  the Western  and  South  Western 
banks were compelled to restrict their  loans.  The  effect  of  this was 
to prevent,  to  a  limited  extent, the  merchants  in  those  states from 
remitting  the amount they owed in the Atlantic  cities.  But this was 
not the greatest evil.  hlany of  the interior merchants, all~tred  by the 
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No . 11 . 
A Li8t  of  Private  Banking Establishments. whicl~  have  been  merged  into 
Joint Stock Banks :  arranged by Mr  .  W .  T .  HENDERSON.  Sub-Manager 
to  the London and  Westminster Bank . 
W her 
place .  Firm of Private Eank .  Joint Stwk Bnnk .  first 
eslab . 
......  Abergavenny 
Aberystwith  ...... 
Ashton under Line 
Atherstone ........ 
Barnard Castle ... 
Barnstaple ......... 
Bedale ............... 
Birmingham  ...... 
Bridgwater ........ 
Bristol .............. 
Ditto  ............. 
.............  Ditto 
Ditto  ............... 
...............  Bruton 
Burford  ........... 
Bury  .............. 
Cardiff .............. 
Carlisle  ........... 
Cheltenham  ...... 
Ditto  ............... 
Chepstow  ......... 
Chippenham  ..... 
Cirencester ......... 
Colebrooke Dale . 
Collumpton ......... 
Coventry ............ 









Ditto  ............... 
Ditto  ............... 
Evesham ............ 
Exeter ............... 
Falmouth  ........ 
Farringdon ......... 
Frome .............. 
......  Glastonbury 
.........  Gloucester 
Gloucester ......... 
Gainsbomagh ...... 
Halifax  ............ 
Ditto  ............... 
Hereford ............ 
......  Huddersfield 
Ditto  ............... 
.........  llfracombe 
Ilminster ........... 
Kingsbridge  ...... 
Knaresborough  ... 
Lallgport ........... 
.  .  ...  Jones and Davis  Monmouths  & Glamorgans  I3kg.C.  1836 
......  .......  Benson and CO  North and South Wales Bank  1836  ............  ......  Buckley and CO  Saddleworth Hanking CO  1833  .......  ....  Chapman and  CO  Coventr  Union Banking CO  1836 
.......  Skinner and CO  Nationa!Provincial  Bank of  England  1833 
.....................................  Pyke and CO  .......... Ditto  1833 
.  .  .......  Hutton and CO  Swaledale & Wensleydale Bkg  CO  1836 
Rnttnn anal  Cn .  National Provincial Hank of Enpland 1833  ...................  ................  Stuckeys&Woodlands Stuckey's Banking CO  1826  ......................................  Stuckey, Lean & CO  .  Ditto  1826 
.......................  Elton, Baillie  & CO  .  lirietol Old Rank  1826 
Cave, Ames  and CO  .  Ditto .......................................  1826 
ffaythorne & Wright National Provincial Uank of England  1833  ..................  StuckeyNephew&Co Stuckey18 Banking CO  1826 
..  ..........  Pitt and CO  County of  Gloucester Banking CO  1836 
Grundy and Wood . Bury Banking CO  ......................  1836  . .  .  ....  .  Towgood and CO  Monmouths  & Glamorgans  Hkg  C  1836 
...................  ....  Wakefield and CO  Carlisle Ranking CO  1836  ..........  ....  Hartlands and CO  Gloucestershire Ranking CO  1831  .......  .........  Pitt and CO  County of  Gloster Banking CO  1834  .  .  .  ...  .  Jones and Blewitt  Monn~ouths  & Glamorgans  Bkg  C  1836  .......  ......  Gundry and  CO  M-ilts and Dorset Banking CO  1836  ......  ..........  Pitt and CO  County of  Gloster Banking CO  1834  ................  .......  Darby and CO  Shropshire Banking CO  1836  ...  .......  lIurley and CO  Devon and Cornwall Sanking CO  1831  ..  .  .  .....  Beck and I'rime  Coventry and Warwicks  Bkg  CO  1835 
Bunney and CO  ....... Ditto ....................................... 1835 
...............  .........  Payne and CO  Stuckey's Banking CO  1826  .......  Skinner and CO  National Provincial Bank of  England  1833 
.......  ......  Watkins and CO  Northamptonshire  Banking CO  1836  ....  ....  Perceval and CO  Northampton Union Banking CO  1836  .........  ...........  .  R  Sankey  North and South Wales Uank  1836  ......  .......  Hagues and CO  West Riding Union  Banking CO  1832  ............  ......  Buckley and CO  Saddlesworth Banking CO  1833  ..  .......  Vizard and CO  County of  Gloucester Banking CO  1834  .....................................  ....  Wood, Pitt and CO  Ditto  l834  ...  13loxsome and CO  National Provincial Bank of England  1833 
..........  ....  Erartlands and  CO  Gloucestershire llanking CO  1831  ....  .......  Sparkes and CO  Devon and Cornwall Ranking CO  1831  .........  ........  Carne and CO  Western District Ranking CO  1836  ..  ...........  Pitt and CO  County of  Gloucester Banking CO  1834  ................  ....  Waldron and CO  Stuckey's Banking CO  1826  .....................  .................  ......  Reeves and CO  Ditto  1826  .........  .......  Itussell and CO  Gloucestershire Banking CO  1831 
............  .  T  Turner  National Provincial Bank of England 1833 
..  .......................................  Skinner and CO ...- Ditto  1833 
............  .  Rawdon Hriggs & CO  Halifax Comlnercial Bank  1836 
.......  Rawson and CO  Halifax & Huddersfield Union Ilank  1836 
....  .........  Joues and CO  Herefordshire Bankin  CO  1836 
.......  f  ...""  Hawson and CO  Halifax & Huddersfie d Unlon Bank  1836 
............  .  Wileon, Sons  & CO  West Riding  Union Bank  1832 
..........  Vye and CO  Naiional Provincial Bank of England  1833 
................  .....  Stuckeys and CO  Stuckey's  Banking CO  1826  ....  ....  Nicholson and CO  Devon and Cornwall Banking CO  1831  ...............  .......  Coates and CO  Yorkshire District Bank  1834  ................  ....  Stuckkys and CO  Stuckey'e  Banking CO  1826 
.. -.  ........ 
Place .  Firm of  Private naak .  When  Jolnl Stock Bank .  Brat 
Leamington ........ 
Leeds .............. 
Ditto  ............... 
Leeds ............... 
Leicester ........... 
............  Leyburn 
LJyerpool  ......... 
......  Tomes and CO 
......  Perfects and CO 
George  Smith & CO  . 
Bywater and CO  ...... 
Pares and CO  ......... 
.......  Hutton and CO 
.......  Aspin4 and CO 
Warwick & Leamington Rankg .  CO  . 
Yorkshire District Hank ............... 
Leeds and West Hidine Banking CO  . 
Leeds Commercial Bank .............. 
Pares' Leicestershire Banking CO  .... 
Swaledale & Wensleydale Bnkg  .  CO  . 
Liverpool Central Hank ............  ............. 
04 Ulcto  .............. Hope and  CO  ......... Liverpool Borough  Bank  ............  1836 
65  Lymington .........  John  West ............ Wilts and Dorset Banking CO  .......  1836 
66  I\Ialmesbury  ...... Robins and CO  .......  Ditto ....................................  1836 
67  Melksham  ......... hloule and CO  ...... North Wilts Banking CO  .............  1835 
68  Monmouth ......... Jones and Davis ...... Monmouths .  & Glamorgans .  Bkg . C .  1836 
69  Nantwich  ........  Mare and Eaton ...... Northern  & Central Bk .  of  England 1834 
70  Neath ............... Howland and CO  ....  Glamorganshire Bank ..................  1836 
71 Newcastle up.Tyne  Backhouse and CO  ... Northumberland & Durham Bkg .  C .  1836 
72  Ditto  ............... Chapman and CO  ....  Newcastle Union Banking CO  ....... 1836 
73 Newport ............ Jones and Blewitt ... Monmouths.&Glamorgans.  Bkg .  CO  . 1836 
......  .......  74  Ditto (Salop)  Horden  andCo  Shro  shire Banking CO  ................ 1836 
.  75  Northampton ...... Perceval and CO  ....  ~ort!arn~tonshire Union Bankg  CO  . 1836 
......  76 Ditto  ..............  Watkins and CO  Ditto ....................................  1836 
. .  77 Nottingham  ...... Rloore and Robinson  Moore & Robinson's Nottingh  B  C .  1836 
......  .............  ............  78  Oldham  Buckley and CO  Saddleworth Banking CO  1833 
.........  ..........  ...........  79 Penzance  Boase and CO  Western District Banking CO  1836 
........  ...  80  Plymouth  Iiinpton & Prideaux  Devon and Cornwall Banking CO  1831 
...............  .........  ......  81 Pontefract  I'erfect  and CO  Yorkshire District  Rank  1834 
.  .  .  .  .........  ...  82  Pontypool  Jones and Blewitt  Monmouths & Glainorgans  Bkg C  1836 
.  .  .......  .  83 Richmond,  Yorks  Hutton and CO  Swaledale & Wensleydale  Bkg  CO 1836 
......  .....  ........  84  Rotherham  Walkers and CO  Sheffield and Rotherham Bank  1836 
......  ......  .............  85 Saddleworth  Buckley and CO  Saddleworth Banking CO  1833 
......  ......  ...........  86  Sheffield  Walkers and CO  Sheffield and Rotherham  Bank  1836 
...  .......  .................  87  Shepton Mallet  Reeves and CO  Stuckey's  Banking CO  1826 
.  88 Shields  ............ Rackhouse and CO  ... Northumberland  & Durham Dit  B .  1836 
........  ...............  ....  89 Ditto  Chapman and CO  Newcastle  Union Bankiug CO  1836 
90 Shiffnal  ............ Biddle and CO  ....... Shropshire Banking CO  ................ 1836 
.......  91 Stokesley  ......... Skinner and CO  National Provincial Bank of England  1833 
.........  92 St  .  Columb  Magor and CO  ....... Western District Banking CO  ......  1836 
.......  93  Stockport  ......... Christy and  CO  Manchester & Liverpool District Bk . 1829 
94 Stockton ............ Skinner and CO  ...... R1ational Provincial Bank of England  1833  .  .  95  Stratford on Avon  Tomes and CO  .......  Stourbridge & Kidderminster  Bk  C .  1834 
.  96  Sunderland ......... Backhouse and CO  ... Northumberland & Durham Distr  B .  1836 
97  Swansea ............ Eaton and CO  .........  Glamorganshire Banking CO  .......... 1836 
98  Taunton ............ Stuckeys and CO  ....  Stuckey's Banking CO  ..................  1826 
............  ....  99  Tetbury ............ Pitt and CO  County of Gloucester Banking CO  l834 
100  Ditto  .............. Wood and  CO  ....... Gloucestershire Banking CO  ..........  1831 
......  .......................................  101 Tewkesbury  Hartlandsand CO  .  Ditto  1831 
.......  102  Thirsk ............... Dresser  and CO  Yorkshire District Bank ............... 1834 
103 Totness  ............ Prideaux and CO  ....  Devon and Cornwall Banking CO  ... 1831 
104  Truro .............. Magor, Turner& CO  .  Western District Rank  ............... l836 
105 Usk ..................  Joues and Blewitt ... Monmouths . & Glamorgans .  Bkg .  C .  1836 
106 Warwick ...........  Tomes and CO  ....... Warwick and Leamington Bank ...... 1834  . 
107 Wellington ........ Reynolds and CO  ....  Shropshire Banking CO  ................  1836 
108 Wells ............... Stuckeys and CO  ....  Stuckev's  Bankine CO  ..................  1826  .  -  .......  109 Wells ............... Reeves and CO  Ditto ............. .:  ...................... 1826 
110 Whitchurch  ...... Corser and CO  .......  Northern & Central Bank of England 1834 
111 Whitehaven  ...... Hartley and CO  ....... Bank of  Whitehaven .................. 1829 
112  Wolverhampton ...  IIordern and CO  ....  Wolverhampton & Staffords .  Bkg .  C .  1831 
113 Yeovil .............. Whitmarsh and CO  ..  Stuckey's  Banking CO  ..................  1826 
FINIS . 
E .  JlJSTlNS  AND SoN.  fn1NTERS . MAnK  I ..AN E. ERRATA. 
Page  11  7, Line  6, for eleven, read iwrlve.  -  118, -  38, for contracted, read co~rttteracfed. 